RCK Joint Venture, (A Joint Venture Comprised of River Road Construction, LLC, Creative Homes, LLC and Keystone Homes of TN, INC.) v. Garrison Cove Homeowners Association, A Tennessee Nonprofit Corporation - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority. I do not believe that the fact that fees are available to the Pattons requires that they be awarded under the particular facts and circumstances of this case. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda J. Hutcherson v. Wallace Jackson Hutcherson
This is a contract interpretation case involving the proper apportionment of proceeds from the sale of several properties owned by the parties as tenants in common. When Husband and Wife divorced in 2005, a marital dissolution agreement was incorporated into their Final Decree of Divorce. In pertinent part, the agreement required the parties to sell six properties and split the proceeds therefrom. The agreement listed each of the properties with a dollar amount beside it. The agreement provided that Wife could be compelled to accept an offer for a particular property so long as her share of the proceeds equaled the dollar amount listed with that property in the agreement. The sum of the amounts listed with the properties at issue was $565,800. Real estate values declined substantially after the agreement was entered, and the properties were finally sold together for $322,287.71 in 2012. Following the sale Husband filed a motion seeking an equal division of the sale proceeds. Wife answered, insisting that the agreement entitled her to $565,800 and that she was therefore entitled to all of the sale proceeds, less Husband’s expenses related to the properties. During a bench trial, the court found the agreement ambiguous and therefore considered parol evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Based on its findings, the trial court determined that the parties intended to split the sale proceeds equally. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the agreement entitled Husband to reimbursement for one-half of his expenses on the properties, which the parties stipulated to be $156,270.48. In its final accounting, the trial court awarded $234,834.09 to Husband and $87,453.62 to Wife. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven R. Bryson
The Defendant-Appellant, Steven R. Bryson, was convicted by a Hardin County jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2011). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to eight years and six months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Bryson argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) the trial court committed plain error in its jury instructions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Devin Jay Davis
The Defendant, Devin Jay Davis, was convicted by a Chester County jury of criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child abuse and neglect, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated child abuse and neglect, the jury’s verdicts in count one and count two are fatally inconsistent, and his convictions violate double jeopardy. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cassidy Aragon v. Reynaldo Aragon
This post-divorce case concerns parental relocation. Father sought to relocate to Arizona, citing family ties and increased career opportunities. The parties agreed that Father spent substantially more time with the child than Mother; however, Mother objected to the relocation, arguing that the move had no reasonable purpose. The trial court agreed with Mother and entered a parenting plan naming Mother primary residential parent. Because the trial court made no best interest finding regarding either the proposed relocation, or the parenting plan, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. Vacated and Remanded. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Michael James Little, Jr. v. Rhonda G. Little
The trial court determined that no material and substantial change in circumstance had occurred and denied Father’s petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Stevie R. Dickson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Stevie Dickson, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. Petitioner entered a best interest plea to second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty years. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the record supports the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jason Osmond Hines v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jason Osmond Hines, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief for his conviction of second-degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to properly impeach the State’s witnesses and adequately present a theory of self-defense. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry R. Shouse
Appellee, Jerry R. Shouse, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury with one count of driving under the influence and one count of violation of the open container law. Prior to trial, Appellee filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that the warrantless seizure was arbitrary and oppressive. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress by written order. The State filed a notice of appeal on the same day that the order of nolle prosequi was entered. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine based on the recent decision of State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 2013), the trial court properly granted the motion to suppress where the actions of the officer were not authorized under any exception to the warrant requirement. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cordell Remont Vaughn
A Perry County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Cordell Remont Vaughn, charging him with first degree murder. After Defendant’s first trial, this court reversed a jury’s verdict that found Defendant guilty of first degree murder. State v. Vaughn, 279 S.W.3d 584, 586-87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). Pursuant to a second jury trial, Defendant was again found guilty of first degree murder. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for new trial. The State filed a Rule 10 application for an extraordinary appeal with this court, which was granted. On appeal, this court reversed the trial court’s granting of a new trial. State v. Vaughn, No. M2011-00067-CCA-R10-CD, 2012 WL 1484191 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 25, 2012) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2012). On May 31, 2013, the trial court entered judgment and sentenced Defendant again to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support his first degree murder conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the toxicology report; and (3) whether his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated. After a review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s conviction of first degree murder; we reverse the sentence of life without possibility of parole and remand this case to the trial court for entry of a judgment of conviction of first degree murder with a sentence of life imprisonment. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Josephine E.M.C.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her young daughter. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights based upon four separate grounds: substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; abandonment by willful failure to visit; abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; and persistent conditions. We find that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and her child, and we reverse the trial court’s finding that grounds for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence. This matter is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph H. Adkins a/k/a Joseph H. Morrison
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Joseph H. Adkins a/k/a Joseph H. Morrison, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder; first degree felony murder; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102, -13-202, -14-403. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction and imposed a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years for each of the remaining convictions and ordered all of the sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of life plus twenty-four years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s pro se motion to remove appointed trial counsel; (2) that the trial court erred by not allowing the Defendant to cross-examine a witness about a prior instance where the witness allegedly lied under oath; (3) that the trial court improperly allowed the admission of hearsay evidence at trial; (4) that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; (5) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for first degree premeditated murder; (6) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions for two of the aggravated assault charges; (7) that the trial court erred by correcting a “typographical error” on the jury’s verdict form; and (8) that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Susan E. Rich et al v. The City of Chattanooga et al.
This case presents the issue of whether citizens who reside on real property that is proposed for deannexation by a municipal ordinance may, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-201 (2011), properly bring a quo warranto or declaratory judgment action against the municipality to challenge adoption of the deannexation ordinance. The trial court dismissed these claims against the municipality, and the plaintiffs have appealed. The plaintiffs have also taken issue with the propriety of the trial court’s determination regarding who would be qualified to vote in the referendum election, as well as other procedural and evidentiary issues. Discerning no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Aso Hassan Nejad v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Aso Hassan Nejad, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit first degree murder and sentenced by the trial court to 25 years’ incarceration. This court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Aso Hassan Nejad a.k.a. Diako Nejad and Ako Hassan Nejad, No. M2009-00481-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3562015 (Tenn. Crim. App., Sept. 14, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Feb. 17, 2011). Petitioner now appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Duckworth Pathology Group, Inc., a Professional Association v. The Regional Medical Center at Memphis (The Med)
A surgical pathology group filed this action in chancery court, claiming that the Med violated its own rules and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to award the petitioner with a contract after a lengthy request for proposals process. The petition stated that the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the statutes governing petitions for certiorari. The trial court granted the Med’s motion to dismiss for numerous reasons, including lack of jurisdiction. We find that the petition was not subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and we reverse the trial court’s finding to the contrary. However, due to the petitioner’s failure to appeal the trial court’s alternative grounds for dismissal, we find it unnecessary to consider the issues raised on appeal, and we otherwise affirm the order of dismissal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travei Pryor
A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Travei Pryor, of eleven counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; four counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and one count of possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class C felonies; and one count of criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for employing/possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury as provided by State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury pursuant to White constitutes reversible error. Therefore, the appellant’s eleven convictions for aggravated kidnapping must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial as to those offenses. The appellant’s remaining convictions are affirmed. However, upon remand, the trial court is to merge the appellant’s aggravated robbery convictions in counts 7 and 8 and counts 9 and 10 and enter single judgments of conviction for those offenses. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travei Pryor - dissenting in part, concurring in part
After reviewing the records and law as it currently stands, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s reasoned opinion with regard to its State v. White determinations. I would affirm the convictions as they were entered, although merging those counts which were alternatively charged. In all other regards, I join in the majority’s opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ernest Lee Jennings v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ernest Lee Jennings, III, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in admitting at trial evidence seized from his room. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Samuel Kyle
The defendant, Joseph Samuel Kyle, was convicted by a Benton County Circuit Court jury of aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation after serving thirty days in jail. On appeal, he argues: (1) interrelated issues that the trial court erred in overruling his motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony into evidence over his objection. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Benton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Hawkins
Defendant, Gary Hawkins, was convicted of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect and aggravated child neglect following a jury trial. Defendant received a life sentence for the murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of 22 years as a violent offender for the aggravated child neglect conviction. In this direct appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of a prior conviction for child abuse into evidence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Armard Reeves
The defendant, Armard Reeves, was convicted of one count of unlawful and knowing possession with intent to deliver three hundred pounds (300 lbs) (136,050 grams) or more of a controlled substance, to wit: marijuana. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to the maximum sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant was arrested as a part of a larger investigation that Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) were conducting into narcotics distribution. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to the lesser-included offense of facilitation; (2) the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed the amount of marijuana in question; (3) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that the defendant must knowingly possess certain amounts of marijuana; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (5) the trial court erred when it failed to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress; and (6) the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant to the maximum sentence for a Range I offender. After a thorough review of the record we conclude that facilitation was properly omitted as a jury instruction, that the “knowing” mens rea requirement does not apply to the amount of marijuana, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, and that the defendant was properly sentenced to the maximum term of incarceration. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Lynn Smith v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, David Lynn Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and is currently serving a sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the denial of his petition was error because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately prepare the petitioner to testify at trial; and (2) failing to investigate and interview an alibi witness. The petitioner further argues that the post-conviction court committed reversible error by refusing to exclude trial counsel from the post-conviction proceedings pursuant to Rule 615 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. Following review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel, and no Rule 615 violation was established. Therefore, we conclude that the petition was properly denied and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: John H. B.
Father appeals the trial court’s determination that he is willfully and voluntarily underemployed and the parenting schedule established by the trial court. Mother appeals the trial court’s determination that it lacked the authority to award attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c). We affirm the trial court’s judgment with respect to the parenting schedule and the finding of voluntary underemployment, and vacate with respect to the issue of attorney’s fees. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Scott Blankenship v. Amy Lynn Cox
This appeals arises from the post-divorce modification of child support following the emancipation of the parties’ oldest of three children. Both parents appeal numerous rulings by the trial court including its child support calculations, a judgment against Mother arising from Father’s overpayment of child support following the emancipation of their oldest child, the imputation of income to Mother for voluntary unemployment, an upward deviation for extraordinary education expenses, allocation of the uncovered medical expenses, allocation of the tax exemptions for the two minors, and attorney’s fees. We have determined that although the trial court was justified in finding a deviation for extraordinary education expenses, the trial court erred by applying the deviation prospectively rather than retroactively to the date of the petition. We reverse the trial court only on this issue and remand for the trial court to recalculate the amount of child support and the judgment against Mother consistent with this finding. We affirm the trial court in all other respects and deny both parties’ request to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in this appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sharron Joy Mayberry
A Humphreys County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Sharron Joy Mayberry, of simple possession of a Schedule III controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced her to eleven months, twenty-nine days suspended to probation and community service. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence, that the trial court erred by not giving a missing evidence jury instruction, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals |