James C. Murray v. James Fortner, Warden
The Petitioner, James C. Murray, was convicted in 1994 by a Davidson County jury of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life in prison on the murder conviction and twenty-two years on the conspiracy conviction. The court ordered the sentences to be run consecutively for an effective sentence of life plus twenty-two years. In this habeas corpus petition, the Petitioner argues that the sentence violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and is thus void. After a thorough review of the issue and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Brad Ramsey
The Defendant, Michael Brad Ramsey, pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant, second offense. He was sentenced to serve forty-five days and granted work release under Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-2-128(c). Following a motion by the Defendant, the Maury County Circuit Court granted the Defendant permission to leave confinement to attend an educational institution. The State now appeals from the release order. After review, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that it was authorized to grant release for educational purposes to a DUI second offender. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Odis Kayaunce Hantz
The defendant, Odis Kayaunce Hantz, appeals his Chester County Circuit Court conviction of aggravated robbery, alleging insufficiency of the evidence. We hold that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stacy Cagle Davis v. Robert F. Davis
After more than eighteen years of marriage, Stacy Cagle Davis (“Wife”) sued Robert F. Davis (“Husband”) for divorce. The case was tried and the Trial Court entered a Final Decree declaring the parties divorced, approving the parenting plan submitted with regard to the parties’ minor child, ordering Husband to pay child support, dividing the marital property and marital debts, and denying Husband’s request for alimony. Husband appeals the denial of his request for alimony to this Court. We reverse the denial of alimony to Husband, award Husband rehabilitative alimony of $800 per month for 36 months, award Husband attorneys’ fees at trial and on appeal, and remand to the Trial Court for a determination of the proper amount of attorneys’ fees. The remainder of the Trial Court’s Final Decree is affirmed. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Phillips v. Tenneseee Board of Probation and Parole
This appeal involves the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari. The appellant prisoner was denied a hearing in front of the appellee board of probation and parole. The prisoner thereafter filed a petition with the chancery court, seeking review of the board’s decision. The chancery court entered an order stating that, in order to avoid dismissal of his petition, the prisoner was required to file, among other documents, a summons for each defendant, with a copy of the petition for each summons to be issued. The prisoner failed to file the summonses, and the chancery court dismissed the petition without prejudice. The prisoner appeals the dismissal, alleging numerous federal constitutional violations. We affirm, finding that the chancery court properly dismissed the petition without prejudice for failure to file a summons. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cedric Ruron Saine
The State of Tennessee has filed a petition requesting this Court to rehear in the opinion filed on April 4, 2008. In its petition, the State requests that we reconsider our holding that the affidavit did not contain sufficient facts to establish probable cause to believe that drugs would be found inside the Defendant’s residence. The State argues that this Court’s opinion is in conflict with a prior decision of our supreme court and overlooks or misapprehends material facts established by the evidence. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Shane Poole
The Defendant, Christopher Shane Poole, pled guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to two counts of misdemeanor theft. Under the plea agreement, he received consecutive terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days, and his sentence was probated. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $1400.00 to the bank where he made the fraudulent withdrawals of funds. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the bank is not a “victim” for the purposes of the restitution statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304. After a review of the record, we uphold the order of restitution to the bank. We remand for entry of corrected judgments. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Shane Poole - Concurring
I fully concur in the excellent majority opinion. I would simply add that Tennessee commercial law supports the majority’s conclusion that the payor bank held a valid claim against the defendant. Generally, “an unauthorized signature is ineffective except as the signature of the unauthorized signer in favor of a person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for value.” T.C.A § 47-3-403(a) (2001). |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Ann Harley v. Geary Falk
A former husband appeals issuance of a restraining order in a proceeding on a petition for a protective order arguing that the trial court awarded unrequested relief. The appellant failed to provide a record of the hearing before the trial court. Absent a record, since we must assume the record would support the trial court, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph P. Rusnak, et al. v. Gail Phebus
The daughter of a nursing home resident used a power of attorney granted by her mother to sell the mother a joint tenancy with right of survivorship in a condominium the daughter owned, with the intention of spending down the mother’s liquid assets so she could qualify for Medicaid. A conservator was subsequently appointed to protect the mother’s interests, and he filed suit for the partition and sale of the condominium property. The mother died shortly thereafter. The court granted the request for partition, but stayed the sale of the property pending this interlocutory appeal. The daughter argues on appeal that Tennessee should follow the general rule which provides that the death of a joint tenant with right of survivorship extinguishes a pending suit for partition. We agree, and we reverse the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Joey Conner v. Carmen Conner
This appeal arises from a post-divorce proceeding wherein the minor child’s mother, contending that there had been a material change in circumstances, sought a change of custody. After several days of hearings, the trial court transferred custody from the father to the mother. We find that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard and also find that the final hearing below was prematurely terminated. We therefore vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Sherrie Engler, et al. v. Karnes Legal Services
This appeal involves the Tennessee saving statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. The plaintiffs’ lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute when their attorney failed to appear at a hearing. Three months after the dismissal, the plaintiffs’ attorney filed a motion seeking relief from the order of dismissal, citing the saving statute, along with an amended complaint. The trial court considered the motion under Rule 60 but did not address the applicability of the saving statute. The court refused to set aside the order of dismissal upon finding that the attorney’s failure to attend the hearing did not constitute excusable neglect. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Cotton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur with the majority opinion that the evidence presented in this case does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Mr. Cotton was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury he sustained while working at Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company. In order to find that this injury rendered Mr. Cotton permanently and totally disabled, however, it is necessary to find that he sustained the shoulder injury and that the injury and subsequent treatment aggravated his pre-existing diabetes. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jeffrey Cotton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee was a diabetic. He suffered a compensable shoulder injury, which required two surgeries and another procedure to correct. He returned to work on light duty status. Some time later, he fell into a diabetic coma. He subsequently developed renal failure and required dialysis thereafter. The trial court found Employee to be permanently and totally disabled, found that the shoulder injury alone had caused a 30% permanent partial disability, and apportioned the award between Employer and the Second Injury Fund. The Fund has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in awarding benefits for permanent total disability. Employee contends that the trial court erred in attributing only 30% disability to the shoulder injury, and in apportioning the award under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-208(a). We affirm the judgment and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion and the Suggestion of Death upon the Record filed in this matter. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Brim Holding Company, Inc. v. Province Healthcare Company
The issue on appeal in this contract dispute is whether the defendant breached its indemnification obligations under the terms of a stock purchase agreement. The trial court found that the plaintiff was entitled to be reimbursed for payment of a claim specifically identified under the indemnification provisions of a stock purchase agreement. Significantly, the trial court found that the indemnity provisions in the stock purchase agreement anticipate the specific loss and assure that it will be paid by the defendant. The defendant contends that the plaintiff has already received reimbursement for that payment through the post-closing working capital adjustment and the plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled to reimbursement under the indemnification provisions. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
George Campbell, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, George Campbell, Jr., appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Trevor Ford
Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of second degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence used to convict him was insufficient to sustain a conviction for any offense greater than voluntary manslaughter. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tarkis Jones v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tarkis Jones, sought post-conviction relief after pleading guilty to charges of second degree murder, unlawful possession of a weapon, and assault. The Shelby County Criminal Court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner argues that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mike Settle v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
Appellant, a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, challenges the trial court's order dismissing his Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The record reveals that the court reached its decision in a lawful manner. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Valley View Mobile Home Parks, LLC. v. Layman Lessons, Inc.
Tenant appeals the Circuit Court’s dismissal of its appeal of the Judgment and Order of the General Sessions Court granting Landlord possession of leased premises. The basis of the Circuit Court’s dismissal was Tenant’s failure to comply with the Court’s second Order requiring Tenant to post a bond. Finding error in the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-130, we reverse the decision of the Trial Court and remand this case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
City of Jackson, Tennessee, ex rel. v. State of Tennessee, ex rel.
The City of Jackson appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its action against the Commissioner of Commerce and Insurance seeking reimbursement for building demolition expenses under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-102-122. Finding that sovereign immunity prohibits monetary claims against the state when brought seeking a declaratory order under either the Declaratory Judgment Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-101 et seq., or the Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §4-5-225, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamiel D. Williams
The defendant, Jamiel D. Williams, appeals his Williamson County Circuit Court conviction of first degree murder, alleging that there was insufficient evidence to prove premeditation. We hold that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court. The judgment is modified because it incorrectly classifies the sentence as a Class A felony. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Madison County, Tennessee v. Tennessee State Board Of Equalization
Several taxpayers appealed Madison County’s valuation of the taxpayers’ limited partnership property to the Tennessee State Board of Equalization. The administrative law judge scheduled a pre-hearing conference, with notice being sent to the taxpayers and Madison County. Some confusion arose, and no representative for Madison County attended the conference. The administrative law judge entered a default judgment against Madison County, and Madison County timely filed a petition to reconsider with the administrative law judge. The administrative law judge took no action on the petition, and after twenty days, the petition was deemed denied by operation of law. Madison County then failed to appeal the administrative law judge’s denial of the petition to reconsider within thirty days to the Assessment Appeals Commission. The Assessment Appeals Commission thereafter issued the Official Certificates of Assessment. Madison County filed a motion to reconsider the Official Certificates with both the administrative law judge and the Board of Equalization, seeking relief under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The administrative law judge denied the motion, but the Board of Equalization granted relief and remanded the matter to the administrative law judge. The taxpayer defendants then filed a petition with the Board of Equalization, challenging the Board’s order setting aside the default judgment. The taxpayers filed a petition for review in chancery court in Madison County. Thereafter, the Board held a hearing, reversed its prior order, and reinstated the default judgment against Madison County. Madison County filed a petition for review in chancery court in Madison County pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322, seeking review of the Board’s reinstatement of the default judgment. The chancery court granted the taxpayers’ motion for summary judgment. Madison County appeals, and we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Aerospace Testing Alliance v. Farris D. Anderson
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2005) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of facts and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had suffered a 65 percent vocational impairment to the body as a whole resulting from gradual hearing loss and tinnitus and also found that the employee’s last day worked was his date of injury. The trial court awarded 260 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the employee failed to prove causation of his tinnitus and that he is therefore entitled to recover only for his hearing loss, an injury to a scheduled member. The employer also asserts that the date of injury should be an earlier date, the last date on which the employee was exposed to high levels of noise injurious to his hearing. We hold that the trial court was correct in setting the employee’s date of injury as the last day on which the employee worked for the employer. Based on the proof in the record, we hold that the trial court did not err in ruling that the employee suffered a “whole body” impairment. The judgment below is affirmed. |
Anderson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
The Estate of Mary Ellen Reagan v. Tennplasco, et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded lump sum benefits. On appeal, a previous workers’ compensation appeals panel reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Employee died for reasons unrelated to the injury, while the appeal was pending. The trial court modified its previous award and again commuted the amount to a lump sum. The Second Injury Fund has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by awarding benefits in excess of those which had accrued prior to the Employee’s death. We agree, modify the judgment accordingly, and remand to the trial court for the calculation of the benefits payable to the Estate. |
Macon | Workers Compensation Panel |