Teresa Woody v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 02S01-9976-CH-00052
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the plaintiff benefits based on a finding of 25 percent permanent partial disability to her whole body. The defendant appeals, asserting the excessiveness of this award and the bar of the statute of limitations. An in-depth discussion of her employment history with the defendant is necessary for an adequate assessment of her claim. She was 34 years old at the time of trial and lives in Obion County, Tennessee. She completed high school and attended Vanderbilt University for a short period of time. At the time of trial, she was a senior at the University of Tennessee at Martin majoring in English, lacking approximately three hours before graduation. Following graduation, she plans to attend graduate school, seek a Masters Degree in English, and ultimately teach. Her work history includes a work study program at Vanderbilt University, primarily clerical in nature. She has worked for Baptist Hospital in Union City as an admission clerk, a clerical position, and in 1988, she began working for Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, in the gift shop. Shortly thereafter, she moved into the factory, working on a bias unit, which involved repetitive overhead lifting, twisting and turning. In June of 1989, she began having pain and problems with her shoulders, and informed her supervisor, David Stephenson, of these problems and filled out an incident report in July, 1989. She was initially seen by Dr. David St. Clair who diagnosed impingement syndrome. Her claim for workers' compensation benefits was eventually denied. She continued to work on the bias machine and her shoulder problems progressively worsened. In 199, she resigned her position with the defendant to attend school, and worked part-time for Baptist Hospital in Union City, again 2
Obion
Workers Compensation Panel
Bruce O. Tibbs, Jr. v. City of Humbodlt, Tn 02S01-9706-CH-00057
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. George R. Ellis,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 33 percent vocational impairment for injuries occurring on October 27, 1995. We affirm the judgment. The plaintiff was employed as an officer with the defendant. The plaintiff finished nine years of formal education and subsequently obtained a G.E.D. He was trained and worked as a machine mechanic prior to becoming employed as an officer with the defendant. At the time of trial, the plaintiff was 33 years of age. Prior Injury On October 9, 1994, the plaintiff injured his back in the course of his employment with the defendant. In February 1995, a lumbar laminectomy at L5-S1 was performed. The treating physician, Dr. John W. Neblett, concluded the plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement from this injury on June 14, 1995 and found the plaintiff suffered a ten percent permanent medical impairment to the body as a whole. The plaintiff was released with restrictions of not repeatedly lifting more than 2 pounds at a time nor ever lifting as much as 4 pounds at a time and that he should not sit more than one hour at a time whether standing or walking. On July 18, 1995, the plaintiff returned to Dr. Neblett and reported he had significantly improved. Dr. Neblett, upon the request of the plaintiff and upon the 2
Gibson
Workers Compensation Panel
Joey Sweat v. Superior Industries, Inc. 03S01-9701-CH-00006
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. I This is a psoriatic arthritis1 case, an on-going debilitating condition, which pre-existed the plaintiff's employment. He alleges that he was asymptomatic prior to his employment by the defendant and that the nature of his job triggered his symptoms and worsened the underlying disease. The defendant says that only the symptoms, i.e., pain and swelling, were exacerbated by employment (as any physical activity would do) but that the disease per se was not worsened. Dr. David Lurie testified by deposition. The precise issue of whether the plaintiff's employment caused a progression of the disease or whether it merely aggravated the symptoms was not sufficiently articulated by Dr. Lurie in the opinion of the trial judge, and he requested that Dr. Lurie elucidate the point either by a supplemental deposition or by letter. Counsel agreed to the latter. He was asked: In your opinion, based on a reasonable medical probability, did Sweat's activities . . . advance and result in an actual progression of his underlying psoriatic arthritis? To which Dr. Lurie responded: "In my opinion, based on reasonable medical probability Sweat's work . . . advanced and resulted in actual progression of his underlying psoriatic arthritis." He testified that the allocation of the progression of the disease from physical activity as contrasted to spontaneous progression was not quantifiable, but that the "repetitive, strenuous, weight-bearing activities resulted in some permanent joint injury." 1A connective tissue arthritis, not curable, and highly debilitating. 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Janet Wynn v. Tecumseh Products Co. 02S01-9709-CV-00081
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Creed Mcginley,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court awarded the plaintiff a 3 percent permanent partial disability to her right leg, a 4 percent permanent partial disability to each of her arms, and medical expenses in the amount of $77.. The trial court noted that the plaintiff is very bright and capable of expressing herself. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: "1. Does the evidence preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that Plaintiff sustained a thirty (3%) percent permanent partial disability to her right leg. 2. Does the evidence preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that Plaintiff's condition to each of Plaintiff's arms was caused by the work activities performed at Tecumseh Products Company. 3. Does the evidence preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that Plaintiff sustained a forty (4%) percent permanent partial disability to each of her arms. 4. Did the Trial Court err in finding that Tecumseh should pay Dr. James Spruill's medical charges in the amount of $77.." We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Henry
Workers Compensation Panel
Shannon Forrest v. Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc. 02S01-9705-CV-00050
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Creed Mcginley
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff has a 7 percent permanent partial disability to her whole body as a result of a compensable injury she sustained in September 1993, and awarded benefits accordingly, together with medical payments and mileage. The employer appeals, insisting that these findings are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The plaintiff is 3 years of age with limited marketable skills. She commenced work for the defendant in 1988 and quit in September 1996. In September 1993 she operated a "top press," and pressed upwards of 2, pairs of trousers each day. She testified that pain and a tingling sensation developed in her right leg and hip for which she sought medical attention, and advised her supervisor of her problems. Her physician was Dr. Lawrence, whom she heard call Jeff Harris, plant manager, to inform him of her condition and request lighter duty. She did not work for "six to eight weeks." Dr. Lawrence referred her to the Jackson Orthopedic Clinic for examination and treatment, and she was later examined and treated at the Semmes Murphey Clinic in Jackson. Various tests were performed, including a CAT scan and MRI. She was eventually referred 2
Carroll
Workers Compensation Panel
Beryl Jack v. State 01S01-9706-BC-00136
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. William Robert Baker,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends the evidence preponderates against the commissioner's finding that her claim is barred because of a false statement contained in her employment application. The panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant has been a certified nursing technician since 1973. She began working for Bethany Health Care, a nursing home, in May of 199 and soon thereafter injured her back while lifting a patient. As a result of that injury, she received two laminectomies at L5-S1. Following those surgeries, she had difficulty standing, bending and sitting for long periods of time. The operating surgeon imposed lifting and bending restrictions. She was awarded permanent partial disability benefits and applied for social security disability benefits. She was terminated from Bethany because that employer did not have work for her within her limitations. On October 1, 1991, she made written application for employment at Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute. On that application, she was asked, "Do you have a limiting disability or handicap?" She responded, "No." In response to a question as to her reason for leaving Bethany, she wrote, "Illness in the family." On another document, she denied having any "history of physical defects." On the strength of that application, she was approved for employment by the state. We find in the record no evidence that the employer had any knowledge of her pre-existing disability. It is equally clear in the record that she could not have been employed as she was if the above questions had been accurately answered. The commissioner denied compensation benefits because of the false application. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review. Kellerman v. Food Lion, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 333 (Tenn. 1996). A false statement in an employee'sapplication for employment will bar recovery of workers' compensation benefits if all three of the following elements exist: first, the employee must have knowingly and willfully made a false representation as to his physical condition; second, the employer must have relied upon the false representation and such reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring; and third, there must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. Federal Copper and Aluminum Company v. Dickey, 493 S.W.2d 463 (Tenn. 1973). The causal 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
John W. Gray, Iii v. Gray and Williams, Inc., et al 02S01-9706-CH-00054
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Neal Small,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 6 percent permanent partial disability. The defendants say the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court's award of 6 percent permanent partial disability to the plaintiff's body as a whole as a result of his work related accident. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The issue with which we are confronted is whether the State may be liable to a county employee for employment discrimination under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA") when the county employee is under the supervision of a state judge who commits quid pro quo sexual harassment against the county employee. The trial court answered the question in the negative holding that the State was not the plaintiff's employer under the THRA. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the THRA imposed liability on the State under an economic realities test. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm as modified the appellate court's reversal of the trial court's judgment.
In this boundary line dispute the defendants appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, insisting that the evidence established their right to the disputed area by adverse possession.
This is an action to recover profits the plaintiff contractor alleges he would have made had he been allowed to construct an additional four warehouses similar in design and usage to a fifth warehouse he constructed and for which he was paid.
During a wide-ranging investigation, law enforcement officers located and seized several items of property thought to be used in the conduct of an illegal drug enterprise. Criminal charges followed the several seizures, and Page Stuart, the appellant, pleaded guilty to offenses involving delivery and conspiracy to deliver large quantities of marijuana. The State thereafter instituted administrative proceedings under Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-11-201 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1992) for the forfeiture of the property seized. Although Stuart challenged the forfeiture of some of the property,1 he was not successful, and both the Chancery Court and the Court of Appeals upheld the forfeiture. We granted Stuart’s application for review under Rule 11
