Empire Berol , U.S.A. v. Nancy Lee Estes 01S01-9610-CH-00205
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Tyrus H. Cobb
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The posture of this case is somewhat unusual. The plaintiff is Empire Berol U.S.A., the employer of the defendant Nancy Lee Estes. It sought a declaratory judgment on March 11, 1993 of the respective rights of the parties under the workers' compensation law, alleging that Estes was asserting a job-related accident resulting in physical injury. Estes filed her answer, admitting that she was injured, but that her condition was one that progressively occurred and was not diagnosed as carpal tunnel syndrome until December 28, 1992. About four months later, Estes filed another answer, coupled with a counter-claim, through different counsel, in which she alleged that she sustained an injury by accident on or about November 17, 1992 during the course of her employment by the plaintiff. All this was followed by the filing of another complaint, by the plaintiff, on May 2, 1994, against Estes and Golden Corral, alleging as a result of discovery, that the injury to Estes arose out of her employment at the Golden Corral, which was designated as a third-party defendant. Golden Corral filed a motion to dismiss, alleging, in effect, procedural errors. The plaintiff thereupon amended its complaint, alleging that Golden Corral was a necessary party under RULE 19, but the procedural problem was unaddressed. Before the motion to dismiss was heard, the parties agreed that it was well- taken, and Estes averred her intention to file a complaint against Golden Corral, which soon followed, in which she alleged that a "gradual injury did occur and that [she] was employed by Golden Corral during a time frame in which the injury may have begun" and that she "sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment while performing work at the place of business of Golden Corral in Shelbyville, Tennessee." Golden Corral denied that Estes was injured as alleged, but if so, her suit was time-barred under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-21. Upon the trial of the case, the central issue was causation, since Ms. Estes' carpal tunnel syndrome was evident and not disputed. She testified that she began 2
Bedford
Workers Compensation Panel
Darla Gail Farmiloe v. Saturn Corporation 01S01-9610-CV-00199
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This complaint was filed June 23, 1994. The plaintiff alleged that she sustained various job-related injuries arising from her employment, the first being November 21, 1991 involving upper back and shoulder pain which developed gradually. The defendant admitted the report of these injuries. Trial of the case in February 1996 resulted in a finding that the plaintiff's job duties advanced the severity of her pre-existing conditions and that she had sustained a 75 percent occupational disability with benefits payable in a lump sum. The employer appeals, and presents for review the issues of (1) whether the plaintiff sustained a compensable injury to her neck, back and left upper extremity, (2) whether the award is excessive, and (3) whether the award should be paid in a lump sum. W e will consider these issues jointly. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1991). Where testimony is presented by deposition, this Court is able to make its own independent assessment of the proof to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
State vs. Robinson 03C01-9510-CC-00303
Trial Court Judge: Rex Henry Ogle
Cocke
Court of Criminal Appeals
02C01-9605-CC-00183 02C01-9605-CC-00183
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
Lauderdale
Court of Criminal Appeals
David H. Crenshaw, Sr. v. Ats Southeast, Inc. 01S01-9701-CH-00018
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is an appeal by the employer from an order of the trial court setting aside a previously issued order of dismissal for failure to prosecute a workers' compensation case within one year under the local rules of court for Davidson County. The trial court set aside the dismissal order under Rule 6.2, TENN. R. CIV. P. The complaint for workers' compensation benefits was filed October 14, 1994. The defendant filed an answer on November 17, 1994. The trial court, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint on November 6, 1995 under the local rule for failure to prosecute. The record before us, which consists of the pleadings, orders and an affidavit of the employee's counsel in support of his Rule 6 motion, show the notice of dismissal was filed on counsel for the plaintiff on November 14, 1995. On January 22, 1996, plaintiff filed a Rule 6 motion to have the order dismissed or set aside. On February 26, 1996, the trial judge found "Plaintiff [had] not made out a sufficient showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to justify relief under Rule 6, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure," however "because this matter is a workers' compensation action, the Order of Dismissal will be set aside and this case shall be put back on the Court's active docket." Unless otherwise set out in the order of dismissal, such order operates as an adjudication upon the merits. Rule 41.2(3), TENN. R. CIV. P. Rule 59.4, TENN. R. CIV. P., provides for a motion to amend or alter a judgment. Such motions must be filed and served on the opposite party within 3 days of the entry of the judgment in question. A judgment becomes final in 3 days and cannot be reviewed after that time. Algee v. State Farm General Ins. Co., 89 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). The order of dismissal in this case became final 3 days after entry thereof, 2
