State of Tennessee v. Jullion Fain Culps
The Defendant, Jullion Fain Culps, appeals from the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing on his effective nine-year sentence. The Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing the Defendant to serve his sentence on probation, given his age, employment status, and his desire to care for his child. The State asserts that the trial court acted within its discretion by imposing a sentence of confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Debbie Williams v. Rodney Holt et al.
This appeal concerns the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress relating to her interaction with a transit bus operator. We affirm the dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Darrnell Treshawn Wiggins v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Darrnell Treshawn Wiggins, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2019 convictions for second degree murder, first degree felony murder, and kidnapping. The Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to challenge on direct appeal the admission of body camera footage showing the victim’s dying declaration. The State asserts that (1) the Petitioner has waived his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel by not properly presenting the issue before the post-conviction court, and (2) waiver notwithstanding, the Petitioner failed to establish appellate counsel’s deficient performance and prejudice. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE JAXON N. ET AL.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hamblen County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Janlynn B. (“Mother”) and Eric N. (“Father”) to their minor children Jaxon N. and Colton N. (“the Children,” collectively). Janice B. (“Foster Mother”) filed an intervening petition also seeking to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The Juvenile Court found in part that Mother failed to attend to the Children’s health needs, including Colton’s serious heart condition. Mother appeals.1 On appeal, Mother argues that the Juvenile Court did not make sufficient best interest findings and, even if it did, it erred in its analysis. We vacate the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan as the record contains only Mother’s third plan. Thus, we modify the Juvenile Court’s judgment to that extent. Otherwise, we find that each of the other grounds found by the Juvenile Court was proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further that the Juvenile Court made sufficient findings on best interest. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm as modified. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shane Scott Caywood
The Defendant, Shane Scott Caywood, pleaded guilty to the sale or delivery of 0.5 grams |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
SONYA HARNESS v. JOHN MANSFIELD, ET AL.
A home health nurse was injured in an automobile accident while driving her vehicle in connection with her employment. She later sought uninsured motorist benefits under a business automobile liability policy issued to her employer. Arguing that the uninsured motorist coverage in the business policy did not apply to the employee’s accident, the insurance carrier moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the carrier’s motion. We conclude that the business policy unambiguously limited uninsured motorist coverage to specifically listed automobiles. Because the nurse’s vehicle was not listed, the uninsured motorist coverage in the business policy did not apply. We further conclude that this policy limitation does not contravene our uninsured motorist statutes. So we affirm the grant of summary judgment. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Gene Sliger
The Defendant, Billy Gene Sliger, appeals his convictions for two counts of rape of a child |
Jefferson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
CITY OF PIGEON FORGE, TENNESSEE v. RLR INVESTMENTS, LLC
In this condemnation action, the trial court entered an order of possession granting to the petitioner city two greenway easements and two construction easements over two tracts of land owned by the respondent corporation. In the order of possession, the court found that the city’s taking was for the public purpose of the city’s greenway project. The corporation filed two successive motions for summary judgment, claiming that because the taking was partially for a private purpose, it violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution. The corporation averred that the order of possession required the city to construct parking spaces on one of the corporation’s tracts to replace parking spaces taken from the other tract and that this would yield only a private benefit. The corporation also asserted that the city had abandoned its taking by failing to construct the replacement parking despite the completion of the greenway. The trial court denied both motions for summary judgment, determining that the order of possession had not required the city to build replacement parking and that no abandonment had occurred. Following a jury trial regarding compensation, the trial court entered a judgment approving the jury’s monetary award to the corporation with prejudgment interest. The corporation has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We deny the corporation’s request for an award of costs and attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Quinton A. Et Al.
Father appeals the trial court’s findings that (1) termination of Father’s parental rights is supported by the grounds of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and (2) termination is in the children’s best interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Vanessa Colley v. John S. Colley. III
In this case, we construe the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, as well as Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c), which permits attorney fee awards in certain original and post-award proceedings in family law cases involving alimony, child support, child custody, and permanent parenting plans. Here, the former husband filed a post-divorce petition to alter the award of transitional alimony, and after considerable litigation, he nonsuited it. The question on appeal under both the marital dissolution agreement and the statute is whether a trial court may award attorney fees to a former spouse for fees incurred in defending the original award of alimony in post-divorce proceedings, where the petition to modify the award was nonsuited before adjudication on the merits. We hold that it may. Under the marital dissolution agreement, our holding is based on the language of the parties’ agreement. As to the statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c) explicitly applies in post-award proceedings to “enforce, alter, change, or modify” an existing decree of alimony, child support, custody, or a permanent parenting plan. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c). For an obligee spouse defending against an obligor spouse’s effort to reduce or end alimony or child support, or modify a permanent parenting plan, the objective may be to maintain the status quo. This objective is achieved upon voluntary dismissal by the obligor spouse. Under these circumstances, the obligee spouse is a “prevailing party” under section 36-5-103(c). For this reason, we hold that trial courts may award attorney fees to an obligee spouse under the statute after the obligor spouse nonsuits a post-divorce petition. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals, affirm the trial court’s award of attorney fees to the former wife, award the former wife attorney fees on appeal, and remand the case to the trial court for a determination of the amount of reasonable attorney fees. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Vanessa Colley v. John S. Colley. III (Concurring in part)
A court-approved marital dissolution agreement awarded Vanessa Turner alimony. Her former husband, John Colley, later sought to modify the alimony award but voluntarily dismissed that post-judgment action without prejudice before it was adjudicated. The question here is whether Ms. Turner is the “prevailing party” in the post-judgment proceeding and therefore entitled to attorney’s fees under the parties’ marital dissolution agreement and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c). The majority opinion concludes that she is. I agree with that bottom line but not with the entirety of the majority’s legal analysis. The majority reasons that Ms. Turner prevailed in the post-judgment proceeding because her objective was to maintain the status quo, and she achieved that objective when her former husband voluntarily dismissed his petition. In my view, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice—standing alone—could not make Ms. Turner a prevailing party. Although Ms. Turner may have “prevailed” in the colloquial sense of that term when the petition was voluntary dismissed, she was a “prevailing party” as that legal term of art has long been understood only because the voluntary dismissal meant that she had succeeded in defending earlier court-awarded relief. To the extent the majority opinion holds that a defendant can be a prevailing party in the absence of any judicially sanctioned change in the parties’ legal relationship or judicial rejection of the plaintiff’s claims, I disagree. I write separately to explain my position. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Governor Bill Le et al.
In this dispute, the trial court found that certain subsections of 2023 Tennessee Public Acts, chapter 488, violated the home rule amendment and the equal protection guarantee found in the Tennessee Constitution. The defendants, who are officials of the State of Tennessee, have appealed the trial court’s ruling. Following our thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s determination that section two of the act is unconstitutional. However, we reverse the trial court’s determination that sections two, six, seven, eight, and nine of the Act violate the equal protection guarantee found in the Tennessee Constitution. We therefore also reverse the trial court’s elision of sections six, seven, eight, and nine from the statute. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kerrington J'Kobe Lake
The Defendant, Kerrington J’Kobe Lake, entered guilty pleas to two felonies, felony evading arrest and attempted tampering with evidence; and three misdemeanors, speeding, reckless driving, and simple possession of marijuana, with the trial court to determine whether to grant judicial diversion or, alternatively, the length and manner of his sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed an effective sentence of three years, with the Defendant to serve 180 days in jail before serving the remainder of his sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court (1) unreasonably denied judicial diversion, and (2) imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Courtney L. Wherry, et al. v. Obion County Board of Education, et al.
This negligence action arose when Courtney L. Wherry (“Ms. Wherry”), a member of the South Fulton High School sideline cheerleading team, fell and injured her neck while performing a “shoulder sit” stunt in the endzone of a football field prior to a high school football game. Ms. Wherry and her parents, Jason T. Wherry and Jaime L. Tidwell, (collectively, “the Wherrys”) brought suit against the Obion County Board of Education and Obion County School District (collectively, “the School District”)1 under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover damages for the injuries sustained by Ms. Wherry. The Wherrys sought recovery based upon two negligence theories: (1) that the school district’s selection and hiring of the South Fulton High School cheerleading coach Nichole Harrell (“Ms. Harrell”) was negligent, and (2) that the negligent acts and omissions of Ms. Harrell on the night of the accident related to the football field conditions were the cause in fact and proximate cause of Ms. Wherry’s injuries. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the School District on both negligence theories. The Wherrys appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Melvin Lee Harth
The Defendant, Melvin Lee Harth, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for aggravated assault involving strangulation, a Class C felony; two counts of aggravated assault involving the violation of a prior court order, a Class C felony; false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102 (Supp. 2024) (aggravated assault); 39-13-302 (2018) (false imprisonment), 39-16-602 (2018) (resisting arrest). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective nine-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tracy D. Boyd, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Tracy D. Boyd, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions of three counts of impersonating a licensed professional, two counts of theft of property, and one count of forgery. He claims that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc., et al.
We granted review in this case to decide whether our collateral estoppel doctrine bars relitigation of a prior class certification denial which was affirmed on appeal. In 2014, Plaintiff Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. filed a putative class action against Defendant BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. EMCF alleged that BCBST had breached various contracts with it and other similar entities by applying a cap on certain payments for medical services after an action by TennCare. The trial court denied class certification, and the Court of Appeals affirmed and remanded. EMCF subsequently voluntarily nonsuited its claims. After getting a favorable ruling in a separate lawsuit against TennCare, EMCF refiled its case against BCBST, again seeking class certification. The trial court held that collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of class certification, but the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the trial court got it right. In this case, the same plaintiff filed suit against the same defendant for the same claims on behalf of the same putative class based on the same common questions. Our collateral estoppel doctrine exists to prevent this type of second-chance relitigation. Certain decisions are final and binding, including when a trial court and appellate court conclude that a particular class cannot be certified. The plaintiff here is certainly entitled to have the merits of its substantive claims heard in its refiled action, but it does not get a do-over on class certification. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Cristobal Jose Vasquez
A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Cristobal Jose Vasquez, of solicitation of a minor and aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective term of nine years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated sexual battery. He also asserts that the trial court erred by (1) allowing testimony concerning uncharged criminal conduct; and (2) excluding extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by the victim or, alternatively, prohibiting him from recalling the victim to lay a foundation for that evidence. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Annie J. Jones, by and through her conservatorship, Joyce Sons a/k/a Calisa Joyce Sons v. Life Care Centers of America d/b/a Life Care Center of Tullahoma
In this appeal regarding Tennessee’s survival statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-102, we hold that a cause of action for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion does not abate upon the death of the person whose privacy was invaded. Here, an elderly woman with severely impaired cognitive functioning was a resident of the defendant skilled nursing facility. While an employee of the facility was helping the resident take a shower, the employee took a personal video call with her incarcerated boyfriend. During the call, the employee propped her cell phone in the shower in a way that displayed the resident’s nude body to the boyfriend. The resident’s conservator sued the defendant facility claiming, inter alia, invasion of the resident’s privacy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the facility, and the plaintiff appealed. While the appeal was pending, the resident died, and her estate was substituted. The Court of Appeals reversed; it held the complaint stated a claim for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion, and that the claim did not abate upon the death of the resident. We granted the defendant facility permission to appeal on abatement. Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-102 provides that no civil action based on “wrongs” abates upon the death of either party, “except actions for wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff.” On appeal, the defendant facility argues that the claim abated either because section 20-5-102 does not apply at all, or because the character exception in the statute applies, since a claim for intrusion upon seclusion is an action for “wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff.” We hold that the survival statute, section 20-5-102, applies to the claim of intrusion upon seclusion, and that the exception for actions for “wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff” does not apply. Therefore, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that the claim for intrusion upon seclusion did not abate upon the death of the resident whose privacy was invaded. |
Coffee | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Diamond Leah Wilson
The Defendant, Diamond Leah Wilson, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of aggravated neglect of a child who was age eight or less, a Class A felony, for which the Defendant is serving a sixteen-year sentence at 100% service. See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (Supp. 2024). On appeal, she contends that (1) the trial court erred in approving the verdict in its role as thirteenth juror, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction, and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ashley Nicole Thomas v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Ashley Nicole Thomas, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition, in which she challenged her multiple convictions related to the sexual abuse of a child and her effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner maintains that her trial counsel was ineffective. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyrone McCurdy
A Madison County jury convicted Defendant, Tyrone McCurdy, of multiple counts of vandalism and theft, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-two years to be served in confinement as a persistent offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marilee Z. Hurley, Trustee of the Marilee Z. Hurley Revocable Trust Dated September 26, 2008 v. Green Shadows Homeowners Association, Inc.
This case involves a dispute between a property owner and her homeowners’ association. Appellant’s property is governed by the homeowner’s association’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions. There are two improvements to appellant’s property, a main house and a carriage house, both of which were originally roofed with vintage concrete tiles. Appellant replaced the roof on the carriage house with asphalt shingles, but did not replace the roof on the main house. Rather, appellant had the main house roof cleaned, which resulted in a lighter appearance. The homeowners’ association demanded that appellant replace the main house roof with shingles to match the carriage house. Appellant refused and filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunction. The association filed a counter-complaint alleging that appellant was in breach of certain provisions of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed appellant’s declaratory judgment action on its finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because appellant failed to join all necessary parties. The trial court granted the homeowners’ association’s motion for summary judgment on its counter-complaint and awarded attorney’s fees. Because the trial court’s order does not adequately explain its reasons for dismissing appellant’s declaratory judgment action, we cannot conduct a meaningful review of that holding, and we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint. There are disputes of material fact that preclude the grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and its award of attorney’s fees to the homeowner’s association. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Hardy, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Charles Hardy, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claims that trial counsel was ineffective in advising him not to testify, and provided ineffective counsel pretrial and at trial. He also argues he is entitled to relief due to the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s individual errors. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and oral arguments, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Terrell McKissack v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Terrell McKissack, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that a codefendant’s recanted testimony constitutes newly discovered evidence. Based on our review, we affirm the coram nobis court’s denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |