State of Tennessee v. Tamela Scott
The defendant, Tamela T. Scott, was convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a class B felony, and three counts of vehicular assault, a class D felony. She received an effective sentence of eight years. The sentence was ordered to be served by one year in confinement and sixteen years on probation. Among the conditions of the defendant’s probation were 200 hours of community service per year, and the defendant was also prohibited from driving for eight years. The defendant appeals the judgments, arguing that (1) the convicting evidence is insufficient; (2) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony of “retrograde extrapolation” related to the defendant’s blood alcohol level; (3) the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding blood alcohol; and (4) the trial court erred in determining the conditions of her community service, the length of her probation, and that her driving privileges will be revoked for eight years. We affirm the judgments for the three counts of vehicular assault. We affirm the conviction of vehicular homicide by intoxication, but we modify the manner of service of the eight-year sentence to one year in confinement followed by eight years of probation. |
Cannon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tamela Scott - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in the well-reasoned opinion of the majority as to all issues except the issue of the Defendant’s sentence. The majority opinion modifies the Defendant’s sentence from one year of confinement followed by sixteen years of probation to one year of confinement followed by eight years of probation. |
Cannon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Margaret Hudson
This is an appeal from an award of discretionary costs. The defendant owned a rental house in an historic district. She violated the historic district’s design guidelines by having vinyl siding installed on the house. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit to require the homeowner to remove the siding. The plaintiff was granted summary judgment, from which the defendant homeowner appealed. In the first appeal of this case, the grant of summary judgment was affirmed. After remand, the defendant homeowner failed to remove the siding, so the plaintiff filed a petition for contempt. After a hearing, the trial court found that the homeowner had the financial resources to have the siding removed, so it ordered the homeowner to (1) retain a contractor and (2) remove the siding. The homeowner was required to notify the court upon completion of both steps. The siding was removed. Once the house was brought into compliance, the plaintiff filed a proposed “order closing the file.” The trial court granted the motion. Within thirty days after entry of this order, the plaintiff filed a motion for an award of its discretionary costs. The homeowner opposed the motion, arguing that the plaintiff’s motion for discretionary costs was untimely, and that the order requiring compliance was the final order, not the “order closing the file.” The trial court awarded the plaintiff its discretionary costs, and the homeowner appealed. We affirm, finding that the motion for discretionary costs was timely filed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Monroe v. Jacqueline Zierden, et al.
The trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate, and granted Appellee reasonable attorney’s fees as provided in the contract. Appellant appeals the award of attorney’s fees; Appellee asserts error in the amount of fees awarded. We affirm. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Walker Newman v. Wayne Woodard, et al.
This case concerns the access rights of a landowner to a section of her property divided from the rest of her land by a steep bluff. The trial court held that the landowner did not have an implied easement through her neighbor’s land to access her property at the bottom of the bluff because the there was insufficient evidence that the right-of-way preexisted severance of the properties. The trial court determined that Mrs. Newman did not have an implied easement by necessity because there was insufficient evidence that Mrs. Newman would be unable build a road down the bluff for a reasonable cost. Because the evidence does not preponderate otherwise, we affirm that Mrs. Newman does not have an implied easement or an implied easement by necessity over the right-of-way. The trial court also held that Mrs. Newman lacked a prescriptive easement over the right-of-way because she failed to prove that her use was exclusive; we affirm on the basis that Mrs. Newman failed to demonstrate that her use of the right-of-way was continuous. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Author Ray Turner v. Stephen Dotson, Warden
The petitioner, Author Ray Turner, appeals the circuit court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the court’s order. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Doe v. Catholic Bishop for The Diocese of Memphis
This appeal involves the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The plaintiff, a thirty-seven year old man, filed a lawsuit against the defendant Catholic diocese. His complaint alleged that, as an adolescent, he was sexually abused by a Catholic priest employed by the defendant diocese. The lawsuit alleged that the diocese was negligent in hiring, retaining, and supervising the priest, and that the diocese breached its fiduciary duty to the plaintiff by failing to disclose to him its knowledge that the priest had abused other young boys. The diocese filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations. In response, the plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations was tolled under the discovery rule, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The diocese was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. On appeal, we reverse, finding that the plaintiff’s complaint is time-barred, and cannot be saved by the discovery rule, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, or the doctrine of equitable estoppel. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford Motor Company Litigation
The second appeal in this case involves the effect of a previous forum non conveniens dismissal. The plaintiffs, residents and citizens of Mexico, were injured in automobile accidents that took place in Mexico. They filed multiple lawsuits against several American corporate defendants, alleging that the accidents were the result of defects in the vehicles’ tires. The corporate defendants moved for dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens. The trial court denied the motions, and the defendants were granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the consolidated case on the ground of forum non conveniens, based on the availability of Mexico as a more convenient forum for litigation of the plaintiffs’ claims. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed numerous lawsuits in several Mexican trial courts. These cases were all dismissed, and the dismissals were affirmed on appeal. The plaintiffs then filed new lawsuits in Davidson County Circuit Court against the same defendants, which were again consolidated for pretrial purposes. The defendants filed motions to dismiss on grounds of issue preclusion, arguing that the issues of forum non conveniens and the availability of Mexico as an available alternate forum had been determined in their favor in the first appeal. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that Mexico was not, in fact, an available forum, as evidenced by the numerous dismissals by the Mexican tribunals. The defendants were granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. On appeal, we address the effect of our previous decision and vacate the order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings on the availability of Mexico as an alternate forum for the plaintiffs’ claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Bee Deselm, et al. v. Diane Jordan, et al.
The plaintiffs brought this action seeking the removal of several Knox County officials from office on the ground that they were ineligible for their positions by operation of the term limits provision of the Knox County Charter. Six days after the plaintiffs filed their complaint, the Tennessee Supreme Court heard arguments in the case of Jordan v. Knox County. The Supreme Court in its Jordan opinion, released on January 12, 2007, decided all issues raised in the case before us. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint on the basis of mootness. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gordon McGee, Jr.
The defendant, Gordon McGee, Jr., was indicted by the Warren County grand jury for simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and applied for pretrial diversion. The state denied the application and the defendant sought certiorari review by the trial court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted certiorari and ordered the state to enter into a memorandum of understanding granting pretrial diversion to the defendant. The state appeals as of right the order of the trial court. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tryphena Nicole Jones
The defendant, Tryphena Nicole Jones, pled guilty to possession of cocaine and failure to appear, both Class A misdemeanors, and was sentenced to consecutive terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent release eligibility. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cordova the Town Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Gill Development Company, Inc.
This appeal involves the interpretation of a declaration of covenants for a homeowners’ association. The declaration made the developer a member of the homeowners’ association, insofar as the developer owned lots within the development. It also stated that the obligation to pay assessments on a given lot did not begin until either the lot was transferred from the developer or improvements on the lot were completed, whichever occurred first. The homeowners’ association sued the developer, seeking damages for unpaid assessments on lots owned by the developer, on which improvements were not complete. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the homeowners’ association. The developer appeals. We reverse, concluding that the declaration of covenants provides that the obligation to pay assessments on the lots owned by the developer had not yet commenced. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Frankie Lewis, et al. v Cleveland Municipal Airport Authority, et al.
This lawsuit challenges actions by the Cleveland Municipal Airport Authority (the “Airport Authority”) and the Bradley County Commission (the “Commission”) involving the rezoning by the Commission of certain property located in Bradley County from Forestry Agricultural Residential to Special Impact Industrial. The Airport Authority intends to relocate the Cleveland Municipal Airport to the rezoned property. Frankie Lewis originally filed this lawsuit and Herbert Haney was added later as a plaintiff. As pertinent to this appeal, the Trial Court determined that Lewis lacked taxpayer standing to bring this lawsuit against the Airport Authority and granted the Airport Authority’s motion to dismiss. Lewis appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit against the Airport Authority. As to the Commission, both plaintiffs allege statutory and procedural violations surrounding notice of the requested rezoning and the conduct of the Commission in eventually granting the request for rezoning. The Trial Court granted the Commission’s motion for summary judgment after concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and the Commission was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Both Lewis and Haney appeal that summary judgment. We conclude that the Trial Court did not err in granting the Airport Authority’s motion to dismiss and the Commission’s motion for summary judgment. The judgment of the Trial Court is, therefore, affirmed. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Travis Plummer v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis and his motion to reopen post-conviction petition. The trial court properly concluded that the Appellant cannot prevail on the claims asserted in the two pleadings. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Erica Lynn Wyma - Concurring
I concur in the result and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I question, though, whether we can firmly say that the victim’s saying, “No, No,” and “Mommy hit me” was sufficiently relevant and not too prejudicial in the context of the trial. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Erica Lynn Wyma
The defendant, Erica Lynn Wyma, was convicted of attempted aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years in the Department of Correction. She argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction, the trial court erred in admitting a statement of the victim as an excited utterance, and her sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Diane Downs, individually and as natural parent of Ryan Cody Downs v. Mark Bush, et. al. - Concurring/Dissenting
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and must, therefore, respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Petitioner has failed to establish grounds for habeas corpus relief. Although the majority has performed an admirable analysis of the present cases on the subject, I am of the opinion that the various principles derived from these opinions are in conflict and, absent a reconciliation, the Petitioner is entitled to relief. Because the record of the proceedings demonstrates that after the jury verdict, the trial court directly contravened statute by imposing a Range III, persistent offender sentence, I would grant habeas corpus relief and remand to the sentencing court for the imposition of a Range II sentence. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Diane Downs, individually and as natural parent of Ryan Cody Downs v. Mark Bush, et al
We granted the plaintiff’s application for permission to appeal in this wrongful death case to determine whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to each of the defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Although the parties have raised several issues in this appeal, the central issue is the nature of the legal duty, if any, owed by the defendants to the plaintiff’s decedent. The decedent was socializing and consuming alcohol with the defendants. While riding in a four-door pick-up truck with the defendants, he became ill. The defendants stopped the truck on the side of an interstate highway so the decedent could vomit. After resuming the trip, the decedent rode in the bed of the truck and, for reasons unknown, exited it. After exiting the truck, he was struck by two vehicles and subsequently died. Upon careful review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants placed the decedent in the bed of the truck. Similarly, we conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the decedent was helpless and whether the defendants took charge of him. Lastly, we hold that none of the defendants stood in any special relationship with the plaintiff’s decedent and consequently they did not assume any affirmative duty to aid or protect him. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond McNeil
The defendant, Raymond McNeil, appeals from his Williamson County Circuit Court conviction of Class D felony evading arrest, alleging that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court erred in the admission of certain evidence at trial. The defendant challenges neither his conviction of driving on a revoked license nor his 12-year effective sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barsha Bates Land et al. v. Larry W. Barnes et al.
The trial court dismissed this medical malpractice case after granting motions to exclude the testimony of both of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. Based upon our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of either expert witness, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry A. Hubble et al. v. Dyer Nursing Home
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In a previous appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed an order requiring the employer to reimburse a third-party insurer for payments made for medical care. The judgment was paid. The insurer sought post-judgment interest on the amount, and the trial court awarded that interest. The employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by awarding post-judgment interest for medical expenses. We agree and reverse the judgment. |
Gibson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Doug Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Company, et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
I fully concur in the majority’s conclusion that Alcoa owed a duty to Ms. Satterfield to take reasonable steps to prevent her from suffering harm as a result of the risks created by the operation of Alcoa’s facility. I write separately to express my belief that any discussion of foreseeability in the context of duty encroaches upon the role of the finder of fact. In doing so, I will explain the considerations that I believe are relevant to a duty analysis. This Court has previously stated that the existence of a duty depends upon the presence |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
Doug Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Company, et al.
This appeal involves the efforts of the estate of a twenty-five-year-old woman who contracted mesothelioma to recover damages for her death. While she was alive, the woman filed a negligence action against her father’s employer, alleging that the employer had negligently permitted her father to wear his asbestos-contaminated work clothes home from work, thereby regularly and repeatedly exposing her to asbestos fibers over an extended period of time. After the woman died, the Circuit Court for Blount County permitted her father to be substituted as the personal representative of her estate. The employer moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the narrow ground that it owed no duty to its employee’s daughter. The trial court granted the motion. The deceased woman’s father appealed the dismissal of his daughter’s wrongful death claim. The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., No. E2006-00903-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1159416 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2007). We granted the employer’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the deceased woman’s omplaint can withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings. We have determined that it does because, under the facts alleged in the complaint, the employer owed a duty to those who regularly and for extended periods of time came into close contact with the asbestos contaminated work clothes of its employees to prevent them from being exposed to a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed; Case Remanded |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
Colonial Pipeline Company v. John G. Morgan et al.
Colonial Pipeline Company filed suit for declaratory judgment, challenging the constitutionality of specified portions of the state tax code and seeking an injunction as to the enforcement of those provisions. The Chancery Court dismissed the action, holding that the company had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. We granted an application for permission to appeal and, after consideration of the issues, hold that (1) a party making a constitutional challenge to the facial validity of a statute need not exhaust its administrative remedies, and that (2) the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar a suit for declaratory judgment asking state officers to be enjoined from enforcing such a statute so long as the action does not seek money damages. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Clinard
A Stewart County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Jason Clinard, of first degree premeditated murder and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1); -204 (2006). In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by (1) not suppressing photographs of the victim, (2) allowing the State an independent psychological examination of the defendant, (3) failing to disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office, and (4) following the statutory sentencing scheme that resulted in the defendant’s life sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals |