State of Tennessee v. William "Bill" Bosley, Jr.
The defendant, William "Bill" Bosley, Jr., was convicted by a Hardin County Circuit Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial based on the State's withholding of evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, and (3) the trial court erred in failing to address the need for a change of venue. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Benjamin Brown
The defendant was convicted of aggravated child abuse and felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. The defendant appealed the felony murder conviction, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction. We granted permission to appeal and address the issue of whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of felony murder, which include second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to these lesser-included offenses, and accordingly, we reverse the felony murder conviction and remand the case for a new trial on the felony murder count. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Macklin
The Defendant, Shawn Macklin, is charged with sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. He sought pretrial diversion, and the prosecutor denied his request. Upon consideration of the Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court found that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We granted this interlocutory appeal to consider whether the trial court properly denied the writ of certiorari by finding that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion. We hold that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor acted within his discretion. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case with instructions that the prosecutor shall reconsider the Defendant's application for pretrial diversion in light of only the relevant factors. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond Stanley Hilliard
The defendant, Raymond Stanley Hilliard, appeals from his Sullivan County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of facilitation of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine, two counts of the facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, two counts of the possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a legend drug, three counts of the possession of a schedule IV drug, possession of a schedule II drug, and maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used and sold. He argues that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the entirety of his agreed seven-year effective sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Allen Sumner
The defendant, Timothy Allen Sumner, appeals from the order of the Criminal Court of Sullivan County revoking his probation. On appeal, he claims that the evidence supported neither the trial court's revocation of probation nor the resulting order that he serve his sentence in confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Milburn L. Edwards v. Cherry Lindamood, Warden
The pro se Petitioner, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus attacking his 1991 convictions for twenty-one counts of rape; two counts of first degree burglary; two counts of aggravated burglary; one count of second degree burglary; one count of aggravated rape; one count of assault with intent to commit rape; and one count of robbery. Following his convictions, the Petitioner initially received an effective sentence of life plus 415 years, which was later modified to life plus 195 years on appeal. State v. Edwards, 868 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). A petition for post-conviction relief was denied by the trial court, and the denial was affirmed on appeal. Milburn L. Edwards v. State, No. M2002-02124-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 23014683 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2003). Two separate petitions for a writ of habeas corpus were summarily dismissed by the trial court, and their denials were affirmed on appeal. Milburn L. Edwards v. Cherry Lindamood, No. M2006-01092-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 152233 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 16, 2007); Milburn L. Edwards v. State, No. M2004-01378-CCA-R3-HC, 2005 WL 544714 (Tenn. Crim. App. March 7, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 29, 2005). On March 15, 2008, the petitioner filed a third pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his convictions on several grounds. The trial court dismissed his petition without the appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Phyllis Ann McBride v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Phyllis Ann McBride, was convicted by a jury of the first degree murder of her husband and was sentenced to life in prison. She appealed her conviction, and this court affirmed. State v. Phyliss Ann McBride, No. 01C01-9606-CC-00269, Rutherford County (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 1997). The Petitioner's subsequent petition for post-conviction relief was denied, and this court affirmed. Phyllis McBride v. State, No. M2000-00034-CCA-R3-CD, Rutherford County (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2001). The Petitioner now appeals pro se the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denial of her petition seeking a writ of error coram nobis, post-conviction relief, and "DNA Pathological and Toxicological Analysis." We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Hubbard
A Shelby County jury found the defendant guilty of carjacking, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years, six months, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court improperly weighed the enhancement and mitigating factors in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Edward Dougherty
A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Gary Edward Dougherty, of two counts of attempt to commit first degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court merged all counts and sentenced the Defendant, a Range I offender, to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appealed, contending: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentence. This Court held that a written order disposing of the motion for a new trial or a minute entry disposing of the motion and bearing the signature of the trial judge is required to confer upon this court jurisdiction of this appeal, and because neither was part of the record, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See State v. Dougherty, No. E2008-00131-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 445070 (Knoxville, March 17, 2009). On August 31, 2009, our supreme court remanded this case to us, directing us to reconsider our opinion in light of State v. Byington, 284 S.W.3d 200, 223 (Tenn. 2009) (noting that "the procedure for correcting and modifying the record reflects the dual goals of avoiding technicality and expediting a just resolution of the case on its merits"). Based upon Byington, we conclude that we do have jurisdiction to review this case on the merits. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Spencer P. et al.
Parents in a dependency and neglect proceeding appealed a juvenile court decision finding their six minor children dependent and neglected and awarding custody to DCS. The circuit court dismissed the parents' appeal as untimely; parents appeal the dismissal to this Court. Finding error, we reverse and remand. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
James E. Scales v. Civil Service Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County and the Metropolitan Police Department
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marcus D. Lee v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Marcus D. Lee, appeals the summary dismissal of his “motion for delayed appeal and post-conviction relief,” claiming that he was deprived of the opportunity to seek appellate review of his convictions and sentences and that he is entitled to due process tolling of the statue of limitations. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion because the statute of limitations had expired and the petitioner failed to present an appropriate basis for tolling the statute of limitations. The State has filed a motion to affirm the judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review, we grant the motion of the State to affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court pursuant to Rule 20. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Alvin Castleman
The State appeals the grant of Petitioner James Alvin Castleman’s petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in finding that the statute of limitations should be tolled for due process reasons. We agree with the State and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court and reinstate the judgment of conviction. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andor Williams
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Andor Williams, of one count of possession with intent to sell marijuana and one count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant, as a Range II multiple offender, to serve a four-year sentence in the workhouse. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred when sentencing him. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Titus A. Miller
A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Titus A. Miller, of simple possession of marijuana and evading arrest, both Class A misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction, to be served consecutively to each other and to a sixty-month federal sentence. The court ordered the defendant to serve the sentences in the county jail, with a release eligibility percentage of seventy-five percent. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences consecutively. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the Madison County Circuit Court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jason Martindill v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jason Martindill, pled guilty to first degree murder on August 28, 2007, and received a life sentence. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not enter his guilty plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Norman Redwing v. The Catholic Bishop For The Diocese of Memphis - Dissenting
I concur in the majority’s analysis of the ecclesiastical doctrine and its holding that we do not have subject matter jurisdiction of Mr. Redwing’s claims of negligent hiring and retention, but that we do have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate his claim of negligent supervision. I must dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that, as a matter of law, Mr. Redwing’s claim of negligent supervision is barred by the statute of limitations. I believe that, in this case, dismissal based on the pleadings is premature and that Mr. Redwing is entitled to conduct discovery on facts pertinent to whether the statute of limitations is tolled. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Norman Redwing v. The Catholic Bishop For The Diocese of Memphis
Plaintiff filed an action against the Catholic Bishop for The Diocese of Memphis, asserting the Diocese was liable for damages arising from the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of a priest, who Plaintiff alleged abused him when he was a child. The Diocese moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and on the grounds that the statute of limitations prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104 had expired. The trial court denied the motions. It also denied the Diocese’s motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted the Diocese’s motion for extraordinary appeal under Rule 10. We affirm the trial court’s judgment with respect to subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim of negligent supervision, but hold that Plaintiff’s claims of negligent hiring and negligent retention are barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. We reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to the expiration of the statute of limitations. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bluff Springs Apartments, LTD. et al. v. Peoples Bank of the South et al.
R. L. Ayers operates several apartment complexes, some individually and some in his capacity as the general partner of the limited partnerships, Bluff Springs Apartments, Ltd., and Village Apartment, Ltd. As a consequence of these interests, he maintained several bank accounts with Peoples Bank of the South. This litigation focuses on seven of those accounts. Ayers has admitted – and in fact has pleaded guilty – to defrauding Peoples and two other local banks by “kiting” checks. It is undisputed that Peoples sustained substantial losses when the other banks discovered the scheme and dishonored checks, leaving Peoples holding several hundred thousand dollars worth of bad checks; however, the precise amount of the loss is in dispute. In August 2003, Peoples froze the accounts that had been opened by Ayers, but, with one exception, waited until September 29, 2006, to offset the monies in those accounts against its losses. Ayers, Bluff Springs and Village (collectively “the Plaintiffs”) filed this action asking for a declaration that Peoples wrongfully converted the funds in the seven accounts and violated the contracts under which the funds were deposited. The Plaintiffs also sought punitive damages. Peoples coupled its answer with a counterclaim. In its counterclaim, Peoples alleged that, after giving the Plaintiffs all credits to which they were due, it was left holding $429,300 in bad checks; it demanded a judgment for that sum. After a bench trial, the court held that Peoples only had a right of setoff against two accounts owned by Ayers individually. The court held that Peoples did not have a right of setoff against the accounts owned by the entities or the one opened in Ayers’ name for tenant deposits. However, the trial court found in favor of Peoples on its counterclaim and awarded it a judgment against Ayers in the amount of $429,221.65, subject to certain credits to be given. Initially, the trial court awarded both Peoples and the Plaintiffs prejudgment interest at the rate of 10%. On Peoples’ post-trial motion, the court cut the interest rate to 1%. Peoples appeals, arguing, primarily, that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to conversion claims bars all of the Plaintiffs’ claims. The Plaintiffs raise their own issuesincluding a challenge to (1) the trial court’s refusal to order the return of funds held in accounts designated for a special purpose, (2) the trial court’s reduction of pre-judgment interest on a post-trial motion, and (3) the amount of damages awarded on the counterclaim. We affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Haley Mariah Anderson, et al vs. Paul E. Stanton, Jr., et al
Haley Mariah Anderson and Macey Elizabeth Anderson ("the Children") by next friend and father, Mac Todd Anderson ("Father"), sued Paul E. Stanton, Jr. ("Stanton"), Hal Knight ("Knight"), Deborah Defrieze ("Defrieze"), d/b/a East Tennessee State University, University School ("University School") (or collectively "Defendants"), and the Washington County Board of Education seeking, in part, to prevent University School from withdrawing the Children from enrollment in University School due to alleged actions of the Children's mother, Treda Anderson ("Mother"). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. TheTrial Court held a hearing on Defendants' motion for summary judgment, entered an order granting Defendants summary judgment, and certified the order as final pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. The Children appeal to this Court the grant of summary judgment primarily raising an issue regarding procedural due process. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Clarence Edward Spinks v. State of Tennessee
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Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James H. Saint, Jr.
The Defendant, James H. Saint, Jr., was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-504(b). The trial court, applying the 2005 Amendments to our Sentencing Act, originally sentenced the Defendant to serve sixty-six years in the Department of Correction. On his first appeal, however, we reversed his sentences and remanded his case for resentencing under the 1989 Act. See State v. Saint, 284 S.W.3d 340, 348 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). Following a resentencing hearing, held on May 14, 2009, the trial court again sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years for each of his six convictions, those sentences to be served consecutively to one another, for a total effective sentence of sixty-six years in the Department of Correction. On this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentences and in ordering him to serve them consecutively. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melissa A. Stewart et al. v. A.K.M. Fakhruddin, M.D. et al.
A man receiving outpatient treatment from a psychiatrist shot and killed his wife and himself. Patient's daughter filed wrongful death actions on behalf of her mother and her father and a negligence action on her own behalf. The trial court granted summary judgment with respect to the wrongful death claim on behalf of the mother and the individual claim of the daughter. The wrongful death claim on behalf of father was voluntarily dismissed. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 33-3-206 does not apply in this case and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to mother's and daughter's negligence claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Melvin S. Nettles v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Melvin S. Nettles, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. In 2007, he pled guilty to sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he received a twelve year sentence to be served on community corrections. He was also assessed a fine of $2,000. The trial court subsequently found that the petitioner violated his community corrections' sentence and ordered confinement. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming: (1) his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barbara Ann Riggs
The Defendant, Barbara Ann Riggs, was found guilty by a Knox County jury of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. __ 39-14-103; -105(4). The trial court imposed a Range I, six-year sentence to be served on probation consecutively to a one-year sentence in another case and set the amount of restitution at $28,600.95. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction, that the trial court erred in enhancing her sentence based upon enhancement factors that were not found by a jury to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the court erred in awarding restitution for attorney's fees and accountant's fees the victim incurred as a consequence of the crime. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |