Douglas Stogner v. Roseann Stogner (Sullivan)
In this post-divorce proceeding, Mother appeals the trial court’s order enjoining the parties from allowing their child to be in the presence of a friend of Mother’s. Father appeals the trial court’s calculation of the number of days he exercises parenting time for purposes of determining his child support. Finding that the court erred in its calculation of the number of days of Father’s parenting time, we vacate the award of child support and remand for a redetermination. We affirm the trial court’s issuance of the injunction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandi Nichole Miller
The defendant, Brandi Nichole Miller, appeals the revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her original twelve-year sentence, arguing: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation; (2) that her due process rights were violated by the fact that the trial court relied on grounds that had formed the bases for her prior probation revocations and were not alleged in the instant revocation warrant; and (3) that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve sentences that had already expired. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the defendant’s probation and reinstating her twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Franklyn Nathaniel Morgan v. Kandi Tonyelle Morgan
Franklyn Nathaniel Morgan (“Father”) filed this divorce action after his spouse, Kandi Tonyelle Morgan (“Mother”), was hospitalized because she had ingested an overdose of medication. Father was given temporary custody of the parties’ daughter who was four years old when the parties separated. Mother then obtained temporary custody based on proof that the Father allowed the marital residence to become filthy and dangerous. After a hearing, the court entered a temporary parenting plan based on “week-about” parenting. After a trial, the court made Mother the primary residential parent during the school year and Father the primary residential parent during the summer. The court also awarded Father parenting time during the spring break and two-thirds of the Christmas break. The court further ordered that Father would pick up the child after school and exercise parenting time from then until he went to work at 6:00 p.m. on his workdays, or until 7:00 p.m., when Mother got off from work on her workdays. Mother had 252 parenting days and Father had 113. The court set Father’s child support according to the Child Support Guidelines (“the Guidelines”), but allowed Father a downward deviation of $30 per month based on the extra parenting time after school, which the court found was not taken into account by the Guidelines. Mother appeals. We modify the judgment to designate Mother the sole primary residential parent. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Emily N.I., et. al.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Teresa O. and Harrison O. Teresa O. was the mother of three children, while Harrison O. was the father of two of those children. The trial court terminated Teresa O.'s parental rights to all three children and terminated Harrison O.'s parental rights to his two children. Teresa O. and Harrions O. appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Ardell Hamilton Trigg
In this case, we address the following two matters: (1) the proper procedure for obtaining appellate review of a judgment of a probate court created by private act upholding a claim filed by the Bureau of TennCare against the estate of a TennCare recipient and (2) the right of TennCare to obtain reimbursement for properlypaid TennCare benefits from real property owned by the recipient at the time of her death. After the decedent’s will was admitted to probate in the Putnam County Probate Court, TennCare filed a claim against her estate seeking reimbursement for services provided through theTennCare program. The decedent’s personal representative filed an exception to this claim. After the probate court upheld TennCare’s claim, the estate appealed to the Circuit Court for Putnam County. The circuit court determined that the decedent’s real property was not subject to TennCare’s claim, and TennCare appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal from the probate court and that the appeal should have been filed with the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, it vacated the circuit court’s judgment and affirmed the judgment of the probate court. In re Estate of Trigg, No. M200902107-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 497459, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011). We granted the estate’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the estate’s appeal from the probate court’s order upholding TennCare’s claim and whether real property owned by the recipient at the time of her death is subject to TennCare’s claims. We have determined that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the estate’s appeal from the probate court’s judgment regarding TennCare’s disputed claim and that the real property owned by the decedent at the time of her death is subject to TennCare’s claims for reimbursement. |
Putnam | Supreme Court | |
Donna Clark v. Sputniks, LLC et al.
In these consolidated cases, the primary issue is whether there is liability insurance coverage for the plaintiffs’ injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of the insured’s bar and restaurant. The insurer denied coverage and declined to defend the insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. We hold that based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there is no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there is no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage. We further hold that estoppel by judgment does not apply to collaterally estop the insurer from arguing the lack of coverage. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
Leonard Gamble v. Sputniks, LLC et al.
In these consolidated cases, the primary issue is whether there is liability insurance coverage for the plaintiffs’ injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of the insured’s bar and restaurant. The insurer denied coverage and declined to defend the insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. We hold that based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there is no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there is no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage. We further hold that estoppel by judgment does not apply to collaterally estop the insurer from arguing the lack of coverage. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandi Nichole Miller
The defendant, Brandi Nichole Miller, appeals the revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her original twelve-year sentence, arguing: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation; (2) that her due process rights were violated by the fact that the trial court relied on grounds that had formed the bases for her prior probation revocations and were not alleged in the instant revocation warrant; and (3) that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve sentences that had already expired. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the defendant’s probation and reinstating her twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction. |
Giles | General Sessions Courts | |
Leslie Raydell Jones v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Leslie Raydell Jones, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth E. Diggs v. LaSalle National Bank Association, et al.
This is an appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court found that the Appellant’s claim sounded in fraud. However, the trial court ruled that the Appellant failed to plead fraud with particularity and dismissed. Affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan Lawrence v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jonathan Lawrence, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated robbery, and resulting effective sentence of twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not plead guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jamiel D. Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jamiel D. Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barry D. McCoy
In this interlocutory appeal by the State, the State challenges the trial court’s ruling denying the State’s request to admit into evidence at trial the video-recorded interview of the minor victim pursuant to newly-enacted Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123. Because the trial court erred by reaching the constitutional question before it was ripe for review, the ruling of the trial court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Consumer Advocate & Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General of Tennessee v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority
This is an appeal from an order of the Tennessee RegulatoryAuthority(“TRA”). The appeal was filed by the Consumer Advocate and Protection Division of the Office of Tennessee’s Attorney General. It challenges the TRA’s authority to allow a gas company to recover attorney fees that were incurred in a proceeding before the TRA that did not involve ratemaking, and the TRA’s authority to order that the attorney fees be recovered from asset management funds. We conclude that the TRA has the authority to order that such litigation fees be recovered as any other reasonable and prudent operating expense of the utility, and that the TRA acted within its authority in ordering that the fees be paid out of asset management funds. The TRA’s decision, therefore, is affirmed. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Janice Lacroix, et al. v. L.W. Matteson, Inc., et al.
Deceased, a resident of Iowa, an employee of plaintiff, delivered materials to the State of Tennessee, and while the materials were being unloaded sustained injuries which resulted in his death, which arose out of the course and scope of his employment. His widow could claim benefits either under the Iowa worker's compensation laws or the State of Tennessee worker's compensation laws, which contain essentially similar provisions. The widow claimed benefits under the Iowa worker's compensation law, and the employer under both laws was entitled to seek subrogation recovery for benefits paid from the alleged third party tort feasors. The State of Iowa would not have jurisdiction over some of the alleged tort feasors, and the employer brought his subrogation action in the State of Tennessee under the Tennessee worker's compensation statutes. Defendants moved for summary judgment and the Trial Court concluded that since the claimant elected to sue under the Iowa worker's compensation statutory scheme, that the employer could not rely on the Tennessee worker's compensation statutes to maintain its action in Tennessee, and dismissed plaintiffs' action. On appeal, we hold that the employer was entitled to employ the Tennessee worker's compensation statute in an effort to recover subrogation benefits against the third party tort feasors. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Hubert Glenn Sexton
The defendant, tried and convicted of two counts of first degree murder, was sentenced to death for each offense. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. In our review, we have found that the trial court erred by admitting detailed evidence of a prior claim of child sex abuse and by allowing references to the defendant’s refusal to submit to a polygraph examination. Further, the record demonstrates several instances of prosecutorial misconduct during the opening statement and during the final arguments of both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Because, however, the defendant admitted to at least three witnesses that he committed the murders and the evidence of guilt was otherwise overwhelming, the errors had no effect on the verdicts rendered at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial. Each of the convictions is, therefore, affirmed. Nevertheless, because certain of the inadmissible evidence was particularly inflammatory and the prosecution made several inappropriate comments, the sentences of death must be set aside. The Court of Criminal Appeals is, in consequence, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cause is remanded to the trial court for new sentencing hearings. |
Scott | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Johnny J.E.M.
This is a termination of parental rights case with respect to Johnny J.E.M. (“the Child”), the minor son of Amanda M. (“Mother”) and Joshua D. (“Father”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the Child from Mother’s home as a result of “serious environmental neglect.” The Child was adjudicated dependent and neglected in Mother’s care; he had no relationship with Father, who was serving a lengthy prison sentence throughout these proceedings. After taking the Child into custody, DCS soon placed him with Janice M. (“Foster Aunt”) and her husband, Sonny M. (collectively “Foster Parents”), the prospective adoptive parents, where he remained for a year and a half before DCS sought to permanently sever the rights of the biological parents to the Child. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition to terminate based on its dual findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination were established as to both parents, and that termination was in the best interest of the Child. Mother and Father, represented by separate counsel, appeal. We affirm. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Al H. Thomas, on Behalf of Himself and the Citizens and Taxpayers of the City of Memphis v. Joseph Lee, III, Robert L. J. Spence, Jr., and Halbert E. Dockins, Jr.
This appeal involves a lawsuit by a taxpayer. The taxpayer filed this action on behalf of the citizens of the municipality to prevent a disputed disbursement of funds, naming as defendants the municipality, the municipality’s utility district, and three private citizens. By the time the initial hearing in this matter took place, the only defendants who remained in the suit were the three private citizens. Finding that the taxpayer lacked standing to pursue this action, the trial court dismissed the case. The taxpayer then filed a motion to alter or amend, seeking to continue to pursue the lawsuit, pursuant to Bennett v. Stutts, 521 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn. 1975). The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend. The taxpayer appeals. We affirm, finding the exception in Bennett v. Stutts inapplicable. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronnie Summey v. Monroe County Department of Education, et al.
This appeal arises from an employment dispute between Ronnie Summey (“Summey”) and the Monroe County Board of Education (“the Board”). Summey worked as head football coach and as a teacher at Sequoyah High School (“Sequoyah”) in Monroe County. Summey sued the Board in the Chancery Court for Monroe County (“the Trial Court”), alleging, among other things, breach of contract and violation of various constitutional rights stemming from when Summey was relieved as head coach and offered a new assignment in the school system. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Board, finding that it was Summey who had breached the contract when he refused to accept the new assignment. Summey appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Rain and Hail, Inc. v. Craig A. Stewart
Rain and Hail, Inc. (“the plaintiff”) obtained a judgment in the state of Iowa against Craig A. Stewart (“the defendant”). The plaintiff filed this present action to register and enforce the foreign judgment in Tennessee, where the defendant resides. The defendant denied being served with a copy of the complaint in Iowa. The court set a hearing date at which neither the plaintiff nor its counsel appeared. The plaintiff’s counsel advised the court that it would submit the matter on the papers it had filed in support of its position. The court dismissed the action with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Maurice Johnson
The defendant, Maurice Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of rape, a Class B felony. He was subsequently sentenced, as a Range II offender, to twenty years in the Department of Correction, to be served at 100%. On appeal, he raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record before us, we find no error and affirm the conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Wiggins
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Robert Wiggins, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of eighteen years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony regarding the perpetrator’s cellular telephone number. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Delawrence Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Delawrence Williams, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that: (1) prior to trial, his counsel did not inform him of the possibility of consecutive sentencing and (2) his counsel failed to research and sufficiently argue against the imposition of consecutive sentences at his sentencing hearing. Because the petitioner has not shown deficiency by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm the denial of the post-conviction petition. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael J. D'Alessandro v. Lake Developers, II, LLC
In 2005, Plaintiff purchased a subdivision lot believing it could later be traded toward the purchase of a condominium. Because no condominiums had been built by 2010, Plaintiff filed suit, seeking to rescind the sale and to recover damages. The trial court rescinded the warranty deed and awarded Plaintiff a return of the purchase price, plus city and county taxes paid and prejudgment interest from the filing of his complaint. Finding no failure of consideration, we reverse the trial court’s rescission of the warranty deed and its damage awards. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s breach of warranty, negligent misrepresentation, promissory fraud, and Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims. All remaining issues are deemed either waived or pretermitted. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brenda Whitesides
The Defendant, Brenda Whitesides, pled guilty to violating the habitual motor vehicle offender law, driving on a revoked license, and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court merged the Defendant’s convictions for driving on a revoked license and violating the habitual motor vehicle offender law and then sentenced her to five years of probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant that alleged that she had violated the terms of her probation by failing to report and by moving out of the State. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve her sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly based its revocation finding on considerations that were not presented by the warrant or supported by the facts adduced at the hearing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals |