Sharon Taylor v. Douglas Butler and City Auto Sales
E2002-01916-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Honorable D. J. Alissandratos

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether a claim for fraudulent inducement to a contract must be submitted to arbitration when the contract’s arbitration clause covers “all claims, demands, disputes or controversies” and states that it is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). We hold that parties may agree to arbitrate claims of fraudulent inducement despite prohibition of arbitration of such claims under Tennessee law, and because the parties in this case specifically agreed that the FAA governs the arbitration clause, they agreed to arbitrate the claim for fraudulent inducement of the contract. However, we also find that the arbitration clause in this case is unconscionable and therefore void because it reserves the right to a judicial forum for the defendants while requiring the plaintiff to submit all claims to arbitration. For these reasons, the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint is overruled, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Sharon Taylor v. Douglas Butler and City Auto Sales - Concurring and Dissenting
W2002-01275-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Honorable D. J. Alissandratos

Charles Webb v. Printpack, Inc.
W2003-02309-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: William B. Acree, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: James Butler, Chancellor
The trial court found that the employee has a fifteen (15%) percent medical impairment rating and has a vocational disability of thirty-five (35%) percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. In this appeal, the employer contends the trial court erred in relying upon the expert testimony of Dr. Joseph C. Boals, III, the plaintiff's independent medical examiner, and that the trial court's award was excessive. We agree and reverse the trial court's award. We find the Employee has a twenty-five (25%) percent permanent partial impairment rating to the body as a whole.

State of Tennessee v. Matthew Kirk McWhorter
M2003-01132-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway, III

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Matthew Kirk McWhorter, of three counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed an eight-year sentence for each conviction, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) insufficient evidence exists in the record to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect the offenses it wished to submit to the jury; (3) the trial court improperly admitted a law enforcement officer's testimony about the Defendant's uncharged conduct; (4) the trial court erred by permitting a law enforcement agent to testify about a recorded recollection; (5) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to prohibit testimony of the victim; (6) reversible error occurred when the State failed to disclose, preserve and turn over a law enforcement official's notes made during the Defendant's initial interrogation; (7) the trial court erred by allowing the State to submit an insufficient Bill of Particulars and to deviate from its Bill of Particulars; (8) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his written and oral statements made to law enforcement officials in Florida; (9) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on child abuse as a lesser-included offense; (10) the State's closing arguments were so improper that they infected the trial with unfairness and denied the Defendant due process; (11) the trial court erred by interrupting the natural flow of jury deliberations to give supplemental instructions; and (12) the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to require the State to elect which incident of sexual touching the State intended for the jury to consider for Count 1, aggravated sexual battery. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and the sentence in Count 1. We affirm the remaining convictions and sentences.

State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Parks
M2003-02002-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

The Appellant, Jeffery Brian Parks, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Lincoln County Circuit Court. In 2003, Parks pled guilty to two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, two counts of incest, and two counts of statutory rape. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Parks, as a Range I standard offender, to six years for each count of sexual battery by an authority figure and incest, both class C felonies, and to two years for each count of statutory rape, a class E felony. These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, Parks argues that the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences with respect to each sentence and by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. The State, on appeal, asserts that consecutive sentencing should be imposed by this court following de novo review. Because the trial court failed to impose a sentence in accordance with our statutory sentencing scheme, we remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing to determine the length of the Appellant’s sentences, the appropriateness of consecutive sentencing, and the Appellant’s suitability for an alternative sentence.

State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Parks - Dissenting in Part
M2003-02002-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

I believe the sentencing in the instant case is controlled by State v. Marshall, 888 S.W.2d 786 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), and Rule 4(H)(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court require it be followed. To the extent that the majority opinion holds this trial judge fashioned an improper sentence, I disagree. The two holdings in Marshall which apply to the instant cases are as follows:

In Re: The Estate of Kathleen Meade, Deceased, L. Grady Lee, v. Helen Jo Gilliam
E2003-02629-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Richard E. Ladd

A typewritten document and a handwritten document prepared later in time were offered for probate. The Trial Court rejected the handwritten document and admitted the typewritten document to probate as the Last Will and Testament of Deceased. On appeal, we reverse.

State of Tennessee v. Guadalupe Arroyo, Alias
E2003-02355-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ray L. Jenkins

The defendant entered guilty pleas to two counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication and was sentenced to consecutive twelve-year terms of imprisonment. The defendant appealed the imposition of maximum sentences and the order to serve the terms consecutively. After this, our second review, we again remand for a new sentencing hearing in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), and the trial court's failure to find specific findings justifying the necessity for consecutive sentencing.

State of Tennessee v. Janice Michele Walker
E2003-02753-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ray L. Jenkins

Defendant, Janice Michele Walker, was charged in a four-count presentment with theft over $10,000, forgery over $10,000, computer fraud, and money laundering. Defendant pled guilty as a Range I standard offender to theft and forgery, both Class C felonies, and the other charges were dismissed. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced to four years for each offense, to be served consecutively, and she was ordered to pay restitution. The trial court determined the manner of service of Defendant's sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve her effective eight-year sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of full probation. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Community Bank of East Tennessee v. Tennessee Department of Safety
E2004-00975-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Vance W. Cheek, Jr.

The Claim Commissioner held Commission was without jurisdiction to entertain claim on appeal. We vacate Judgment and remand.

Ron Colquette v. Peter Zaloum
E2003-2301-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Daryl R. Fansler

Ron Colquette (“Plaintiff”) sued Peter Zaloum (“Defendant”) claiming, in part, that Defendant made fraudulent misrepresentations in connection with the sale of his business and the lease of his land to Plaintiff, and that Defendant violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered a Final Judgment holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff was entitled to damages in the amount of $70,054.35, plus pre-judgment interest; that Plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages in the amount of $15,000; and that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act was not applicable to this case. Defendant appeals, and Plaintiff raises additional issues concerning the applicability of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act to the facts of this case, and the amount of punitive damages awarded to him. We affirm.

Anthony C. Long v. Tony Parker, Warden
W2003-02609-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Lee Moore Jr.

The petitioner, Anthony C. Long, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. We reverse the dismissal and order habeas corpus relief.

In re: Estate of Angula Wilson Whitehorn Turner
W2003-02652-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Dewey C. Whitenton

Beneficiary of will appeals the order of the chancery court awarding attorney fees, executor fees, and other expenses. Both factual and legal objections are made to the awards made by the court. The legal objections are without merit, and the factual objections are not well-taken, because there is no transcript or statement of the evidence. We affirm.

Rodney McKinney v. Tony Parker, Warden
W2004-00133-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Lee Moore Jr.

The petitioner, Rodney McKinney, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his claim for writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Richard A. Jones and Richard A. Jones, Jr. v. Jody W. Henderson
W2003-02564-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert A. Lanier

This case arises from the discovery of an extramarital affair. The Appellants brought suit against
Appellee, seeking damages on theories of outrageous conduct and interference with a contract.
Appellee filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss and this appeal followed. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Thomas Newt Moore v. Universal Furniture Limited
E2003-00913-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: H. David Cate, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the trial court erred in finding circumstantial evidence of permanent physical restrictions on employee's ability to work; and in its determination that the employee sustained a 7 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole because it was excessive. We hold that the trial court was not in error in finding circumstantial evidence of permanent physical restrictions on the employee's ability to work, nor was its conclusion that the employee was 7 percent permanently partially disabled to the body as a whole excessive.

Sandra W. Duncan v. State of Tennessee
E2003-01898-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Vance W. Cheek, Jr., Commissioner
The claim of the Appellant for workers' compensation benefits was rejected upon a finding that she was injured as the result of her own misconduct when she became embroiled in an altercation with a fellow employee. We hold that summary judgment is inappropriate and remand the case for a merit trial

Christopher A. Eadie v. Complete Co., Inc.et al.
M2002-02010-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge R.E. Lee Davies

We granted review in this case to consider whether an employee is barred from seeking workers’ compensation benefits in Tennessee because the employee made a binding election of remedies by pursuing benefits for the same injury in another state. We hold that the employee’s filing of a claim in South Carolina, his request for a hearing there, and the taking of depositions in that matter constitute affirmative acts to obtain benefits in another state sufficient to constitute a binding election of remedies that bars the employee’s Tennessee claim. Therefore, we reject the conclusion of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel on this issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee v. Edward Slavin, Jr.
M2003-00845-SC-R3-BP
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Richard E. Ladd

We have this case on direct appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, from an order of the Chancery Court suspending Edward A. Slavin, Jr., Esq., from the practice of law for three years. Slavin appeals, raising the following issues: (1) whether Chancellor Richard E. Ladd erred in refusing to recuse himself; (2) whether Slavin's in-court speech is protected by the First Amendment; and (3) whether the sanctions imposed by the Chancellor are excessive. Upon careful review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that Chancellor Ladd did not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself and that the speech at issue does not fall within the protective ambit of the First Amendment. After a thorough examination of the sanctions, we impose a two-year suspension. Slavin may, however, apply for reinstatement pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 19.3, at the expiration of one year from date of this opinion.

Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee v. H. Owen Maddux
M2003-01136-SC-R3-BP
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William M. Dender

A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility found that H. Owen Maddux had wilfully and deliberately converted funds from his law firm. In addition to other sanctions, the hearing panel suspended Maddux from the practice of law for a period of thirty days. The Chancery Court for Hamilton County affirmed the judgment of the hearing panel but imposed additional sanctions. Disciplinary Counsel appealed to this Court, contesting only the sufficiency of the thirty-day suspension. We hold that the thirty-day suspension is appropriate. We affirm.

Helen Gleason v. Daniel P. Gleason, III
M2003-01580-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. S. Daniel

The trial court awarded Petitioner alimony arrearages of $7,250 plus interest. Respondent appeals, asserting the statute of limitations and the defense of laches. We modify the judgment of the trial court and remand.

State of Tennessee v. Marvin Glenn White
M2003-02299-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham

A Marion County jury convicted the defendant, Marvin Glenn White, of two counts of premeditated first degree murder for which he received concurrent life sentences. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in admitting statements which constituted double hearsay. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Kenneth Snell v. City of Murfreesboro
M2003-02716-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Corlew, III

Plaintiffs appeal from trial court's dismissal of complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs allege that trial court erred in finding that Plaintiffs had no standing to challenge annexation ordinance passed by City of Murfreesboro. Finding that the trial court was correct in determining that Plaintiffs were not entitled to challenge the annexation ordinance under Tennessee declaratory judgment statute, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Bruce Franks, Jr. - Concurring
W2003-01673-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I disagree with its conclusion that a sentence of split confinement fulfills the requirement of an alternative sentencing presumption. I believe an alternative sentence means one that is an alternative to confinement, as explained in my dissent in State v. Christina B. Jones, M2002-02428-CCA-R3-CD, Williamson County (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2003), app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2003).

State of Tennessee v. Bruce Franks, Jr.
W2003-01673-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The defendant, Bruce Franks, Jr., pleaded guilty to arson, a Class C felony, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-301(a)(1) (2003), and agreed to a three-year, Range I sentence. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing to determine themanner of service of the sentence and ordered split confinement.  The defendant appeals the confinement component of his sentence. We affirm.