Sidney Tillman Hoover, v. Daniel Edmondson Hoover
01A01-9706-CV-00245
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge H. Denmark Bell

This is a divorce case. Defendant-appellant Daniel Hoover appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and asserts that the land containing the parties marital home was improperly classified as wife’s separate property. Plaintiff-appellee Sidney Hoover asserts that the trial court erred in failing to award her one-half of Husband’s retirement account.

City of Murfreesboro v. Mariann M. Worthington, City of Murfreesboro v. Thomas W. Worthington and wife, Mariann M. Worthington
01A01-9703-CV-00124
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard

Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing of Plaintiff/Appellant City of Murfreesboro, the petition is denied.

In the matter of: Joel Kristen Sipe, State of Tennessee, Dept. of Childrens Services v. Bruce Sipe and Laurel Sipe
01A01-9704-JV-00185
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Andrew J. Shookhoff

This is a termination of parental rights case. The minor child in question is Joel Kristen Sipe, born September 7, 1995 to Laurel Sipe (“Mother”) and Bruce Sipe (“Father”). The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents as to this child after finding on clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to do so. Both parents have appealed. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.

Bobby Blackmon, v. Steven F. Glaser
01A01-9606-CV-00269
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas Goodall

The plaintiff, Bobby Blackmon, has appealed from a judgment reading as follows: The Motion to Set Pretrial Management Conference is overruled. This order shall be considered as a final judgment disposing of any claim, right or liability of any party as contemplated by T.R.A.P. Rule 3(a). IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of March, 1996.

Patricia Diane Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
02S01-9705-CH-00048
Authoring Judge: Cornelia A.Clark, Specials Judge
Trial Court Judge: HON. GEORGE R. ELLIS

State of Tennessee vs. Gary Raines, Debra Raines and Jerry Raines
01C01-9703-CC-00108
Authoring Judge: Judge John H. Peay
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

Following the denial of their motion to suppress evidence, the Defendants, Gary Raines and Debra Raines ple d guilty in the Circuit Court of Cheatham County to possession of marijuana for resale and possession of drug paraphernalia, and Defendant Jerry Raines pled guilty to simple possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. In their pleas, Defendants reserved the right to appeal the trial court’s d enial of their motion to suppress as a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rules 11(e) and 37(b)(2)(I) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, the certified question is: “Whether or not the initial entry upon the premises and the subsequent consent search was legal.” We affirm the judgment of the trial court, as modified to correct an apparent clerical error.

Ronald E. Nelson v., James P. Everett, et al.
02A01-9707-CV-00150
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Swearengen

Plaintiff/Appellant, Ronald E. Nelson (“Nelson”) appeals the judgment of the trial court granting defendants/appellees’, James P. Everett (“Everett”) and Memphis Publishing Company, Inc., d/b/a The Commercial Appeal (“Memphis Publishing Company”) (collectively “defendants”), motion for summary judgment. For reasons stated hereinafter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Patricia Herndon, Next of Kin of Warren G. Price, Deceased, v. Michael and Jeanette Hughes, and Jeff McAlpin, D/B/A Pyramid Motors and McAlpin Enterprises
02A01-9706-CV-00128
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Swearengen

This appeal involves an automobile accident and the subsequent wrongful death action brought by the daughter of the decedent. Plaintiff-appellant, Patricia Herndon, filed suit against
Michael Hughes, the driver of the other automobile, the driver’s wife Jeanette Hughes, co-owner 2 of the vehicle, and Jeff McAlpin & Associates, Inc., (McAlpin), the car dealership that sold Mr. Hughes the automobile. Ms. Herndon appeals the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to McAlpin.

State of Tennessee vs. William F. Hegger
01C01-9607-CR-00283
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas H. Ware

On May 17, 1994, a Davidson County jury found Appellant, William F. Hegger, guilty of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, first offense. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I standard offender to eleven months and twenty-nine d ays incarceration (all but ten days suspended), imposed a two-hundred and fifty dollar fine, ordered Appellant to attend alcohol treatment school, and suspended Appellant’s driver’s license for a period of one year. Appellant was further ordered to perform two hundred hours of public service work. On February 22, 1996, following a hearing upon Appellant’s motion, the trial court modified Appellant’s sentence, waiving the fine and public service work. The trial court found that Appellant had completed his jail time and the one year suspension of his license. Appellant filed a timely notice of app eal, raising several issues, namely:

1) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence regarding the horizontal gaze nystagmus HGN) test;

2) whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Lt. Louise Kelton;
3) whether the evidence was sufficien t to suppo rt the jury verdict;
4) whether the defense counsel provided effective assistance of counsel.

After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial co urt.

Daryl Turner vs. State of Tennessee
01C01-9608-CR-00374
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane Wheatcraft

The appellant, Daryl Turner, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1993, appellant was convicted of selling a Schedule II controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, and was sentenced to twelve (12) years as a Range III persistent offender. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. See State v. Darrel Tucker1, No. 01-C-01-9310-CR00347 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 6, 1994), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1995). The appellant, thereafter, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, malicious prosecution, and invalid “reasonable doubt” jury instructions.2 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed appellant’s petition upon finding no ground to warrant post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

Daryl Turner vs. State of Tennessee
01C01-9608-CR-00374
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane Wheatcraft

The appellant, Daryl Turner, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1993, appellant was convicted of selling a Schedule II controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, and was sentenced to twelve (12) years as a Range III persistent offender. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. See State v. Darrel Tucker1, No. 01-C-01-9310-CR00347 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 6, 1994), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1995). The appellant, thereafter, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, malicious prosecution, and invalid “reasonable doubt” jury instructions.2 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed appellant’s petition upon finding no ground to warrant post-conviction relief. We affirm the  judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

Meese & Associates, Inc., v. Eddie Powers and David Hicks, Rebecca Car Kirklin, v. Meese Associates, Inc.
03A01-9705-CH-
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Billy Joe White

Plaintiff, Meese & Associates, Inc. (“plaintiff”), appeals the judgment of the trial court 2 awarding Intervening Plaintiff/Appellee, Rebecca Kirklin (“Kirklin”), the real estate commission for the sale of Defendants/Appellees’, Eddie Powers (“Powers”) and David Hicks (“Hicks”) (collectively “defendants”), property by Kirklin. For reasons stated hereinafter, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand.

Alexander Jackson Bullard vs. The City of Chattanooga Fireman's & Policeman's Insurance & Pension Fund Board - Concurring
03A01-9705-CH-00193
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Howell N. Peoples

In this action plaintiff sought job-related disability benefits from his pension plan, administered by the City of Chattanooga Firemen’s and  Policemen’s Insurance and Pension Fund Board (“Board”). The Board, after an evidentiary hearing, voted 3 to 2 to deny benefits. An appeal was taken to the Chancery Court, and the Chancellor overturned the decision of the Board and awarded benefits. For reasons hereinafter stated we affirm and adopt from the Chancellor’s Opinion.

Russell Keith Berry v. Bryan Lee Berry and Paula Faye Berry
03A01-9707-CH-00410
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Lewis W. May, Jr.

Plaintiff Russell Keith Berry, brought this action on behalf of himself and his grandmother. He alleged that his grandmother, Lorena Beryl Berry, is mentally incompetent and physically ill and that the defendants, his brother and sister-in-law, gained unfair advantage of her incompetency by fraudulently taking control of all her worldly possessions. The plaintiff also alleged the defendants converted his personal property while he was incarcerated. Defendants move for summary judgment. The motion was granted and the complaint dismissed. This appeal resulted. We find there are genuine issues of material fact and revers the trial court's judgment.

Interstate Mechanical Contractors, Inc., v. MCH Partners: Jimmy R. Reagan, d/b/a Precision Construction Company, et al. - Concurring
03A01-9706-CH-00234
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Chester S. Rainwater

This appeal involves a payment dispute between the plaintiff, Don Conseen, a subcontractor doing business as DC Service & Sales, and defendants Jimmy R. Reagan and Howard Sexton, doing business as Precision Construction Company, a general contractor. Plaintiff sued for payment for construction work which he testified was requested and approved by defendants, and for which he was promised payment by the defendants. An evidentiary hearing was held. The defendants presented no proof at trial. The chancellor granted plaintiff a judgment for $19, 267.45, the amount sought by the plaintiff. The defendants appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. Stephen Renfro, Jr., v. John Doe
03A01-9710-CV-00447
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dale Workman

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered i favor of Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, an unnamed party brought before the court pursuant to T.C.A. § 5 6 - 7 - 1 2 0 6 .  The question before us is whether the plaintiff, Steven Renfro, is an insured within th emeaning of Ohio Casualty's uninsured motorist (UM) policy provisions. The precise issues, whether the plaintiff, at the time of his injury, was "occupying" the covered vehicle as that term is defined in the policy under consideration. The trial court fond, on motion for summary judgment, that the plaintiff was not "occupying" the ehicle. we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Southland Realtors Inc., v. Tabor Construction Company, Inc., - Concurring
03A01-9710-CV-00455
Authoring Judge: Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

The trial court allowed the plaintiff a recovery of a commission for the sale of real estate. The defendant appeals, insisting that (1) the plaintiff was not a party to the sales agency contract and thus had no standing to file this action, (2) the agency contract expired before performance, (3) the plaintiff “performed no useful work,” and (4) the record “cannot support a judgment for anyone.” Each of these issues alleges that the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment.

Lawrence Dixson and wife, Mary Dixson, v. Atlantic Soft Drink Company, also D/B/A Pepsi Cola Company
03A01-9709-CV-00417
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Judge Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

At approximately 1:00 on Christmas morning of 1995, a pickup truck which had been stolen from the defendant Atlantic Soft Drink Company's business compound, crashed into the plaintiffs' residence, allegedly causing property damage and personal injury to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, in their complaint asserted that the defendant was negligent in leaving the keys inside the unlocked
truck and providing inadequate security for the parking lot where company vehicles were left. The plaintiffs also sought to impose liability on the defendant under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The defendant moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted and the complaint dismissed. This appeal resulted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Scenic Helicopters, Inc., Scenic Helicopter Rides , Limited, v. City of Sevierville, Tennessee
03A01-9709-CH-00439
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chester S. Rainwater, Jr.

This complaint sought a writ of mandamus to require the City to issue a sign permit, or, alternatively, to review the action of the City in denying the application for a permit. The Chancellor found that the action of the Board of Zoning Appeals in denying the permit was arbitrary and ordered the issuance of the permit. We affirm.

Randy Hicks v. State of Tennessee
03C01-9608-CR-00296
Authoring Judge: Judge Curwood Witt
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mayo L. Mashburn

Randy Hicks appeals the McMinn County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his "Motion for New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence Rule 22, FRCrP." The lower court considered this "motion" under the law applicable to motions for new trial, petitions for writ of error coram nobis, and petitions for post-conviction relief, found it without merit, and summarily dismissed Hicks's claim without conducting a hearing. Hicks's underlying conviction is for criminal facilitation of first degree murder, for which he is serving a 25 year sentence. State v. Hicks, 835 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). In his pro se appellate brief, Hicks never directly attacks the lower court's denial of his "motion," but he does raise several issues relating to the admission of evidence, denial of a severance and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence at his trial. He also filed with his pro se appellate brief a document entitled Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, in which he alleges that the district attorney knowingly and willfully submitted false evidence in his trial.1 Having painstakingly reviewed the record and Hicks's brief, we affirm the trial court's summary dismissal of the claim. Likewise, we find the petition filed in this court proper for dismissal.

Lucy B. Anderson v. Lenzing U.S.A
03S01-9704-CV-00036
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ben K. Wexler,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal has been perfected by Lucy Anderson, widow and administratrix of the Estate of Billy Joe Anderson, deceased, from a ruling by the trial court that her claim for death benefits was not compensable as she failed to establish her husband's death was caused by his work activities. At the time of his death, Mr. Anderson was 54 years of age, was six foot four inches tall and weighed between 26-28 pounds. He had been employed as a cutter operator with defendant, Lenzing U.S.A., for about six years but had worked a total of 21 years for the company. Plaintiff testified her husband was in good health, took no medication and never complained of chest pains. She said he smoked cigars sometimes but did not appear to inhale the smoke. She also stated he had no complaints before reporting to work on March 11, 1993. He was working the "C" shift which started at 12 midnight and ended at 7: a.m. Arvine Taylor, decedent's shift supervisor, testified and described the duties of a cutter operator. The employer is engaged in the business of producing rayon fiber. As the material moves through the production line, it is called a "tow." A cutter operator is responsible for keeping the tow moving down the production line. If knots appear in the tow, the operator uses a knife and cuts the knot out. If the tow stops for any reason, the operator reels it back up on the machine and continues the process. Also, if co-workers spot a knot along the production line, a horn is sounded to alert the cutter operator. It appears a cutter operator has the responsibility of watching over several machines involved in this process. On the night in question, the deceased was looking after four units on the production line. The evidence indicates that among the four machines, there were 42 breaks during the shift. Records showed there was a break on unit #2 at 5:25 a.m. and at 6:3 a.m., unit #4 and unit #1 were down. Supervisor Taylor told the court the records indicated it was an average night on the production line. He said it would normally take ten to fifteen seconds to remove a small knot and that there was very little physical exertion in cutting out a knot or resuming a tow if it was down. 2

Douglas Bumpus v. Birmingham-Nashville Express, et al.
01S01-9707-CV-00144
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James E. Walton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. I This is another gradually-occurring injury case involving physical disability not caused by trauma, specific episode, or `accidental injury' as the term is historically used, that would best be resolved by appropriate legislation. The plaintiff is a career truck driver who developed osteoarthritis in both knees to the extent that full knee replacements were required. The prostheses were successful and after three months the plaintiff resumed his truck driving career. Nevertheless, the trial judge found that the plaintiff suffered a 7 percent vocational disability to both legs. His monetary recovery was limited to 26 weeks because of his age. The employer appeals, insisting that: (1) the plaintiff's arthritic condition is not compensable because non-job related; (2) the award is excessive; and (3) the lump sum order is improper. II The plaintiff was born in August, 1934. While he has held a number of jobs, he is a career over-the-road truck driver. He began working for the defendant in 1984. He is described as a freight peddler, meaning that he delivers and unloads the cargo he transports. Over the years the wear and tear occasioned by lifting and carrying heavy loads began to affect his bodily joints, particularly his knees. In 1987 or 1988, he sought treatment for his knees from Dr. James R. Smith, who diagnosed arthritis, about which nothing could be done. The condition worsened, his legs bowed, and knee replacements were recommended. III 2

Stephanie Clinard v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.
01S01-9703-CV-00051
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James E. Walton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant here contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's injury was causally connected to her employment. The panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Clinard, is approximately 4 years old and has a GED. She has worked as a cashier at a convenience market in Springfield since 1992, having previously worked as a cashier, as a baby sitter, as a production worker in a garment factory and as a homemaker. On March 24, she noticed a pop in her neck and a shooting pain in her left arm, while manually operating a credit card machine at work. She reported the event to her supervisor, who did not refer her to a physician or provide a list from which she could choose one. The claimant went to her own physician, Dr. Robert Ferland, who took her off work and prescribed physical therapy. She also saw two neurosurgeons, both of whom ordered diagnostic testing. One of them expressed doubt as to whether the injury was work-related, but was unable to point to any other possible cause. The other had no opinion as to the cause of injury. The claimant was unable to work from May 2, 1994 until she returned during the last week in July of the same year. She terminated her employment in November of that year after the pain worsened. The employer did not provide any medical benefits. Ultimately, the claimant sought outa Dr. Cantrell, who referred her to Dr. Arthur Cushman, another neurosurgeon. Dr. Cushman diagnosed a herniated disc in her neck and performed corrective surgery. The pain diminished following the surgery. Dr. David Gaw saw her after surgery and prescribed permanent limitations. The claimant took karate after the injury, but we find in the record no evidence that her injury was caused by karate lessons, as the employer's insurer contends. The lay proof supports the claimant's contention that her injury was work related. Dr. Cushman conceded the credit card machine incident and continued use of the arm at work was a possible cause of the injury. He estimated her permanent impairment at seven percent.. Dr. Gaw testified the credit card incident was the most likely cause, in the absence of any other explanation, and assigned a fifteen percent permanent impairment to the whole body. Both of these doctors based their opinions of permanent impairment on approved guidelines. The trial court found the injury to be work related and awarded benefits under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law (the Act). Appellate 2

Martha Shupe v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania
03S01-9706-CV-00065
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ben K. Wexler,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal was perfected by the employer, Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, from a decision of the trial court awarding the employee, Martha Jane Shupe, 9% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal defendant insurance company insists (1) the trial court was in error in finding the cervical disc injury was work-related and (2) if the injury was work- related, the award of 9% was excessive under the proof. The employee contends (1) she is totally disabled and the award should be fixed at 1% and (2) the trial court was in error in finding the aneurysm rupture was not work-related. Plaintiff was 45 years of age at the time of the trial and had completed the 8th grade. She was employed at a Burger King restaurant on April 27, 1992, when she climbed upon a shelf to return a box to a higher shelf; in attempting to come down, her foot slipped and she fell some distance landing on her feet; she stated the fall caused her body to twist and she experienced immediate intense pain in her neck. Plaintiff was taken immediately to a hospital emergency room where she was examined and referred to another doctor. She remained off work for about two weeks and then returned to work on a reduced time schedule. She testified after some period of part time work, her employer decided she should not work further. On about May 27, 1992, she was present with her husband at a court hearing (unrelated to present case) when she turned her head to look out the window and felt a sting of pain in the back of her neck. Shortly later she experienced double vision problems and could not move her legs for awhile. She also became nauseated. Further investigation into her complaints indicated there had been a rupture of an aneurysm in her head and that she also had a herniated cervical disc. Surgery was performed to correct the aneurysm problem and about a year later, she had a fusion to repair the disc problem. The trial was conducted on October 28 and 29, 1996, which was about 4 _ years after sustaining the injury. She testified she had attempted to find some light 2

Beverly Riddle v. Murray Outdoor Products
02S01-9706-CH-00058
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 58 percent permanent partial disability to each arm as a result of carpal tunnel syndrome. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: I. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff had properly satisfied notice and statute of limitations requirements for her alleged left upper extremity injury. II. Whether the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff 58 percent impairment to each arm. We affirm the judgment.