Charles W. Hendricks v. Lori A. Smith
This appeal arises from a dispute over child custody. Charles W. Hendricks (“Father”) and Lori A. Smith (“Mother”) entered into an agreed permanent parenting plan concerning their two minor children (“the Children”). Less than two weeks after entry of the plan, Father filed a motion for custody of the Children in the Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”) alleging that the parenting plan had been procured by fraud as Mother had not disclosed that she worked as a licensed prostitute in Nevada. The Magistrate found a material change in circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the Children for Father to have custody. Mother appealed to the Juvenile Court. After a trial, the Juvenile Court found a material change in circumstances based on Mother’s having worked as a prostitute and her having concealed that fact, as well as Mother’s hostility to Father and the Children’s stepmother. The Juvenile Court entered a permanent parenting plan designating Father as primary residential parent of the Children. Mother appealed to this Court. Because the Juvenile Court did not conduct a best interest analysis, we vacate the judgment of the Juvenile Court and remand for further proceedings as necessary. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alvin Upchurch
Defendant, Alvin Upchurch, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court to serve 12 years in confinement. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether the sentence imposed was excessive. Having reviewed the record before us, we conclude that Defendant’s sentence was proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sean Blake
Appellant, Sean Blake, pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted second degree murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and robbery. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed because appellant’s sentences had expired. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion because an illegal sentence may be challenged at any time pursuant to Rule 36.1. The State concedes that this case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cedric Taylor
Appellant, Cedric Taylor, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, for which he received an effective sentence of eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Darelle Smith
A jury convicted the defendant, William Darelle Smith, of first degree (premeditated) murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, this court affirmed the denial of the motion for a new trial. The defendant appealed a single issue to the Tennessee Supreme Court: that his right to an impartial jury was compromised because the trial court did not hold a hearing after the discovery, during jury deliberations, that a juror was not only acquainted with one of the State’s witnesses but had sent the witness a communication through Facebook complimenting her on her testimony. The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had erred in refusing to hold a hearing and remanded the case. After a hearing during which the juror and the witness testified regarding the nature of both their relationship and the communication, the trial court again denied the defendant a new trial. The defendant appeals. We conclude that the State sufficiently rebutted any presumption of prejudice raised by the juror’s extrajudicial communication or by his concealment of his acquaintance with the witness, and accordingly we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerterrius Marshawn Akridge Et Al. v. Fathom, Inc. et al.
This is an interlocutory appeal regarding the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit following a shooting that occurred on December 24, 2011, outside Club Fathom in Chattanooga, a youth outreach ministry operated by two of the defendants. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied their motions, and the defendants sought and were granted an interlocutory appeal. We determine that the court erred in failing to grant summary judgment to the defendants regarding the plaintiffs’ negligence claims. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court. We remand the case for entry of summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs’ negligence claims and for a determination regarding the remaining lease issue. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Edward Arnold, Jr.
Defendant, William Edward Arnold, Jr., was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child for acts that took place while Defendant was a mentor for the victim through Big Brothers Big Sisters. Prior to trial, Defendant sought to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior sexual knowledge pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412. The trial court granted the motion in part but prohibited the introduction of any extrinsic evidence at trial. At the conclusion of the proof at trial, the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on two counts of aggravated sexual battery, finding them “impossible” under the facts as presented to the jury. The jury convicted Defendant of the remaining charges: one count of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child. The trial court denied the motion for new trial and sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal as to the counts for which he was found guilty, the denial of the motion for new trial, and the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412. After a thorough review of the record, the applicable authorities, and the issues, we determine the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, and the trial court properly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal. Further, we determine that the trial court properly determined that specific instances of conduct of prior sexual behavior of the victim were not admissible under Rule 412(c)(4). Additionally, we agree with the trial court’s determination that due process permitted the victim to be subject to cross-examination, limited by Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Rezba v. Michael Rezba
Father brought suit against Son in general sessions court for repayment of certain alleged debts. After Father’s case was dismissed, he appealed to circuit court, which also dismissed Father’s claims after a trial. Based on the record on appeal, sufficient facts exist to support the trial court’s determination, and the decision of the trial court is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Anne Ogles v. Thomas Wayne Ogles
This is an appeal from a three-day divorce trial. The trial court classified and valued the parties’ assets and divided the marital estate. The court awarded the wife $2,000 per month in transitional alimony for a period of 14 months, and it denied the parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. The wife appeals, challenging the trial court’s classification and valuation of certain assets, the alimony award, and the trial court’s decision to deny her request for attorney’s fees. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Miller v. Annie Miller
Plaintiff/Appellee Mark Andrew Miller (“Father”) filed a petition for contempt against Defendant/Appellant Annie Elizabeth Miller(“Mother”). After conducting a hearing, the trial court found Mother guilty of two counts of criminal contempt. Mother appealed asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter or, alternatively, that the evidence did not support a finding that she acted willfully. Although we conclude that the trialcourthad jurisdiction to adjudicate Father’s petition for contempt,we agree with Mother that the contempt convictions should be overturned. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brian M et al.
This is a termination of parental rights appeal brought by the incarcerated father. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support termination of the father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment and confinement under a sentence of ten years or more. The court further found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Elizabeth Adams v. State of Tennessee
An employee injured her shoulder while working for her employer and failed to make a meaningful return to work. The Claims Commission awarded the employee 55% permanent partial disability. The employer appealed, arguing that the award is excessive 1 because the Commissioner erred in assessing an 11% anatomical impairment rating and in applying a five times multiplier. We modify the Commissioner’s judgment, and affirm as modified. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Grover Cowart v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Grover D. Cowart, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, or, in the alternative, motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the judgments of conviction in Case No. 50934 are void; (2) the judgment of conviction in Count 1 of Case No. 50934 is too “indefinite nd ambiguous” to run consecutively to his conviction in Case No. 49900; (3) the judgments of conviction in Counts 2 and 3 in Case No. 50934 are too “indefinite, uncertain, and ambiguous” to run consecutively to Count 4 in Case No. 49900; and (4) the sentences in Case No. 50934 are expired. Discerning no error, we affirm the summary dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lori Kay Jones Trigg v. Richard Darrell Trigg
This is an irreconcilable differences divorce case. The trial court entered a final judgment of divorce that incorporated the parties’ mediated marital dissolution agreement. Shortly thereafter, Husband filed a motion to set aside or to alter or amend the final judgment, claiming he was under duress when he entered into the marital dissolution agreement and also claiming that the trial court was required to conduct a hearing before entering the final judgment. The trial court disagreed and denied Husband’s motion. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Bryan Gatlin
The Defendant, William Bryan Gatlin, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, Class E felonies, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4) (possession of a controlled substance) (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014), 39-17-425 (possession of drug paraphernalia) (2014). The trial court merged the possession of marijuana convictions. The Defendant was sentenced to serve two years for the merged possession of marijuana conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia. The sentences were imposed consecutively to each other and to any unexpired sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a knock-and-talk encounter and a warrantless entry into his apartment and that the judgments should be reversed because without the illegally obtained evidence, the remaining evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cathy Turnbo Franks v. Ronald Franks
This appeal involves various financial issues relative to a divorce. Husband appeals the trial court’s determination of several factual findings relative to alimony, including Wife’s ability to secure employment, Husband’s ability to earn in the future, the award of attorney’s fees to Wife, and the value of several marital assets divided in the property division, including the value of an LLC jointly owned by the parties. Wife also appeals the trial court’s determination of value and the division of the parties’ joint interest in the LLC, which the trial court awarded to Husband without assigning a value. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Aimee Lorraine Howell v. Clint Austin Howell
In this divorce action, Father appeals the rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido awarded to Mother, the amount of parenting time he received, the designation of Mother as sole decision-maker and the failure of the trial court to find that Mother was voluntarily underemployed. We affirm the award of rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido and the designation of Mother as primary residential parent; we vacate and remand for further consideration the residential parenting schedule,the allocation of decision-making authority, and the determination of Mother’s income. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville, et al. v. Robert W. Donaldson, Jr.
Defendant appeals a judgment holding that he ran a stop sign, contending that the court did not have subjectmatter or in personam jurisdiction over the matter, and that the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County lacked standing to bring the action. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Donald C., et al
Mother’s parental rights to her children were terminated on grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, persistence of conditions, and noncompliance with a permanency plan. Mother challenged the ground of abandonment, arguing there was a no contact order in place that prevented her from visiting her children. When the no contact order was put into place, Mother was informed she would be able to visit her children if she passed drug tests and took parenting classes. Mother continued to test positive for illegal drugs and failed to take advantage of services offered by the Department of Children’s Services. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that Mother abandoned her children by failing to visit them and that it is in their best interest to terminate her rights. A petition for custody that may have been pending when Mother’s rights were terminated is part of a different proceeding and does not render the court’s decision to terminate Mother’s rights premature. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Cedric Jones, Sr. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Suit for breach of contract to recover on a homeowners policy for losses sustained when policyholder’s home was allegedly burglarized and was allegedly damaged as a result of a storm. Upon defendant’s motion, the trial court granted summary judgment, holding that the insurance company defendant had demonstrated that policyholder could not meet his burden of proof as to any of his claims. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Sirbaugh v. Vanderbilt University, d/b/a Vanderbilt University Medical Center, et al.
The plaintiff in this interlocutory appeal filed a complaint asserting health care liability claims against the original defendants, at which time she included a certificate of good faith in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122. The original defendants asserted comparative fault against non-party health care providers. The plaintiff waived compliance by the original defendants with section 29-26-122(b), which required the defendants to file a certificate of good faith regarding the non-party health care providers. The plaintiff thereafter amended her complaint to add the named non-party health care providers as new defendants but did not file a new certificate of good faith. The new defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The trial court denied the motions and granted this interlocutory appeal. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bryan Dewayne Clark v. Jennifer Inez Clark
This appeal arises from divorced parents’ child custody dispute. After Mother was arrested twice for driving under the influence, Father requested that he be designated as the primary residential parent and that Mother have supervised parenting time only. Without making any specific factual findings, the trial court found that there had been a “substantial and material change in circumstances” since the prior custody order, and the trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother’s parenting time was decreased by 196 days, her decision-making authoritywas removed, and she was ordered to pay child support to Father. Because the trial court’s order fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph E. Peek v. Tri-Green Equipment, LLC, et al
An employee was exposed to a chemical in the course of his employment. He alleged that he developed a disabling pulmonary condition as a result of the exposure. His employer denied that the condition was caused by the exposure. The trial court found for the employee and awarded permanent partial disability and other benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the finding of causation. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Putnam | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Chad Seigmund v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, et al
In December 2011, Chad Seigmund (“Employee”) was involved in a motor vehicle accident in the course of his employment. His employer, Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC (“Employer”) provided medical treatment but denied that Employee sustained permanent impairment or disability. Following a trial, the trial court found that Employee had sustained permanent disability and awarded Employee 16.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the permanent disabilityfinding. In accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Dennis Turner et al v. City of Bean Station et al
Dennis Turner was injured while playing softball in a charity tournament at Marvin Rich Field in Bean Station. He sued the City of Bean Station, among other defendants, alleging that the City negligently failed to properly maintain the pitcher’s mound, pitcher’s rubber, and the field as a whole, resulting in his injury. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that its governmental immunity is not removed by the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), which removes immunity for “any injury caused by the dangerous or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement owned and controlled by [a] governmental entity.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-204(a)(2012) (emphasis added). The City presented proof establishing that it does not own Marvin Rich Field. The trial court denied the motion but granted permission for an interlocutory appeal. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and grant the City’s motion for summary judgment. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals |