State of Tennessee v. Archie Tyrone Wilson
Appellant, Archie Tyrone Wilson, was in custody in the State of Tennessee. In July 2012, the State of Florida submitted a request under the Interstate Compact on Detainers for custody of Appellant in connection with a charge of sexual battery. Appellant requested a hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered his transfer to Florida for prosecution. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred. After a thorough review of the record on appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not err. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order of transfer. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Robert Lee Abbott
Residuary legatees appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion to disallow compensation for executrix and estate’s attorney. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Reginald Tutton v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, et al.
Inmate was serving a 47-year sentence for rape and attempted first degree murder. Inmate had a parole hearing in 2011, when he had 19 years of his sentence left to serve. Parole was denied, and Inmate’s next parole hearing was scheduled to take place six years later. Inmate challenged Parole Board’s decision to defer his next parole hearing for six years. The trial court held the Board acted lawfully in deferring Inmate’s next parole hearing for six years. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on appeal. Board members serve for staggered six-year terms, and Inmate will not be denied the opportunity for new Board members to review his request for parole six years from the date of his last hearing. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Aaron Tate
The Defendant-Appellant, Aaron Tate, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery; one count of especially aggravated burglary; one count of employment of a firearm during a felony offense; one count of especially aggravated kidnapping; one count of aggravated kidnapping; two counts of aggravated assault; and one count of facilitation to commit aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Tate as a Range II, multiple offender and ordered each of his sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of one-hundred-thirty-eight years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, Tate argues that the jury was not provided with an instruction consistent with State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012); therefore, his “convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping offend due process.” He further argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon our review, we conclude that the absence of an instruction pursuant to White was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to Tate’s convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and facilitation of aggravated assault. However, the lack of the White instruction was reversible error as to his convictions for aggravated assault charged in counts six and seven. Accordingly, we reverse Tate’s kidnapping convictions charged in counts four and five and remand the matter for a new trial as to those offenses. We modify count two and reduce the especially aggravated burglary conviction to aggravated burglary and remand for resentencing on this conviction. We reverse Tate’s conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony offense and remand for a new trial on count three. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth Timmons Austin v. Benjamin Holt Gray
This appeal arises from the modification of a parenting plan in a post-divorce action. In the initial Permanent Parenting Plan, Mother was designated the primary residential parent of their son. Four years later, Father filed a Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan, alleging that multiple material changes in circumstances had occurred and that it was in the child’s best interest for Father to be the primary residential parent. While the petition was pending, Mother was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric facility; immediately thereafter, on Father’s pendente lite motion, the trial court designated Father as primary residential parent with sole decision-making authority pending further adjudication. Father then amended his Petition to enumerate additional material changes. Some eight months later, the trial court conducted a trial. The court found that Mother’s mental health, Mother’s attitude and untoward actions directed at Father, the child’s manipulation and power struggles with his parents; the child’s enrollment in an out-of-state boarding school, and multiple other factors demonstrated that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that it was in their son’s best interest for Father to serve as the primary residential parent with sole decision-making authority. Mother appeals claiming the trial court erred in determining that a material change in circumstances existed and that a modification was in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodney Turner
The Defendant, Rodney Turner, was convicted by a jury of two counts of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-202, -17-1324. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of forty years for both counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court also imposed a ten-year sentence for the employment of a firearm conviction and ordered that six years of that sentence be served at one hundred percent. The trial court ordered that the sentence for the employment of a firearm conviction be served consecutively to the sentences for the attempted first degree murder convictions, for a total effective sentence of fifty years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to produce a prior statement made by one of the State’s witnesses. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Waddell
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his conviction of second degree murder. He argues that the jury should have found that he was acting in self-defense or, in the alternative, that he committed voluntary manslaughter. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Louis Mayes v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Louis Mayes, contends that both his transfer counsel and his trial/appellate counsel rendered the ineffective assistance of counsel in the juvenile and trial courts, respectively, and that the post-conviction court erred in denying post-conviction relief. Specifically, he alleges that transfer counsel failed to properly prepare for the transfer hearing and that his trial/appellate counsel failed to include a key witness at the suppression hearing and was deficient on appeal for failing to challenge the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion. Upon consideration of the relevant authorities and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Archie Elliott, also known as Archie Elliott III
The defendant, Archie Elliott, also known as Archie Elliott, III, was indicted for two counts of aggravated cruelty to animals while he was employed by the Memphis Animal Shelter. He entered open pleas of guilty to these offenses and was sentenced, in each count, to two years confinement, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in both the length and manner of service of the sentences, which were to be served, as a Range I, standard offender, at 30%; that the court showed bias in statements regarding the court’s feelings regarding animals; and that the court erred in weighing the impact of letters opposing alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
E. Ron Pickard et al. v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Board et al.
This appeal involves the proper procedure for persons desiring to obtain administrative and judicial review of a decision by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (“TDEC”) regarding the issuance or denial of a waste water and storm water discharge permit. After TDEC issued a final permit allowing the operator of a limestone quarry to discharge water into Horse Creek, the owners and managers of a neighboring wildlife sanctuary filed a petition with the Tennessee Water Quality Control Board (“Board”) seeking to appeal TDEC’s decision to issue the permit and also requesting the Board to issue a declaratory order regarding the proper interpretation of the Antidegradation Rule, Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1200-04-03-.06. After the Board scheduled a contested case hearing, an administrative law judge dismissed the request for a declaratory order on the ground that Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-3-105(i) (2012) provides the exclusive procedure to obtain administrative review of TDEC’s decision to issue the discharge permit. Rather than pursuing the permit appeal already pending before the Board, the wildlife sanctuary filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the proper interpretation of the Antidegradation Rule. The trial court granted the wildlife sanctuary’s motion for summary judgment and issued a declaratory judgment regarding the interpretation and application of the Antidegradation Rule to the permit at issue in this case. TDEC and the Board appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment on the ground that the trial court had failed to give “any deference to TDEC’s interpretation of the Antidegradation rule” and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a trial “to determine the proper interpretation of the Antidegradation rule.” Pickard v. Tennessee Dep’t of Env’t and Conservation, No. M2011-02600-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3834777, at *24-25 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2012). We granted the Board’s and TDEC’s joint application for permission to appeal. We conclude that Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-3-105(i) disallows parties challenging the issuance of a discharge permit from seeking a declaratory order from the Board regarding matters involved in the issuance of the permit and requires that parties desiring to seek judicial review of a decision to issue a discharge permit must first exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of TDEC’s decision. Because the wildlife sanctuary’s appeal from TDEC’s issuance of the discharge permit was still pending before the Board, the trial court should have declined to adjudicate the wildlife sanctuary’s petition for a declaratory judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with directions to dismiss the petition because the wildlife sanctuary failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before the Board. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Hollace Donte Richards
The Defendant-Appellant, Hollace Donte Richards, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation. He previously entered guilty pleas to one count of theft of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000 and one count of sale of marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance. Subsequently, Richards entered guilty pleas to one count of aggravated burglary and one count of failure to appear. He was ordered to serve his four sentences consecutively for a total effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. The trial court ordered Richards to serve his two-year sentence for theft in confinement and suspended the other three sentences to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Richards argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his entire sentence in confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jamelle M. Felts v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jamelle M. Felts, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He also appeals the denial of coram nobis relief, arguing that an eyewitness’s affidavit recanting his trial testimony is newly discovered evidence entitling him to a new trial. Upon review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief and the denial of coram nobis relief. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara A. Lynch, et al v. Loudon County, Tennessee, et al
In this wrongful death action, the plaintiffs alleged that after the deceased was involved in a single car accident, the investigating officer improperly allowed her to continue driving, resulting in her death when she had another wreck shortly thereafter. In the initial lawsuit, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that the public duty doctrine applied and granted the motion. After the plaintiffs appealed, we held that under the public duty doctrine, disputed material evidence existed as to whether the officer assumed a specific duty to protect the deceased but then discontinued his aid and protection to her, thereby leaving her in a worse position than she was in before he intervened. We therefore reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Lynch v. Loudon Cnty., No. E2010-02231-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 4952778 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2011). Upon remand the trial court found that the special duty exception did not apply and the public duty doctrine was a complete bar to the plaintiffs’ action. The court additionally concluded that Restatement (2nd) of Torts section 324 was not applicable and even if fault was compared, the fault of the deceased exceeded that of the officer by more than fifty percent. Accordingly, the trial court found that the claims of the plaintiffs must be denied. The plaintiffs again appeal. We affirm. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Miljenovic v. Sherri E. Miljenovic
This interlocutory appeal concerns an interstate custody dispute. Father attempted to register and modify the child custody provisions of a New Jersey judgment in Tennessee. Mother agreed to the registration but objected to the modification because she believed the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the judgment. The trial court disagreed and registered and modified the judgment. Mother pursued this extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Following our review, we hold that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of K.A.P.
This is a dependency and neglect appeal. The father of the child at issue filed a dependency and neglect petition in the juvenile court against the child’s mother. The juvenile court held that the parties’ son was dependent and neglected and designated the father as the primary residential parent. The mother appealed the juvenile court’s decision to the circuit court. The circuit court conducted a de novo trial on the father’s dependency and neglect petition. The circuit court noted the mother’s past drug use but also found that the mother had consistently had clean drug tests since the juvenile court proceeding. Nevertheless, the circuit court held that the child was dependent and neglected, so it left the father as the primary residential parent. The mother now appeals. Based on our review of the record, we hold that the facts as found by the circuit court do not amount to clear and convincing evidence that the son was dependent and neglected in the mother’s care. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wesley Clayton Nightwine and Ruby Michelle Bush
The Defendants, Wesley Clayton Nightwine and Ruby Michelle Bush, were indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for various drug and firearms offenses following the execution of a search warrant at Mr. Nightwine’s residence. The Defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized, and the trial court granted that motion and dismissed the case as to each defendant. The State appeals, asserting that the search warrant was valid and the evidence was admissible. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Marvin Sutton
The plaintiff, who is the decedent’s daughter, filed this will contest action regarding the estate of the decedent on April 24, 2012. A previous will contest proceeding brought by another daughter of the decedent had been dismissed by the trial court through an order entered February 7, 2012. The trial court dismissed the instant will contest as barred by the final judgment in the previous in rem proceeding. The plaintiff appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Webb v. Mark Thomas Webb
Father appeals the trial court’s amended judgment in this divorce action. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Dunlap
The Defendant-Appellant, Mark Dunlap, appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence. The Defendant previously entered guilty pleas to kidnapping, aggravated assault, attempted aggravated burglary, and vandalism. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of six years, which was suspended to time served with the balance of his sentence to be served in the community corrections program. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve his sentences in confinement after revoking his community corrections and erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wal-Mart Stores East, L. P. v. North Edgefield Organized Neighbors, Inc.
This appeal arises from a Complaint to Quiet Title and for Declaratory Relief filed by WalMart Stores East, L.P. Pursuant to a 2008 Quitclaim Deed, Wal-Mart conveyed, subject to a reversion clause, a one-quarter acre parcel to the defendant upon which stood a 1930’s era Fire Hall. The reversion clause states, in pertinent part, that fee-simple ownership of the property shall revert to Wal-Mart in the event the improvements are subject to any casualty. “Casualty” is defined in the deed to include a fire that results in damage to all or substantially all of the Fire Hall or damage that is not repaired within 180 days after the occurrence of such casualty. It is undisputed that substantially all of the Fire Hall was damaged following a fire that occurred on December 1, 2011. This action ensued, and Wal-Mart subsequently filed a motion for summary judgement contending fee-simple title reverted to Wal-Mart due to the December 2011 casualty. The defendant did not dispute the fact that substantially all of the Fire Hall was damaged by the fire; nevertheless, the defendant opposed the motion on the basis that the term “casualty,” as defined in the deed, is ambiguous. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the term “casualty” was clear and unambiguous, that the damage resulting from the December 2011 fire constituted a casualty, and that the property reverted back to Wal-Mart. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the petitioner. The defendant appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Charles W. McGinnis
George E. Copple, Jr., and Suzette Peyton, attorneys who represented the administrator of the decedent’s probate estate, appeal from an order of the trial court holding them personally liable for expenses incurred by a non-party in responding to a subpoena duces tecum. One year after the subpoena was issued and the expenses were incurred by non-party Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., to comply with the subpoena, the attorneys for the administrator of the estate filed a motion to withdraw. Merrill Lynch did not object to the motion to withdraw, but did file a response requesting that its expenses to comply with the subpoena be assessed against the attorneys personally. The trial court granted leave to withdraw; however, the court did not relieve the attorneys as sureties for “costs to date including and limited to $776.00 incurred by Merrill Lynch in the reproduction of materials produced by Merrill Lynch to counsel for the Administrator.” In its order, the trial court stated that its ruling was based upon the record as a whole, including, but not limited to, Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 45. No other authority was cited in the order. The attorneys appeal. Being unable to identify any authority upon which to hold the attorneys personally liable for the expense of a non-party to comply with a subpoena duces tecum, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristina Morris v. Jimmy Phillips, et al.
A multi-vehicle accident occurred in August 2010. The plaintiff initially named only one of the drivers involved in the accident along with the record owner of the driver’s vehicle. The record owner filed an answer identifying three other drivers/tortfeasors involved in the accident in December 2011,and the driver identified the same three individuals as tortfeasors in his answer that was filed seven months later, in July 2012. The plaintiff did not file an amended complaint adding the individuals identified as defendants until August2012, which was more than 90 days after the first answer was filed. One of the individuals named as a defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the plaintiff waited too late to add her as a defendant. The trial court denied the motion. The late-added defendant appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Gilliam v. Bridgestone North American Tire, LLC
This appeal involves an employee’s eligibility to seek reconsideration of a workers’ compensation settlement. An employee who sustained a compensable shoulder injury returned to work and settled his workers’ compensation claim. He was later laid off after his physician modified the restrictions for an earlier unrelated injury to his foot. Thereafter, the employee filed suit in the Chancery Court for Coffee County seeking reconsideration of the settlement of his shoulder injury. While this suit was pending,the employee returned to work as the result of a confidential settlement between his employer and the EEOC. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the employee could seek reconsideration of the settlement for his injured shoulder and awarded the employee additional disability benefits. The employer appealed and asserted that the employee was not entitled to seek reconsideration because, despite the layoff, he had never been “subsequently no longer employed by the pre-injury employer” as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6241(d)(1)(B)(ii)(2008). The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Allan Pope
A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Allan Pope, of one count of using public equipment for private purposes, one count of official misconduct, and one count of theft of services over $10,000 but less than $60,000. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Defendant’s conviction for theft of services and reversed and dismissed the Defendant’s convictions for official misconduct and private use of public property. State v. Pope, No. E2011-01410-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4760724, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 5, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 5, 2013). On remand, the Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting that the trial court reconsider its previous denial of the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion; the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Heather McMurray
The defendant, Heather McMurray, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of three counts of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone, three counts of the delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone, possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell within 1000 feet of a school zone, and possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone, all Class B felonies. The trial court merged the convictions based on the same incidents and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of twelve years for each conviction, with a mandatory eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction due to the fact that the offenses were committed in a drug-free school zone. The defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain her convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify as an expert witness; and (3) whether the trial court erred by denying her motion for a mistrial after the State played a redacted version of her statement to police. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |