Tresa Dorianne Barkley Young n/k/a Tresa B. Floyd v. Steven Glen Young
This appeal involves a wife's petition for civil contempt filed against her ex-husband. The wife sought an order holding the ex-husband in civil contempt for failing to pay alimony in solido pursuant to the divorce decree and commanding him to pay the amount of the arrearage. Following a hearing on Wife's petition, the chancery court entered an order reclassifying the husband's alimony obligation from alimony in solido to rehabilitative alimony due to the parties' cohabitation after their divorce. In addition, the chancery court found that the wife was not entitled to alimony during the periods the parties lived together following their divorce, and the court awarded the wife a reduced sum of rehabilitative alimony. The wife filed an appeal to this Court. We reverse and remand this case to the chancery court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
La Southaphanh v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, La Southaphanh, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court's dismissal of his two petitions for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and theft over one thousand dollars, a Class D felony. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial for aggravated burglary and theft over one thousand dollars because his attorney failed to move to suppress his confession, failed to move for a mistrial when his co-defendant stated that the petitioner was in a gang, failed to attack the credibility of one of the investigating officers, and failed to meet with him and prepare for trial adequately. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial for aggravated assault because his attorney failed to meet with him and prepare for trial adequately. We affirm the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Malinda L. Mason
Defendant, Malinda L. Mason, was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and for violation of the implied consent law. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, fifth offense, and sentenced to twenty-one months in the county workhouse as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant's sole issue on appeal challenges the trial court's denial of her request for a mistrial. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randy E. Rice, Personal Respresentative of the Estate of James Neil Rice v. Andrew Johnson Bank, et al.
James Neil Rice ("Mr. Rice") applied to Mountain Life Insurance Company ("Mountain Life") for a credit life insurance policy to cover the principal amount of a loan made to him by Andrew Johnson Bank ("the Bank"). When Mr. Rice died, Randy E. Rice, Personal Representative of the Estate of James Neil Rice ("Plaintiff"), made demand upon Mountain Life and the Bank to tender the policy proceeds to satisfy the loan. When Mountain Life and the Bank refused this demand, Plaintiff filed suit. Both Mountain Life and the Bank filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted the motions for summary judgment holding, inter alia, that no contract of insurance existed because Mr. Rice's application never was approved or accepted by Mountain Life and, therefore, no insurance policy was issued to Mr. Rice. Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment. We vacate and remand. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Richard E. Miller v. Bernard Stone, et al.
Richard E. Miller, in his capacity as an officer and director of Duncan Electric Company, Inc. ("Duncan Electric"), brought this action against the company's other directors, Bernard Stone and Greta B. Lindsay (collectively "the defendants"), alleging that they had breached certain fiduciary duties owed to him. Stone and Lindsay each moved for summary judgment on the basis that a settlement agreement and release entered into by the parties in a prior and separate lawsuit barred the plaintiff's present action. The trial court granted the defendants' motions and ordered the plaintiff to pay their attorney's fees. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
John William Thomas v. Norma E. Pino-Rutkowski
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of John William Thomas ("Plaintiff") in the amount of $190,095, of which $53,295 was for relocation expenses and increased rent. Plaintiff was injured when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Norma E. Pino-Rutkowski ("Defendant") while Defendant was backing out of a parking space. Due to his poor eyesight, Plaintiff does not have a driver's license and has to walk to work. Plaintiff claimed he was required to move much closer to work because he could no longer walk as far as he could before being injured. Plaintiff sought as part of his damages his relocation expenses and the $300 in his increased monthly rent. Defendant claims on appeal that Plaintiff was required to specifically plead these damages and because he failed to do so, that portion of the jury's verdict cannot stand. Defendant also claims the Trial Court erred when it allowed Plaintiff's granddaughter to testify and when it told the jury that "although the law in Tennessee may require insurance, you are not to consider the presence of insurance in this case." We agree with Defendant, and we vacate the judgment in its entirety and remand for a new trial. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Don Smith Ford, Lincoln-Mercury v. Doug Bolinger, et al
Don Smith Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. sued Doug Bolinger based upon theories of negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("the TCPA"). The plaintiff averred that the defendant failed to disclose substantial body damage to his vehicle, which vehicle the defendant traded to the plaintiff in connection with his purchase from the plaintiff of a new Ford Explorer. The defendant denied the plaintiff's allegations and filed a third-party complaint against previous owners of the vehicle, Gary Hoese, dba Gary's Used Cars ("Hoese") and East Gate Motors, Inc. ("East Gate"). The defendant's third-party complaint is based upon alleged common law violations and upon the theory that Hoese and East Gate violated the TCPA in failing to disclose the condition of the vehicle's title. The trial court found that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for negligently misrepresenting the condition of the vehicle and awarded it damages in the amount of $17,085. In addition, the trial court dismissed the defendant's third-party claims against Hoese and East Gate and, without stating the basis of its action, awarded attorney's fees to them, as well as to the plaintiff. The defendant appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in finding him liable for negligent misrepresentation; that the trial court erred in failing to hold Hoese and East Gate liable to the defendant; and that the trial court's awards of attorney's fees was improper. We vacate the trial court's fee awards to the plaintiff, Hoese, and East Gate pending further proceedings in the trial court. The balance of the trial court's judgment is affirmed. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony L. Harris v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anthony L. Harris, was found guilty by a jury of armed robbery by use of a deadly weapon and aggravated kidnapping. The petitioner received a total effective sentence of ninety years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William D. Busby
The Defendant, William D. Busby, was convicted by a jury of four counts of rape of a child. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to four concurrent terms of twenty years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury about the State's election of offenses. Finding that the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lewis | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Theron Hale
The Defendant was found guilty by jury verdict of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days with the sentence suspended, conditioned upon his successful completion of probation. The Defendant now appeals, raising three issues: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for domestic assault; (2) the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to elect the particular offense the Defendant was guilty of; and (3) the Defendant suffered a due process right violation when he was denied immediate access to his personal property. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ryan James Moran v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ryan James Moran, pled guilty to multiple offenses that occurred in 1995, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of seventy-five years in prison. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed because it was barred by the statute of limitations. The Petitioner appeals, contending that the post-conviction court erred. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Keith D. Henderson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Keith D. Henderson, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Burns v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner pled guilty to one count of second degree murder and one count of aggravated assault on February 7, 2003. The trial court sentenced him to twenty (20) years and five (5) years, respectively, for the above convictions. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court held a hearing and stated upon the record that the petition was denied. However, a written order was never entered by the trial court. Because there is no final order from which the petitioner may appeal, we dismiss the appeal. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Dale Baruchman In the Matter of: B.B. (d/o/b 11/16/90) and H.B. (d/o/b 3/2/89)
This is a parental termination case involving a mother with a documented history of severe mental illness. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her minor son in February 2002, alleging the grounds of persistent conditions and failure to substantially comply with the permanency plans. The department filed an amended petition in August 2002, seeking to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her minor daughter based upon the same grounds. In September 2002, the department filed another amended petition alleging as an additional ground for termination the mother’s mental incompetence. Following a hearing over two non-consecutive days, the chancery court entered an order finding the department had proven all the grounds it alleged for terminating the mother’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence, and terminating the mother’s parental rights would be in the children’s best interest. While we disagree with the trial court’s finding that DCS proved each ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm the chancery court’s decision to terminate the mother’s parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Antonio Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Antonio Jackson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. On appeal, Jackson contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that his trial attorneys were ineffective by failing to pursue an alibi defense and by failing to properly investigate and prepare the case for trial. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Judith D. Pickern v. Robert M. Pickern
This is an appeal from a finding of contempt following the enrollment of a foreign decree. The issue presented is whether Mr. Pickern could be held in civil contempt of court for his failure to pay alimony upon the enrollment of the foreign decree when a petition for contempt had not been filed. Following a hearing, the trial court enrolled the foreign decree, found Mr. Pickern in willful contempt of court, awarded Ms. Pickern judgment for the alimony arrearage and her attorney’s fees, and ordered the sale of Mr. Pickern’s real property to satisfy the alimony arrearage unless he paid the judgment within ninety days. We hold that the trial court properly enrolled the foreign decree, but its actions were premature regarding the civil contempt because no petition had been filed seeking this relief. Therefore, we affirm the enrollment of the foreign decree and the judgment for the alimony arrearage, but vacate the finding of civil contempt and the award of attorney’s fees. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnell Jason Leberry
A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Ronnell Jason Leberry, of aggravated assault, extortion, especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of facilitation to commit aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-two years and six months. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on accomplice testimony; (2) he was denied a unanimous jury verdict; (3) the trial court erred by failing to recuse itself; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (5) he was denied his right to an impartial jury because certain jurors considered evidence not admitted at trial; (6) the trial court erred by failing to recuse the Assistant District Attorney General at trial; (7) he was denied the right to a fair trial because he was required to wear leg-shackles during the trial; (8) he was denied a fair trial due to the racial composition of the jury; and (9) the trial court erred by enhancing the Defendant's sentences and ordering consecutive sentencing. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm all of the Defendant's convictions. Further, we hold that the trial court improperly enhanced the Defendant's sentences in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and we reduce the Defendant's sentences in accordance with this opinion to an effective sentence of twenty-eight years. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nancy Carol Cantrell v. James Mark Cantrell
This is a divorce proceeding in which the parties accused each other of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court granted both parties a divorce, and custody of the parties' child was awarded to Husband along with child support. Marital property, mostly debts, was allocated in part to Husband and in part to Wife. The trial court declined to assess attorney fees. Wife appealed claiming that she should have been granted the divorce and custody of the child. Wife also claimed that the marital debts were not allocated equitably and that she should have been awarded her attorney fees. We modify in part and affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles O. Emesibe
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Charles O. Emesibe, was convicted in count one of first degree felony murder during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the kidnapping of Ibiene A. Emesibe; in count two of first degree felony murder during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the kidnapping of Letitia Abili; in count three of first degree felony murder of Ms. Emesibe during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a burglary; in count four of first degree felony murder of Ms. Abili during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a burglary; in count five of first degree premeditated murder of Ms. Emesibe; and in count six of first degree premeditated murder of Ms. Abili. The trial court merged counts one and five with count three, and counts two and six with count four. The trial court imposed life sentences for each felony murder conviction and ordered Defendant's two life sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs into evidence; (3) that the trial court erred in ruling certain statements admissible; (4) that the trial court erred in admitting court documents pertaining to Defendant's divorce into evidence; (5) that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Ms. Emesibe's attorney concerning Defendant's divorce proceedings; and (6) that the trial court erred in ordering Defendant's two life sentences to be served consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond D. Simpson - Order
In an opinion filed on January 7, 2005, this court affirmed the trial court's denial of probation but modified the defendant's sentence to comply with the requirements of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ____, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). On January 18, 2005, the state filed a petition to rehear pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 39. The state asserts that this court erred by modifying the sentence because the defendant waived any challenge under Blakely and because the record was incomplete. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas M. McCormick v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Thomas M. McCormick, appeals as of right the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Bedford County Circuit Court. He seeks relief from his conviction for aggravated assault and sentence of twelve years as a Range III, persistent offender. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Miguel Garcia
A Hamblen County Criminal Court Jury convicted the defendant, Miguel Garcia, of possession of more than three hundred grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the defendant's judgment of conviction, but we modify his sentence under the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), from twenty-two years to twenty years. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frankie Donald Releford v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Frankie Donald Releford, appeals the judgment of the Sullivan County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Releford argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and that the post-conviction court erred in allowing trial counsel to remain in the courtroom during the post-conviction proceeding. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brett W. Woodroof vs. Nathan E. Fisher, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between the biological father, Brett W. Woodroof, who filed a petition to establish paternity of the nine year old child, Taylor Leigh Fisher, and the stepfather, Nathan E. Fisher, with whom the child has lived since she was two years old. The trial court determined that Mr. Woodroof was the natural father and awarded him visitation rights, but did not award him custody. A review of the record indicates that Mr. Woodroof asked for custody initially in his petition to determine parentage, but subsequently withdrew his request in his amended petition, and repeatedly advised the court throughout the lengthy court proceedings that spanned sixteen months that he sought only visitation with the child, and not custody. Mr. Woodroof requested custody only at the end of the trial process, after the testimony of the medical experts and other persons had been presented, and after numerous assertions in court that he was not presently seeking custody. We hold that his request for custody came too late and therefore we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for further action consistent with this opinion. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Danny Worthington v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Danny Worthington, appeals the judgment of the Scott County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. On appeal, Worthington argues that trial counsel was ineffective for providing erroneous advice and, as a result, his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Scott | Court of Criminal Appeals |