Kala Shay Hunn v. Kevin Carlton Hunn
In this divorce proceeding,Father appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Finding no error, we affirm. Additionally, we grant Mother her attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Brad Blevins v. City of Belle Meade, Tennessee by and Through Its Board of Zoning Appeals
After receiving a stop-work order, a property owner petitioned the City of Belle Meade Board of Zoning Appeals for a declaration that a nearly completed structure on his property constituted an accessory use as a children’s playhouse under the city’s zoning code. After a hearing, the Board denied the request and the property owner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking court review; the trial court affirmed the Board’s denial. We concur with the trial court and affirm the Board’s action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Morris Wayne Adcock
Defendant-Appellant, Morris Wayne Adcock, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for aggravated assault and domestic assault. A jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of simple assault and the charged offense of domestic assault, Class A misdemeanors. The trial court merged the simple assault conviction with the domestic assault conviction and sentenced Adcock to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail. On appeal, Adcock argues: (1) the trial court erred in failing to rule on the defense’s objection to one of the prosecutor’s questions to Joshua Jernigan; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; (3) the cumulative effect of the errors entitles him to relief; and (4) his sentence is excessive. Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christine Stevens ex rel. Mark Stevens v. Hickman Community Health Care Services, Inc. et al.
More than sixty days before filing suit, the plaintiff gave written notice to the potential defendants of her healthcare liability claim against them. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) (2012) requires that a plaintiff’s pre-suit notice include a HIPAA compliant medical authorization that permits the healthcare provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from every other provider that is being sent a notice. Contrary to the statute, the plaintiff provided a non-HIPAA compliant medical authorization that only permitted the release of medical records to plaintiff’s counsel. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on noncompliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court denied the motion, ruling that plaintiff’s noncompliance was excused by extraordinary cause. We hold that the plaintiff was required to substantially comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) and failed to do so, and that her failure to comply is not excused by extraordinary cause. We dismiss the plaintiff’s case without prejudice. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
Christine Stevens ex rel. Mark Stevens v. Hickman Community Health Care Services, Inc. et al. - CONCUR AND DISSENT
On April 11, 2011, Christine Stevens (the “Plaintiff”) provided written notice to Hickman Community Health Care Services, Inc., Elite Emergency Services, LLC, and Halford Whitaker, M.D. (collectively, the “Defendants”), advising each of them of her potential health care liability claim based upon their negligent treatment of her late husband, Mark Stevens. As required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(A)–(D) (Supp. 2011), the Plaintiff’s notice included the full name and date of birth of the Plaintiff’s late husband; the contact information for the Plaintiff; the name and address of the Plaintiff’s counsel; and a list of the names and addresses of all providers being sent a notice. The notice also included a medical authorization form intended to allow each of the Defendants to access the medical records in the possession of the other Defendants, as is required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The medical authorization form, however, was not fully compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Keenan Scott McNeal
The Defendant, Keenan Scott McNeal, was convicted by a Blount County jury of possession of 0.5 grams or more of a substance ontaining cocaine with intent to sell or distribute within 1,000 feet of a child care facility, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. Upon our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cynthia J. Finch
The Defendant, Cynthia J. Finch, was indicted for one count of fabricating evidence, a Class C felony; one count of forgery of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and one count of forgery of less than $1,000, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-105, -14-114, -16-503. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was acquitted of the fabricating evidence count and convicted of the two forgery counts. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years to be served on unsupervised probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the statute allowing a district attorney general to specially appoint the attorney general and reporter to conduct specific criminal proceedings violates the Tennessee Constitution; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions; (3) that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of a settlement in a civil lawsuit between the Defendant and Knox County; (4) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to its definition of “value” and in denying the Defendant’s request for an instruction on the rule of cancellation; (5) that the State abused its discretion in denying the Defendant’s request for pretrial diversion; (6) that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion; and (7) that the trial court erred in its determination that the Defendant was not an especially mitigated offender. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stanley Rooks
Appellant, Stanley Rooks, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-four years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the identification by the victim was not reliable. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Quamine Jones v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Quamine Jones, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder by a Shelby County jury. See State v. Quamine Jones, No. W2007-01111-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4963516, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Jackson, Nov. 21, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2009). Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the supreme court denied permission to appeal. Id. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals, challenging the denial of post-conviction relief. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the record preponderates against the post-conviction court’s findings. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cynthia J. Finch - concurring and dissenting
I concur with the majority opinion in all respects save one. I believe the Defendant should have been granted judicial diversion, given the circumstances of this case, the Defendant’s excellent background, and the circumstances existing in Knox County relative to official misconduct and the granting of diversion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth Kay Tomes v. Michael Joe Tomes
In this divorce case, Wife appeals the trial court’s determination that she was not entitled to an award of alimony. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award alimony and affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Dexter F. Johnson v. State of Tennessee
In 1994, the Petitioner, Dexter F. Johnson, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of attempted aggravated burglary. The Petitioner pled guilty in an agreement that provided that he would receive a life sentence for the two first degree murder convictions, twenty-five years for the attempted first degree murder conviction, and six years for the attempted aggravated burglary conviction. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed four unsuccessful petitions for habeas corpus relief. See Dexter F. Johnson v. Carlton, Warden, E2008-02032-CCA-R3-HC, 2010 WL 323126 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 27, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 30, 2010). The Petitioner then filed a fifth petition for habeas corpus relief, which the habeas corpus court summarily dismissed. The Petitioner appeals, contending that the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition because the State’s motion to dismiss did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-116, as the State did not attach a judgment form or indictment to the motion to dismiss. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
1963 Jackson, Inc., et al. v. Lloyd De Vos, et al.
This appeal arises from Lessee’s rental and operation of a hotel owned by Lessor. Lessee sought Lessor’s consent to an assignment of the lease to a third party. Not only did Lessor withhold consent to the assignment, Lessor terminated the lease based on conditions at the hotel that he deemed to violate the lease. Lessee sued alleging that Lessor wrongfully terminated the lease and unreasonably withheld consent to the assignment. The trial court determined that Lessee had not breached the lease and that Lessor unreasonably withheld consent to the assignment. The trial court awarded Lessee $150,000 in damages for Lessor’s unreasonable withholding of consent to the assignment. Lessor appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennesse v. Willie Gatewood
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Willie Gatewood, of attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to fifty-five years for the attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder conviction and to thirteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we discern no error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennesse v. Cleo Henderson
Appellant, Cleo Henderson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, violent offender to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant has presented several issues that we have deemed waived; however, we have reviewed his sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing issues. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Louis Mayes v. State of Tennessee
In 2006, the Petitioner, Louis Mayes, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. State v. Louis Mayes, No. W2007-02483-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1312629, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2009). In 2013, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in which he presented multiple claims, including his right to a hearing to present newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition on the basis that the petition was timebarred. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the coram nobis court erred when it dismissed his petition, contending that the newly discovered evidence warrants a waiver of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert E. Bonds Peeples v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert E. Bonds Peeples, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to secure an expert witness to testify regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Artist Building Partners and Howard Caughron v. Auto-Owners Mutual Insurance Company
This appeal involves a dispute between an insurer and its insured following a fire loss at a commercial building. The case was resolved by a series of motions for partial summary judgment. The issues on appeal involve the amount of damages owed by the insurer for the insured’s lost business income during the period of restoration of the building following the fire. The insurer relies upon two separate provisions of the insurance policy to argue that its obligation to pay for lost business income was limited to either six or, at most, twelve months. The trial court denied the insurer’s motions for partial summary judgment and granted the motions for partial summary judgment filed by the insured, holding that the insurer’s obligation to pay was not limited to either a six-month or a twelve-month period. The insurer appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth E. King v. Anderson County, Tennessee
We granted permission to appeal in this case to decide whether, for the purpose of determining proximate cause, an assault on an inmate by another inmate is always reasonably foreseeable because penal institutions house dangerous individuals. The plaintiff sued for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of negligence on the part of the staff of the Anderson County Detention Facility in classifying and housing the plaintiff and in failing to release him in a timely manner. The County denied any negligence on its part. The trial court found that while the County was not negligent in its classification or housing of the plaintiff, it had a duty and breached that duty in failing to timely release him. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $170,000 in damages, excluding medical bills, and assessed 55% of the fault to the County and 45% to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s actions, making an additional finding that proximate cause existed sufficient to link the plaintiff’s injuries to the County’s breach of its duty to timely release him. We reverse the Court of Appeals and trial court in part and hold that Anderson County is not liable for failing to release the plaintiff in a timely manner because the injuries Mr. King suffered as a result of the delay were not reasonably foreseeable. The award of damages is vacated, with the exception of the statutorily mandated payment of the plaintiff’s medical bills, and the case is reversed and remanded to the trial court for dismissal. |
Anderson | Supreme Court | |
Tamara J. Harness v. Gerald Scott Harness
This appeal arises from a dispute over the finality of a judgment and notice in a child support matter. Tamara J. Harness (“Plaintiff”) and Gerald Scott Harness (“Defendant”) have a history of litigation related to their divorce. On November 18, 2009, Defendant simultaneously filed separate petitions to modify his spousal support and child support obligations. The Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”) confirmed the findings and recommendations of the magistrate with respect to child support on April 29, 2011 . After a hearing, the Trial Court set aside its April 29, 2011 modification of Defendant’s child support. Defendant appeals, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in addressing for a second time his petition to modify child support when that issue allegedly had been resolved by the magistrate’s findings and recommendations as confirmed by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court’s order of confirmation was interlocutory rather than final, and that the Trial Court did not err in revisiting the child support issue. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Alexander A. Stratienko, M. D. v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, et al
Over nine years of litigation in both state and federal courts has stemmed from a 2004 incident (“the Incident”) wherein Alexander A. Stratienko, M.D. (“Plaintiff”) pushed Van Stephen Monroe, Jr., M.D. while in a staff break room at Erlanger Hospital (“the Hospital”) in Hamilton County, Tennessee. In this appeal, Plaintiff raises issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting partial summary judgment to Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, in not allowing another amendment to the complaint and additional discovery, in excluding claims at trial relative to an administrative hearing, and in holding that Plaintiff failed to prove at trial intentional interference with business relations. We find no error in the Trial Court’s judgments and, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth E. King v. Anderson County, Tennessee - DISSENT
I respectfully dissent. |
Anderson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Clark
The defendant, Kevin Clark, appeals his Overton County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of first degree murder, aggravated arson, abuse of a corpse, reckless endangerment, and two counts of aggravated assault. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the videotaped deposition of a State’s witness in lieu of live testimony, that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of forensic testing conducted on the defendant’s shoes and clothing, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Overton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Corey Brian Austin
The defendant, Corey Brian Austin, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Telly Savalas Johnson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Telly Savalas Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of five counts of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder. Petitioner was sentenced by the trial court to an effective sentence of 75 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. The facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions can be found in this court’s opinion in State v. Telly Savalas Johnson, No. W2009-00764-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3245284 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed Aug. 17, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 12, 2011). In summary, the proof showed that Petitioner shot a .380 caliber pistol multiple times into a van which contained two adults and three minor children. One of the children was struck in the leg by a bullet. Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |