State of Tennessee v. Cory Lee Jackson
The Defendant-Appellant, Cory Lee Jackson, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. At trial, the jury convicted Jackson of the lesser included offense of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-103(a), -105(a)(3). The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to six years in confinement. On appeal, Jackson argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his missed court dates on unrelated charges; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony regarding Budget’s loss regarding the rental vehicle; and (4) his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clay Stuart Gregory
The Defendant-Appellant, Clay Stuart Gregory, was convicted by a Humphreys County jury of aggravated robbery, first degree felony murder, and premeditated first degree murder. The first degree murder convictions merged into a single conviction for which the trial court sentenced the Defendant to life in prison. The trial court then sentenced the Defendant to eight years for aggravated robbery to be served concurrently to his life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it refused to grant the Defendant’s recusal motion; and (3) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny Pyle v. Betty Mullins
Johnny Pyle sued Betty Mullins for personal injuries sustained in a three-vehicle accident. Mullins admitted liability. The issue of damages was tried to a jury. At the close of the proof, the jury returned a verdict awarding Pyle $15,000 in compensatory damages. The trial court, in its role as the thirteenth juror, affirmed the verdict. Pyle appeals. He claims the verdict should be set aside because of a lack of material evidence to support the verdict, erroneous evidentiary rulings, and the failure of the court to instruct the jury regarding a pre-existing condition. On our review, we conclude that there is no reversible error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Lee Dobson
The Defendant, Travis Lee Dobson, pled guilty to one count of vehicular homicide as a Range I, standard offender, and the trial court imposed twelve years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence and by denying any form of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cannon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
H. Jewell Tindell, et al v. Callie A. West, et al
This is the second appeal in this boundary line dispute between neighbors. Following (1) the original trial, (2) the release of our opinion in the first appeal, and (3) the subsequent issuance of the mandate, the defendants, husband and wife, filed a motion “to void or set aside the judgment” pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant Callie A. West appeals, raising issues regarding the propriety of the court’s earlier trial rulings. We hold that defendant Mrs. West waived these issues, either by failing to raise them at the first trial, or by failing to raise them in the first appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that Mrs. West has not established a Rule 60.02 ground for relief from the final judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Spencer D. Land, et al v. John L. Dixon, et al
The plaintiffs – purchasers of a tract of land at auction – brought this action alleging professional negligence in the conduct of the auction, misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“the TCPA”). The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On plaintiffs’ first appeal, we affirmed the dismissal of the misrepresentation and TCPA claims. Land v. Dixon, No. E2004-03019-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1618743 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed July 12, 2005) (“Land I”). We vacated the dismissal of the claim for professional negligence, and remanded the case for trial of that issue. After remand, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment and their subsequent motion in limine, holding that plaintiffs were precluded, under our holding in Land I, from presenting evidence of the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations as an aspect of their professional negligence claim. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants on the professional negligence claim. In this second appeal, we hold the trial court did not err in its ruling excluding evidence of misrepresentations and in limiting the negligence claim of the plaintiffs to the conduct of the defendants in their capacity as auctioneers. We further find no prejudicial error in the trial court’s jury charge regarding comparative fault and auctioneer discretion. We affirm the trial court’s judgment based on the jury verdict. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Scott J. Wexler v. James Reed, Jr. et al.
Scott J. Wexler sued James Reed, Jr., and Robert Rankin in the General Sessions Court for Knox County to recover damages based on an alleged fraudulent sale of goods. The general sessions court awarded a judgment in Wexler’s favor in the amount of $2,000, the purchase price of the goods, plus costs. Defendants appealed to the trial court. After a bench trial, the court awarded a judgment in favor of Wexler, but reduced the amount to $1,025 including interest. Wexler appeals. We modify the judgment to reinstate the award of $2,000 plus costs. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Louis W. Adams v. Megan Elizabeth Leamon, et al.
This is a motor vehicle accident case wherein the jury’s verdict resulted in an award of compensatory damages to the plaintiff of $317,000.00. The defendants filed a motion seeking a new trial or, in the alternative, a remittitur of the amount of damages awarded. The trial court granted the remittitur, finding that the damages awarded by the jury were excessive and unsupported by the evidence. The trial court also ruled that if the plaintiff rejected the remittitur, a new trial would be awarded. The plaintiff accepted the remittitur under protest, subsequently filing the instant appeal. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for a new trial solely on the issue of damages. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Wayne Garrett v. Avril Chapman, Warden
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Gary Wayne Garrett, has appealed the Wayne County Circuit Court order dismissing his second petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that the trial court failed to order mandatory pre-trial jail credits. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph L. Coleman v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Joseph L. Coleman, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition because his sentence is void and unconstitutional. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas court properly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demetrius Hollins
The defendant, Demetrius Hollins, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the exclusion of certain evidence, as well as the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kala Shay Hunn v. Kevin Carlton Hunn
In this divorce proceeding,Father appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Finding no error, we affirm. Additionally, we grant Mother her attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Brad Blevins v. City of Belle Meade, Tennessee by and Through Its Board of Zoning Appeals
After receiving a stop-work order, a property owner petitioned the City of Belle Meade Board of Zoning Appeals for a declaration that a nearly completed structure on his property constituted an accessory use as a children’s playhouse under the city’s zoning code. After a hearing, the Board denied the request and the property owner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking court review; the trial court affirmed the Board’s denial. We concur with the trial court and affirm the Board’s action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Morris Wayne Adcock
Defendant-Appellant, Morris Wayne Adcock, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for aggravated assault and domestic assault. A jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of simple assault and the charged offense of domestic assault, Class A misdemeanors. The trial court merged the simple assault conviction with the domestic assault conviction and sentenced Adcock to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail. On appeal, Adcock argues: (1) the trial court erred in failing to rule on the defense’s objection to one of the prosecutor’s questions to Joshua Jernigan; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; (3) the cumulative effect of the errors entitles him to relief; and (4) his sentence is excessive. Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christine Stevens ex rel. Mark Stevens v. Hickman Community Health Care Services, Inc. et al.
More than sixty days before filing suit, the plaintiff gave written notice to the potential defendants of her healthcare liability claim against them. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) (2012) requires that a plaintiff’s pre-suit notice include a HIPAA compliant medical authorization that permits the healthcare provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from every other provider that is being sent a notice. Contrary to the statute, the plaintiff provided a non-HIPAA compliant medical authorization that only permitted the release of medical records to plaintiff’s counsel. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on noncompliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court denied the motion, ruling that plaintiff’s noncompliance was excused by extraordinary cause. We hold that the plaintiff was required to substantially comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) and failed to do so, and that her failure to comply is not excused by extraordinary cause. We dismiss the plaintiff’s case without prejudice. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
Christine Stevens ex rel. Mark Stevens v. Hickman Community Health Care Services, Inc. et al. - CONCUR AND DISSENT
On April 11, 2011, Christine Stevens (the “Plaintiff”) provided written notice to Hickman Community Health Care Services, Inc., Elite Emergency Services, LLC, and Halford Whitaker, M.D. (collectively, the “Defendants”), advising each of them of her potential health care liability claim based upon their negligent treatment of her late husband, Mark Stevens. As required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(A)–(D) (Supp. 2011), the Plaintiff’s notice included the full name and date of birth of the Plaintiff’s late husband; the contact information for the Plaintiff; the name and address of the Plaintiff’s counsel; and a list of the names and addresses of all providers being sent a notice. The notice also included a medical authorization form intended to allow each of the Defendants to access the medical records in the possession of the other Defendants, as is required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The medical authorization form, however, was not fully compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Keenan Scott McNeal
The Defendant, Keenan Scott McNeal, was convicted by a Blount County jury of possession of 0.5 grams or more of a substance ontaining cocaine with intent to sell or distribute within 1,000 feet of a child care facility, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. Upon our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cynthia J. Finch
The Defendant, Cynthia J. Finch, was indicted for one count of fabricating evidence, a Class C felony; one count of forgery of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and one count of forgery of less than $1,000, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-105, -14-114, -16-503. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was acquitted of the fabricating evidence count and convicted of the two forgery counts. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years to be served on unsupervised probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the statute allowing a district attorney general to specially appoint the attorney general and reporter to conduct specific criminal proceedings violates the Tennessee Constitution; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions; (3) that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of a settlement in a civil lawsuit between the Defendant and Knox County; (4) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to its definition of “value” and in denying the Defendant’s request for an instruction on the rule of cancellation; (5) that the State abused its discretion in denying the Defendant’s request for pretrial diversion; (6) that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion; and (7) that the trial court erred in its determination that the Defendant was not an especially mitigated offender. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stanley Rooks
Appellant, Stanley Rooks, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-four years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the identification by the victim was not reliable. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Quamine Jones v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Quamine Jones, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder by a Shelby County jury. See State v. Quamine Jones, No. W2007-01111-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4963516, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Jackson, Nov. 21, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2009). Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the supreme court denied permission to appeal. Id. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals, challenging the denial of post-conviction relief. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the record preponderates against the post-conviction court’s findings. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cynthia J. Finch - concurring and dissenting
I concur with the majority opinion in all respects save one. I believe the Defendant should have been granted judicial diversion, given the circumstances of this case, the Defendant’s excellent background, and the circumstances existing in Knox County relative to official misconduct and the granting of diversion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth Kay Tomes v. Michael Joe Tomes
In this divorce case, Wife appeals the trial court’s determination that she was not entitled to an award of alimony. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award alimony and affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Dexter F. Johnson v. State of Tennessee
In 1994, the Petitioner, Dexter F. Johnson, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of attempted aggravated burglary. The Petitioner pled guilty in an agreement that provided that he would receive a life sentence for the two first degree murder convictions, twenty-five years for the attempted first degree murder conviction, and six years for the attempted aggravated burglary conviction. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed four unsuccessful petitions for habeas corpus relief. See Dexter F. Johnson v. Carlton, Warden, E2008-02032-CCA-R3-HC, 2010 WL 323126 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 27, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 30, 2010). The Petitioner then filed a fifth petition for habeas corpus relief, which the habeas corpus court summarily dismissed. The Petitioner appeals, contending that the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition because the State’s motion to dismiss did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-116, as the State did not attach a judgment form or indictment to the motion to dismiss. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
1963 Jackson, Inc., et al. v. Lloyd De Vos, et al.
This appeal arises from Lessee’s rental and operation of a hotel owned by Lessor. Lessee sought Lessor’s consent to an assignment of the lease to a third party. Not only did Lessor withhold consent to the assignment, Lessor terminated the lease based on conditions at the hotel that he deemed to violate the lease. Lessee sued alleging that Lessor wrongfully terminated the lease and unreasonably withheld consent to the assignment. The trial court determined that Lessee had not breached the lease and that Lessor unreasonably withheld consent to the assignment. The trial court awarded Lessee $150,000 in damages for Lessor’s unreasonable withholding of consent to the assignment. Lessor appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennesse v. Willie Gatewood
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Willie Gatewood, of attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to fifty-five years for the attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder conviction and to thirteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we discern no error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |