Charles Michael Kincade v. Amanda Wooldridge Kincade
This appeal arises from a divorce; the primary issues on appeal pertain to the permanent parenting plan. During the pendency of the divorce and following a successful mediation, the parties entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement and a Permanent Parenting Plan. Six weeks later, Father filed a notice of withdrawal of his consent to the mediated parenting plan. Subsequently, an order was entered approving the Marital Dissolution Agreement and declaring the parties divorced, reserving the issue of a permanent parenting plan for trial. Following the trial, the court established a permanent parenting plan similar to the mediated plan with four modifications. When Mother’s counsel submitted the final order for the court’s approval, it contained three alternatives for the “right-of-first-refusal” provision, which was one of the four modifications. The trial court approved one of the “right-of-first-refusal” alternatives and entered the final order. Father appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in its formulation of the parenting plan and in awarding Mother her attorney’s fees. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. We also award Mother the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees she incurred on appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jay Dee Garrity v. State of Tennessee - Rehear
The Petitioner, Jay Dee Garrity, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of three counts of aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective forty-eight-year sentence to be served at 100%. On appeal, he contends that he is entitled to a new trial because trial counsel was presumptively ineffective under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). In the alternative, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel under the usual Strickland standard. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Strickland. Therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, the judgments of conviction are vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Russell Leaks v. State of Tennessee
This appeal involves a suit filed in the Tennessee Claims Commission against the State of Tennessee. The claimant alleged that he was seized without a warrant or probable cause, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The State sought dismissal, alleging that the Claims Commission did not have the requisite jurisdiction to hear such a claim. The Claims Commissioner agreed and dismissed the claim. The claimant appeals. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Marcus T. Johnson v. Darren Settles, Warden
Marcus T. Johnson, the Petitioner, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“the Petition”) claiming that he was being illegally restrained of his liberty because the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (“the Parole Board”) violated his due process rights by failing to timely serve him with a parole violation warrant and failing to conduct a preliminary hearing within fourteen days of the service of the warrant. The State moved to dismiss the Petition for failure to state a cognizable claim. The habeas corpus court granted the State’s motion and summarily dismissed the Petition. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Maya R. Et Al.
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to two children on the grounds of (1) persistence of conditions, (2) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the children. She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We reverse in part and affirm in part. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Converging Capital, LLC v. Michael Matthews
This appeal involves the attempt of Converging Capital, LLC, to collect an alleged credit card debt of Michael Matthews. Converging Capital alleged that it owned the debt as a result of a sale of certain accounts receivable from Pilot Receivables Management, LLC, which had earlier bought the debt from Citibank, the issuer of Matthews’s alleged MasterCard account. During the trial, Converging Capital presented the testimony of its records administrator. Matthews objected to the introduction of the bills of sale and assignment, and several credit card statements, on hearsay grounds. He also argued that Converging Capital failed to establish that his debt, if any, was included in the sales of the accounts receivable. The trial court overruled these objections and entered judgment against Matthews in the amount of the alleged debt, $55,684.88. We find that Converging Capital failed to meet its burden of proving that it owned the debt. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss Converging Capital’s complaint with prejudice. Costs are assessed against Converging Capital. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Samuel Huffine
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Samuel Huffine, pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, reckless aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence of an intoxicant, driving under the influence of an intoxicant per se, driving left of center, and speeding, for an effective sentence of nine years, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied an alternative sentence. We affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Authur R.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on the minor child, Authur R. (“the Child”), of Lola R. (“Mother”) and Authur D. (“Father”). The Child was placed in protective custody on June 13, 2013, after Mother was discovered to be under the influence of illegal drugs while the Child was in her custody. The Hamilton County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected on November 26, 2013. On November 25, 2015, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father. An amended petition to terminate was subsequently filed on May 6, 2016. DCS alleged as a basis for termination against both parents the statutory grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit, (2) abandonment by willful failure to support, (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent, and (4) substantial noncompliance with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans. Concerning Mother only, DCS also alleged the additional statutory grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and (2) persistence of the conditions leading to removal of the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its determination by clear and convincing evidence that DCS had proven as to both parents the statutory grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and substantial noncompliance with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan. With regard to Mother only, the trial court determined that DCS had also proven by clear and convincing evidence the ground of persistence of the conditions leading to the Child’s removal. The trial court further determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother and Father have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Ugenio Dejesus Ruby-Ruiz v. State of Tennessee
