Tennessee Department of Health and the Division of Health Related Boards v. Kandala Chary, et al
The Tennessee Department of Health appeals from the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to four doctors following the dismissal of its administrative action against the doctors. Following a contested case hearing in which all material facts were stipulated, the Board of Medical Examiners dismissed all charges upon the finding that “the Department had not proven facts sufficient to establish that Respondent[s] violated Tenn.Code Ann.§§ 63-6-101 et seq., 63-6-214, and Tenn Comp. R. [and] Regs.” When the Department did not seek judicial review of the dismissal, the doctors requested and were awarded their attorneys’ fees and costs. The Department then filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the award. The chancery court affirmed the award and this appeal followed. Finding there is substantial and material evidence to support the administrative law judge’s decision to award the attorneys’ fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-325, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Keith A. Davis v. Shaw Industries Group, Inc. et al
Plaintiff was terminated from his at-will employment for violating company policy by allegedly lying during an investigation into whether he was involved in a romantic relationship with a human resources manager. Plaintiff filed this action against his former supervisor, and his former employer, for intentional interference with his employment. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that, as a matter of law, the corporate employer cannot be held liable for intentionally interfering with its own employment contracts, and that the undisputed facts established the supervisor did not act outside the scope of his authority in assisting in the investigation; thus, he could not be held liable. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion. We affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Jackie Perry v. Lennox Hearth Products
An employee alleged that he suffered a work-related hearing loss. After finding that the employee established a compensable injury, the trial court awarded 40% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee suffered a compensable injury. Alternatively, the employer contends that the award was excessive. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Quincy Deangelo Gardner v. State of Tennessee
Quincy Deangelo Gardner ("the Petitioner") filed for post-conviction relief from his conviction of first degree felony murder, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Carrigan v. Davenport Towing and Recovery Services, LLC, et al.
In this workers’ compensation action, the employee alleged that he sustained a compensable injury to his lower back while using a sledge hammer. He had injured his back in a similar manner a year earlier, and his employer asserted that the earlier event was the cause of the employee’s symptoms and need for additional medical treatment. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and awarded additional temporary and permanent disability benefits. The employer has appealed, challenging both the temporary and permanent disability benefits awarded. The employee raises two additional issues: the adequacy of the vocational disability award and the trial court’s decision not to award certain discretionary costs. We reverse the trial court’s decision not to award the employee each of the discretionary costs requested; we affirm judgment of the trial court in all other respects. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Alonzo W. Howard
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee reported to his employer that he had sustained bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of his work activities. The employer provided the employee with medical treatment. After the parties reached an impasse at the benefit review conference, the employer filed a petition seeking a determination of whether the employee was entitled to additional workers’ compensation benefits. The employee’s pre-trial motion to compel discovery was denied by the trial court. At trial, both sides presented expert medical evidence to support their positions as to the cause and nature of the employee’s condition. The trial court denied the employee’s claim, accrediting the testimony of the employer’s expert witness that the employee did not suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome and that his symptoms did not arise out of or occur in the course and scope of his employment. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to compel discovery and in accrediting the testimony of the employer’s expert witness. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Vaughn
The Defendant, Donald Vaughn, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-502. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of forty-eight years, to be served at 100%. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; (2) that his guilty pleas were not valid because the State failed to prove an essential element of the offense; and (3) that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review, we conclude that these issues are without merit and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Jaiden C.W. and Caiden J.W.
This is the second appeal of this case, involving the issue of child support and arrears. In In re Jaiden C.W., No. M2010-01105-COA-R3-JV, 2011 WL 2306057 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2011), this Court vacated the trial court’s determination of Appellant Father’s child support obligation because the trial court did not base its determination on Father’s actual income. Upon remand, the trial court interpreted the law of the case to limit its review only to Father’s income,and to negate any consideration of other variables affecting child support. Because the trial court misinterpreted the law of the case to limit its review of the parties’ actual circumstances, we vacate the order on child support and remand for reconsideration. Vacated and remanded. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Paul J. Frankenberg, III v. River City Resort, Inc., et al
The former president and chief operating officer of a corporation brought this action against the corporation and its CEO, alleging that Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-13-101, which grants “employees and laborers of any corporation . . . a lien upon the corporate and firm property . . . for any sums due them for labor and service performed for the corporation,” provided him a lien in the amount of his alleged unpaid bonus and severance payments. The trial court dismissed the statutory lien claim, holding that the claimant was not included in the statutory definition of “employee.” The claimant has appealed. We hold that the Supreme Court’s ruling in State ex rel. McConnell v. People’s Bank & Trust Co., 296 S.W. 12 (Tenn. 1927) that a corporation’s “managing officers” are not “employees” as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-13-101 controls. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Sylvia Susana Marquez v. Pedro Marquez
This appeal arises from a post-divorce dispute over custody of five children. Sylvia Susana Marquez (“Mother”) and Pedro Marquez (“Father”), divorced in 2003, are mother and father of the five minor children (“the Children,” collectively). Father was designated the primary residential parent of the Children. Mother filed a petition in the Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) to modify the parenting plan and for emergency custody based on allegations of violence involving Father. In her petition, Mother also argued that a material change of circumstances had occurred such as to justify her being designated the primary residential parent of the Children. The Trial Court found an emergency had arisen and awarded temporary emergency custody of the Children to Mother. Later, after a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order restoring custody to Father after stating that the emergency had been “removed by [Father].” Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Morris L. Marsh v. NECX Disciplinary Board, et al
The order from which the pro se incarcerated appellant, Morris L. Marsh, seeks to appeal was entered on November 28, 2012. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the November 28, 2012 order, even considering the date upon which the appellant placed the Notice of Appeal in the mail for filing with the trial court clerk (February 10, 2013). See Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g). Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Mackenzy Ruth Murdock, et al. v. Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center, et al
After a defense verdict in this medical malpractice case, the plaintiffs filed a motion asking the trial court, sitting as the thirteenth juror, to determine that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and grant them a new trial. The court denied the motion. The plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court’s remarks from the bench show that it did not properly perform its role as the thirteenth juror. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Hazel N. Ledford
Hazel N. Ledford died on June 22, 1991. Her will (“the Will”) was a joint holographic one made with her husband, Wilson A. Ledford, who predeceased her. Her stepdaughter, Martha Ledford Powell, became the sole personal representative (“the Personal Representative”) and executor of her stepmother’s estate (“the Estate”). The Will was admitted to probate in July 1991, but the Personal Representative did not file her first accounting until 2009. The final accounting was filed in February 2010. The final accounting revealed that the Estate had paid approximately $350,000 toward remediation of soil contamination caused by underground petroleum storage tanks (“the USTs”) on a parcel of land Mr. Ledford conveyed before his death to a family trust. While Mrs. Ledford was never a title owner of the property, she did join in the execution of the deed to the trust. The Will left a portion of Mrs. Ledford’s residuary estate to a charitable trust. The charitable trust and the Tennessee Attorney General (sometimes referred to collectively as “the Objectors”) objected to the final accounting on the ground that the remediation payments were not a proper expense of the Estate. The court denied the objections and approved the final accounting. The court also approved, in part, the Personal Representative’s request for attorney’s fees. The Objectors appeal. We reverse. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Lue Holcomb v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Lue Holcomb, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that his discovery of a written statement containing the victim’s recantation of her allegations against him constitutes newly discovered evidence of his innocence of aggravated assault. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Alysia M. S.
A couple who had cared for a minor child filed a petition alleging that the child was dependent and neglected. The juvenile court awarded the couple temporary custody, and after finding that the child was dependent and neglected, directed custody to remain with the couple. Mother appealed. Grandparents filed an intervening petition. After a trial de novo, the circuit court found that the child was not dependent and neglected, dismissed both petitions, and directed the juvenile court to implement Mother and child’s reunification. The couple appealed. Discerning no error and finding no clear and convincing evidence of dependence and neglect, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jamie Dickerson, et al v. Rutherford County, Tennessee
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s award of summary judgment to Rutherford County on the basis of foreseeability and comparative fault in this negligence action under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Stanley Franklin v. Vought Aircraft Industries, Inc. et al.
After the employee sustained a compensable injury to his low back which required surgery, he returned to work. The company for which he worked was sold to another entity after the date of injury but before the employee’s return to work. At trial, both parties agreed that the one and one-half times multiplier cap did not apply because the sale of the company was a “loss of employment” for the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6241(d). At trial, the employee was awarded 78% permanent partial disability, the maximum permitted under law, based on an anatomical rating of 13%. The employer has appealed and is contending that the award is excessive. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Smith | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Carl Bohannan v. Expedited Transport Associates, Inc. et al.
In this workers’ compensation appeal, the employee, a truck driver, alleged that he injured his right shoulder and low back when his tractor-trailer overturned. His employer stipulated that the shoulder injury was compensable, but denied that he had sustained a permanent back injury. Instead, the employer contended that the employee’s back symptoms were the result of a previous back injury, which had been the subject of a previous workers’ compensation claim and settlement. The trial court determined that the employee had suffered a new, compensable back injury and was permanently and totally disabled. The trial court apportioned 80% of the liability for the award to the employer and 20% to the Second Injury Fund. Employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that a new, compensable back injury occurred. In the alternative, it argues that the trial court incorrectly apportioned the award. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Todd Crittenden
The Defendant, Joshua Todd Crittenden, was convicted by a Blount County Circuit Court jury of two counts of robbery, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-13-401 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to consecutive ten-year terms of confinement for an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela Ingram v. Heads Up Hair Cutting Center
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. The employee alleged she sustained a gradual injury to her cervical spine as a result of her job. Her employer denied her condition was work-related and contended that her claim was barred by her failure to provide timely notice of her claim and the operation of the statute of limitations. The employer also argued subsequent employers were liable per the last injurious injury rule. The trial court found for the employee and awarded benefits. On the employer’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court held that the employee’s award was capped at one and one-half times the anatomical impairment rate pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1). The employer appeals, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning compensability and the statute of limitations. The employee asserts the trial court erred by capping her disability award. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Quinzell Grasty
A Hamilton County jury convicted appellant, Quinzell Grasty, of felony murder, second degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction and sentenced appellant to serve a life sentence for felony murder. The trial court also sentenced appellant to serve eight years for attempted especially aggravated robbery and three years for aggravated burglary, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to police, by admitting photographs of the victim and a recording of the 9-1-1 call, by failing to redact references to appellant’s gang affiliation from his statement, and by admitting demonstrative evidence in the form of a shotgun purported to be similar to the weapon used in the murder. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric Grier v. Alstom Power, Inc.
This appeal arises from a dispute over post-settlement medical care. The employee alleged that he developed asthma as a result of exposure to welding fumes in the workplace. The employee and employer settled the workers’ compensation claim. The trial court’s order approving the parties’ settlement provided that the employer would pay employee permanent partial disability benefits and provide future medical care “for the work related injury described” in the order. The trial court also designated Dr. Robert Younger III as the treating physician. Following the settlement, a dispute arose between the parties regarding payment for Dr. Younger’s treatment. The employer refused to pay for continuing treatment for the employee’s asthma because he was no longer exposed to welding fumes. The employee sought to require the employer to pay for the medical treatment Dr. Younger provided. After reviewing the medical proof submitted by the parties, the trial court ordered the employer to pay for Dr. Younger’s recommended treatment. The employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Michael Young v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Michael Young, pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery in exchange for an effective forty-year sentence. Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress petitioner’s statement to police based on his being a juvenile and by failing to ensure that petitioner understood the sentence alignment included in the plea agreement. He also contends that his guilty plea was rendered involuntary because of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenner D. Ensey v. Karla Davis, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development et al
Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision upholding the decision of the designee of the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, which denied appellant unemployment benefits. We reverse, finding that, while appellant did quit his job voluntarily, he had good cause for doing so. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffery Gaylon Douglas v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jeffery Gaylon Douglas, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his convictions for rape and sexual battery on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing, finding that the Petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by improperly advising him to testify at his trial. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |