Barbara Vargo v. Lincoln Brass Works
M1999-00734-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Soloman
This appeal involves a dispute between an employee and her former employer over severance pay. After the employee obtained a $13,750 judgment in the Metropolitan General Sessions Court of Davidson County, the employer perfected a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Davidson County. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the employee had a vested right to severance pay under the employer's severance policy and awarded the employee $15,262.50. The employer has appealed. We have determined that the employer's severance policy contained an enforceable contractual obligation to pay severance pay to eligible employees. In the absence of proof that the employee was ineligible, we find that the trial court correctly interpreted and applied the severance policy. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Marilyn E. Reel vs. George C. Reel, Jr.
M1999-01151-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: James T. Hamilton
This is a divorce case ending a twenty-seven year marriage. The trial court made an essentially equal division of property, awarding Wife the marital residence which remained unfinished even though the parties had occupied it since 1985. We modify the property division to provide Wife additional funds with which to complete and repair the residence.

David Rivkin vs. Lori Postal
M1999-01947-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
This appeal involves the financial aftermath of a short-lived nonmarital affair that ended badly. The man filed suit in the Chancery Court for Williamson County seeking a partition of the jointly-owned property and the return of his personal property. The woman responded with a counterclaim for breach of promise to marry. Following a bench trial, the trial court divided the jointly-owned property and awarded the woman $150,000 in damages on her breach of promise claim. Both parties now take issue with the judgment. The man asserts that the evidence does not support awarding the woman $150,000 or granting the woman such a large share of the jointly-owned property. The woman takes issue with the reduction of her share of the property because of damage to the man's personal property while it was in her possession. We have determined that the evidence does not support the trial court's conclusion that a promise to marry existed or that the woman was damaged by the failure of the marriage to take place. We have also determined that, with the exception of a cedar chest belonging to the man's grandmother, the manner in which the trial court divided the parties' jointly-owned property was proper.

Lisa Ann Vaccarella vs. Raymond M. Vaccarella
M1999-01937-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
The unusual procedural history of this case presents for review the validity of the parties' marital dissolution agreement ("MDA") and the subsequent divorce decree entered by Judge Henry Denmark Bell incorporating this MDA, as well as the court's decision regarding child custody, support, and visitation. After Wife filed Rule 59 and 60.02 motions for relief from her MDA, the second trial judge, Russ Heldman, determined that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-103(b) requires a hearing prior to incorporating the signed marital dissolution agreement into a decree granting the parties an irreconcilable differences divorce. Judge Heldman further found the MDA to be invalid due to duress and violations of Wife's due process rights and vacated Judge Bell's decree granting the parties' divorce. We overrule the trial court on these issues and find the MDA signed by the parties, as well as the January 31, 1998 decree of Judge Bell granting final divorce, to be valid. We thus reinstate both the MDA and original decree. With regard to the issues of custody, visitation, and child support, we find substantial change in circumstances and affirm Judge Heldman's determinations on these issues.

Clark vs. Farrell
M1999-01945-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Holloway
This is an appeal by the defendant from an action of the trial court in assessing discretionary costs against the defendant. The trial court entered an order of dismissal with prejudice on finding that "the parties have settled all matters in controversy . . ." which order was approved for entry by counsel for both parties. The plaintiff filed a motion for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2). The trial court then granted discretionary costs to the plaintiff in the amount of $2,185.75. We reverse.

Jeffery Tolbert vs. Dept. of Correction
M1999-02387-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen H. Lyle
This appeal arises from an action challenging the calculation of sentence reduction credits for an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections. After the inmate filed a petition claiming that he had been denied such credits, Department filed motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit stating that Inmate's sentence had been properly calculated. Inmate failed to respond in a manner as required by Rule 56.06 Tenn. R. Civ. P. to establish that any genuine issues of material fact existed. As a result, trial court granted summary judgment motion. We affirm.

Old Republic Surety Co. v. Morris Eshaghpour
M1999-01918-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
The defendant purchased a building permit bond from the plaintiff surety company and executed an indemnity agreement to hold the surety harmless against all loss, liability and expenses the company might sustain on the bond. A claim was made against the bond regarding a home built by the defendant. The surety company notified the defendant, investigated the claim, and eventually settled with the claimant. In this lawsuit to collect under the indemnity agreement, the trial court granted summary judgment to the surety. The defendant argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because the motion was not properly supported according to the Rules of Civil Procedure and, alternatively, the issue of whether the surety acted reasonably and in good faith in settling the claim precludes summary judgment. We disagree and affirm the summary judgment on the issue of liability, but remand for proof on total damages.

Brenda Reese vs. Rickie Reese
M1999-02429-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Tyrus H. Cobb
The defendant, an incarcerated felon, appeals the action of the Chancellor in granting a divorce to his wife and settling all property rights between the parties. We affirm the judgment of the Chancellor

Pamela Sweat vs. James Sweat
W1999-00158-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Bob G. Gray

Max Pass vs. Shelby Aviation
W1999-00018-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

Geral Largen vs. Cracker Barrel Old County Store, Inc., et al
E1999-01006-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Russell E. Simmons, Jr.

Michael Grandberry v. Illinois Tool Works,
M1998-00528-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
This case is before the Court upon motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann._ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference;

John Pointer, et al. v. Tennessee Equity Capital Corp.
M1999-01934-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
A now defunct company and its owner sued a former creditor on the basis the creditor's control and management of the company damaged it so that it was no longer a profitable business, causing the stock to lose value. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants because the only competent evidence established that the company was never profitable and that no action by the defendants caused the demise of the company. We affirm.

Project Creation, Inc., et al vs. Kenneth Neal, et al
M1999-01272-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: John O. Wootton
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' libel action and then granted Defendants' motion for sanctions pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.02(1) and 11.02(3), finding that the libel action was filed for an improper purpose and without factual support. The court awarded Defendants $9,262.90 in expenses and attorney fees. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

H & M Enterprises, Inc. v. Kathy Murray
M1999-02073-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd
This appeal involves a spouse's liability for money that the other spouse embezzled from her employer. When the employer discovered the embezzlement, it filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wilson County against the embezzler and her spouse to recover $196,231.69. After hearing the evidence without a jury, the trial court awarded the employer a judgment against the embezzler and her spouse for $196,231.69 and also awarded the employer a $78,500 judgment for punitive damages against the embezzler. The embezzler's spouse asserts on this appeal that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's determination that he should be jointly and severally liable for the embezzled funds. We agree and, therefore, reverse the judgment against the embezzler's spouse.

State vs. Keen
W1997-00147-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: John P. Colton, Jr.

State vs. Keen
W1997-00147-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: John P. Colton, Jr.

Maestas vs. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.
W1998-01907-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
The plaintiffs alleged that defendants' products, surgically implanted in their backs, were defective. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on grounds that the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiffs appealed, contending that: 1) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the "discovery rule"; and 2) under the doctrine of "cross-jurisdictional tolling," the statute of limitations was tolled during the period in which the plaintiffs sought class certification in a class action filed in federal court. We decline to adopt the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional tolling. As the plaintiffs have conceded a "universal date of discovery" that is outside the applicable statute of limitations, our rejection of cross-jurisdictional tolling renders the plaintiffs' claims time-barred. Accordingly, we need not address the "discovery rule" issue raised by plaintiffs. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment, is hereby affirmed.

State vs. Culbreath, et al
W1999-01553-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

State vs. Michael Gilliam
E1999-01112-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: James E. Beckner

Lawrence Strickland vs. State
E1999-00119-CCA-R3-CD
Trial Court Judge: E. Eugene Eblen

Scotty Bailes Builder v. Allen H. Davis
03S01-9904-CH-00046
Authoring Judge: Houston M. Goddard, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Telford E. Forgety, Jr.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(1) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue before us is whether the Plaintiff, Scotty Bailes doing business as Scotty Bailes Builder, and Defendant, Allen Davis, agreed for Mr. Davis to have workers' compensation coverage during the roofing job in question. We think they did not and thus affirm. In November 1996, Mr. Davis, a subcontractor, heard that Mr. Bailes, a general contractor, needed a roofer. After meeting with Mr. Bailes, Mr. Davis prepared a proposal, and the parties met on November 13, 1996, although what occurred at this meeting is disputed by the parties. Mr. Davis contends that he, along with two other men, met with Mr. Bailes, but Mr. Davis asserts that he was never asked to sign a form indicating that he did not desire workers' compensation coverage until after his injury. However, Mr. Bailes argues that Mr. Davis, a subcontractor, met with him and his assistant, and Mr. Davis verbally declined workers' compensation coverage for himself, although Mr. Bailes explained that he was required to obtain workers' compensation coverage for Mr. Davis's employees. Mr. Bailes insists that he repeatedly attempted to obtain from Mr. Davis the proper paperwork

Tennessee Roofing Corp. and Cna Insurance Co. v. Randall Lloyd
03S01-9902-CH-00016
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Daryl R. Fansler,
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Randall Lloyd appeals an award of 25 percent to the body as a whole as inadequate. We agree and modify the award.

Annette Burnett v. Goody's Family Clothing, Inc.
03S01-9904-CV-00044
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Dale C. Workman
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Goody's Family Clothing, Inc., has appealed from the action of the trial court in awarding the employee, Annette Burnett, 6% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer raises several issues on appeal. The primary issue is whether the expert medical evidence is sufficient to establish that plaintiff's physical condition resulted from an incident or activity at work. Other issues are whether the trial court was in error in holding proper notice of injury was rendered and whether the court properly exceeded the 2 _ times cap under T.C.A. _ 5-6-241(a)(1). Plaintiff was 49 years of age and had completed the 9th grade. She later obtained a G.E.D. certificate. She became employed by Goody's in 1996 and was employed as a "tagger" which involved placing price tags on clothing for retail sale. On May 12, 1997, she was standing on a stool tagging clothing when she unintentionally stepped off of the stool. She testified she attempted to grab a pole but missed it and she immediately felt pain in her left leg from the groin down.1 She described the pain as mild something like a cramp. She reported the incident to her supervisor and helped complete an accident report. She declined to seek medical attention thinking it was unnecessary. She continued to work and said the pain would leave and return over the next two months. She stated that during July 1997 the pain became more severe and began to spread into her hip and down her leg to her ankle. She saw her family doctor during August and received a cortisone shot which did not relieve her symptoms. Arrangements were made by her doctor to see an orthopedic surgeon. She continued to work until surgery was later performed during November 1997. On September 18, 1997, she was seen and examined by Dr. Paul H. Johnson, an orthopedic surgeon. He operated on her on November 12th and did a 1This is the only description of the incident at work. It is not clear whether she fell to the floor or caught herself and landed on her feet. 2

Ford vs. Humphres
M1999-00423-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins
This appeal involves a dispute over the estate of Ms. Thelma Humphres, who was found by the trial court to have died intestate owning a one-half interest in her home and the approximately twenty acres on which it was locataed. She also owned some personal items which sold for $1,355.50. Appellant, Joy Ford, one of Ms. Humphres eight children, believed that Ms. Humphres had executed a will leaving her mother's entire one-half interest in the home and property to her. Ms. Ford objected to the administration of her mother's estate by her brother, Appellee, Danny Humphres, and attempted to prove a lost will. Ms. Ford failed to prove a lost will, and the property was subsequently sold to pay the estate's debts. As Ms. Ford owned the other one-half interest in her mother's property, she objected to the sale of this property. She also objected to the allocation of costs and fees related to the sale and the general administration of her mother's estate. All of her objections were overruled. She now appeals the trial court's actions in these matters. We affirm the trial court.