West Warren-Viola Utility District v. Jarrell Enterprises, Inc.
Utility district brought action to condemn a parcel of real property which was located outside the district’s boundaries in order to construct a water storage tank, associated piping, and an access road. The trial court denied the petition, and the district appeals. Finding that the district is given the power in the Utility District Law to construct and maintain its system, and that the unrebutted evidence shows that the district was not attempting to expand the boundaries of its service area, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a hearing on the damages due the property owner. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Healthcare Horizons, Inc. DBA Healthcare Horizons Consulting Group, Inc. v. James Guy Brooks
James Brooks began working for Healthcare Horizons, Inc. in October 2013. He was required to sign a confidentiality and non-solicitation agreement (CNSA). The CNSA provides that disputes regarding the agreement would be settled by binding arbitration; there were exceptions – claims requesting equitable or injunctive relief were to be resolved by litigation in Knoxville. In March 2014, Healthcare Horizons terminated Brooks. He subsequently accepted a position with a new firm founded by John Graham, the former president of Healthcare Horizons. Graham had also executed a CNSA while working for Healthcare Horizons. His agreement provided that all disputes arising out of that agreement would be settled exclusively by binding arbitration. In November 2014, Healthcare Horizons filed a complaint against Brooks, alleging a breach of his CNSA and misappropriation of trade secrets. Brooks filed a motion to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to stay the case pending resolution of an ongoing claim of Healthcare Horizons against Graham. The trial court denied Brooks’ motion. He appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Wong Chan v. Henry Wah Chan
Amy Chan (Wife) and Henry Chan (Husband) were granted a divorce in 2005, and the division of their marital assets was reserved for a future hearing. Some ten years later, in 2015, the trial court entered an order decreeing a division as outlined in a proposal by Wife. Husband appeals, maintaining that the trial court had previously ruled from the bench that the assets would be divided based upon a proposal filed by him. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Vincente Acosta v. Kity Sonia Acosta
This is a divorce case. On appeal, Vincente Acosta (Husband) argues that the trial court erred in reopening the proof shortly after the conclusion of a nonjury trial. The court did so for the purpose of receiving additional evidence on the subject of spousal support. Husband also argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay Kity Sonia Acosta (Wife) alimony in futuro of $1,500 per month. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the proof and thereafter awarding Wife spousal support in futuro. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Cooper Singletary, et al. v. Gatlinburlier, Inc. et al.
This is a premises liability action. A visitor fainted and fell into an antique, glass display case located in a retail store in Gatlinburg, Tennessee. The glass in the case shattered, piercing her chest and causing her death. Her husband sued the retail store and the mall in which it operated for negligence. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, finding that the injuries were not reasonably foreseeable. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Paul B. Schodowski, D.P.M. et al v. Tellico Village Property Owners Association, Inc. et al.
This case originated with the filing of a declaratory judgment action by the plaintiffs, Paul B. Schodowski, D.P.M., and Sharon Ann Ziegler (“Plaintiffs”), against the Tellico Village Property Owners' Association and its individual board members, Alan Hart, Ginny Ranck, Tom Lee, Claire Frazer, Joe Marlette, Cap Purvis, and Bob Coates (collectively, “TVPOA”). Plaintiffs alleged that the restrictive covenant regarding payment of annual assessments applicable to their lot in the Tellico Village development should not be enforced. TVPOA filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, inter alia, that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), determining that the restrictions were enforceable as written and that Plaintiffs had notice of the restrictions when they purchased their lot. Plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stevean Wilson - dissenting
I dissent from the majority conclusion affirming the trial court’s imposition of confinement in this case. The trial court did not engage in any findings of fact to support its determination of confinement as required by law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C) (2014) (whether confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct; whether confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant); see also Shannon Ann Maness and Daryl Wayne Maness, No. W2012-02655-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 350429, at *16-17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2014) (noting that the trial is still required to place on the record its reasons for imposing the specific sentence and remanding for new sentencing hearing because the record did not support the trial court’s finding of confinement based on deterrence); State v. Robert Joseph Harr, No. W2011-02735-CCA-R3CD, 2013 WL 5422801, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2013) (Tipton, P.J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that he did not believe “our supreme court intended in Bise or Caudle to do away, in wholesale fashion, with Tennessee jurisprudence developed over the last thirty years upon which the Sentencing Act is based and in which the Act’s provisions are interpreted”).
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Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrell Hayes
Defendant, Terrell Hayes, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery after a jury trial. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of ten years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant timely sought an appeal. The following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court improperly prohibited Defendant from introducing evidence about codefendant Timothy Williams‘s prior robbery charge; and (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial and/or allowing counsel to testify as a witness for the defense. After a review, we determine the trial court erred in refusing to allow Defendant to question witnesses about the prior robbery. However, we determine the error was harmless. Defendant failed to raise the issue with regard to counsel‘s testimony in the motion for new trial. This issue is waived. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stevean Wilson
The Defendant, Stevean Wilson, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, and the trial court entered the agreed sentence of six years with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined after a hearing. After the hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant an alternative sentence and ordered that he serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rodney Bibbs v. Tennessee Board of Parole
Appellant is an inmate in the Tennessee prison system; he is serving a life sentence, with the possibility of parole, for first degree murder. Appellee, the Tennessee Board of Parole, declined to recommend the Appellant for parole, citing as its reason the seriousness of his offense. Appellant filed a common law writ of certiorari in the Davidson County Chancery Court challenging the Board’s decision to deny him parole. The chancery court dismissed the petition. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Izzabella B.
This is an appeal from an order designating a primary residential parent, setting visitation and child support, and changing the child’s last name to that of Father. The juvenile court found that naming Father as primary residential parent was in the child’s best interest and determined that the child’s last name should be changed. Mother appealed both the designation of primary residential parent and the changing of the child’s last name. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Wilson - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion. Since the State requested that this court defer its ruling until our state supreme court issues a ruling in a separate case where the State has urged adoption of a “good faith exception” to Art. I, section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee, I feel compelled to respectfully express my opinion on this issue. I respectfully believe that the United States Supreme Court participated in a most egregious example of judicial activism when it filed its opinion in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). I agree that it is well settled that the exclusionary rule as it applies to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is not a personal constitutional right to the man or woman whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated by the government. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. It is, instead, a judicially created remedy to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals. Id. However, it is obvious that a constitutional right without an effective remedy for violation of that right is nothing more than an unenforceable objective on a piece of paper. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Alan Hager
The Defendant, Mark Alan Hager, pled guilty to a charge of burglary of a motor vehicle and to a charge of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-402, -103, -105(a)(3). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received concurrent terms of one year and three years respectively, on community corrections. Subsequently, the Defendant’s community corrections sentence was revoked, and upon revocation, the trial court imposed a new total effective sentence of six years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences, and (2) that the trial court erred in not awarding sufficient credit for time served on community corrections. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences; however, we remand this case to correct the judgments to reflect the full measure of the Defendant’s community corrections credit. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Wilson
The Defendant, Christopher Wilson, filed a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal seeking our review of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence against him. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test based upon a violation of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that a “good faith exception” to the Defendant's forced blood draw existed and denied the Defendant's motion. The Defendant filed an application for an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant's motion to suppress based upon a “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant's motion to suppress. As such, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rodger Lee Moon v. Carolyn O'Day Moon
Husband and Wife were married for approximately three years when Husband filed a complaint seeking a divorce. Wife filed a counter-complaint seeking a divorce as well. The trial court awarded Wife a divorce, classified the parties‟ assets as separate or marital, and divided the marital estate. The trial court also awarded Wife transitional alimony for a period of two years. Husband appealed, arguing the trial court erred in (1) classifying a boat he purchased before the marriage as marital property; (2) dividing the marital estate in an inequitable manner; and (3) awarding Wife transitional alimony. On appeal, we affirm the trial court‟s judgment in all respects and grant Wife‟s request for the attorney‟s fees she incurred in defending Husband‟s appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua R. Starner and Caitlyn Metz
A Montgomery County jury convicted Defendant Joshua R. Starner of aggravated child abuse, first-degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, first-degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect, and aggravated sexual battery. The jury convicted Defendant Caitlyn Metz of aggravated child abuse, first-degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, first-degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect, and facilitation of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court dismissed both Defendants’ sexual battery convictions and merged the felony murder convictions. The trial court sentenced Defendant Starner to life in prison for the felony murder conviction and fifteen years for each of the remaining two convictions, aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect. The trial court ordered that Defendant Starner’s fifteen year sentences run concurrently with each other but consecutively to his life sentence. The trial court sentenced Defendant Metz to the same sentences but ordered that all her sentences run concurrently. On appeal, Defendant Starner contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred when it ordered partial consecutive sentencing. Defendant Metz contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for severance and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darryl Claxton
Following a jury trial, Darryl Claxton (“the Defendant”) was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment for the death of Terry Johnson (“the victim”). The Defendant raises the following issues on this direct appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred when it allowed a witness to testify about the Defendant's association with a “group of young men” in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b); (3) whether the trial court erred when it allowed a witness to “speculate” about the disposition of the murder weapon in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 602; and (4) whether the cumulative effect of the errors requires a new trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Matthew T.
The parents of a son born in May 2013 appeal the termination of their parental rights. In December 2013, the son was removed from his parents’ custody after law enforcement discovered that he was living in a home with two methamphetamine labs. After a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order finding that the son was dependent and neglected and that the parents had committed severe abuse as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(21). Parents did not appeal this order. Three permanency plans were created, all of which required the parents to maintain contact with the Department of Children’s Services, notify the Department of changes in their address or phone number, submit to and test negative on unannounced drug screens, and pay child support. In August 2014, the Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The trial court conducted a hearing, which the parents did not attend even though they knew of the date. An employee of the Department was the only witness to testify. She testified that the parents had not updated their contact information, maintained contact with the Department, or engaged in much visitation with their son. In addition, the father did not complete a drug treatment plan, admitted to using illegal drugs, and tested positive for drugs. After the hearing, the court found that the following grounds for termination had been established by clear and convincing evidence: abandonment, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and severe abuse. The court also found that termination of parental rights was in the son’s best interest. Parents appealed. In accordance with In re Carrington H., --- S.W.3d ---, No. M2014-00453-SC-R11-PT, 2016 WL 819593, at *12-13 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016), we have reviewed the trial court’s findings related to all of the grounds for termination and the best interest of the child and conclude that termination is appropriate based on abandonment, substantial noncompliance, severe abuse, and persistence of conditions. We also hold that termination is in the son’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ike O. Nwangwa
A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant, Ike O. Nwangwa, of Count 2, operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol concentration was .08% or more but acquitted him of Count 1 Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with two days to be served in jail followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by accepting the guilty verdict to Count 2 when the jury acquitted him of Count 1. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles L. Hartley
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Charles L. Hartley, pleaded guilty to nine drug-related offenses for a total effective sentence of eight years with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve one year in confinement and the remaining seven years on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied him an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robin Ann Longstreth v. Phillip Andrew Longstreth
The issues on appeal arise from a final decree of divorce following a 27-year marriage in which Wife is clearly the economically disadvantaged spouse. The trial court awarded Wife the divorce, divided the property, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro and approximately one-third of the attorney’s fees she requested. Both spouses appeal. Husband contends the trial court erred by awarding Wife alimony in futuro, insisting she could be rehabilitated. Husband also contends Wife had sufficient resources to pay all of her attorney’s fees. Wife challenges the division of property and seeks to recover all of the attorney’s fees she incurred at trial and in this appeal. Both parties challenge the trial court’s decision to include, sua sponte, a mathematical formula pursuant to which alimony will be modified in the future based solely on the parties’ future income thresholds. We agree with the parties that the trial court erred by incorporating an automatic modification of alimony that is based solely on future income thresholds. We affirm the award of alimony in futuro to Wife; however, we vacate that portion of the alimony award that purports to automatically modify alimony based on future income thresholds. We affirm the division of property. We find that Wife should be awarded $18,105.75 of the $29,141 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses she claims she incurred at trial. Therefore, we modify the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees Wife incurred at trial. As for Wife’s fees incurred on appeal, we find that she is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Mesmer Cocke v. Thomas Lawrence Hunt Cocke
This is an appeal of an order granting a reduction in child support. Mother appeals the trial court’s finding that she is voluntarily underemployed and alleges that the trial court improperly modified the parties’ parenting plan sua sponte. We conclude that the trial court did not modify the parenting plan in this case and affirm the order of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mitchell L. Bowers v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by dismissing this action for failure to prosecute. The trial court dismissed the action because the case had been pending for more than one year but no summons had been issued. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William W. York v. Tennessee Board Of Parole
This appeal arises from the denial of parole. The Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole found that the inmate’s release from custody would depreciate the seriousness of the crime of which he was convicted. The inmate filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari, alleging violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the inmate alleges the same state and federal constitutional violations. He also argues that the trial court erred in not letting him conduct discovery and in relying on an affidavit filed in support the Board’s decision. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony T. Brandon
Defendant, Anthony T. Brandon, stands convicted of possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine base, and possession or casual exchange of marijuana. The trial court imposed an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and for possession with intent to sell.5 grams or more of cocaine base; (2) that his sentences were excessive; and (3) that the trial court should have merged Counts 1 through 4 into one conviction. Based on the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we merge Defendant’s convictions for possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine base, but we affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals |