State, Ex Rel, Pernie Barger, et al vs. City of Huntsville , State ex rel, George Brawner, Sr., et al vs. City of Huntsville
E2001-00395-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Billy Joe White
The Trial Court held service of process on the City's Mayor under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.04(8) was insufficient. On appeal, we affirm.

Alvin Bates vs. Dr. Joseph Metcalf
E2001-00358-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.

Alvin Bates vs. Dr. Joseph Metcalf
E2001-00358-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.

Alvin Bates vs. Dr. Joseph Metcalf
E2001-00358-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.

Daniel M. Banks v. State of Tennessee
E2000-02620-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The petitioner, Daniel M. Banks, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the petitioner was provided the effective assistance of counsel and knowingly and voluntarily entered his pleas of guilt to possession of marijuana with intent to sell, possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, and possession of drug paraphernalia, the judgment is affirmed.

Gerald Williams vs. Cora Williams
E2000-02782-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Steven C. Douglas
In this divorce action, Gerald B. Williams ("Plaintiff") appeals the Trial Court's award of alimony in futuro in the amount of $800 per month to Cora Rita Williams ("Defendant"). The parties were married thirty-eight years. While Plaintiff earns approximately $32,000 per year, Defendant's income is substantially less at approximately $11,220. The Trial Court specifically found that Defendant could not be rehabilitated. Plaintiff contends on appeal that the Trial Court erred in awarding any alimony to Defendant because the proof at trial did not establish Defendant's need for financial support and Plaintiff's ability to pay alimony. Plaintiff also argues that if the award of alimony is appropriate, the amount is excessive. We modify the alimony from $800 to $600 per month, and affirm the judgment as modified.

Shelton vs. Tidwell
E2000-02913-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Wheeler A. Rosenbalm
Defendants sold plaintiff equipment which had been stolen. The Trial Court entered a Judgment for plaintiff for the purchase money. On appeal, we affirm.

James Jones vs. Pierce Garrett, a/k/a Perry Garrett
E2000-00196-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Kindall T. Lawson
This is a suit wherein James Lee Jones, III, and his wife seek a determination that Pierce Brandon Garrett, a/k/a Perry Garrett, has abandoned his son so that they may adopt him. The Trial Judge found by clear and convincing evidence that abandonment had occurred, but did not make any finding as to the best interest of the child. We affirm the finding as to abandonment and remand the case for a determination as to best interest.

Wanda Carey Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Center, Inc., et al.
M1999-00346-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

We granted review of this case to determine whether the holder of a certificate of need may be held liable for the healthcare facility operator's tortious acts. We hold that the Tennessee statutes and rules governing certificates of need impliedly impose a non-delegable duty upon the certificate of need holder to initiate operation of the healthcare facility. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Michael O. Johnson
M2000-01837-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The defendant appeals from the trial court's denial of probation or some other form of alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

State of Tennessee v. Peter Allen Ross
W1999-00972-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles C. Mcginley

The appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia with intent to sell after officers discovered 53.5 grams of cocaine in his motel room. Prior to trial, he challenged the search of his motel room under the federal and state Constitutions, but the trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding that he possessed no reasonable expectation of privacy in the room after he disclaimed ownership of the room key. Following his conviction, the appellant urged the trial court to consider as a mitigating factor that his conduct did not cause or threaten serious bodily injury, but the trial court disagreed and sentenced the appellant to serve the maximum term in the range. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences, and we granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of the record and applicable legal authorities, we agree that the appellant relinquished his otherwise legitimate expectation of privacy in his motel room by disclaiming ownership of the key and by asserting that it belonged to another person. We also conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions on both charges. Finally, although the trial court should have considered the mitigating factor in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-113(1),  we conclude that the maximum sentence in the Range is nevertheless appropriate. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Peter Allen Ross - Dissenting
W1999-00972-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles C. Mcginley

For denying that a key to a hotel room belonged to him, the defendant has been stripped of
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The majority
imposes this harsh result even in the face of obvious and undisputed evidence that the subject
premises were under the defendant’s exclusive and private control. Because I am unable to agree
that a refusal to incriminate one’s self in response to police inquiries should result in a loss of Fourth Amendment rights, I respectfully dissent.

Eddie F. Depriest v. Kevin Meyers, Warden
M2000-02312-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Jones

The petitioner, Eddie F. Depriest, appeals as of right from the Wayne County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner claims that the circuit court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to convict him because he was a juvenile when he committed the offense and a proper transfer hearing had not been conducted. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Tavis Shields
W2000-01404-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence a booking record purportedly containing the defendant's fingerprints. The defendant contends that the booking record is hearsay and not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the introduction of the defendant's booking record into evidence was proper as a business record. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Randall Anthony
W2000-02234-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

In September 1991, the Defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault and possession of a weapon with intent to employ it in the commission of aggravated assault. The Defendant was sentenced to six years for the aggravated assault conviction and to two years for the weapon conviction. The sentences were to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of eight years, with six months to be served in jail and the remainder to be served on intensive probation. Following several probation violation reports, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking his entire eight-year probated sentence when his six-year sentence had expired prior to the issuance of the probation revocation warrant. Finding that the probation revocation warrant was not timely filed as to the aggravated assault conviction, we reverse the judgment of the trial court revoking the Defendant's probation for that count. Finding that the probation revocation warrant was timely filed as to the weapons conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the Defendant's probation for that count.

State of Tennessee v. Latroy W. Askew
E2000-02010-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ray L. Jenkins

The defendant, Latroy W. Askew, appeals from the order of the Knox County Criminal Court which revoked Defendant's probation and required him to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Having reviewed the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Bank/First Citizens Bank, v. Citizens and Associates, Allied Mortgage Capital Corp., Frieda Gray, and Henry Gray, A/K/A James Gray, First Tennessee Bank
E2000-02545-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell E. Simmons, Jr.

Drawer of checks and Bank failed to exercise ordinary care in transactions under Tenn. Code Ann. §47-3-406. Drawer was assessed 80% of fault and Bank 20%. Drawer appeals. We affirm, as modified. 

The Bank/First Citizens Bank v. Citizens and Associates, et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
E2000-02545-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell E. Simmons, Jr.

I concur in so much of the majority opinion as holds that Citizens is precluded from raising an issue on appeal as to the dismissal of First Tennessee Bank. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the facts do not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Citizens was 80% at fault for the loss occasioned by Frieda Gray’s forgery. In my judgment, Citizens did not engage in negligent conduct that substantially contributed to the forgery, as that concept is embodied in T.C.A. § 47-3-406. Accordingly, I would hold that the Bank, who was clearly negligent in allowing checks made payable to a business to be deposited directly into an individual’s bank account, was 100% at fault for the loss.

Billy and Mary Milliken v. Crye-Leike Realtors, et al
M1999-00071-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clara W. Byrd

The buyers of a new residence filed this action against the builder and their realtor after discovering that the house was defective. The claims against the realtor alleged negligent misrepresentation and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act based in part on the agent's representation that the builder was licensed. The jury, using a jury verdict form, found that the realtor had committed a deceptive act or practice prohibited by the Consumer Protection Act, but determined that the buyers had suffered no loss therefrom. The jury also found the realtor liable for negligent misrepresentation, calculated the damages resulting from the realtor's negligent misrepresentation, and apportioned fault at 10% to the buyers, 10% to the realtor, and 80% to the builder, a nonparty. On appeal, the buyers argue that the verdict was inconsistent and challenge the assessment of costs and the failure to award attorney fees. We affirm the verdict, the denial of attorney's fees, and the apportionment of court costs. We vacate the denial of discretionary costs and remand for determination of that issue.

Larry Niedergeses, et al v. Giles County, Tennessee
M2000-00428-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.

This case presents a tragic set of facts involving an automobile accident which occurred in Giles County on May 8 or 9, 1997, sometime between 11:15 p.m. and 12:15 a.m. Michael Niedergeses died as a result of this accident. His parents, Larry Niedergeses and Roberta Niedergeses, instigated this suit against Giles County alleging that the county's negligence in failing to maintain the bridge signage caused their son's accident and resulting death. The case was tried non-jury in the Circuit Court of Giles County. That court found Mr. Niedergeses fifty percent at fault and Giles County fifty percent at fault. Plaintiffs appeal this ruling asserting that the trial judge was in error and should have found Giles County more than fifty percent at fault. The appeal presents for review the question of "whether the evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that John Michael Niedergeses was fifty percent at fault in the May 9, 1997 accident." We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the judge's findings and affirm the trial court's ruling.

State of Tennessee v. Christina Sue Libertus
M1999-01710-CCA-OT-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge William Charles Lee

The Defendant pled guilty in 1999 to ten counts of forgery committed in Bedford County. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of six years, four months incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that she was improperly sentenced. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Defendant's sentence is appropriate and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William P. Livingston v. State of Tennessee, Board of Paroles
M1999-01138-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. Mccoy

Petitioner appeals the trial court's decision to deny his petition for common law writ of certiorari challenging a Board of Paroles decision to revoke his parole and the court's grant of Respondent's motion for summary judgment. Petitioner appeals the order on two grounds, (1) his due process rights were violated by the introduction of inadmissible evidence, and (2) these procedural flaws led to the hearing officer becoming biased and unable to conduct a fair and impartial hearing. For the reasons below, we find both claims without merit and affirm the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Albert Eugene Pleasant
M1998-00653-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles D. Haston, Sr.

The defendant, Albert Eugene Pleasant, appeals his Warren County Circuit Court jury conviction for first degree murder in connection with the shooting death of his girlfriend on June 9, 1996. In this direct appeal, he contests the sufficiency of the conviction evidence and challenges the admissibility of photographs of the victim taken post-mortem and of evidence of prior threats and physical abuse of the victim by the defendant. After a review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Dorothy Wilkins v. The Kellog Company
M1999-00676-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

This workers’ compensation case presents the question of how a “temporary partial disability”
benefits award, as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(2), is calculated. The trial court held that an award is calculated based on the employee’s “average weekly wage,” which is the measure of benefits for the other categories of disability listed in the Workers’ Compensation Law (“temporary total disability,” “permanent total disability,” and “permanent partial disability”). The employer appealed this decision to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. The case was transferred to the full Supreme Court before the Panel handed down its decision. We now reverse the trial court and hold that the express terms of the statute indicate that a temporary partial disability award has a unique method of calculation, based on “the difference between the wage of the worker at the time of the injury and the wage such worker is able to earn in such worker’s partially disabled condition.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(2). This method does not include the average weekly wage definition. Under the correct calculation, the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to any temporary partial disability benefits. The award of $3,258.20 is accordingly reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court. Appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e); Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed and Remanded.
 

Dorothy Wilkins v. The Kellog Company - Dissenting
M1999-00676-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

The majority holds that the difference between pre- and post-injury wages for an employee whose weekly wage fell from $1,433.82 to $860.80 is $0. This holding, in my view, contravenes legislative intent, creates the potential for abuse of the benefit scheme, and muddles benefit calculation. In order to more effectively promote the Worker’s Compensation Act’s intended objectives and clarify benefit calculation, I would define “wage” in the temporary partial disability provision to mean “average weekly wage,” not “hourly rate of pay.” Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.