Following a trial, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Ugenio Dejesus Ruby-Ruiz, of three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor; five counts of aggravated sexual battery; nine counts of rape of a child; one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor; and two counts of rape, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 121 years in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied following a hearing. Upon review, we conclude that the pro se petition was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations applicable to post-conviction proceedings. However, because we are unable to determine from the record whether due process requires the tolling of the statute of limitations, we vacate the post-conviction court’s order and remand the case to the post-conviction court for a determination of whether due process tolling applies. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lee Alan Sprague
The defendant, Lee Alan Sprague, appeals his Roane County Criminal Court jury convictions of reckless driving and driving on a suspended license, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new preliminary hearing. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ladarius L. Reffegee v. Blair Leibach, Warden
Pro se Petitioner, Ladarius L. Reffegee, appeals from the Trousdale County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his judgments of conviction and sentences are void because an arrest warrant was not issued prior to his arrest, divesting the court of jurisdiction to sentence and convict him. The State asserts that the Petitioner failed to show that his judgments were void. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tracy Lebron Vick v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Tracy Lebron Vick, pleaded guilty to second degree murder and received a forty-year sentence. Nineteen years after his sentencing, he filed a petition for postconviction DNA analysis. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Prather
Defendant, Carlos Prather, pled guilty to two counts of vandalism over $1,000 and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of ten years as a Range III offender, to be served on supervised probation. As a condition of probation Defendant was ordered to complete the Jericho Program. On February 5, 2016, a probation violation warrant was issued alleging that Defendant violated the terms of his probation by being arrested for passing bad checks, failing to report the arrest, non-compliance with the Jericho Program, and being arrested for contempt of court on February 4, 2016. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original ten-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Javon Webster v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Javon Webster, appeals from the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the post-conviction petition filed approximately twelve years after expiration of the one year statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions. Petitioner alleged facts in his petition which he claims justify tolling of the statute of limitations based upon due process grounds. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Pierce Lankford v. City of Hendersonville, Tennessee
This case involves the seizure of the plaintiff’s cellular telephone and other items of personal property by police officers employed by the defendant city during a criminal investigation in October 2012. The plaintiff pled guilty in August 2013 to one count of aggravated assault and three counts of simple assault before the criminal division of the Sumner County Circuit Court (“criminal court”). While subsequently incarcerated, the plaintiff initiated this action on March 2, 2016, by filing a motion requesting, inter alia, a “property hearing” in the civil division of the Sumner County Circuit Court (“trial court”), averring that his cellular telephone and other personal property had been illegally seized without notice and that his telephone had ultimately been destroyed by order of the criminal court. The plaintiff asserted that city police officers had violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court subsequently entered an order, inter alia, determining that the plaintiff’s pleading was in substance a complaint alleging conversion. The city filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that it had governmental immunity from the plaintiff’s constitutional and conversion claims. The city also asserted that any negligence claim was time-barred under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-305(b) (2012). Upon consideration of additional pleadings filed by the parties, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, finding that the city possessed immunity from claims that its employees had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights or committed conversion. The trial court further determined that any negligence claim against the city was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Janie Marie Marcum-Bush v. Kevin Patrick Quinn
As part of a divorce proceeding, the trial court awarded one party a monetary judgment against the other. The judgment debtor’s obligation to pay the judgment did not arise until the sale of certain real property or after two years from the date of the judgment. Although the real property was sold, the judgment debtor made no payments on the judgment. The judgment creditor later moved to extend the judgment. The motion was filed within ten years of the date of the sale of the real property but more than ten years from the entry of the judgment. The trial court granted the motion to extend, concluding that the judgment creditor’s cause of action on the judgment did not accrue until the real property was sold. Because the motion to extend the judgment was untimely, we reverse. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark W. Givler v. State of Tennessee
This case originated when the plaintiff, who was incarcerated in the Tennessee Department of Correction facility at Mountain City, Tennessee, filed a claim against the State of Tennessee (“the State”), alleging that medical professionals at the correctional facility had provided him with untimely and inadequate medical care for a serious heart condition. Finding that the plaintiff’s allegations concerned individuals who were not employed by the State, the Claims Commission (“Commission”) initially dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff subsequently attempted to file a proposed amendment naming State employees as defendants and then a second claim, resulting in the instant action. The State filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the defense of res judicata. Finding that the plaintiff had misnumbered his proposed amendment to the original claim, the Commission treated the proposed amendment and second claim together as an amended claim. Ultimately determining that the plaintiff had alleged a health care liability action but failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites for such a suit and that he had failed to establish the Commission’s jurisdiction over intentional or criminal acts allegedly committed by State employees, the Commission entered a final order dismissing the action. The plaintiff has appealed. Determining that the plaintiff has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we dismiss this appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
MJM Real Estate Investments, LLC v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee, Et Al.
This appeal arises from a statutory writ of certiorari. The petitioner filed an application with the Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission (“the Commission”) to obtain a permit to renovate a 1935 industrial building in the Broadway Historic Preservation District in downtown Nashville. The Commission partially approved the application but required modifications before a permit would be issued. In pertinent part, the Commission denied the request to install vertically operable windows (similar to “roll up” garage doors) because they were not consistent with the style of the original 1935 windows. The Commission also required the construction of a parapet wall around the fifth story rooftop deck, rather than a railing proposed by the petitioner, to hide the building’s rooftop additions because the additions were not compliant with the design guidelines for the district. Following an evidentiary hearing, the chancery court affirmed the Commission’s decision. We affirm the chancery court. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Haley S. Et Al.
This appeal arises from a juvenile proceeding wherein the mother, Heather P. (“Mother”) filed a petition to modify her visitation with her two children, Haley S. and Leila P. (“the Children”), who were eleven and four years old, respectively, at the time of trial. Haley’s father, Michael S. (“Father”), remained incarcerated during the entire action. Leila’s father was deceased prior to the commencement of this proceeding. The paternal grandparents of Leila, Leroy W. and Tammie W. (“Grandparents”), who had legal custody of both children, subsequently filed a counter-petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children and Father’s parental rights to Haley. The magistrate of the juvenile court entered a pre-trial order, stating, inter alia, that if Grandparents were successful in terminating the parents’ rights, Mother’s petition to modify visitation would be dismissed but that if Grandparents were not successful, Mother’s petition would be scheduled for hearing. The magistrate’s order further allowed Mother to amend her original petition to modify visitation. Following a bench trial regarding the termination action, the trial court granted Grandparents’ petition to terminate the parents’ parental rights to the Children. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions leading to the removal of the children from Mother’s custody still persisted. The trial court further found that grounds existed regarding Father because he had abandoned Haley by failing to visit her and because he had failed to establish parentage. Mother appealed the trial court’s decision. Because no adjudicatory hearing order exists in the record finding the Children to be dependent, neglected, or abused, we reverse the ground of persistence of conditions as to Mother. We further determine that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support its determination that statutory grounds for termination existed regarding Father. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the judgment terminating Father’s parental rights and remand to the trial court for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) (2017). |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joel Wayne Allen
The Defendant, Joel Wayne Allen, appeals his convictions from a jury trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal, and the interest of justice does not support waiver of the timely filing requirement. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Benton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dwight Gossett
The Defendant, Dwight Gossett, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced by the trial court to twelve years at 100% in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Reggie Horton
The defendant, Reggie Horton, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated kidnapping, and simple assault, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of aggravated kidnapping. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deandre Bonds aka Israel El-Elyon
The Appellant, Deandre Bonds, aka Israel El-Elyon, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, second offense, and one count of evading arrest, both Class A misdemeanors, for which he received a total effective sentence of six months. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support the convictions. Based upon our review, we conclude that the judgments of conviction incorrectly note the convictions are Class B misdemeanors; accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court only for entry of corrected judgments reflecting that the offenses are Class A misdemeanors. The trial court’s judgments are affirmed in all other respects. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Von Brown
The Defendant, David Von Brown, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony; possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony; two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class D felonies; two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony by one having a prior felony conviction, Class D felonies; and felon in possession of a firearm, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the two drug convictions and imposed a sentence of twelve years on that conviction; the court merged the four various possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony convictions and imposed a sentence of five years on that conviction; and the court imposed a sentence of five years on the felon in possession of a firearm conviction. The court ordered that the sentence for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction be served consecutively to the other sentences, which were to be served concurrently, for a total effective term of seventeen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in not considering any mitigating factors in determining his sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harold Allen Vaughn
The Defendant, Harold Allen Vaughn, appealed his convictions for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and especially aggravated robbery, contending that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that his co-defendant was an accomplice as a matter of law. Upon review, this court affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for entry of a separate judgment form in Count 2 reflecting that the Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction was merged with his attempted first degree murder conviction in Count 1. State v. Harold Allen Vaughn, No. W2016-00131-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 7102748, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2016), perm. app. granted and case remanded, No. W2016-00131-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2017) (order). On November 17, 2017, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the Defendant’s pro se application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s opinion in State v. Henderson, 531 S.W.3d 687 (Tenn. 2017). State v. Harold Allen Vaughn, No. W2016-00131-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2017) (order). Upon further review, we vacate the Defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated robbery, modify this conviction to aggravated robbery, and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing and for entry of an amended judgment form in Count 4 reflecting this modified conviction and sentence. We also remand the case for entry of corrected judgments forms in Counts 1 and 2 as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |