Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc. v. BlueRoad Fontanel, LLC
A gas company obtained an easement by eminent domain across a property owner’s land. A jury determined the amount of just compensation payable to the landowner. On appeal, the gas company argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear expert testimony from the landowner’s expert regarding the value of the property and that the jury verdict is not supported by material evidence. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Brandon Coleman, et al. v. CBL & Associates, Inc., et al.
This interlocutory appeal concerns the relation back doctrine under Tennessee Rule of Civil |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
William H. Lublin v. Vastland Northcrest Development, LLC
This matter arises from two failed real estate transactions. A buyer contracted to purchase two townhomes from a real estate developer. However, after the sales failed to close, the developer purported to cancel the transactions. The buyer then sued the developer, seeking decrees for specific performance and damages for breach of contract. The buyer also asserted a claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court entered an order awarding the buyer specific performance but denying his claim for damages. The trial court also found a TCPA violation and awarded the buyer his attorney’s fees and costs. On the breach of contract claim, we have determined that the developer breached the contracts and that the buyer failed to sufficiently prove his damages, and we affirm the trial court’s decision. We also conclude that the trial court erred in finding a TCPA violation and reverse this finding, as well as the award of fees and costs pursuant to the TCPA. Finally, we have determined that the developer was not the prevailing party in the trial court or on appeal and deny its request for an award of attorney’s fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Hubert Russell
Defendant, Charles Hubert Russell, was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the indicted charge violated the Second Amendment. After the trial court denied the motion, Defendant pled guilty to the indicted charge but reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure pertaining to whether his conviction violated the Second Amendment right to bear arms. After reviewing the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Poser Investments, Inc. v. Old National Hospitality Company et al.
A judgment creditor domesticated a Georgia judgment in Tennessee under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. When the creditor sought to enforce the domesticated judgment, the debtor raised a statute-of-limitations defense. The trial court ruled that the enforcement action was time-barred because the limitations period began to run when the foreign judgment was rendered in Georgia. Upon review, we conclude that domestication of the foreign judgment under the Uniform Act resulted in a new Tennessee judgment for purposes of the statute of limitations. So we reverse the trial court’s decision |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
JACQUIZ MCBEE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
The Defendant, Jacquiz McBee, has filed a petition for recusal appeal seeking review of the Knox County Criminal Court’s January 28, 2026 order denying his motion to recuse. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 2.02. Following our review of the Defendant’s petition, we have determined that a response from the State is not necessary and summarily deny relief. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JENNIFER LEIGH SEXTON
The Defendant, Jennifer Leigh Sexton, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
KARS LLC ET AL. v. RONALD OGLE ET AL.
The plaintiffs sued the defendants alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with business relations, fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint after finding that the plaintiffs failed to timely close on their transactions with the defendants. The plaintiffs appeal. Following thorough review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Gail Gottesman v. Todd Hecker, et al.
In this matter involving the sale of a parcel of improved real property, the buyer claimed |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE MAGNUS H. ET AL.
The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to his five minor children after finding clear and convincing evidence that the father, who was incarcerated when the termination petition was filed, abandoned the children by wanton disregard; the children were victims of severe abuse; the father was confined under a criminal sentence of six years; and termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The father appeals. Upon diligent review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Genesis Roofing Company v. Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration Review Commission
This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4- 5-322 of a decision of the Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration Review Commission (the “Review Commission”). Asserting that the petition was untimely because it had been filed more than 60 days after entry of the agency’s final order, the Review Commission filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1). The petitioner opposed the motion by asking for an enlargement of time pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02. The trial court denied the petitioner’s motion for an enlargement of time and granted the Review Commission’s motion to dismiss. The petitioner appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
MARY GERMAINE WILSON ET AL. v. DR. ALICIA JAMELLE MICKLES
The plaintiffs in a health care liability action moved to continue the trial date due to health issues from which one of the plaintiffs was purportedly suffering. The trial court denied the motion to continue, and the plaintiffs’ counsel informed the trial court that the plaintiffs would not be attending the trial, despite the denial of their motion for continuance. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case due to the plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute the case and the plaintiffs’ noncompliance with a pretrial order. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully moved to alter or amend the dismissal order and ultimately appealed to this Court. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
YIN C. LEMLEY v. WILLIAM A. ROWE ET AL.
This appeal arises from an action for breach of a contract wherein the defendants had agreed to assist the plaintiff in purchasing improved real property. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the plaintiff had committed the first material breach of the parties’ contract, had acted in bad faith, and had misrepresented information to the defendants regarding her performance of the contract. However, the court determined that the defendants had continued to accept payment on the contract after the plaintiff’s breach. The trial court awarded to the plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $170,470.04, representing reimbursement of all payments she had made to the defendants, plus interest, but minus expenses incurred by the defendants over the course of the agreement. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for specific performance. The plaintiff has appealed. Due to significant deficiencies in the plaintiff’s appellate briefs, we conclude that she has waived consideration of all issues on appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. We deny the defendants’ request for an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Faulkner
This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Defendant, Christopher Lee Faulkner, for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. The Defendant seeks to challenge the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. The State has filed a response in opposition to the motion. Based on the following, we deny the Petitioner’s motion for an interlocutory appeal. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randall L. Rice et al. v. The Tennessee Democratic Executive Committee
A majority of the members of the State Executive Committee of the Tennessee Democratic Party approved adding unelected “ex-officio members” as full members of the Executive Committee with voting rights. A group of dissenting Executive Committee members brought suit, claiming that the addition of voting members of the Executive Committee in this manner violated statutory provisions governing the composition of state party executive committees, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-13-101 et seq. In response, the Executive Committee argued the statutory provisions permit adding ex-officio members as full voting members and invoked constitutional avoidance principles in support of the Executive Committee’s interpretation of the statutory scheme. The Executive Committee filed a counterclaim challenging the constitutionality of the statutory scheme based on freedom of association principles. Both parties sought judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the Executive Committee’s motion for judgment on pleadings, construing the statutory scheme as permitting the Executive Committee’s actions. Accordingly, the trial court pretermitted the constitutional issue, dismissing the Executive Committee’s counterclaim as moot. The dissenting members appealed. We conclude the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statutory scheme. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
LEIGHTON H. LIPPERT ET AL. v. B & D REAL ESTATE PROPERTIES, LLC
A developer failed to use proper erosion control measures, resulting in recurring sediment runoff into a pond owned by neighboring landowners and increasing accumulation of sediment therein. The trial court concluded that developer’s actions constituted a temporary, not permanent, nuisance and awarded injunctive relief and damages. Damages for emotional distress were included among the damages the trial court awarded. The developer appeals, challenging the trial court’s finding as to proximate causation and asserting that its actions, if a nuisance, were a permanent and not temporary nuisance, and accordingly the landowners’ suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The developer also asserts that the trial court erred as to the remedies awarded, challenging both the injunctive relief and emotional distress damages. We affirm the trial court’s findings as to proximate causation and its conclusion that the nuisance is temporary. We also affirm the trial court’s imposition of an injunction. However, we reverse the award of damages for emotional distress based upon deficient pleading. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, et al. v. Virginia Jones
The defendant was involved in a motor vehicle collision with a tractor-trailer truck in |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Abernathy
This matter is before the Court upon application of the Defendant, Jonathan Abernathy, for permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The State has filed a response in opposition. The Defendant seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence. Upon full consideration, the application is denied for the reasons stated below. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerald Elijah Crossley
Defendant, Gerald Elijah Crossley, challenges his Madison County Circuit Court jury convictions of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Defendant’s alleged gang affiliation and expert testimony about gang-related activities and that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence and that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. AMANDA JEAN PHILLIPS
The Defendant, Amanda Jean Phillips, was convicted by a Scott County jury of aggravated |
Scott | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Hawkins v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the Appellant’s petition for an accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, § 2. The Appellant asks this Court to review the post-conviction court’s November 14, 2025 order denying his motion to recuse Judge Chris Craft from his capital post-conviction proceeding. The State has filed a response in opposition to the petition. Having reviewed the petition, the supporting documents, and the State’s response, this Court has determined that additional briefing and oral argument are unnecessary. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.05, 2.06. For the reasons set forth below, the post-conviction court’s order is hereby AFFIRMED. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Martha Jane Durocher
Defendant, Martha Jane Durocher, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for reckless endangerment with a weapon. Defendant was convicted as charged after a bench trial, and the trial court imposed a two-year sentence to be suspended on probation. Defendant appeals, arguing the evidence at trial was insufficient. Because the evidence does not establish that Defendant’s conduct placed any person or persons in imminent danger of serious bodily injury or death, we reverse and vacate her conviction for felony reckless endangerment with a weapon. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
TED PHILLIPS ET AL. v. NATIONAL AGGREGATES LLC ET AL.
The plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of their claims against two sets of |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE CHARLEE G. ET AL
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established several grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We now affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
KELLY LISH, ET AL. v. O. RAYMOND LOWRY, ET AL.
This breach of contract case involves a partnership dispute where one partner who undertook the winding down of the long-term partnership sought (1) reimbursement of loans and advances made to cover partnership expenses together with interest thereon; (2) compensation for services rendered on behalf of the partnership and attorney fees; and (3) taking into account the foregoing, disbursement of partnership funds to the partners. The other two partners disputed the claims and made counterclaims. Because we cannot ascertain whether the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law support the judgment, we vacate the judgment and remand it for the entry of a more detailed order that reflects that it is the product of the trial court’s individualized decision-making and independent judgment. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals |