Jackson Manufacturing Company, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Marie Lambert
03S01-9906-CV-00057
Authoring Judge: Hon. Carroll L. Ross, Circuit Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Carroll L. Ross,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiffs, Jackson Manufacturing Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, contend the trial court was incorrect in awarding the defendant, Marie Lambert, 4% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole instead of a lesser amount to a scheduled member on the basis that the disability associated with the shoulder and neck area was not caused by the accident at work. We disagree with the plaintiffs and affirm the judgment of the trial court. The defendant Lambert was born March 15, 194. She failed to complete the ninth grade and has had no other formal education or vocational training. She went to work when she was seventeen. Her work history consists primarily of operating sewing machines in chair factories. Prior to April 21, 1995, the defendant had never experienced any pain in her shoulder or neck area. On April 21, 1995, while in the employ of Jackson Manufacturing Company, she was pulling and feeding material into an industrial computer-operated sewing machine when she injured her left ring finger at the knuckle which joins the hand. In order to pull the material she had to pull very hard with her whole arm. She described the incident as follows: ". . . as I got to the end of it (a 2 inch piece of material) my hand came off and that's when whatever popped hurt, hit - - and I hit myself so hard, you know, and my arm went backwards." She was promptly sent to Dr. Chalmer Chastain, Jr., who examined her and recommended she be referred to an orthopedic specialist or hand specialist. She returned to her place of employment and was referred that same day by her employer to Dr. Cauley Hayes, a specialist in hand surgery. Dr. Hayes treated her hand and on May 11, 1995, performed surgery on her left ring finger metacarpophalangeal joint. Dr. Hayes returned her to work three months after the accident and she was placed on light duty carrying cushions, which was too much for her condition. Thereafter she cleaned tables and bathrooms. Subsequently she was terminated for missing work and has not worked since then. While under Dr. Hayes' care the defendant and her boyfriend testified she complained at each visit to Dr. Hayes of problems with her arm, shoulder and neck. Dr. Hayes' medical records dated November 7, 1995, show her first complaint of heaviness in the arm. On that occasion the x-rays showed an abnormal cervical spine, and Dr. Hayes referred her to Dr. Adele Ackell, a neurologist. Dr. Hayes felt the defendant had sustained permanent impairment to the hand but did not assign a percentage of impairment. He did not believe the shoulder and 2

Mary Alice Maupin v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge
03S01-9901-CC-00009
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James B. Scott, Jr.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge, has appealed from the trial court's ruling awarding the employee, Mary Alice Maupin, certain travel expenses pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. _ 5-6-24. All other issues were settled and approved by the trial court. The sole issue is whether the employee is entitled to a mileage allowance under subsection (a)(6)(A) of the statute which provides; "When an injured worker is required by the worker's employer to travel to an authorized medical provider or facility located outside a radius of fifteen (15) miles from such insured worker's residence or workplace, then, upon request, such employee shall be reimbursed for reasonable travel expenses. The injured employee's travel reimbursement shall be calculated based on a per mile reimbursement rate, as defined in subdivision (a)(6)(B), times the total round trip mileage as measured from the employee's residence or workplace to the location of the medical provider's facility. . . . . . . ." The trial court made findings that the employee "was not able to work at the time these medical expenses were incurred, and that the plaintiff's residence was more than fifteen miles from the location of the requested medical treatment and as the plaintiff had to travel in excess of fifteen miles from her home to the location for medical treatment, the Court finds that these expenses should be reimbursed." The order also recited that plaintiff had not been released to return to work at the time her travel expenses were incurred and that the medical treatment was authorized. The employer contends the trial court misconstrued the statute and that the mileage allowance should not have been allowed as the authorized medical treatment was within fifteen miles of the workplace and that the statute measured the right to mileage reimbursement by determining whether the travel was fifteen miles from the worker's residence or workplace. The employee insists the statutory language does not give the option to the employer to measure mileage from the location it may choose but the statute must be examined in light of actual distance traveled. It is also argued that the statute does not say mileage is to be determined and measured "from the employee's residence or workplace, to be determined by the employer" or it does not state measurement shall be "from the employee's residence or workplace, whichever is less." The case is to be reviewed de novo accompanied by a presumption of the findings of fact unless we find the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). However, in reviewing a question of law, there is no presumption in favor of the ruling. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Tenn. 1993). There is no issue concerning the factual findings of the trial court. In construing a statute, proper interpretations should give effect to the entire statute by giving its words their natural and ordinary meaning. Pryor Oldsmobile v. 2

Kathleen J. Young-Green v. Richard W. Green
W1999-00093-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

Kathleen Young-Green appeals from the judgment of the Chancery Court of Shelby County. Her complaint had sought imposition of a constructive trust over assets allegedly procured through the exercise of undue influence. The trial court dismissed the case under Rule 41.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure finding that the Plaintiff had not satisfied her burden of proof. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

Dorothy West Harmon v. Harvey Carl Harmon
W1998-00841-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Joe C. Morris

This is a divorce case. The husband is a physician employed by a professional association. The trial court granted the wife the divorce and awarded the wife, inter alia, 50% of the value of the husband’s interest in his medical practice and 45% of the husband’s retirement and profit sharing plans. The wife was awarded alimony in futuro of $6000 per month for 13 years. The husband was ordered to assume responsibility for the parties’ marital debt. The wife’s request for attorney’s fees was denied. The wife appeals the trial court’s valuation of the husband’s interest in the medical practice, the amount of alimony awarded, the division of the retirement and profit sharing plans, and the denial of attorney’s fees. The husband appeals the trial court’s order that he pay the marital debt. We reverse the trial court’s valuation of the husband’s interest in his medical practice, holding that the values set forth in buy-sell agreements executed by the husband are relevant but not binding on the wife in the divorce. The remainder of the trial court’s decision is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Bryon A. Peete
W1998-02116-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.

The appellant, Byron A. Peete, appeals his conviction in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder. Pursuant to the appellant’s conviction, the trial court sentenced the appellant to thirteen years and six months incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction. Although not clearly articulated, his argument appears to encompass the following specific contentions: (1) the evidence presented at trial concerning his low intellectual quotient (I.Q.) precluded a finding that the killing was knowing as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (1997); (2) alternatively, in light of the evidence concerning the appellant’s low I.Q., the record demonstrates the provocation required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211(a) (1997); or (3) in light of the evidence concerning his low I.Q., the record demonstrates that the appellant killed the victim, Terrance Baker, in self-defense within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(a) (1997). Following a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee vs. Ernest Puryear
W1999-02031-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

A Shelby County jury found defendant guilty of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. Defendant received an eight-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, defendant claims (1) the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction for aggravated robbery, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon our review of the record, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction, and defendant received effective assistance of counsel. Thus, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.

Timothy Shaun McClure, v. Stacy Dawn McClure
W1998-00804-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Dewey C. Whitenton

This is a divorce case. The trial court awarded the husband sole custody of the parties’ children and ordered the wife to pay child support. Supervised visitation was awarded to the wife, and visitation was also awarded to the maternal grandmother and great-grandmother. The trial court also ordered that the marital home be sold, with the proceeds divided between the parties. We affirm the award of custody to the husband, reverse the award of visitation to the maternal grandmother and great-grandmother, reverse the order that the marital home be sold, and remand.
 

Pamela F. Jones v. Middle Tennessee Publishing Co., et al
M1999-00697-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Tom E. Gray, Chancellor
This case is before the Court upon motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference

Flora Richardson v. Saturn Corporation
M1998-00080-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert L. Holloway,
This case is before the Court upon motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference; Whereupon, it appears to the Court that the motion for review is not well taken and should be denied; and It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the judgment of the Court.

Lawrence Taylor v. Pya/Monarch, Inc., et al
M1999-01766-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III, Chancellor
This case is before the Court upon motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference;

State vs. Marcella I. Mealer
M1998-00006-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John H. Peay

RE: The matter of Ashley Michele Menard
M1999-00117-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson

Hoalcraft vs. Smithson
M1999-00143-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman

Environmental Abatement, Inc. vs. Astrum R.E. Corp.
M1998-00871-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell

Crump vs. TN Civil Service Commission
M1999-02677-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Adams vs. Cooper
M1999-02664-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell

M1999-2664-COA-R3-CV
M1999-2664-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: William C. Koch

Papachristou vs. The University of TN
M1999-00960-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

State vs. Charles R. Marshall, Jr.
M1999-01311-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge L. Terry Lafferty
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

Owner-Operator Ind. Drivers Assoc., et al vs. Concord EFS, et al
M1999-02560-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Cornelia A. Clark

Owner-Operator Ind. Drivers Assoc., et al vs. Concord EFS, et al
M1999-02560-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell

Owner-Operator Ind. Drivers Assoc., et al vs. Concord EFS, et al
M1999-02560-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Cornelia A. Clark

02681-COA-R3-CV
02681-COA-R3-CV

01C01-9903-CR-00075
01C01-9903-CR-00075
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman

W1999-01313-SC-DPE-PD
W1999-01313-SC-DPE-PD