American General Financial Services, Inc. v. Martin Goss/Unknown Tenant of Foreclosed Property - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in the decision of the majority to affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of American General Financial Services, Inc. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Goss’s appeal is not so devoid of merit as to warrant a holding that his appeal is frivolous in nature. When an appellant seeks to reverse or modify a trial court’s judgment based upon an alleged error grounded in the facts of the case, but fails to present us with a verbatim transcript or statement of the evidence, the appellant’s appeal has no chance of success. An appeal is deemed frivolous if it is devoid of merit or if it has no reasonable chance of success. Bursack v. Wilson, 982 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Industrial Dev. Bd. v. Hancock, 901 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). See also Linn v. Howard, E2006-00024-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 208442 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed on January 26, 2007). When the only issues on an appeal are factual ones – as opposed to legal questions – we must have a record that permits us to reach those issues. In my judgment, this appeal is – by definition – a frivolous appeal. I would remand for a hearing to determine “just damages” due the appellee pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122 (2000). |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Cyrus Deville Wilson v. State of Tennesse
The Petitioner, Cyrus Deville Wilson, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the coram nobis court and remand the Petitioner’s case for an evidentiary hearing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cyrus Deville Wilson v. State of Tennessee - Dissenting
I dissent from the majority opinion because I conclude that the allegations contained in the Petitioner’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis are insufficient to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief. As such, I do not think that the coram nobis court erred when it summarily dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Warren Fowler v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Warren Fowler, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping, both Class A felonies, and received concurrent sentences of 20 years. The Petitioner challenges the performance of trial counsel and the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Healthmart USA, LLC et al. v. Directory Assistants, Inc.
In a dispute over the enforceability of an arbitration provision in a consulting contract, the trial court found the provision ambiguous and denied the appellant’s motion to dismiss or to compel arbitration. We find that the provision is not ambiguous. We remand for a ruling on the condition precedent to arbitration: whether the appellant made a good faith effort to come to a mutual agreement before unilaterally selecting an arbitration service, location, and choice of law forum. We have also concluded that should the parties reach arbitration, the issue of fraud in the inducement is arbitrable. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leonard Allen
A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Leonard Allen, of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years in confinement to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) a plea agreement he entered into with the State after the jury convicted him is invalid because he had already filed a notice of appeal to this court; (2) the trial court committed plain error by not ruling that a photograph array shown to the victim months after the robbery and introduced into evidence at trial was impermissibly suggestive; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s conviction for especially aggravated robbery. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marshall Howard Murdock v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has appealed the trial court’s order dismissing his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kirby Whited
A Fentress County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Kirby Whited, of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. Following his conviction, the trial court imposed a sentence of three years, with fifty days to be served in jail and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court. The State concedes that the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant’s conviction. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient; therefore, the appellant’s conviction must be vacated and the case dismissed. |
Fentress | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cumberland Properties, LLC v. Ravenwood Club, Inc., et al.
This is a contract case. Appellant, a Nashville Country Club, hired Appellee, a real estate development and consulting firm, to help the Club procure the best price available for the sale of its real property. Appellee claimed that it was due fees under the parties’ written agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellant appeals, arguing that: (1) the parties’ contract was not supported by adequate consideration; (2) the parties’ contract was void as against public policy based upon Appellants’ allegation that Appellee was acting as a broker; (3) the trial court erred in allowing parol evidence and in its interpretation of the terms of the parties’ agreement; and (4) the trial court erred in calculating Appellee’s damages. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand for determination of Appellee’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in defending this appeal. Affirmed and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert A. Stolze v. Janet F. Stolze
In this divorce action, Husband appeals trial court’s award of alimony to Wife, grounds for divorce, and overall division of marital assets. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the nature or amount of alimony awarded, grounds for divorce, or the overall division of marital assets, the judgment is affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel Natalie L. Dancy v. Paul L. King
The petitioner executed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity shortly after the birth of a child. Several years later, after he was ordered to pay child support, he filed a petition seeking to rescind the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, or alternatively seeking court-approved DNA testing, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-113. The juvenile court denied his petition upon finding that he failed to prove fraud in the procurement of the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding concerning fraudulent procurement, we reverse and remand for further proceedings to include parentage tests. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Phillip McCormick v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Phillip McCormick, appeals pro se the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from the remainder of his forty-year sentence for a 1984 conviction. The Petitioner contends that (1) the trial court erred by finding that the State did not relinquish jurisdiction when it surrendered him to federal authorities to serve concurrent federal and state sentences for felonies he committed while on parole, (2) the State violated his due process rights by failing to hold a parole revocation hearing before transferring him, and (3) the trial court erred by dismissing his petition without appointing counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Everett
Appellant, Jonathan Everett, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. After a lengthy jury trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of second degree murder, one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and one count of reckless endangerment. As a result, Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-nine years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. Appellant presents the following issues for our review on direct appeal: (1) whether the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss and remand for a preliminary hearing; (2) whether the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress Appellant’s statement; (3) whether the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s request to cross-examine Jamarcus Palmer about specific instances of conduct; (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; and (5) whether the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss; the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress when Appellant’s statement was made knowingly and voluntarily; the trial court properly denied Appellant’s request to cross-examine Jamarcus Palmer; the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; and the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeff Burkhart v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee, et al.
Assistant Chief Shift Commander of city fire department appeals trial court affirmance of hearing committee’s finding of just cause for his termination. Finding that the trial court appropriately applied the proper standard of review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Dorothy Watson v. Robert L. Payne, Jr.
amount of “zero.” The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for additur. We vacate the trial court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial or additur, and remand. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Teddy Ray Mitchell
The defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct and sentenced to thirty days in jail, to be served on probation. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient. This Court granted the State permission to appeal in order to consider the admissibility of a racially derogatory term, to review the sufficiency of the evidence, and to determine whether the conviction violated the constitutional right to free speech. Because the disputed testimony was properly admitted, the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for disorderly conduct, and there was no violation of the right to free speech, the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed. The judgment of conviction and sentence is reinstated. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Teddy Ray Mitchell - Dissenting
I write separately to dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct. After giving proper deference to the jury’s verdict, I cannot agree that the evidence is sufficient to support Mr. Mitchell’s conviction for disorderly conduct. Moreover, I conclude that Mr. Mitchell’s conduct was protected as free speech. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
Fred Thompson, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Fred Thompson, Jr., appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of theft and theft of property valued less than $10,000, a Class D felony. He received a sentence of life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of five years for the theft conviction. The Petitioner challenges the performance of trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Rae Lewter
The Defendant-Appellant, James Rae Lewter, was convicted by a Lincoln County jury of burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, both Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced Lewter as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of eight years at thirty-five percent in the Department of Correction. On direct appeal, Lewter argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him; (2) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence of eight years in violation of State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733, 740 (Tenn. 2007); and (3) the State engaged in misconduct during closing arguments. See State v. James Rae Lewter, No. M2007-02723-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1076716, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 9, 2009), rev’d, 313 S.W.3d 745 (Tenn. June 4, 2010). Upon initial review, this court, after concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, reversed and vacated Lewter’s convictions and dismissed the indictment. Id. Following the reversal, the State applied for permission to appeal this court’s decision to the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, and on August 17, 2009, permission to appeal was granted. Upon review, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that “the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Lewter, 313 S.W.3d 745, 746 (Tenn. 2010). Consequently, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case to this court for consideration of the remaining two issues: (1) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence in violation of Gomez, 239 S.W.3d at 740; and (2) whether the State engaged in misconduct during closing arguments. See Lewter, 313 S.W.3d at 751. On remand, we conclude that Lewter did not receive an excessive sentence pursuant to Gomez and that the State’s remarks during closing argument did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, as to the issues remanded for our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas E. Campbell
The Defendant-Appellant, Thomas E. Campbell, was convicted by a Warren County jury of attempted child abuse, a Class B misdemeanor, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to six months in the county jail for attempted child abuse. For aggravated sexual battery, Campbell was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Campbell claims that: (1) both convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence; and (2) his sentence for aggravated sexual battery was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Henry Lee Moore
The Defendant, Henry Lee Moore, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for two counts of violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act, a Class E felony, and one count of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, and ordering the remainder of his effective four-year sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Alexander Montgomery, III
The Defendant, Paul Alexander Montgomery, III, was convicted of nine counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions of rape of a child and (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). Following our review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the Defendant’s case for a new trial. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby G. Neely v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Bobby G. Neely, appeals the Marion County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape of a child, criminal attempt to manufacture a Schedule II controlled substance, and child abuse, for which he received an effective sentence of fifteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by determining that he failed to file his petition for post-conviction relief in a timely manner. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
April Amanda Worley v. Richard Thomas Whitaker
Plaintiff sought and obtained an Order of Protection from the trial court against defendant, Subsequently, following an evidentiary hearing, the Court found defendant in contempt of the Order of Protection, and sentenced him to 1830 days in prison. Defendant has appealed to this Court inter alia, seeking a reduction in the sentence. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court, but modify by reducing his sentence to 730 days. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Mary Pauline Stumpe Schorn, Deceased
In March of 2004, the trial court entered an order to probate the Last Will and Testament of Mary Pauline Stumpe Schorn (“Deceased”) and appointed John H. Schorn the Personal Representative of Deceased’s estate (“Personal Representative”). On April 13, 2010, the trial court entered an order that, inter alia, ordered the Personal Representative to “compile a complete list of where the estate monies are and what has been spent since the last accounting was provided to the beneficiaries …,” within thirty days, and to close and settle the estate within ninety days. The Personal Representative appeals the April 13, 2010 Order to this Court. We hold that the order appealed from is not a final judgment, and, therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The appeal is dismissed. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals |