Fred T. Hanzelik v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
This direct appeal involves a disciplinary proceeding against a Chattanooga lawyer arising out of his representation of two clients. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that the lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for forty-five days. Following the lawyer’s appeal to the Chancery Court for Hamilton County, the trial court upheld the lawyer’s forty-five-day suspension after finding that the record supported the hearing panel’s findings that the lawyer had attempted to bill one client twice, had breached his ethical obligations to another client, and had failed to cooperate with the Board of Professional Responsibility during its extended investigation into his conduct. On this appeal, the lawyer insists (1) that the evidence does not support the hearing panel’s findings, (2) that the hearing panel erred by receiving into evidence a videotaped deposition given by one of his clients, (3) that the hearing panel failed to properly apply the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and (4) that the hearing panel failed to consider the discipline imposed on other lawyers for similar infractions. Based on our review of the record, we, like the trial court, affirm the hearing panel’s decision to suspend the lawyer’s license to practice law for forty-five days. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Aldrick D. Lillard v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Aldrick D. Lillard, appeals as of right from the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court committed reversible errors by (1) refusing to allow the Petitioner to amend his petition for postconviction relief during the evidentiary hearing; (2) finding that the post-conviction hearing testimony from the assistant district attorney regarding his discussions during trial with the Petitioner’s trial counsel was irrelevant; and (3) concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his trial attorneys were ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court merged the Petitioner’s two conspiracy convictions but found that the Petitioner failed to prove any additional allegations in his petition for relief. Following our review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s ruling prohibiting the Petitioner from amending his petition during the evidentiary hearing.We also conclude that the post-conviction court’s finding that the prosecutor’s testimony was irrelevant was in error, albeit harmless. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Phillip A. Corbitt et al. v. Rolanda Amos
The sellers of real estate brought this action against the successful bidder at a real estate auction after the bidder failed to close because she was unable to obtain a loan sufficient to purchase the property. The sellers later auctioned the property for a substantially lower price. It is undisputed that the buyer breached the contract by not closing and that the sellers are entitled to recover certain special damages; the buyer challenges the trial court’s award of $55,300 for the seller’s general damages for their loss of the benefit of the bargain. We have determined the trial court’s decision is not supported by competent evidence in the record and that the sellers failed to prove the fair market value of the property on the date of the breach was less than the contract price. Therefore, we reverse the award of $55,300 for the loss of the benefit of the bargain. We, however, affirm the award of special damages, specifically the expense of conducting a second auction and sale, property taxes paid between the date of the breach and the second sale, and prejudgment interest, which shall be calculated based upon the judgment as modified. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Chas Alan Sandford v. Kristine Elaine Sandford McKee
Husband and Wife were married for eight years when Husband filed for divorce. Husband had purchased 63 acres of real property before marrying Wife and split the property into two parcels. When dividing the property between the parties, the trial court determined the house and ten acres was Husband’s separate property, but the appreciation on that parcel was marital property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B). The trial court determined the remaining 53 acres was Husband’s separate property and that Wife had no interest in that parcel. Wife appealed, claiming both parcels transmuted into marital property during the marriage. In the alternative, Wife argued that the increase in value of the other 53 acres was marital property due to work she performed on a guesthouse located on the 53-acre parcel. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Christopher L. B.
Mother appeals the finding that termination of her parental rights to her son was in the son’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the termination of her rights. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dixie M. M.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights upon finding that four grounds for termination had been established – the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the provisions of the permanency plan, abandonment by willful failure to visit and support, and failure to establish parentage, and that termination of Father’s rights was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that three grounds for termination were established by the requisite proof and that termination of his rights is in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Darion X. Y., Darius D. Y.
Father’s parental rights to his son were terminated on the ground that Father is confined in a correctional facility for more than ten years as a result of a criminal act and that the child was under the age of eight at the time of Father’s sentencing. Father contends that the trial court should have considered the possibility of his receiving parole in determining whether grounds for termination of his rights were present and whether termination was in the child’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Orlando Ladd v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board
Appellant, an inmate with the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his appeal for review of disciplinary actions taken against him by the prison, and affirmed by the TDOC Commissioner. The trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-9-102. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Seth Haley
On March 6, 2008, the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Seth Haley, was indicted in case number 199-2008 for violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender’s Act (MVHOA), evading arrest, possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conviction of two or more prior offenses of simple possession or casual exchange of a controlled substance thatcould be used to enhance his punishment for the third offense of simple possession of a controlled substance pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-418(e). On June 6, 2008, Haley was indicted in case number 4502008 for possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver. On March 30, 2009, he entered guiltypleas in case number 199-2008 to the offenses of violating the MVHOA and evading arrest, Class E felonies, and in case number 450-2008 to the offense of possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining charges in case number 199-2008. On June 10, 2010, Haley was indicted in case number 439-2010 for felony escape and two counts of felony failure to appear. On September 30, 2010, Haley entered a guilty plea in case number 439-2010 to one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining counts in that case number. On December 10, 2010, the trial court sentenced Haley as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of two years for violating the MVHOA conviction, two years for the evading arrest conviction, and ten years for the possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver conviction. The court also sentenced Haley as a Range II, multiple offender to a consecutive sentence of four years for the felony failure to appear conviction, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Haley contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider any mitigating factors before imposing his sentence and erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antwain Tapaige Sales v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner,Antwain TapaigeSales,appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting forty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in determining that he failed to satisfy the threshold burden to warrant an additional hearing regarding whether the statute of limitations should have been tolled due to his mental incompetence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aldrick D. Lillard v. State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the post-conviction court erred in failing to allow the Petitioner to amend his petition during the evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner sought to amend his petition to allege another ground for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the amendment would have raised the issue of trial counsel’s failure to assert the trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial in the Petitioner’s motion for new trial or on direct appeal. The motion for a mistrial related to the admission of impermissible character evidence regarding prior, uncharged bad acts during the prosecutor’s opening statement. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rodney W. Schutt v. Jodie Ann Miller (Schutt)
This appeal concerns post-divorce motions to set aside a marital dissolution agreement. The parties were divorced based on a mediated marital dissolution agreement. Shortly after the final decree was entered, the appellant wife filed post-divorce motions to set aside the marital dissolution agreement. The original trial judge first recused herself as to certain issues in the proceedings, and then later recused herself as to the entire case, so the post-divorce matters were ultimately heard by a special judge. All told, the appellant wife filed over 83 post-divorce pleadings, most involving efforts to set aside the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Eventually, the trial court denied the wife’s motions to set aside and awarded the appellee husband over $61,000 in fees as sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The wife now appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David White v. Empire Express, Inc. and Empire Transportation, Inc.
The case involves a lease-purchase agreement. The plaintiff is a truck driver. The co-defendants are two affiliated companies – a truckload hauling company and a leasing company. The plaintiff truck driver worked for the hauling company. The truck driver entered into a lease-purchase agreement with the leasing company to purchase the truck he drove in his work for the hauling company. His lease payments on the truck were made via weekly payroll deductions; the hauling company deducted the amount of the lease payments from the truck driver’s payroll and transferred those amounts to the leasing company on his behalf. If the driver earned less than the amount of the lease payment, the hauling company paid the lease payment anyway and the deficiency became a debt that the truck driver owed to the hauling company. At the end of the lease, the lease-purchase agreement required the truck driver to pay the residual value of the truck. He was allowed to pay this over the course of one year, also through weekly payroll deductions. After the final residual payment was made, the leasing company refused to give title of the truck to the plaintiff truck driver because he still owed money to the affiliated hauling company. The defendant leasing company then repossessed the truck and sold it. The plaintiff truck driver filed this lawsuit against both defendant companies, alleging breach of contract, conversion, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the truck driver on his breach-of-contract claim, and it conducted a bench trial on the breach-of- contract damages and the remaining claims. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff on all of his claims and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The defendants now appeal. We affirm the award of compensatory damages and reverse the award of punitive damages. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
De Lano Parker v. Shelby County Government Civil Service Merit Board and The Shelby County Sheriff's Department
Appellee corrections officer’s employment with the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office was terminated for appearing in a video in which he stated that he had been a gang member. The Civil Service Merit Board affirmed the termination. The officer filed a petition for judicial review in the Shelby County Chancery Court, arguing that there was not substantial and material evidence to sustain his termination and that the termination violated his First Amendment rights. The trial court ruled that the Civil Service Merit Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence, but vacate and remand to the Civil Service Merit Board for consideration of Appellee’s First Amendment argument. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie Lewis
The Defendant, Willie Lewis, was found guilty by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) excluding relevant testimony regarding the victim’s tattoo, (2) not permitting the Defendant to refer to the victim’s tattoo during closing argument, and (3) issuing a flight instruction that was not supported by the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Marshall
The Defendant, Dennis Marshall, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of possession with intent to sell twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a multiple offender to sixteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court committed plain error (2) by denying him an open and public trial; (3) by admitting hearsay statements into evidence; (4) by admitting evidence of other investigations; (5) by admitting evidence of the utility account holder at the home in which the drugs were found; (6) by admitting evidence about his having money but no job; (7) by admitting nonexpert testimony about the value of the cocaine found at the crime scene; (8) by admitting evidence about the recovery of a razor blade at the scene; and (9) by admitting evidence of his personal relationship with a minor female. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Hanke, Sr.
The Defendant-Appellant, Richard Hanke, Sr., entered a plea of guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to robbery (count one), aggravated burglary (count two), aggravated assault (count three), and two counts of kidnapping (counts four and five), all Class C felonies. He additionally pleaded guilty to retaliation for past action (count six) and possession of a weapon with intent to employ in offense (count seven), both Class E felonies. The trial court imposed a term of six years’ confinement for the robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and each kidnapping. It further imposed a sentence of two years for possession of a weapon with intent to employ in offense and retaliation for past action. The trial court ordered the concurrent term of six years’ confinement in counts one, two, and four to be served consecutively to the concurrent term of six years’ confinement imposed in counts three, five, and seven. Count six was ordered to be served consecutively to all other counts, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering partially consecutive sentencing. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cortino Harris v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Cortino Harris, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to investigate and call at trial several eyewitnesses to the crime. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carlos C. Beasley v. Henry Steward, Warden
The Petitioner, Carlos C. Beasley, pro se, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 1998 especially aggravated robbery conviction and resulting twenty-four-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him habeas corpus relief. He argues that his conviction and sentence are void because the indictment was defective. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nickalos Boyce
The Defendant, Nickalos Boyce, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robin Elizabeth Willis
The Defendant-Appellant, Robin Elizabeth Willis, was convicted by a Hawkins County jury of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender and ordered her to serve three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Willis argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; and (2) her sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robin Elizabeth Willis - Concurring in part, Dissenting in part
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, P.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to convict the Defendant. I respectfully disagree, however, with its conclusions that the victim was particularly vulnerable and that the three-year sentence should be served in confinement |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Blake Ball
The Defendant-Appellant, Robert Blake Ball, was convicted by a Greene County jury of attempted second degree murder and sentenced to eleven years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, Ball challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Jones
A Hamilton County jury convicted Defendant, Mario Jones, of possession of more than 50 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty years as a Range I standard offender. In his appeal, Defendant presents the following issues for review: (1) the stop of Defendant’s vehicle and the subsequent detention of Defendant violated his constitutional rights, and the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion tosuppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction; (3) the trial court improperly allowed Lieutenant Queen to testify concerning the calendar, notes, and pills found in Defendant’s vehicle; (4) the trialcourt erred in finding that chain of custody had been established; and (5) the trial court erred in rejecting Defendant’s proposed mitigating factor. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Heather Junghanel v. Andres Hernandez
Andres Hernandez (“Father”) filed a petition seeking to terminate his child support obligation. The Trial Court held a hearing and entered an order on March 17, 2011 awarding a judgment against Father of $5,726.47 in child support arrearages but also providing for further hearing for a full review and calculation of arrearages. The case subsequently was heard before a Special Master who found that Heather Junghanel (“Mother”) was entitled to a judgment against Father of $21,976.27 in child support arrearages. Father appealed the Special Master’s report to the Trial Court. The Trial Court found that the March 17, 2011 order was a final order and awarded a judgment against Father of $5,726.47 in child support arrearages. The State of Tennessee ex rel. Mother appeals to this Court arguing that the Trial Court improperly retroactively modified Father’s child support obligation. We find and hold that the Trial Court erred in holding that the March 17, 2011 order was a final order. We vacate the Trial Court’s September 20, 2011 order and remand this case to the Trial Court for a hearing on Father’s objections to the Special Master’s report. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |