Ray Donald Hawkins v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County Tennessee
01S01-9508-CV-00126
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant sued his employer for workers' compensation benefits covering mental and emotional disability which resulted from being informed that he was about to be fired. The trial judge dismissed the action because it did not state a claim on which relief could be granted. We conclude that the judgment should be affirmed. I. The complaint alleged that the appellant had worked for the Nashville Electric Service for thirty-one years, serving finally as Executive Assistant General Manager. On March 11, 1992, one hour before a scheduled meeting of the Power Board, a Board member informed the appellant that at the meeting the Board would vote to dismiss him. Although the rumor turned out to be false, the appellant alleged that the shock and fright produced by the unwelcome news caused such mental and emotional stress that he became permanently disabled. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The trial judge initially overruled the motion but decided to grant it, after further proceedings in the case. II. - 2 -
Hawkins
Workers Compensation Panel
Ray Donald Hawkins v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County Tennessee
01S01-9508-CV-00126
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Hamilton Gayden, Jr.,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant sued his employer for workers' compensation benefits covering mental and emotional disability which resulted from being informed that he was about to be fired. The trial judge dismissed the action because it did not state a claim on which relief could be granted. We conclude that the judgment should be affirmed. I. The complaint alleged that the appellant had worked for the Nashville Electric Service for thirty-one years, serving finally as Executive Assistant General Manager. On March 11, 1992, one hour before a scheduled meeting of the Power Board, a Board member informed the appellant that at the meeting the Board would vote to dismiss him. Although the rumor turned out to be false, the appellant alleged that the shock and fright produced by the unwelcome news caused such mental and emotional stress that he became permanently disabled. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The trial judge initially overruled the motion but decided to grant it, after further proceedings in the case. II. - 2 -
The appellant, Barry Hughes, challenges, by extraordinary appeal, the trial court's judgment affirming the district attorney general's denial of his application for pretrial diversion. The appellant sought to divert two counts of official oppression, one count of official misconduct, and one count of fabricating evidence. The charges stem from allegations that, while performing his duties as a police officer, he planted cocaine in a civilian's car. We affirm.
This is an appeal of a nonjury action in chancery form originally brought to rescind a contract for the sale of real estate and for damages to real property. The complaint was filed on January 22, 1 1991. Four separate hearings have been held in this cause. The first hearing was held without intervention of a jury. The second and third hearings were heard in the presence of a jury, and the fourth hearing in this cause was held without a jury. Following the fourth trial in the Chancery Court of GilesCounty, Tennessee, the chancellor entered a judgment against appellant for $22,279.59. The defendant, Earl Laursen, timely filed a notice of appeal from the final order entered January 9, 1995. The defendant, Delorita Laursen, did not perfect her appeal by filing a notice of appeal and is not before this Court. See, e.g., Town of Carthage, Tennessee, et al. v. Smith County, Tennessee, No. 01-A-01-9308-CH-00391 (Tenn. App., March 8, 1995). The appeal by the defendant/appellant, Earl Laursen, has been perfected and is properly before this Court. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in not having a jury hear the fourth case and in assessing damages to the real property. We reverse and remand for reasons that will hereinafter be shown.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
This is a medical malpractice case. Plaintiffs, Lisa and Ricky Prince, are husband and wife. Lisa Prince ("Plaintiff") was injured during out-patient surgery, allegedly as a result of improperly administered anesthetic. Initially, the suit was brought against Coffee Medical Center, Dr. Ramprasand (the surgeon), and Michael Cruz (the nurse anesthetist). Dr. Ramprasand and Cruz settled with Plaintiffs and were dismissed prior to this action. Plaintiff alleges on appeal that Coffee Medical Center ("CMC") was negligent in failing to establish adequate anesthetic policies and procedures and in failing to enforce its own anesthesia policies and procedures. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CMC and Plaintiff has appealed. For the reasons stated below, we reverse.
This appeal involves a marriage that failed in less than three years. The husband filed suit in the Circuit Court for Sequatchie County seeking a divorce and the enforcement of the parties’ prenuptial agreement. The wife also requested a divorce and challenged the validity of the prenuptial agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129(b) (1991) and upheld the prenuptial agreement. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the parties their personal property and directed the husband to assume certain credit card indebtedness and to provide the wife medical insurance for up to thirty-six months. Both parties take issue with various portions of the final divorce decree on this appeal. We have determined that the trial court erred by failing to consider the husband’s income earned during the marriage as marital property. Accordingly, we modify the division of marital property and the award of spousal support.
The husband of a woman who suffered a fatal heart attack shortly after being discharged from a hospital emergency room filed a medical malpractice suit against the treating doctor and the medical group for which he worked. The trial court dismissed the claim against the defendant doctor because the plaintiff failed to obtain service on him. A summary judgment was subsequently granted to the defendant medical group on the ground of the plaintiff’s failure to produce a qualified affidavit on the proper standard of care and on causation, as is required by the Medical Malpractice Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. We affirm the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Stanley Bailey v. Amre, Inc.
03S01-9511-CH-00124
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Billy Joe White
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Chancellor held " . . . really all I can do is find that the medical proof does not bear out a finding of permanent disability," and this action for workers' compensation benefits was thereupon dismissed, the propriety of which is presented for our review, which is de novo on the record accompanied by a presumption that the findings of fact of the trial court are correct unless the evidence otherwise preponderates. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). We affirm.
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Ross N. Everett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
03S01-9508-CH-00093
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frederick D. Mcdonald,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff, Ross N. Everett, has appealed from the action of the trial court in awarding 45% permanent partial disability benefits to his left leg. His primary contention is the Chancellor was in error by not finding his pre-existing arthritic condition was aggravated by the accident. Plaintiff, 71 years of age at the time of the trial, was injured on March 2, 1992, while working for the defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., when he was attempting to hang fishing lures. He testified he turned his foot to move and his knee twisted causing the injury. He related to the court a knee problem pre- existed the accident as he had seen a doctor during February, 1992. He said he was having pain and swelling in his knee, and he was unable to fully flex it. The only other witness to testify was Dr. Edwin E. Holt, an orthopedic surgeon, who testified by deposition. Dr. Holt stated his pre-existing problem in his knee was caused by arthritis; that the arthritic condition was not caused by the accident but the accident probably aggravated the arthritis by causing more pain; that the accident did not increase the arthritis; and that the accident did cause a meniscal tear which he corrected by arthroscopic surgery on September 12, 1992. Dr. Holt gave a 14% impairment rating to the left leg as a result of the meniscal tear and a 1% impairment rating to the pre-existing arthritic condition. We do not believe the Chancellor misapplied the ruling in the Cunningham v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 811 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1991) case as insisted by the plaintiff. Although a question as to whether plaintiff had sustained an injury by an "accident at work" was involved, the general rule concerning aggravation of a pre- existing condition was set forth, the rule being where an employee's work aggravates a pre-existing condition by making the pain worse but does not -2-
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Clifford E. Wells v. Jefferson City Zinc, Inc.
03S01-9509-CV-00100
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ben Hooper,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer appeals the trial court's finding that the plaintiff is 1% permanently and totally disabled, its apportionment of 7% of the liability to the employer and 3% to the Second Injury Fund and its commutation of the award to a lump sum. We modify the judgment to void the commutation of the award to a lump sum payment. As modified, we affirm the judgment. The plaintiff, 51 at the time of trial, has a ninth-grade education. His past work experience includes farming, paint spray mixing and operating and supervision of same, millwrighting, construction and working in the defendant's mines. He began working for the defendant in 1977. He suffered a back injury, possibly in the course and scope of his employment with the defendant-employer, in 1978. A lumbar laminectomy was performed in 1985 as a result of that injury. No workers' compensation claim was ever filed, and the employer did not pay any medical expenses. Plaintiff re-injured his back on February 21, 1992, while moving a pump in the course of his employment. He was laid off by the employer in June 1994, never having returned to work. Dr. John Bell, an orthopaedic surgeon, treated the plaintiff after his 1992 injury. He had also performed the plaintiff's 1985 surgery, after which he had assigned the plaintiff a 15% permanent impairment. He assigned the plaintiff a five percent impairment rating for the 1992 injury under the most recent edition of the A.M.A. Guides. He restricted the plaintiff from lifting more than 35 pounds occasionally, 2 pounds frequently, climbing and kneeling, bouncing, crouching or crawling more than occasionally. He had apparently informed the plaintiff of similar -2-
Nellie Myrtle Farley v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
01S01-9509-CV-00147
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Bobby Capers,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendants below appeal the trial court's award of 75% permanent partial disability to each upper extremity. They challenge the amount of the award, its commutation to a lump sum, and the trial court's award of temporary total disability benefits from May 26, 1994 to December 1, 1994. We modify the trial court's award, finding that the evidence preponderates against an award of 75% permanent partial disability to each extremity and towards a finding of 45% permanent partial disability to each extremity. As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff, 63 at the time of trial, has a sixth grade education. She worked for the defendant-employer for almost 26 years. In late October 1993, she was found to have bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. She continued to work until January 3, 1994, when she took an early retirement. She testified at trial that she retired early because her arms were "messed up." Carpal tunnel releases were performed in February and May 1994. At trial, she testified that she reached maximum medical improvement in early December 1994. She has not applied for any job since her retirement. Dr. Abbey, an orthopedic surgeon, treated the plaintiff and testified, by deposition, on behalf of the defendant. He testified that the plaintiff did well post- operatively and that he assigned her a zero percent impairment rating. He also testified that after he assigned her this rating, the plaintiff had problems with swelling and discomfort and, between the two surgeries, she developed triggering in her left long finger. He opined that the plaintiff reached maximum medical improvement on May 23, 1994 for her carpal tunnel syndrome, although she probably had not reached that stage for her triggering finger. He assigned no permanent restrictions. Dr. Robert Paul Landsberg, another orthopedist, examined the plaintiff at the request of her attorney and testified, also by deposition, on her behalf. He
Trousdale
Workers Compensation Panel
Nellie Myrtle Farley v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
01S01-9509-CV-00147
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Bobby H. Capers
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendants below appeal the trial court's award of 75% permanent partial disability to each upper extremity. They challenge the amount of the award, its commutation to a lump sum, and the trial court's award of temporary total disability benefits from May 26, 1994 to December 1, 1994. We modify the trial court's award, finding that the evidence preponderates against an award of 75% permanent partial disability to each extremity and towards a finding of 45% permanent partial disability to each extremity. As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff, 63 at the time of trial, has a sixth grade education. She worked for the defendant-employer for almost 26 years. In late October 1993, she was found to have bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. She continued to work until January 3, 1994, when she took an early retirement. She testified at trial that she retired early because her arms were "messed up." Carpal tunnel releases were performed in February and May 1994. At trial, she testified that she reached maximum medical improvement in early December 1994. She has not applied for any job since her retirement. Dr. Abbey, an orthopedic surgeon, treated the plaintiff and testified, by deposition, on behalf of the defendant. He testified that the plaintiff did well post- operatively and that he assigned her a zero percent impairment rating. He also testified that after he assigned her this rating, the plaintiff had problems with swelling and discomfort and, between the two surgeries, she developed triggering in her left long finger. He opined that the plaintiff reached maximum medical improvement on May 23, 1994 for her carpal tunnel syndrome, although she probably had not reached that stage for her triggering finger. He assigned no permanent restrictions. Dr. Robert Paul Landsberg, another orthopedist, examined the plaintiff at the request of her attorney and testified, also by deposition, on her behalf. He
