Rosie Fuller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., W2002-00745-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff had suffered a 9 percent disability to her body as a whole as a result of an injury to her legs and back. The award was apportioned at 75 percent to the employer and 15 percent to the Second Injury Fund because the plaintiff had a previous injury to her leg which amounted to a 25 percent permanent partial disability, which was paid by Wal-Mart. We modify and affirm the judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed as Modified and Remanded JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J. and JOE C. LOSER, SP. J., joined. Jay L. Johnson, Jackson, Tennessee, attorney for appellant, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. David Hardee, Jackson, Tennessee, attorney for appellee, Rosie Fuller. Paul G. Summer, Attorney General and Reporter; E. Blaine Sprouse, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. MEMORANDUM OPINION In 1997, the plaintiff developed tarsal tunnel syndrome in her right leg. She was placed in a brace to support her right leg. In September of 1999, the plaintiff started having pain in her left leg. Dr. Wormbrod placed a brace on the left leg as well. Further, the plaintiff began to experience back pain. The plaintiff fell on July 4, 2, while at work and represented she injured both legs and her back. The plaintiff continued to work for the defendant throughout the time of her leg problem and was still working at the time of trial. The defendant assigned her to work at a light-duty job which accommodated the medical restrictions set by physicians. A supervisor testified that plaintiff was a good employee and there was no plan to discharge her. The plaintiff received two raises after her disability and is making more than she was prior to her injuries. Medical Evidence Dr. James Warmbrod, an orthopedic surgeon, was the plaintiff's treating physician. He described the tarsal tunnel syndrome condition the plaintiff suffered and was of the opinion this could be caused by her long hours of standing on concrete in her job. He placed restrictions on long periods of standing, weight lifting, etc., and recommended that she do only sedentary jobs. Dr. Warmbrod did not fix any medical impairment rating, nor did he testify as to a date of maximum medical improvement. He testified the plaintiff might require surgery in the future. He was, however, reluctant to do surgery for various reasons. He was of the opinion the back pain the plaintiff suffered was because her gait was altered as a result of wearing the braces. Dr. Riley Jones, an orthopedic surgeon, filed a C-32 form, basically stating the plaintiff's problems were not related to her work and gave no impairment rating. Dr. Robert Barnett, an orthopedic surgeon, evaluated the plaintiff and confirmed Dr. Warmbrod's opinion of the injuries. Dr. Barnett found the plaintiff had sustained a 44 percent whole body disability. This included a 5 percent rating because of back pain, 15 percent for the left leg problem and 3 percent for the previous injury to the plaintiff's right leg. There is no medical evidence in the record to show the plaintiff sustained any injury to her right leg which would be compensable as a result of the fall of July 4, 2. Findings at Trial The trial judge found the case involved injury to both legs and also to the plaintiff's back. He found the plaintiff had to alter her gait since she began wearing a brace on her right leg in 1999. He found the injury at work on July 4, 2, aggravated her three prior injuries. The trial court found the plaintiff reached maximum medical improvement on June 2, 2, the date Dr. Wormbrod placed work restrictions on her. The trial judge found the plaintiff had sustained a 9 percent whole body disability as a result of the injury and because of the previous disability, which was 25 percent to the body as a whole. The trial court concluded that the defendant must pay 75 percent or 36 weeks of the award and the -2-
Madison
Workers Compensation Panel
XI Properties v. Racetrac Petroleum M2001-00977-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley
Plaintiffs, XI Properties Inc. et al., purchased land from the defendant, RaceTrac, adjacent to RaceTrac Petroleum in 1992. Seven years later, XI Properties, while attempting to develop the property, learned RaceTrac had inadvertently conveyed to them portions of RaceTrac parking, curbs and light posts. Plaintiffs proposed to remove the unnatural slope created by the parking lot, but defendants were concerned about their rights and responsibilities. Plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. We reverse the trial court=s grant of summary judgment to XI Properties as to adverse possession by RaceTrac. We remand the issue to the trial court to determine if Racetrac can establish possession of the property. Further we affirm the finding that XI Properties owes no duty to RaceTrac for lateral support, so long as it does not act negligently.
Putnam
Court of Appeals
Stephen Morgan v. Paula Morgan M2002-00793-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano
Husband and Wife were declared divorced on the basis of stipulated grounds. Wife appeals the classification and division of the property. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
Robertson
Court of Appeals
Cathy Lovett v. John Kelley M2002-01078-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton
A woman whose car was struck by another vehicle brought suit against the driver of a van involved in the accident as well as the driver's employer, claiming the collision aggravated her pre-existing back injury. The defendants did not dispute liability, but claimed that the plaintiff's injury was relatively minor. After a hearing, the trial court entered a $100,000 judgment against the defendants. We reverse, because we believe the trial court's award included damages for injuries that were not proximately caused by the defendant's actions.
Maury
Court of Appeals
Mark Pirtle Chevrolet v. Celebration Nissan M2002-00554-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: J. B. Cox
This case involved claims and counter-claims for breach of contract on the sale of an automobile dealership. After a hearing, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs damages for most of their claims. Since the defendants did not file a timely notice of appeal, we cannot consider arguments about the court's Final Order. However, the plaintiff filed a Rule 60 motion to clarify one paragraph of the Final Order. The trial court granted the motion, and modified the order to specify that the defendant was to pay the plaintiff $49,000 for certain cars that had been the subjects of a dispute. The defendant appealed the trial court's action. We affirm.
Bedford
Court of Appeals
James Pylant v. Karen Spivey M2002-00602-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Holloway
This appeal involves a dispute over the extent of a father's obligation, under a provision in a property settlement agreement, to pay for his daughter's college education. The daughter chose to attend an expensive private college. The trial court found that father should pay tuition equivalent to the cost of an out-of-state public university. Both parties appealed. We affirm the trial court's decision that the father is obligated to pay reasonable costs, but vacate the judgment because there is insufficient proof of such costs.
Giles
Court of Appeals
Gail Allen v. Saturn Corp. M2002-01238-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton
Appellants, Gail and Larry Allen, sustained injuries when a tent collapsed during a thunderstorm at a Homecoming at the Saturn Corporation in Spring Hill. They brought suit for their injuries caused by negligence in maintenance and construction of the tent. They dismissed or settled their claims with all Defendants except Saturn Corporation. Saturn filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that Appellants were unable to establish a prima facie case of the Appellee's negligence. The trial court granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
The defendant pled guilty to one count of vehicular homicide and three counts of reckless aggravated assault following an automobile accident in which a mother was killed and her three young children were injured. The trial court imposed an effective four-year sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Henderson
Court of Criminal Appeals
James Glover vs. Tetyana Glover E2002-01690-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Kindall T. Lawson
The trial court entered a judgment granting the complaint for annulment filed by James Eugene Glover ("Husband"). Within 30 days of the entry of the judgment, Tetyana Glover ("Wife") filed a motion seeking to set aside the judgment. She claims that she did not have prior notice that the complaint was to be considered on June 19, 2002, the date on which the record reflects this case was heard. The trial court, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Wife's motion, denied her request to set aside the judgment. Wife appeals. We vacate the trial court's order refusing to consider Wife's motion and remand this matter to the trial court for consideration of the motion.
Hamblen
Court of Appeals
Messer Griesheim dba MG Industries vs. Cryotech E2002-01728-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Wheeler A. Rosenbalm
This appeal from the Knox County Circuit Court questions whether the Trial Court erred in granting a summary judgment in favor of the Appellee/Defendant, Eastman Chemical Company, with respect to various claims connected with the purchase and sale of contaminated carbon dioxide by the Appellant/Plaintiff, Messer Griesheim Industries, Inc., d/b/a MG Industries. We affirm in part, vacate in part and remand.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Messer Griesheim dba MG Industries vs. Cryotech E2002-01728-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Wheeler A. Rosenbalm
This appeal from the Knox County Circuit Court questions whether the Trial Court erred in granting a summary judgment in favor of the Appellee/Defendant, Eastman Chemical Company, with respect to various claims connected with the purchase and sale of contaminated carbon dioxide by the Appellant/Plaintiff, Messer Griesheim Industries, Inc., d/b/a MG Industries. We affirm in part, vacate in part and remand.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Shamery Blair vs. West Town Mall E2002-02005-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
Knox
Court of Appeals
Shamery Blair vs. West Town Mall E2002-02005-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
Knox
Court of Appeals
Shamery Blair vs. West Town Mall E2002-02005-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
Knox
Court of Appeals
Anne Strickland vs. Daniel Cartwright E2002-02176-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Telford E. Forgerty, Jr.
Anne Strickland ("Plaintiff") approached Daniel Cartwright ("Defendant") about the possible purchase of Defendant's restaurant. Unable to come up with the full purchase price of $1.5 million, Plaintiff made an initial payment of $170,000 and began leasing the restaurant with monthly rental payments of $7,000. No written agreement ever was finalized between the parties. Plaintiff vacated the premises after six months allegedly due to the poor condition of the building and the amount of repairs that were needed. Plaintiff filed suit seeking a return of the $170,000, claiming this money was intended by the parties to be a down payment on the purchase of the restaurant, an event which never occurred. Defendant claimed the parties had agreed to a nonrefundable initial payment of $250,000 to allow Plaintiff the privilege of being able to walk in and take over a fully staffed and operational restaurant. Since Plaintiff paid only $170,000 toward the initial $250,000 payment, Defendant filed a counterclaim for the remaining $80,000. After a trial, the Trial Court awarded Plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $138,000. Both parties appeal. We affirm.
The defendant, John Paul Hassler, appeals from the Cumberland County Criminal Court's revoking his probation that was ordered for his sentences for selling cocaine. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant, Sherry L. Williams, pleaded guilty to 20 forgery charges and three charges of criminal impersonation, with a recommended effective sentence of seven years. The plea agreement provided that the trial court would determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied any form of alternative sentencing and ordered incarceration in the Department of Correction. From this determination, the defendant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Sullivan
Court of Criminal Appeals
Adrian Scaife vs.Chantelle Roberson E2002-02666-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples
John D. Knowles, Jr. ("Deceased") died intestate in December of 2000. A Petition for Intestate Administration ("Petition") filed in April of 2001, listed Adrian Scaife ("Plaintiff") as one of Deceased's daughters. This Petition never was granted. Several months later, an Amended Petition for Intestate Administration ("Amended Petition") was filed. The Amended Petition listed Plaintiff as an heir, but did not state Plaintiff's relationship to the Deceased. A. Chantelle Roberson ("Defendant") sought to be appointed administratrix of the Deceased's estate (the "Estate") and signed the Amended Petition. The Amended Petition was granted and Defendant was named administratrix of the Estate in June of 2001. The Notice to Creditors for the Estate was published in June and July of 2001. Notice to Creditor letters were sent to all known creditors and any persons having claims, or believed to have claims, against the Estate. Plaintiff received a copy of the Letters of Administration and a Notice to Creditor letter informing her that in order to inherit from the Deceased, she would need to establish paternity within the four month time period allowed to creditors for filing claims. Plaintiff took no steps to establish paternity within the four month period. In February of 2002, Plaintiff sued seeking to prohibit Defendant from denying Plaintiff is a child of the Deceased. The Trial Court granted Defendant summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
The appellant, Angela Caprice Parchman, was convicted by a jury in the Obion County Circuit Court of the sale of .5 grams or more of crack cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II multiple offender to twelve years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that her trial counsel was ineffective. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant, John L. Shelton, pled guilty to driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, and was sentenced to one day in jail and a fine of one dollar. The State appealed, arguing that the sentence was illegal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The petitioner, Benjamin Blackwell, was convicted of second degree murder and, on direct appeal, this court affirmed his conviction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
The petitioner, Adarryl Devon Brooks, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which followed his jury convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, criminal impersonation, and failure to appear. On appeal, the petitioner contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate his case and in failing to interview prospective witnesses. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
The defendant, John Richenberger, entered a plea of guilt to driving under the influence, fourth offense, a Class E felony. The trial court imposed a Range I jail sentence of one year, requiring a mandatory minimum of 150 days' service. There was a $3,000.00 fine. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to order a sentence in the community corrections program. The judgment is affirmed and the cause remanded for consideration of correction of the length of the sentence.
The appellant, Alan E. Monday, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of reckless homicide in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-215 (1997). He was sentenced as a career offender to twelve years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to convict the appellant of reckless homicide; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to require the prosecution to identify the reckless act upon which it relied; and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Knox
Court of Criminal Appeals
Brenda Jones vs. David Jones E2002-01684-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: G. Richard Johnson
In this post-divorce case, David Wayne Jones (Husband) filed a motion requesting the Trial Court to discontinue alimony payments. The sole basis for the motion was that Brenda Gail McNeeley Jones (Wife) was "currently residing with a male individual." Wife denied that a reduction in alimony was appropriate, due to her alleged continuing need and Husband's continuing ability to pay. Wife moved for an increase in alimony payments due to her "increased medical expenses, and vocational disability that [she] suffers by reason of the need for eye surgery." The Trial Court awarded Husband a reduction in the amount of alimony from $1,500 per month to $1,000 per month. On appeal, Husband argues that the Trial Court erred by refusing to eliminate the alimony payments, and Wife argues that the Court erred by reducing them. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
