In this construction contract dispute, the Chancery Court of Montgomery County granted a judgment plus prejudgment interest to Razorback Marble Manufacturing Company, Inc. On appeal, Roberts Construction Company, Inc. and D. D. Roberts, Individually, raise issues pertaining to the Contractor’s Licensing statutes and the Notice of Non-Payments statute. Razorback insists that it was due a larger judgment and a greater award of prejudgment interest.
I concur in Judge Todd’s opinion affirming the grant of summary judgment to the defendants. I write separately simply to emphasize the following points:
First, the bonus plan allowed the plaintiffs to purchase shares of the company at a price below the market price. When the plaintiffs left the company before the shares fully vested, they did not forfeit their investment; they simply lost the difference between what they had invested and the market value of the shares. The difference in the purchase price and the market value is what this controversy is about.
Property owners alleged in a petition for common law certiorari that the city of Decherd acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to rezone their property from residential to commercial. The Chancery Court of Franklin County dismissed the petition. We affirm.
Mary Ardelle Gower died on August 11, 1995 in Wayne County, Tennessee at the age of 73. Her will was offered for probate by William Steven Jones, the executor therein named and the sole beneficiary of the will.
This is a child support case. The Chancery Court of Wilson County set the mother’s obligation of support at $723.00 per month. The mother appeals and asserts that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment below.
This appeal involves another chapter in a lingering, acrimonious dispute between two Nashville lawyers stemming from a failed settlement of a case in federal court. After one of the lawyers abandoned his third-party complaint against the other lawyer for fraudulent misrepresentation, the other lawyer filed a malicious prosecution action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. When the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was premature, the prevailing lawyer sought Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against the lawyer whose malicious prosecution claim had been dismissed. The trial court declined to grant sanctions, and the lawyer seeking sanctions has appealed. We have determined that the record supports the trial court’s decision not to award sanctions and, therefore, affirm the trial court’s decision.
This appeal involves a dispute over the interpretation of a provision allocating the responsibility for paying legal expenses in the event of a default or breach of two leases. The lessee filed suit against the lessor in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a declaration that the leases had expired and requesting its attorney’s fees in accordance with the provisions of the lease agreements. The trial court granted the lessee’s motion for summary judgment and declared that the leases had expired but denied the lessee’s claim for legal expenses. The lessee has appealed. We have determined that the trial court correctly interpreted the lease agreements and, therefore, affirm the summary judgment.
This appeal involves a dispute over a real estate commission on four retail properties in Memphis. After a former client leased these properties, a real estate broker filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a commission from its former client and the lessors of the four properties. The trial court granted the former client’s motion for summary judgment and, following a bench trial, dismissed the broker’s claims against the four lessors. On this appeal, the broker asserts that the trial court erred by granting his former client’s summary judgment motion and that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s dismissal of his claims against the four lessors. We have determined that the trial court properly granted the summary judgment motion and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s judgment in favor of the four lessors.
C.L.H. has filed a timely Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition for rehearing and a Tenn. R. App. P. 14 motion to consider post-judgment facts. She asserts that our original opinion filed on June 12, 1998 misapprehends material facts with regard to her more recent self-improvement efforts, and she offers new evidence regarding her educational attainments and the stability of her living environment.
Dickson
Court of Appeals
Shelley Sackett v. Hal Roseman M2002-00587-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson
This interlocutory appeal was brought to determine whether the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Joint Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).
Doris Barnes v. Cigna Insurance Company 02S01-9710-CV-00087
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Julian P. Guinn,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court held the plaintiff had sustained a 4 percent permanent partial disability to the right arm1 and a 3 percent permanent partial disability to the left arm as a result of a gradually occurring injury which arose in the course of and in the scope of her employment with Martin Marietta Ordnance Systems, Inc. ("Martin Marietta"). The defendant, Cigna Insurance Company, appeals and raises the following issue about the award to the left arm: "1) Whether the trial court's award of 3% permanent partial disability to the left upper extremity was contrary to the weight of the evidence given the 6.35% anatomical impairment awarded by the evaluating physician and the zero percent (%) anatomical impairment awarded by the treating physician?" We find the award of 3 percent to the plaintiff's left arm was not contrary to the weight of the evidence and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Carroll
Workers Compensation Panel
Dianna Skelton v. Robert Shaw Controls 01S01-9710-CC-00229
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. J. O. Bond,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded Dianna Skelton ["employee"] workers' compensation benefits based on one-hundred percent permanent, total disability. Robertshaw Controls Company ["employer"] appeals, challenging the extent of employee's disability, the admissibility of the opinion of a clinical psychologist as to permanency of employee's disability, and the failure of the trial court to apply the multiplier caps set forth in T.C.A. _ 5-6-241(a)(1). For the reasons herein stated, we modify the award to find 6 percent permanent vocational disability and, as modified, affirm the judgment of the trial court. I Mrs. Skelton had been employed as a factory laborer at Robertshaw for six years when, on September 4, 1992, she sustained a work-related injury to her lower back while lifting parts weighing about 3 pounds and placing them in an overhead bin. She timely reported the injury to Robertshaw and saw Dr. Bowden Smith, an approved physician, for treatment. Dr. Smith gave her epidural steroid blocks and heat treatments and took her off work for 2-1/2 weeks, then ordered lighter work in the Transition Room from September 22, 1992 until October 6, 1992, when she was released to return to full work. She continued to experience back pain, complained to Robertshaw, and then saw another approved physician, Dr. Larry Laughlin, who ordered X-rays and prescribed physical therapy. She continued to complain of pain. On November 2, 1992, she saw Dr. Robert Weiss, neurosurgeon, also an approved 2
Smith
Workers Compensation Panel
James W. Smith v. Wilson Co. Concrete 01S01-9712-CR-00278
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. J. O. Bond,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In January, 1997, the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment that the plaintiff was totally and permanently vocationally disabled, with benefits awarded accordingly. The plaintiff returned to the trial court complaining that the judgment was not being satisfied in a timely way. He alleged that the accrued benefits were not paid timely, and that his "weekly checks" were sporadic. To correct this problem he filed a motion to require the defendant to pay the entire judgment or, alternatively, "that the Court determine the interest as the parties were in dispute as to the amount and the method by which it should be figured." The trial court ordered the defendant to pay interest calculated on the entire amount of the judgment, i.e., on the unaccrued portion of the judgment. The defendant appeals, insisting that interest cannot be assessed on installments not due. We agree, since the precise issue has heretofore been adjudicated by the Supreme Court. Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(h) provides in part: (h)(1) If the judgment or decree of a court is appealed pursuant to subsection (e), interest on the judgment or decree shall be computed from the date that the judgment or decree is entered at an annual rate of interest five (5) percentage points above the average prime loan rate for the most recent week for which such an average rate has been published by the board of governors of the federal reserve system on the total judgment awarded by the supreme court. (2) Total judgment awarded is computed by the total number of weeks multiplied by the benefit rate without any reduction. 2
Smith
Workers Compensation Panel
Ingram Book Co. v. Stacey Fitzgerald 01S01-9712-CV-00268
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Ingram Book Company, contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings that (1) the employee's injury was one arising out of and in the course of employment, (2) the award is not barred by the last injury rule and (3) the claimant retains a twelve percent vocational disability award. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Twenty-eight-year-old Stacey Fitzgerald was hired as an executive secretary by Ingram Book Company in September of 1994. Between late February and mid March, she told her supervisor, Terry Cook, she was experiencing right arm pain and requested an ergonomic keyboard. In early June, 1995, a non-work related back injury caused Ms. Fitzgerald to take a temporary leave of absence. Upon her return to work in late August, she requested a part-time position to aid her recovery. Due to continued pain in her right arm, Ingram Book Company sent Ms. Fitzgerald to the Baptist Occupational Medicine facility on or about October 23, 1995. There, she was treated with anti-inflammatorymedicine, a wrist splint, and an elbow band. In November, 1995, Ms. Fitzgerald missed several days of work due to strep throat, a death in the family, and hospitalization for pneumonia. Ingram Book Company terminated her employment during her hospital stay. Following her termination, Ms. Fitzgerald was referred to Dr. Arthur Cushman, whom she saw twice. He concluded Ms. Fitzgerald had a zero percent anatomical impairment rating and assigned no permanent restrictions. Ingram Book Company then arranged for her to receive treatment from Dr. William Jekot. On January 17, 1996, Dr. Jekot diagnosed Ms. Fitzgerald as having mild cubital tunnel syndrome and tendinitis of the right elbow. During March of 1996, Ms. Fitzgerald obtained employment with the Daily News Journal running a newspaper route. However, she quit three months later claiming her preexisting condition caused problems in executing her duties. On May 21, 1997, Dr. Jekot requested a reevaluation visit with Ms. Fitzgerald to prepare for his deposition. Dr. Jekot diagnosed chronic 2
Rutherford
Workers Compensation Panel
James Ed Linkous, Jr. v. Federated Rural Electric 01S01-9709-CH-00191
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jeffrey F. Stewart,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant, Reliance Insurance Company, insists (1) the chancellor erred in applying the successive or "last injurious injury" rule and (2) the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Linkous, is in his late thirties with a high school education, a few junior college courses, apprenticeship training as a journeyman lineman and twenty years' experience as a lineman. On September 13, 1993, he fell from a bucket truck and was injured. After conservative treatment and work hardening, he returned to work in April of 1994 with no permanent medical impairment or restrictions. He performed the same duties as before the accident, until July of 1994, when he suffered a second injury at work. The second injury was surgically treated and the claimant has again returned to his same duties, but with restrictions and a permanent impairment rating. The primary dispute before the trial court was whether disability and medical benefits should be the responsibility of the insurer at the time of the first or second injury, a factual dispute. The trial judge invoked the successive injury rule, long recognized in Tennessee, and sometimes referred to as the last injurious injury rule. Because both issues involve questions of fact, our review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review. Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 315 (Tenn. 1987). As to the first issue, Reliance Insurance Company, the insurer in July of 1994 argues that it should not be subjected to liability because the July 1994 injury was merely an onset of increased pain resulting from the first injury, citing Cunningham v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 811 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1991) as authority. In that case, the trial court found that plaintiff's condition was due to a general arthritic condition predating his employment at Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company and that, although his employment may have aggravated his preexisting condition by increasing his pain, there was no connecting industrial injury or accident that might be considered the triggering incident producing an acceleration of his condition. That finding was supported by expert medical evidence. The medical proof in the present case is quite different. The doctor who 2
