Peggy J. Skaggs v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company
03S01-9603-CV-00029
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ben K. Wexler,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer's insurer contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's fatal heart attack arose out of his employment. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant, Peggy Skaggs, is the widow of Charles R. Skaggs, deceased. At the time of his death, Mr. Skaggs was employed by the First Baptist Church of Morristown as Maintenance Supervisor. On August 8, 1994, following several hours of manual labor at the church, he developed severe neck pain and numbness and tingling in his hands and arms. Mrs. Skaggs, also a church employee, called an ambulance. He was taken to Ft. Sanders Hospital, where he died on August 1, 1994. According to the Death Certificate, death was caused by (1) heart attack, (2) coronary artery disease and (3) sudden cardiac death. The cause of the heart attack was confirmed by a medical doctor, who testified by deposition, "I believe the activity (he) engaged (in) may indeed have precipitated the onset of his myocardial infarction." The doctor conceded on cross-examination that undiagnosed pre-existing coronary artery disease may have been a contributing cause. The trial judge found the employee's heart attack to have been caused by physical exertion at work, thus compensable. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). A heart attack is compensable, as an accidental injury, if it can be shown by competent evidence that the attack was precipitated by physical exertion or stress at work. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S.W.2d 523 (Tenn. 1991). The key, it has been held, to the recovery or denial of benefits is whether the heart attack is precipitated by the physical activity and exertion of the employee's work. Wingert v. Government of Sumner County, 98 S.W.2d 921 (Tenn. 1995). Moreover, an employee's death or disability resulting from a heart attack is causally related to his employment and therefore compensable, 2

James W. Smith v. Wilson County Concrete Co., et al.
01S01-9604-CR-00073
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon.

James W. Smith v. Wilson County Concrete Co., et al.
01S01-9604-CR-00073
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon.

Lovell & Malone vs. Commonwealth Life Ins.
01A01-9607-CH-00299
Trial Court Judge: Robert S. Brandt

01A01-9608-CH-00352
01A01-9608-CH-00352
Trial Court Judge: Robert S. Brandt

Ulrich vs. Ulrich
01A01-9606-CV-00264
Trial Court Judge: Thomas Goodall

Frank Collier Auction & Realty Co. vs. Rice, et. al.
01A01-9608-CH-00384
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Almany vs. Christie
01A01-9608-CH-00376
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III

Davis vs. TN. Dept. of Correction & Campbell
01A01-9610-CH-00487
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Davis vs. TN. Dept. of Correction & Campbell
01A01-9610-CH-00487
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Waste Management vs. South Central Bell
01A01-9504-CV-00182
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers

Waste Management vs. South Central Bell
01A01-9504-CV-00182
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers

Joseph Chidester and wife, Kathleen Chidester v. L. D. Elliston, O.D.
02A01-9602-CV-00029
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

In this medical malpractice action, the Plaintiffs, Joseph and Kathleen Chidester, 2 filed suit against the Defendant, Dr. L. D. Elliston, for failing to diagnose the Plaintiff’s malignant tumor. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment holding that the Plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by the one year statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs’ have appealed the trial court’s order arguing that the statute of limitations does not bar this action because the Plaintiffs’ cause of action did not accrue until the Plaintiff’s malignancy recurred. For the reasons stated hereafter, we reverse the judgment of the court below and remand.

03C01-9512-CV-00394
03C01-9512-CV-00394

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

01C01-9508-CC-00244
01C01-9508-CC-00244
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

01C01-9510-CC-00323
01C01-9510-CC-00323

01C01-9512-CC-00422
01C01-9512-CC-00422
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

01C01-9601-CR-00032
01C01-9601-CR-00032
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

01C01-9603-CR-00113
01C01-9603-CR-00113
Trial Court Judge: Thomas H. Shriver

01C01-9602-CC-00079
01C01-9602-CC-00079
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III

01C01-9601-CR-00027
01C01-9601-CR-00027

01C01-9603-CC-00093
01C01-9603-CC-00093
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

01C01-9604-CR-00129
01C01-9604-CR-00129
Trial Court Judge: Thomas H. Shriver

01C01-9604-CR-00147
01C01-9604-CR-00147
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.