Sarah C. Jannerbo v. E. Mattias Jannerbo
This appeal arises from the divorce of Sarah C. Jannerbo (“Wife”) and E. Mattias Jannerbo(“Husband”). Wife sued Husband for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce. Following a trial, the Trial Court, inter alia, divided the marital estate and awarded Wife periodic alimony. Husband appeals, arguing that the Trial Court erred in awarding both the type and amount of alimony that it did. Husband also argues that the Trial Court erred in its classification and division |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Trevon Williams
The appellant, Brandon Trevon Williams, appeals the revocation of his probation claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering execution of the original sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Trent Patterson
Defendant, Brandon Trent Patterson, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder. By agreement between the parties, Defendant was also charged by criminal information with one count of aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Defendant was acquitted of attempted first degree murder and convicted of aggravated assault. Defendant was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment. Defendant appeals his conviction, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Eugene Poole
Defendant, Anthony Eugene Poole, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for aggravated assault. Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of assault and sentenced by the trial court to 11 months and 29 days to be suspended on probation. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and asserts that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; 2) the trial court erred by not instructing the jury as to the defenses of duress and necessity; 3) the statute of limitations barred his prosecution; 4) his sentence of intensive probation and imposition of a fine was improper; and 5) the trial court erred by ordering Defendant to pay restitution to the victim. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Matthew Whitehair
The Rutherford County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Matthew Whitehair, for three counts of rape of a child, two counts of rape, eight counts of incest, three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. During the investigation of the case, officers interviewed Defendant at the police station and videotaped the interview. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the videotaped interview. After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court held that the videotape was not relevant because Defendant’s answers were ambiguous. Following the granting of the motion to suppress the State moved the trial court for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. The trial court denied this motion and the State applied in this Court for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. This Court granted the State’s application solely on the basis that the trial court acted arbitrarily in denying the application for a Rule 9 appeal. This Court did not address the merits of the granting of the motion to suppress. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to suppress. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant Defendant’s motion to suppress |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tracy Rose Baker v. Jeffrey D. Baker
In this post-divorce dispute, the mother of the parties’ children appeals from an August 2010 order wherein the trial court revoked her probation for eighteen counts of criminal contempt and imposed the maximum sentence of 180 days. Pursuant to an April 2010 Agreed Order, Mother pled guilty to eighteen counts of criminal contempt and was sentenced to 180 days in jail; however, the entire sentence was suspended and she was placed on probation subject to revocation should she fail to comply with a plethora of conditions of probation. In July 2010, Father filed a Petition to revoke Mother’s probation. Following a hearing, the trial court found Mother in violation of her probation and ordered her to serve 180 days in jail. Mother appealed alleging that the Agreed Guilty Plea Order is void because the trial judge failed to conducta hearing before accepting the guiltyplea as required byBoykin v.Alabama, 395 U.S. 239 (1969) and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b). This is not a direct appeal of the Agreed Guilty Plea Order, but a collateral attack of that order and, although this modest record suggests that the trial court may not have engaged Mother with the in-person colloquy required by Boykin and Rule 11(b), the record fails to establish that important fact. Thus, the Agreed Guilty Plea Order is not void on its face. However, the August order, specificallythe reasonableness of the sentence of 180 daysin confinementforviolating terms of probation, is on direct appeal. Considering the unique facts of this case, we find an effective sentence of 180 days is clearly excessive in relation to Mother’s acts and omissions while on probation and modify the sentence to provide for a total period of confinement of thirty (30) days. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Rose Baker v. Jeffrey D. Baker - Concur
We have determined that we have no means of reaching the issue of the validity of the Agreed Order itself. I believe that the appropriate procedure to challenge the agreement at this point in time is by petition for post-conviction relief, which Mother is pursuing. Nonetheless, we are troubled by the procedure used herein that resulted in an original punishment of six months incarceration for Mother. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Byrom v. Randstad of North America, L.P.
The employee fell at work. He was then diagnosed to have a brain hemorrhage. The evidence showed that the fall occurred in an open area, that it was unlikely that the employee either slipped or tripped, and that he struck his head on the floor but not upon any objects. Employee had no recollection of the fall. The employer denied the employee’s workers’ compensation claim, asserting that the fall did not arise from his employment. The trial court found that the employee did not sustain his burden of proof as to causation. Employee has appealed, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Ronald Eady v. Commodore Express, Inc. et al.
In this workers’ compensation suit, the employee, a truck driver, alleged that he sustained a compensable injury to his back. His employer denied that an injury occurred and further contended that, if an injury did occur, it did not arise from or in the course of his employment. The trial court held that the injury was the result of the employee’s attempted assault on a co-employee and, therefore, did not arise from his employment. The complaint was dismissed, and the employee has appealed, arguing that the trial court’s finding was in error. We affirm the judgment. |
Lincoln | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Tyrone E. Montgomery v. Ricky Bell, Warden
The petitioner, Tyrone E. Montgomery, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from his first degree murder conviction and life sentence. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred and that his conviction is void because: (1) the indictments did not allege the “knowingly” and “intentionally” mental states; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on premeditation and felony murder; (3) he was charged with “Murder By Use of A Firearm” but convicted of first degree felony murder, a crime for which he did not have proper notice from the indictment; and (4) his judgment of conviction is facially invalid and void. Following review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the petition and affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles B. Chappelle et al. v. Edward Lee Burch et al.
Plaintiffs appeal from trial court’s finding that their neighbors, the defendants, were not in violation of an Agreed Order, which stated that the neighbors’ land could be used only for residential purposes or for commercial use as a stable and for pasturing of horses, but for no other purpose. Plaintiffs contend that horse shows conducted on the property violated the terms of the Agreed Order. The trial court found that horse shows were an aspect of the commercial stabling business in Sequatchie County and, therefore, did not violate the terms of the Agreed Order. We affirm. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Brandon Adams v. Morgan County Correctional Complex, et al
Petitioner, who is incarcerated, was charged with possession of a cell phone and pled guilty. He filed a Writ of Certiorari after punishment was levied against him, contending that he understood his punishment would be five days of punitive segregation and a $5 fine, but the punishment meted out was suspension of visitation privileges for six months. The Trial Judge upheld the suspension and dismissed the Petition, finding that petitioner pled guilty and waived his right to appeal, and the writ was filed after the sixty day time frame had elapsed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Brandon Adams v. Morgan County Correctional Complex, et al. - Dissenting
I cannot concur in the majority opinion. The petitioner alleges that he entered his guilty plea and signed the waiver of right of appeal as a part of an agreement with prison officials that his punishment would be five days of punitive segregation and a five dollar fine. He alleges that, instead of the promised punishment, his visitation privileges were suspended for six months. It seems to me that, if he can prove all of this, his plea and waiver of right of appeal would be rendered invalid. If this be the case, his right to appeal would remain intact. I also believe his petition filed July 13, 2010, was timely as I believe the time for filing did not begin to run until Commissioner Ray’s May 20, 2010, decision. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Claudia O. Draime
The Defendant, Claudia O. Draime, pled guilty to theft over $60,000, a Class B felony, for an agreed Range I sentence of eight years, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence and restitution. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied probation and ordered the Defendant to serve her eight-year sentence in confinement. It is from that judgment that the Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly imposed a sentence of full confinement. After a thorough review of the law and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Wayne Davis v. Dwight Barbee, Warden and Henry Steward, Warden
The Petitioner, Michael Wayne Davis, appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Morgan Phillips v. Stephanie J. Rountree
In this divorce appeal, Husband challenges the trial court’s classification and division of the marital property and debts and its order requiring him to provide wife with his residential address. We find no error in the division of the marital estate, but agree that the trial court acted prematurely by including in the divorce decree a requirementthathusband provide wife with his residential address. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Clarence Andrew Elcan v. Amanda Hart Elcan
In this post-divorce dispute, the trial court granted father’s petition to modify the parenting plan and denied mother’s subsequent petition to modify the parenting plan. We affirm the trial court’s decisions. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Wayne Webb
A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Larry Wayne Webb, guilty of forgery in an amount over one thousand dollars and identity theft, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly admitted a vehicle certificate of title into evidence at trial; and (3) his convictions for forgery and identity theft should merge. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephen William Newsome et al. v. Kevin Darrell Porter
The issue in this appeal of a parental termination proceeding is whether the trial court erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the minor child. We agree with the father that the trial court was required by Rule 13 of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules to appoint a guardian ad litem. Because the court failed to do so, the trial court’s decision must be vacated. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Wayne Wilson v. Bill Jennings et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the employee alleged that he was working as a carpenter for the defendant, Wayne Neeley, when he fell from the roof of a house and seriously injured his right ankle. Neeley denied that he was the employer and also denied that he was a subcontractor for the defendant, B & L Construction, the general contractor. The trial court held that the employee was employed by Neeley and that Neeley was a subcontractor of B & L Construction. Because Neeley did not have workers’ compensation insurance, the trial court found B & L Construction liable for workers’ compensations benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-113 and awarded both temporary total disability benefits and accrued medical expenses, but nothing else. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred by failing to award permanent disability benefits and future medical benefits. In response, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by awarding temporary disability benefits. We hold that the trial court properly awarded temporary total benefits, but erred by failing to award permanent disability benefits and future medical benefits to the employee. The judgment is reversed in part and the case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Bradley | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Mary Anne Osesk v. Michael W. Osesek
Husband filed a petition to terminate or modify the amount of alimony in futuro he was obligated to pay, asserting that a post-divorce decrease in his income as well as the fact that Wife secured employment after the divorce constituted substantial and material changes in their circumstances which warranted the elimination of or a reduction in the amount of alimony. The trial court held that, while the loss of Husband’s job was not anticipated, there was nota substantialand materialchange of circumstances because Husband had otherassets from which to continue to make the alimony payments; the court accordingly dismissed the petition and awarded Wife her counsel fees. Husband appeals the dismissal of the petition and award of attorney fees to Wife. We affirm the holding that Husband’s assets are available to satisfy his alimony obligation and the award of attorney fees to Wife. We vacate the dismissal of the petition and remand for further consideration. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Leroy Poston
The Defendant-Appellant, James Leroy Poston, was indicted by the Cumberland County Grand Jury for one count of second degree murder. Poston subsequently entered a guilty plea to reckless homicide in the Cumberland County Criminal Court. Pursuant to his plea agreement, Poston received a sentence of two years as a Range I, standard offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Poston argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for an alternative sentence. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of a judgment sentencing Poston to serve his two-year sentence on supervised probation. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stanley A. Gagne v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
Plaintiff brought suit against defendant, his insurance company, claiming a burglary loss. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds the statute of limitations had run, but plaintiff argued that under contract law the statute of limitations is six years. The Trial Court enforced the one-year statute of limitations contained in plaintiff's policy of insurance and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court which held that the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the policy was applicable to this claim. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nickolus L. Johnson
A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Nickolus L. Johnson, of premeditated first degree murder, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2006), for the shooting death of Officer Mark Vance of the Bristol Police Department. Following penalty phase proceedings, the jury found the presence of the following two aggravating circumstances: (1) that thedefendant previously had been convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person; and (2) that the defendant knew or should have known when he committed the murder that the victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (9) (2006). After finding that these aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating factors presented by the defense, the jury sentenced the Defendant to death. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g)(1) (2006). In this appeal, the Defendant challenges both his conviction and accompanying death sentence. He raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence presented during the guilt phase was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether Tennessee’s death penalty statute violates article I, section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution; (3) whether the exclusion of jurors from the jury based on their views on the death penalty violates article I, sections 6 and 19 of the Tennessee Constitution; (4) whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the videotape of the Defendant taken in Officer Graham’s patrol car immediately following the Defendant’s arrest; (5) whether the trial court erred in failing to require defense counsel to present mental health mitigation evidence despite the Defendant’s objection to the presentation of such evidence; (6) whether individual and cumulative instances of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument at the penalty phase denied the Defendant his right to a fair trial and should have resulted in the trial court declaring a mistrial; (7) whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s requests for special jury instructions during the penalty phase in response to the prosecutor’s assertion during closing that the Defendant had failed to express remorse; (8) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s oral motion for a change of venue based on the effect pretrial publicity in the case had on potential jurors; (9) whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s request for authorization of funds with which to hire an expert to support the claim that pretrial publicity in the case required a change of venue in order to protect the Defendant’s right to a fair trial; and (10) whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s request for additional peremptory challenges during jury selection. Following our review of the record, and our mandatory review of the sentence, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1) (2006), we affirm the judgments including the sentence of death. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Garry et al. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Company et al.
In this easement boundary dispute, property owners seek damages against a gas company for trespassing and nuisance. The gas company possesses three separate utility easements for natural gas pipelines on the property at issue, which easements include the right to perform maintenance and other work on the pipelines. When the gas company undertook major repairs to the pipelines in 2006, the property owners filed this action, alleging the gas company exceeded the boundaries of the utility easements and trespassed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the gas company based on the affidavit of an employee of the gas company. We find the affidavit fails to establish the employee’s personal knowledge of material facts stated therein, specifically the boundaries of each easement; accordingly, we reverse and remand. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals |