State vs. Ira Ray Crouch
E1999-02320-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Phyllis H. Miller
Having pled guilty to two counts of statutory rape, the defendant now challenges his sentence. He argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion for judicial diversion. We affirm his sentence of five years on probation.

Joseph Spottswood Crowell vs. Mayme Modena Roberson
E1999-00348-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Frank V. Williams, III
The appellee has filed a petition for rehearing pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 39. In the first ground of his petition, he asserts that we made a mistake in computing the "[a]djustment re: North Carolina property" reflected on page 8 of our opinion. The appellee is in error in this assertion. We purposely utilized an adjusting figure of $141,915 rather than $140,447.50 -- the latter figure being fifty percent of the value of the marital property share of the North Carolina property. The larger figure was a "plug" figure used to achieve equality in the overall division of the parties' marital property. Since it will be necessary to transfer funds to consummate this division, we deemed it equitable in this case to equally divide the parties' marital estate. The trial court found that equality was equitable and the evidence does not preponderate against this finding.

State vs. Frederick Cavitt
E1999-00304-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Cupp
While incarcerated in the Tennessee Department of Correction, the defendant was indicted for aggravated assault, pled guilty to the lesser included offense of simple assault, and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The defendant moved for pretrial jail credits, in the amount of three hundred and twenty-one days, calculated from the day the arrest warrant was served to the day the judgment was entered. We conclude that the defendant is not entitled to the claimed jail credits and therefore affirm the trial court's order dismissing the defendant's Motion to Modify Judgment to Reflect Jail Credits. We modify the sentence to indicate service in either the Carter County Jail or workhouse.

Eddie Brannon v. Pen Gulf, Inc.
03S01-9906-CH-00053
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Howell N. Peoples
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jerri Bryant
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Travelers Insurance Company (hereafter "Travelers") appeals the granting of summary judgment dismissing Reliance Insurance Company (hereafter "Reliance") as a party defendant before trial. Travelers asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the last injurious exposure rule did not create an issue of whether Reliance, as a subsequent workers' compensation insurance carrier for Pen Gulf, Inc., may be liable for Eddie Brannon's injury. An appeal from a summary judgment in a workers' compensation case is not governed by the de novo standard of review provided by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3), but by Rule 56, T.R.C.P. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Tenn. 1991). No presumption of correctness attaches to decisions granting summary judgment because they involve only questions of law and the reviewing court must determine whether the requirements of Rule 56 have been met. Gonzales v. Alman Const. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Tenn. 1993). Summary judgment is proper when the movant demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56.3, T.R.C.P. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 28, 21 (Tenn. 1993). "It is almost never an option in workers' compensation cases. In a summary judgment hearing, even where the parties have no right to a jury trial, the trial judge is not at liberty to weigh the evidence." Hilliard v. Tennessee State Home Health Services, Inc., 95 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Tenn. 1997). Eddie Brannon filed this action on March 23, 1998 to recover workers' compensation benefits for "bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome which was caused by the 2

State vs. Seria D. Ward
M1998-00128-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Thomas H. Shriver
The defendant was convicted in Davidson County of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to confinement for seventeen years. He appealed the conviction, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offense, that his videotaped confession should have been excluded, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Joyce Newman
M1999-00161-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Graham
The defendant pled guilty in Sequatchie County to two counts of selling a Schedule II substance and was sentenced to confinement for four years and six months. After serving six months, she was placed in community corrections. Subsequently, an affidavit was filed by her probation officer, alleging that she had violated her Community Services Behavioral Contract in several ways, including "breaking house arrest." Following a hearing, the trial court agreed that the defendant had violated the house arrest provision of the contract and ordered that she serve the remainder of her sentence with the Department of Correction. The defendant timely appealed, alleging that the trial court improperly considered certain evidence and that, if she was reconfined, she should have served her sentence at the local jail, rather than with the Department of Correction. Based upon our review, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for a new revocation hearing.

State vs. Michael S. Reid
M1999-00305-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
The Williamson County grand jury indicted the appellant, Michael S. Reid, with one (1) count of driving under the influence, third offense, one (1) count of driving on a revoked license and one (1) count of criminal impersonation. The appellant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license and criminal impersonation and, after a jury trial, was found guilty of driving under the influence, third offense. The trial court sentenced the appellant to concurrent terms of eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days, suspended after service of 180 days, for driving under the influence, third offense and six (6) months, suspended after service of ten (10) days, for driving on a revoked license. In addition, the appellant received a consecutive sentence of six (6) months, suspended after service of five (5) days, for criminal impersonation. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in (1) admitting hearsay evidence over his objection by allowing a Williamson County Sheriff's Deputy to testify as to the contents of a dispatch he received prior to stopping the appellant; and (2) allowing the state to introduce evidence concerning a prior stop of the appellant for which he was not charged. We hold that the officer's testimony concerning the dispatch was nonhearsay and relevant and, as a result, properly admissible. Additionally, we conclude that the appellant has waived the issue regarding the prior stop as a result of his failure to object to this evidence at trial and his failure to include this issue in the motion for new trial. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Ronald Wayne Ashby
M1999-01247-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: William Charles Lee
The defendant appeals his aggravated burglary conviction. He asserts that insufficient evidence supported the jury verdict, that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of another crime, and that his sentence is excessive. We conclude that sufficient evidence supported the verdict and that the "other crime" evidence was properly admitted. We affirm the sentence.

Hudgens vs. Rogers
M2000-00239-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Arthur E. Mcclellan
The mother of four minor children appealed the trial court's decision to change custody from Mother to Father based on a material change in circumstances. Prior to the entry of that order, it had been determined that an agreement, originally announced to the court which awarded custody of the children to Mother, had been set aside due to the court's finding that there had been no meeting of the minds of the parties as several critical issues had been left unresolved. We have determined that the court was correct in that decision. Therefore, the standard which the trial court should have applied was one of comparative fitness and best interest of the children rather than a material change of circumstances. This matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Joseph S. Burris, Jr.
01C01-9907-CC-00247
Trial Court Judge: J. Steve Daniel

Johnna Hayes vs. Jeff Hayes
W1999-00445-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
This appeal arises from a dispute between Plaintiff Johnna Lea Hayes (Beuerlein) and Defendant Jeff C. Hayes regarding the amount of Mr. Hayes' child support obligation and the enforcement of a promissory note executed by Ms. Beuerlein in conjunction with the parties' divorce. The trial court found (1) that Mr. Hayes has an annual income of $64,139.00, (2) that Mr. Hayes' child support obligation is $1,221.00 per month but that this amount should be reduced to $621.00 per month until Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note is satisfied, (3) that Mr. Hayes' child support arrearage is equal to $14,940.00, (4) that Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note is equal to $39,569.85, (5) that, subtracting Mr. Hayes' child support arrearage from Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note, the net amount that Ms. Beuerlein owes to Mr. Hayes is $24,665.85 plus ten percent (10%) interest, and (6) that each party shall pay his or her own attorney's fees. For the reasons set forth below, the ruling of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Planters Gin Company v. Federal Compress &Amp; Warehouse
W1999-02460-COA-R3-CV-
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio

Talmage Crump vs. Kimberly Bell
W1999-00673-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
This is a personal injury case. Plaintiff filed a complaint and issued summons, which was returned "not to be found." Plaintiff issued an alias summons which was also returned "not to be found." Plaintiff issued pluries summons more than one year after the return of the alias summons. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's case for failure to comply Rule 3, Tenn.R.Civ.P. Plaintiff asserts that defendant is equitably estopped from relying upon Tenn.R.Civ.P. 3, because of action of defendant's liability insurance carrier leading him to believe that the defense would not be raised upon which he relied to his detriment. The trial court found no estoppel, and plaintiff has appealed.

Glenda Faye Tolliver v. National Health Care
E1999-01017-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Lafferty, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Daryl R. Fansler, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for a hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff sustained an accidental injury during her employment with the defendant and that the trial court awarded the plaintiff a twelve and one-half (12-_) percent vocational disability. After a complete review of the record, briefs of the parties and applicable law, we affirm. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is Affirmed. LAFFERTY, SR. J., in which BARKER, J., and PEOPLES, SP. J., joined. Robert W. Knolton, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the appellant, National Health Care Corporation. William A. Hotz, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Glenda Faye Tolliver. MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff, age 4, is a licensed practical nurse and a certified nursing assistant instructor. On March 6, 1996, the plaintiff was assisting Tracey Bunch, a nursing assistant trainee, in transferring a patient from a bed to a wheelchair in the defendant's health care center. The plaintiff testified that she felt pain in the right side of her neck, down her shoulders and at the base of her skull. The pain was in the cervical area and the right arm. The pain increased and the following day the plaintiff informed her supervisor. She was referred to Dr. Watson and then to Dr. Uzzle. The plaintiff testified that she had two past injuries, (1) in 199, she sustained a cervical strain while working. Her MRI was negative and she returned to work; (2) in 1993, she fell at the Cracker Barrel injuring her elbow, "it stoved up her neck" and she also injured her left knee. She returned to work. After treatment for her injury of March 6, 1996, the plaintiff returned to work on light duty. The plaintiff requested that her return be limited to an instructor, but she was made a supervisor on the three to eleven shift. On the same day that the plaintiff returned to work, she was fired. At the time of trial, the plaintiff was working two jobs, one as an LPN at the UT hospital and as a supervisor for Helen Ross McNabb, a rehabilitation center. The plaintiff testified that she has problems doing her work, such as giving EKG's, lifting woman's breast, and any computer work, since she must keep her head down. The plaintiff cannot work the floor, lift patients and deliver meal trays. By deposition, Tracey Michelle Bunch testified that on March 6, 1996, she was working as a nursing assistant trainee, working on her certified nursing assistant certification, when the plaintiff assisted her in moving an elderly patient in and out of bed. The plaintiff did not complain of any injury, but the following day the plaintiff was not available as the instructor. The following Monday, Ms. Bunch saw the plaintiff at work answering calls at the nurse's station. The plaintiff had to make a full body turn instead of just a simple head turn. Keri Trammell, Director of the National Health Center, testified that she hired the plaintiff as an instructor for the certified nursing assistant program and as an LPN supervisor. She stated that she was familiar with the report of March 6, 1996, and that the plaintiff was referred to see Dr. Uzzle. The plaintiff was allowed to continue to work but on light duty. About May 1, 1996, Dr. Uzzle removed these restrictions. On May 29, 1996, Ms. Trammell called the plaintiff into her office and advised the plaintiff, based upon the medical reports, that she would be returned to a supervisor's position. The plaintiff refused to accept the supervisor's position, stating that she could only work as an instructor. MEDICAL EVIDENCE By deposition, Dr. Maren L. Watson, a family practitioner, testified that he saw the plaintiff on March 11, 1996, with a complaint of neck pains as well as headaches. The plaintiff advised Dr. Watson that she was lifting a patient at the National Health Center and that evening the pain got worse. In his examination, Dr. Watson found that the plaintiff's vital signs were normal, she was in no distress and cooperative with the exam. As to the musculoskeletal exam, Dr. Watson palpated the plaintiff's neck, upper back and shoulders and found generalized mild tenderness. Although Dr. Watson found no muscle spasms, he did note that the plaintiff's right shoulder was resting one inch lower than her left shoulder. Dr. Watson opined that the plaintiff certainly sustained a cervical muscle strain due to lifting a patient and this caused some pain in her neck that had radiated to her shoulders and middle back, which warranted a few days off from work. Dr. Watson testified that the plaintiff was unhappy with his recommended course of treatment and he did not see her again. Dr. Watson could not give an opinion as to any assessment for physical impairment for the plaintiff. -2-

Merritt vs. Yates
M1999-00775-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal involves a dispute between Plaintiff June Yates Merritt ("Ms. Merritt") and Defendants Aileen Biron Yates ("Mrs. Yates") and Claire Biron ("Mr. Biron") regarding the proper interpretation or construction of mutual wills executed in April of 1985 by Mrs. Yates and her husband Thomas Harry Yates ("Mr. Yates"), who was the father of Ms. Merritt. After the death of Mr. Yates in December of 1985, Mrs. Yates deeded certain real property to Mr. Biron, gifted certain personal property to Mr. Biron, and established a revocable trust using money received as a result of her husband's death. In an action filed by Ms. Merritt challenging these transactions, the trial court determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact and entered a judgment in favor of Ms. Merritt. Additionally, the court denied Ms. Merritt's motion for discretionary costs. Mrs. Yates appeals the court's order granting a judgment in favor of Ms. Merritt and Ms. Merritt appeals the court's ruling regarding her motion for discretionary costs. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

State vs. Manolito Jemison
M1999-00752-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Steve R. Dozier
The defendant was found guilty by a Davidson County jury of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter on one count of first degree premeditated murder and the lesser offense of reckless homicide on one count of felony murder. The counts were merged into one conviction for voluntary manslaughter, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter and the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court erroneously applied one enhancement factor and failed to apply two mitigating factors. Based upon our review, we agree that an enhancement factor was improperly applied. However, since two other enhancement factors were properly applied, and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Inscoe, et al vs. Kemper, et al
M1999-00741-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal arises from a suit filed by Inscoe seeking the return of earnest money held in escrow for the purchase of Kemper's residence. When Inscoe decided not to purchase the residence, Kemper refused to return the earnest money. The trial court found in favor of Inscoe and ordered the return of the earnest money. In making its finding, the court stated that Inscoe's promise to buy was illusory and there was no meeting of the minds, thus the contract was void and unenforceable. Kemper appeals.

State v. Dwanna L. Mason
M1999-02535-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.
The defendant pled guilty in Davidson County Criminal Court to vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, a Class C felony, and four lesser charges against her were dismissed. Her guilty plea was submitted without any agreement of the parties as to length or manner of service of sentence. After a sentencing hearing at which the defendant testified, the trial court sentenced her to five years and six months in continuous confinement. The defendant appeals as of right this sentence. We conclude that the imposition of a sentence of five years and six months was appropriate. We affirm the sentence as to length but modify it to show a period of confinement equal to time already served with the remaining time to be served on probation.

State of Tennessee v. Daronopolis R. Sweatt
M1999-2522-CCA-R3-CD
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III

Beavers vs. The Lebanon Democrat Newspaper
M1999-02401-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal arises from an action initiated by Plaintiffs, Mae and Jerry Beavers, against the Defendant newspaper, the Lebanon Democrat, for libel and slander. The Beavers' claim arises out of two separate articles published by the newspaper. The trial court granted the newspaper's motion for summary judgment, holding that the first article was substantially true and the second article was a non-actionable opinion. The Beavers appeal.

State vs. Michael Sample & Larry McKay
W1999-01202-CCA-R3-PC
Trial Court Judge: Bernie Weinman
The Defendants were each convicted in 1982 of two counts of felony murder. Each Defendant received two death penalties for the murders. On post-conviction, the Defendants contend that the State withheld exculpatory information and that their death penalties were predicated in part on an invalid aggravating circumstance. The trial court dismissed the petitions without a hearing, finding that the Brady claims were time-barred and finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have imposed the death sentences absent consideration of the invalid aggravating circumstance. The Defendants now appeal the trial court's findings on both claims for relief. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Jeremy Tompkins vs. Mary Rainey
W1999-01218-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: A. V. Mcdowell
In this action to establish parentage, Jeremy Earl Tompkins (Father) appeals the trial court's final judgment awarding Mary Helen Rainey (Mother) custody of the parties' infant son. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

State vs. Jerry Rodgers
W1999-01443-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Chris B. Craft
The defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and sentenced to eight years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in relying on New York convictions as prior felonies in order to sentence him as a multiple offender. After review, we conclude that the record does not support the trial court's finding that the New York convictions qualified as prior felonies for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, we reverse, and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.

State vs. Christopher Henderson
W1999-00958-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of judicial diversion and full probation following his guilty plea to possession of cocaine under 0.5 grams with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

State of Tennessee v. Shunna Demetria Hilliard
W1999-00483-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn