In Re Frankie V. et al.
Upon petition by the State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services and following a trial, the Putnam County Juvenile Court terminated father’s parental rights to his three minor children. We affirm because there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s decision and because there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Cera B., Kellie B., and Donald B.
In this appeal,the Mother and Father of three children appeal the termination of their parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support. We reverse the termination of parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to support; in all other respects, we affirm the judgment. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Danny A. Stewart v. Derrick D. Schofield, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
We accepted this appeal to clarify the procedures an inmate must follow to dispute the determination of parole eligibility when the inmate is serving consecutive determinate sentences imposed pursuant to the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (“1989 Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-101 to -505 (2010 & Supp. 2011). We clarify that the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) governs an inmate’s challenge to the Tennessee Department of Correction’s (“TDOC”) calculation of a release eligibility date. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-101 to -325 (2011). Under the UAPA, an inmate must request a declaratory order from TDOC before filing a declaratory action in court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225(b). Petitioner failed to seek a declaratory order from TDOC; thus, the trial court properly dismissed his petition for common law writ of certiorari naming TDOC and TDOC officials. The UAPA does not govern an inmate’s challenge to a decision of the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (“Board”) concerning parole. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-106(c). Rather, the petition for common law writ of certiorari is the procedural vehicle for bringing such challenges. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101 (2000). While Petitioner also named the Board and Board officials in his petition for common law writ of certiorari, the trial court properly granted their motions to dismiss because the allegations of the petition fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The method for calculating release eligibility and custodial parole discussed in Howell v. State, 569 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1978) is not applicable to inmates sentenced pursuant to the 1989 Act and serving consecutive determinate sentences for parole-eligible offenses. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the chancery court dismissing the petition is reinstated. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Samuel K. Robinson v. Candace Whisman et al.
Former inmate challenged the calculation of his prison sentence, contending the Tennessee Department of Correction erred in failing to award him pretrial jail credit. The orders of judgment TDOC relied upon to calculate the prison sentence apparently did not indicate the inmate had earned pretrial jail credit. The former inmate filed a complaint against individuals employed by the prison and TDOC, contending they violated his constitutional rights and were liable to him for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). The trial court dismissed the former inmate’s complaint because the defendants calculated the former inmate’s sentence based on the judgments as they were required to do by statute. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Dwayne Johnson
A Montgomery County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Antonio Dwayne Johnson, for six counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine and six counts of delivering .5 grams or more of cocaine. Following a jury trial on counts nine and ten of the indictment (alternate theories of selling and delivering .5 grams of cocaine on August 22, 2008) Defendant was found guilty of selling more than .5 grams of cocaine. The remaining counts of the indictment were apparently tried separately. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Multiple Offender to twelve years at 35% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bruce Turner
The Defendant, Bruce Turner, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2010). He was sentenced to twentyfive years’ confinement and community supervision for life. On appeal, he contends (1) that he did not receive a unanimous jury verdict and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify about a sexual assault that occurred in Louisiana; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to testify that she saw a handgun in the Defendant’s bedroom; and (4) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to refer to herself as a hostage. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryan Keith Bradford
The Defendant, Bryan Keith Bradford, appeals from his conviction upon his guilty plea for robbery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-401 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years’ incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying him a community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rachel Leigh Jessie
Defendant, Rachel Leigh Jessie, was indicted by the Carroll County Grand Jury in a seven count indictment for two counts of selling Methylendioxymethamphetamine (MDMA or “Ecstasy”), a Schedule 1 controlled substance; one count of selling 13.5 grams of marijuana; and four counts of selling counterfeit MDMA. Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of selling MDMA, both Class B felonies, and one count of selling marijuana, a Class E felony, with the manner and length of her sentence to be determined by the trial court. The remaining charges were dismissed. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a standard offender to eight years in community corrections after serving one year incarcerated for each of the two counts of selling MDMA, and two years in community corrections after serving 180 days incarcerated for selling marijuana. Defendant’s sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. Defendant appeals her sentences and asserts that the trial court erred by denying a sentence of full probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Charles B. Lehman
Claimant filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission to recover for the wrongful death of his father, a resident of Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute; the Commission awarded damages for loss of consortium, pain and suffering, and medical and funeral expenses. Claimant appeals the amount of damages awarded for loss of consortium and pain and suffering. We affirm the damages awarded for loss of consortium and modify the award of damages for pain and suffering. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Eric A. Martin
A police sergeant stopped a vehicle driven by appellant, Eric A. Martin, for violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-4-110(b), the statute requiring a vehicle license plate to be maintained free from foreign materials and in a clearly legible condition. He then determined that appellant was driving with a revoked driver’s license. A grand jury indicted appellant for driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license and driving on a cancelled, suspended or revoked license, seventh offense. Appellant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license, fifth offense. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to eleven months twenty-nine days and revoked his driver’s license for one year. The trial court suspended all of the sentence except for twenty days and placed appellant on probation. As a condition of the plea agreement, appellant attempted to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law challenging the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-4-110(b). Following our review, we conclude that appellant failed to certify a question of law that is dispositive of the case. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin L. Buford, Sr.
The defendant, Kevin L. Buford, Sr., was found guilty after a jury trial of facilitation of felony murder, a Class A felony, and attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. On appeal, he raises numerous challenges to his convictions and sentencing, including claims that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by failing to suppress his pretrial statements to police; (3) his two convictions should have been merged; and (4) the trial court erred at sentencing by finding him to be a Range II offender, by imposing consecutive sentences, and by giving him excessive sentences on both counts. After a careful review of the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the testimony given by one of the defendant’s accomplices is sufficient to support his convictions and that this testimony is sufficiently corroborated by other evidence. We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because any police misconduct that may have occurred was unintentional and because the statements the defendant made to police were given after the defendant received repeated Miranda warnings and occurred several hours after he was taken into custody. We conclude that double jeopardy principles do not require the merger of the defendant’s two convictions because the statutes under which the defendant was convicted include different elements and therefore punish distinct offenses. Finally, after engaging in de novo review of the defendant’s sentencing, we conclude that the defendant was properly sentenced as a Range II offender,the sentences imposed by the trial court were not excessive, and that the trial court did not err by ordering them to be served consecutively. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of Michael R.O., Jr.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child at issue. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had committed severe child abuse, had been sentenced to prison for the child abuse, and had been sentenced to confinement for more than ten years. The trial court also found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Affirmed |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rebecca Draper and J.C. Draper
The Defendants, Rebecca and J. C. Draper, were each indicted for one count of manufacture of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §1 § 39-17-417(a)(1), - 425(a)(1). The Defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of a search of their manufactured home and backyard. The trial court denied the Defendants’ motion. The Defendants then entered into a plea agreement with the State and reserved a certified question of law for appellate review pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Defendant Rebecca Draper pled nolo contendere to one count of possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days on probation. Defendant J. C. Draper pled guilty to one count of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to three years on probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-433. In this appeal, the Defendants contend that the trial court erred by denying their motion to suppress the evidence against them. Following our review, we reverse, vacate the judgments of the trial court, and dismiss the charges. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward L. Baird
Appellant, Edward L. Baird, entered guilty pleas without recommended sentences to three felony offenses involving distribution of controlled substances. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered appellant to serve an effective sentence of ten years in confinement. Appellant contests the manner of service of his sentence, arguing that the trial court should have ordered split confinement. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Fred Ratliff, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
In February 2011, the Petitioner, Fred Ratliff, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, wherein he challenged his 1976 conviction for first degree murder. The Petitioner claimed that he had “compelling” new evidence of his innocence because the State failed to disclose a key prosecution witness’s juvenile record in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court first dismissed the petition as time-barred, finding that due process did not require tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. Then, addressing the merits of the Petitioner’s Brady claim, the coram nobis court concluded that the Petitioner had not shown that the new evidence may have resulted in a different judgment had it been presented at trial. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Scott County Circuit Court. |
Scott | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andre Dotson v. Contemporary Media, Inc., d/b/a The Memphis Flyer, and John Branston
This is a libelous defamation case that was dismissed on grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees, a newspaper and its reporter. Appellant, who was a then-incarcerated inmate, filed the instant lawsuit, purportedly in forma pauperis. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on grounds that: (1) Appellant’s failure to pay all fees and costs in other lawsuits, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 41-21-812, required dismissal of the lawsuit; (2) Appellant could not renounce his indigency in order to avoid the operation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 41-21-812; (3) Appellant failed to issue service of process on the newspaper, thus requiring dismissal of this Defendant/Appellee; (4) the allegedly defamatory statement was protected by the fair reporting privilege. After review, we hold that: (1) because there is no Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 29 uniform affidavit of indigency in this record, we cannot conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 41-21-812 was triggered; (2) having failed to establish in the record that he was, in fact, proceeding as a pauper in this case, Appellant’s attempt to renounce his indigency was a nullity; (3) Appellee newspaper was properly dismissed from the lawsuit for lack of service of process; and (4) it was error for the trial court to rule on the motion for summary judgment without first lifting the stay on discovery to allow Appellant to conduct discovery. Vacated in part, reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Hannah Ann Culbertson v. Randall Eric Culbertson
This extraordinary appeal arises from the trial court’s order granting Wife’s motion for disclosure of Husband’s psychological records. After thorough consideration, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to consider Husband’s claims that his psychological records were protected from disclosure by the psychologist-client privilege, and that he did not waive the privilege. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Petschonek v. The Catholic Diocese of Memphis, et al.
Defendant employer moved for summary judgment in this common law retaliatory discharge action on the grounds that Plaintiff employee was not an employee-at-will and that Plaintiff had failed to identify any law or clear public policy allegedly violated by Defendant. The trial court denied the motion. We granted permission for interlocutory appeal. On appeal, Defendant raises the issue of whether the courts lack jurisdiction under the ministerial exception. We hold that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. We also hold that Plaintiff was not an at-will employee, and therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of common law retaliatory discharge. The trial court’s judgment denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is reversed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Petschonek v. The Catholic Diocese of Memphis, et al. - Separate Concurrence
I concur with the majority opinion in this case, and submit this separate concurrence only to make an additional point. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Justin Parliment
The defendant, Justin Parliment, appeals from his Hickman County Circuit Court jury conviction of possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution, see T.C.A. § 39-16201(b)(2) (2006), claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for the marijuana introduced into evidence, that the fine imposed bythe jury is excessive, and that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randy Bray v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Randy Bray, appeals from the Grundy County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After trial, a jury convicted him of two counts of first degree premeditated murder. In this appeal, Bray argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to file motions to suppress (1) a shotgun, (2) his statement to police, and (3) a 911 call. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v Antonio D. Alexander
The Defendant-Appellant,Antonio D.Alexander,was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of attempted aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, second degree murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon. The jury sentenced Alexander to life without the possibility of parole for the first degree felony murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced him to a consecutive ninety-year sentence for the remaining convictions. On appeal, Alexander argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the jury erred in unanimously finding the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the aggravating circumstance that “[t]he defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim murdered, during the act of murder”; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Toney Jason Hale v. State of Tennessee
In 2004, the petitioner, Toney Jason Hale, pled guilty before the Bedford County Circuit Court to three counts of automobile burglary, a Class E felony. He received an effective sentence of three years as a Range I, standard offender, to be served consecutively to a previously imposed Marshall County sentence. Seven years later, in 2011, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that his convictions violated double jeopardy protections. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition after a hearing. The petitioner argues on appeal that the court erred in denying him relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James R. Oliphant v. The State of Tennessee
This common law writ of certiorari was filed by an inmate, who asserted that the parole board violated his rights by returning him to jail for violating his parole. The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice because the inmate failed to pay any portion of the initial filing fee or to issue a summons to the parole board. Affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dawn Louise Burnett v. Dennis Ervin Burnett
This case involves the sufficiency of notice given to an incarcerated party in a divorce proceeding. Wife filed for divorce and sent Husband notice of a hearing for approval of Wife’s temporary parenting plan. Although Father was not present at the hearing, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce in favor of Wife, assigning the majority of the marital debt to Husband. Husband appealed, asserting that he was not properly notified that the hearing would concern issues other than a temporary parenting plan. Vacated and remanded. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals |