LaBryant King v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, LaBryant King, pled guilty in 1998 to one count of selling over .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class A felony. The Defendant agreed to be sentenced as a Range I offender to fifteen years. The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief raising challenges to his indictment, conviction and sentence. After a hearing the trial court denied relief, and this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clarence W. Carter
The Defendant, Clarence W. Carter, was tried and convicted of one count of conspiracy to sell cocaine and one count of possession of cocaine. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to consecutive sentences of thirty-two years for the conspiracy conviction and sixteen years for the possession conviction. This Court affirmed the Defendant's convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See State v. Clarence W. Carter, No. M2000-02230-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31370469 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 21, 2002). The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review, and upheld the Defendant's convictions and sentence on the possession conviction, but determined the trial court committed error in sentencing the Defendant as a Range II offender for his conspiracy conviction when he did not receive notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment by the State in the superceding indictment under which he was tried. See State v. Carter, 121 S.W.3d 579 (Tenn. 2003). Upon remand, the Defendant was re-sentenced on his conspiracy conviction as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years imprisonment to be served consecutively to his prior sentences. In this appeal the Defendant raises two issues, claiming that upon re-sentencing the trial court erred by: 1) imposing an excessive sentence for his conspiracy conviction, and 2) imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lorenzo C. White, et al. v. Carolyn Fields Hayes, et al.
This is a will construction case. The testator died in 1912, leaving a holographic will. In the will, the testator left his real estate to his children for life, then to his grandchildren for life, then to his great-grandchildren until they became of age, then to be divided “as law directs.” In 1992, after the last grandchild had died, the great-grandchildren of the testator petitioned the trial court to interpret the will and set out the rights of the parties. The trial court concluded that the testator intended to leave the remainder interest in his property to the great-grandchildren per stirpes. The appellant great-grandchild filed the instant appeal, claiming that the trial court should have construed the devise as being per capita, not per stirpes. We affirm, concluding that the trial court’s finding of a per stirpes division of the property is consistent with the laws of intestate succession in Tennessee. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Evans
The defendant, Tony Evans, pled guilty to unlawful possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell. He was sentenced to six years in a community corrections program but was later placed on probation. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his six-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s revocation of his probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
National Bank of Commerce v. Universal Transaction Consultants, Inc.
Plaintiff National Bank of Commerce filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that its agreement with Defendant Universal Transaction Consultants, Inc. was null and void for Defendant’s failure to perform a condition precedent. Defendant counter-claimed for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract. The trial court determined that Universal Transaction Consultants had failed to prove damages and dismissed the claims of both parties. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Dee Huskey
The state has appealed the Knox County Criminal Court's suppression of statements made to police by the defendant, Thomas Dee Huskey, and of items found and seized from his home. The state contends that (1) the trial court erred as a matter of law in suppressing the statements and (2) the trial court erred in suppressing the items found at the home (a) because the police arrested the defendant in good faith reliance upon a capias which subsequently was declared void and (b) because the defendant's father consented to a search of the defendant's room. The defendant asserts that if the state's appeal is successful, then he contends that the trial court erred in prior rulings denying suppression of his statements and the items seized from his home on other myriad grounds raised by the defendant. We affirm the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary Flanary, et al. v. Carl Gregory Dodge of Johnson City, LLC - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur with the majority opinion on all issues raised except the final issue of enforceability of the contract, having only been signed by Flanary. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Flanary, et al. v. Carl Gregory Dodge of Johnson City, LLC
Gary Flanary filed suit against Carl Gregory Dodge of Johnson City, LLC (“the dealership”) and alleged that the dealership, without negotiation and without his consent or knowledge, had charged him an “administrative fee” in connection with his purchase of a vehicle. Flanary claimed that this practice violated, inter alia, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“the TCPA”). He sought class action certification. The dealership filed a motion for summary judgment, relying upon the arbitration agreement (“the Agreement”) signed by Flanary to support its position that Flanary was required to arbitrate his claims. The trial court stated that it personally did not believe an agreement to arbitrate under the circumstances of this case was fair; but, nevertheless, it opined that it felt compelled by the current state of the law to hold that arbitration was mandated by the terms of the Agreement. Flanary appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to submit to arbitration. We affirm the judgment below to the extent the trial court, albeit reluctantly, held that the Agreement, on its face, is enforceable. However, based upon our determination that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was mutuality with respect to the obligation to arbitrate, we vacate so much of the trial court’s judgment as holds that the parties entered into a contract to arbitrate. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings on Flanary’s complaint. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Christy Michelle Berry vs. Lester Stephen Berry
This is a post divorce child custody case. The trial court changed custody to the father based upon the mother's homosexuality and the effect it would have on the child as he grew older. We hold that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that there had been a material change in circumstances to justify a change of custody in the absence of proof that the mother's sexual orientation had affected or would affect the child's well-being in any meaningful way. Accordingly, the trial court's decision is reversed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Christy Michelle Berry vs. Lester Stephen Berry - Concurring
I concur in the majority’s opinion. I write separately to stress that which is missing in this case, i.e., evidence, be it in the form of expert testimony or otherwise, showing that the subject child has been, or can reasonably be expected to be, adversely affected by his mother’s lifestyle. In my opinion, the trial court’s judgment must be reversed because of a lack of proof to support its critical finding of adverse effect. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
David Lackey v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he should have been appointed post-conviction counsel and given an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we remand this matter to the post-conviction court to determine whether the petitioner’s right to due process of law requires that the petition be considered regardless of its untimeliness. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry Lee Robinson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Terry Lee Robinson, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree murder and received a life sentence. Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court's denial of his petition. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frank Robert Bigsby v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner was convicted of possession of twenty-six (26) grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver. He appealed this conviction. We affirmed his conviction in State v. Bigsby, 40 S.W.3d 87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). The petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Strickland v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, Kenneth Strickland, was convicted by a jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, and sentenced to twelve years in the Department of Correction. The judgment against the Defendant was affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Kenneth Strickland, No. M2002-00543-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21997739 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Aug. 22, 2003). The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief claiming that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. After an evidentiary hearing the trial court denied relief and this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andrew Charles Helton v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Andrew Charles Helton, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended after appointment of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues (1) that the prosecutor misrepresented to the jury during closing argument evidence concerning the 911 tape; (2) that the prosecutor improperly pointed the murder weapon at the jury during closing argument; (3) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutorial misconduct which occurred during closing argument; and (4) that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he objected to the jury's request during deliberations to review the tape of a neighbor's call to the 911 operator on the night of the shootings. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Domingo Ponce v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Domingo Ponce, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Braxton v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael Braxton, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of aggravated rape and aggravated assault. He received a total effective sentence of twenty-three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which petition the post-conviction court summarily dismissed as being untimely. The petitioner appeals the dismissal, arguing that his petition was not barred by the statute of limitations. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for a hearing on the timeliness of the petitioner's petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny Tyus v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for delivery of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, cocaine, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shannon D. Young v. Tony Parker, et al.
The Petitioner, an inmate in custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his petition for common law writ of certiorari as being untimely filed. We affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Ferris
The defendant, William Ferris, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to twenty-five years for each of the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years for the aggravated burglary convictions and twenty years for the aggravated robbery conviction. The court merged the two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and the two counts of aggravated burglary and ordered that the kidnapping, burglary, and robbery sentences be served consecutively to each other for an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial sua sponte upon admission of testimony about the defendant’s pending indictment for attempted second degree murder; and (3) whether the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Amy Brown Young v. Insurance Company of The State of Pennsylvania, et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff complained of wrist pain which was subjectively diagnosed as cumulative trauma. The treating physician found no impairment, as did neither of the first two physicians to whom the plaintiff was referred. The third physician, Dr. Fishbein, relying on subjective complaints, made four years after the plaintiff left her job, found a 5 percent impairment in each arm. We find the evidence preponderates against the judgment. |
Grundy | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jimmy R. Lyle v. Pasminco Zinc, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged that he has a repetitive-stress job-related condition in his right knee diagnosed as degenerative arthritis. Surgery was performed September 18, 1997. After giving notice in July 1999, this action was filed on March 20, 2000. The trial judge concluded that the one-year statute of limitations precluded recovery and granted summary judgment. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Keith Edward Garrett v. Priscilla Louise Garrett, et al., Estate of Luther Gaston Garrett
In this second appeal of this case, the Trial Court had ruled that appellee was entitled to a dwelling house and all improvements on land owned by the Deceased. Appellant appeals this and numerous issues. We affirm. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Joseph Owen Boote, Jr., Decedent, et al. v. Helen Boote Shivers, et al.
Appellants are residuary beneficiaries of their father's estate. They challenge the estate's payment of attorney fees and expenses incurred by executrix (the widow of testator and stepmother of Appellants) in unsuccessfully defending against her removal as executrix. Appellants contend that because litigation concerning the removal of their stepmother as executrix was solely for the personal benefit of the executrix and was necessitated by her neglect in administering the estate, the trial court erred as a matter of law in ordering the attorney fees and expenses incurred in defending against the removal petition be paid out of the estate. Appellee, the former executrix, contends that the trial court did not err in exercising its discretion in ordering legal fees to be paid out of estate. Finding that the trial court erred in ordering the expenses paid out of the estate, we reverse and remand. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
William L. Smith v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, William L. Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner's sentence for rape of a child is illegal, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is reversed, relief is granted, and the cause is remanded to the Bledsoe County Circuit Court for transfer to the Hamilton County Criminal Court for appropriate remedial action. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals |