Opinions
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Ray Chapman
Appellant, Jonathan Ray Chapman, was convicted of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in confinement. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting his videotaped confession into evidence and (2) failing to admit a statement made by his girlfriend into evidence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cederick Earl Johnson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Cedric Earl Johnson, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On October 11, 2010, judgments of conviction were entered against Petitioner pursuant to his negotiated guilty pleas to attempted first degree murder, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated burglary. Petitioner received an effective sentence of twenty-five years of incarceration. On February 1, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On February 27, 2013, the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition with prejudice because it was filed outside the one-year applicable statute of limitations. On April 11, 2013, Petitioner filed his notice of appeal. In its brief, the State moves this court to dismiss the appeal because the notice of appeal was filed almost two weeks late. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) (a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of entry of the judgment appealed from). We decline to dismiss the appeal and waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal. However, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Courtney Knowles
The defendant, Courtney Knowles, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of rape of a child, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shana Schafer
A Shelby County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Shana Schafer, for driving while under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”) and DUI with a blood alcohol content (“BAC”) of greater than .08 percent. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test based upon a violation of State v. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1992). The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and the State filed for an interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted the State’s application, and, on appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joyce E. Monday, et al v. Earl D. Thomas, et al
The trial court dismissed this tort action as barred by the statute of limitations upon determining that Plaintiffs had failed to comply with Rule 4.03(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure where they failed to return alias summonses until 235 days after they were issued. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Robert C. Litton v. Jennifer M. Litton
In the parties’ divorce, the trial court denied Wife’s request for spousal support and her request for reimbursement for medical expenses incurred. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Lena Barner v. Burns Phillips, Acting Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, et al
This case involves Employee’s right to unemployment compensation benefits. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development denied Employee’s claim for unemployment compensation benefits after finding that she voluntarily quit her job based on her belief that she would soon be terminated. Employee appealed that finding in the trial court, where she also contended that she was denied her due process rights of notice and representation during the agency proceedings. The trial court upheld the denial of benefits, finding substantial and material evidence that Employee voluntarily quit her job, and finding that Employee was not denied due process during the agency proceedings. We affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Ronnie Woodall v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ronnie Woodall, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of rape of a child. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial, that the State failed to disclose favorable evidence, and that the post-conviction court erred by failing to address each of the issues raised in the petition for post-conviction relief. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Western Farm Products, LLC v. Sumner County
Land owner applied to the Sumner County Board of Zoning Appeals for a conditional use permit to operate a quarry with accessory asphalt and concrete plants and rock crushing facilities. After a public hearing, the Board denied the application. The land owner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Board’s decision; the trial court affirmed the Board’s denial. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Bobo v. State of Tennessee Real Estate Commission
This is an appeal from an administrative decision permanently revoking a real estate broker’s license. The Chancery Court reversed the decision of the administrative panel, finding that the decision was not based on substantial and material evidence, that the procedure utilized violated both statutory and constitutional principles, and that the administrative panel demonstrated “evident partiality.” We reverse the decision of the Chancery Court and reinstate the decision of the administrative panel. Reversed and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Landon R. W.
This is a grandparent visitation case. The grandparents filed a petition seeking to have a parenting plan established which designated them as primary caregivers or, in the alternative, provided them with “regular custodial time” with respect to a grandson who previously lived at their home. The juvenile court judge held that the Grandparents did not prove that the mother opposed visitation, and dismissed the petition. Concluding thatthe evidence does not preponderate against the court’s finding that the mother did not oppose visitation, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jose Antonio Henriquez
The Defendant, Jose Antonio Henriquez, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies; attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony; solicitation of a minor, a Class C felony; and sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504 (2010) (aggravated sexual battery), 39-12-101 (2010) (criminal attempt), 39-13-528 (2006) (amended 2013) (solicitation of a minor), 39-13-529 (2006) (amended 2011, 2012, 2013) (sexual exploitation of a minor). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of eleven years as a violent offender for each of the aggravated sexual battery convictions and five years as a Range I, standard offender for each of the attempted aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, and sexual exploitation of a minor convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) his right to a speedy trial was violated and (2) a fatal variance exists between the solicitation of a minor charge and the trial proof. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary Allen Jordan v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Gary Allen Jordan, appeals the denial of his petitions for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to sell, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, felony evading arrest, and two counts of aggravated assault. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we affirm the denial of the petitions. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jim Najib Jirjis v. Tammy Sue Jirjis
The trial court granted a divorce to a husband and wife after a marriage of nineteen years. The court named the husband as the primary residential parent of the parties’ children, divided the marital property between the parties, and awarded the wife transitional alimony of $3,000 per month for five years. The husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred in including his separate property in the marital estate subject to division. The wife argues that the alimony award was insufficient in light of the length of the parties’ marriage and the disparity in income between them, and that the court erred in failing to award her attorney’s fees. We agree that husband’s separate property should not be included in the marital estate, but that the division of property is still equitable. We hold that the wife is entitled to alimony in futuro. We also find that she should be awarded one-half of the attorney’s fees she incurred at trial. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ella M. I., et al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. We conclude from the record that clear and convincing evidence does not support the trial court’s finding of willful abandonment and, accordingly, reverse. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Margaret Renee Wright v. Patricia Dunlap et al.
The plaintiff, Margaret Renee Wright, has appealed from the dismissal of her action for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Upon review of the record, this court determined that neither Ms. Wright’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion nor her notice of appeal were timely filed. We thus ordered Ms. Wright to show cause why her appeal should not be dismissed. Ms. Wright’s trial counsel has filed a response asserting that both Ms. Wright’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion and her notice of appeal were in fact timely filed. 2 It appears fromMs. Wright’s response that certain documents were omitted from the record. Nevertheless, we still conclude that Ms. Wright’s Tenn. R. Civ. P.59 motion was untimely and thus dismiss the appeal. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ashley B.
The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marvin Davis
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Marvin Davis, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years at 100%. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting the videotaped forensic interview of the victim; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
A To Z Smart Products & Consulting, et al. v. Bank of America
Garnishor obtained a final judgment which held Garnishee liable for full amount of outstanding debt of the judgment-debtor. The trial court granted Garnishee’s motion to alter or amend and vacated the conditional judgment and the final judgment against the Garnishee; Garnishor appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Glenn J., et al
Father of two children appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and the finding that termination of his parental rights would be in the best interest of the children. Finding no error we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
City Press Communications, LLC et al v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association
The principal issue is whether an association that governs and coordinates interscholastic athletic competition of substantially all public and private secondary schools in Tennessee is the functional equivalent of a government agency for purposes of the Tennessee Public Records Act. Two reporters and their newspaper filed this action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505 to obtain records from the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association regarding the enforcement of its bylaws on member schools. The chancery court held that the association was the functional equivalent of a government agency; therefore, it was subject to the Tennessee Public Records Act, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 et seq. The court also ordered it to produce the records at issue, subject to the redaction of students’ names. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Alexis L., et al.
Mother appealed the trial court’s determination that several grounds for terminating her parental rights had been met and that termination was in the best interest of her children. She failed to appeal or argue one of the grounds for termination, so the trial court’s finding regarding that ground is final. Because only one ground need be found, we decline to examine the other grounds. We agree with the trial court’s determination that clear and convincing evidence existed to conclude that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Antonius Harris, et al v. Tennessee Rehabilitative Initiative In Correction
Fourmen who worked forTennessee Rehabilitative Initiative in Correction (TRICOR)while incarcerated in the Department of Corrections filed a grievance with the Department, contending that TRICOR had failed to pay them all the wages they had been promised. The Grievance Committee ruled in their favor, but TRICOR and the Department refused to authorize any additional pay. The men filed two different actions in the Davidson County Chancery Court. This appeal is from the denial of the trial court in Part III of a motion to reconsider. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Frederick Parks v. State of Tennessee
In 2000, the Petitioner, Frederick Parks, pled guilty to one count of escape. The trial court sentenced him to one year in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a prior six-year sentence as well as any other prior sentences. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. State v. Frederick Parks, No. W1999-01357-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1672341, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 27, 2000), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed. In 2012, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which was dismissed. This Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition on appeal. Frederick Parks v. Cherry Lindamood, No. W2013-00361-CCA-R3-HC, 2013 WL 6529307, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 10, 2013), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed. In 2013, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he presented multiple claims, including that his guilty plea to the escape charge had been illegally induced by the prosecutor. After a hearing, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the coram nobis court erred when it dismissed his petition, contending that the newly discovered evidence warrants a waiver of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Reuben Hickok Fairfield v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Reuben Hickok Fairfield, pled guilty to second degree murder and tampering with evidence, and he agreed to concurrent sentences of thirty-five years, at 100 percent, for the second degree murder conviction and to six years, at 30 percent, for the tampering with evidence conviction. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because his counsel was ineffective and his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err when it dismissed the petition. The post-conviction court’s judgment is, therefore, affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |