Deborah Bray v. Radwan R. Khuri, M.D.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) requires a person who asserts a potential claim for healthcare liability to include with pre-suit notice a HIPAA compliant medical authorization permitting the healthcare provider who receives the notice to obtain complete medical records “from each other provider being sent the notice.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Here, the plaintiff sent pre-suit notice of her claim to a single healthcare provider and included a medical authorization. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendant healthcare provider moved to dismiss, asserting the plaintiff had failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that a prospective plaintiff who provides pre-suit notice to one potential defendant is not required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) to provide the single potential defendant with a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. We reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Betty C. Thomas v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Defendants related to the foreclosure of Plaintiff’s home. She contends the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her complaint. She also contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend. Defendants insist the trial court should be affirmed in all respects. They also contend the appeal should be dismissed due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Appeals. As Defendants contend, Plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with our appellate rules of advocacy and for this reason alone we would be justified in affirming the trial court. Nevertheless, we reviewed the record and the trial court’s actions and affirm the trial court in all respects. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frederic Jermaine Armstrong
Defendant, Frederic Jermaine Armstrong, was convicted of aggravated assault for the beating of a correctional officer. Defendant’s conviction was also subject to a criminal gang enhancement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-121(b), which was later vacated because of this Court’s ruling in State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn.Crim. App. 2016). On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and whether he was properly sentenced to the maximum within the applicable range. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kerry Granderson
The Defendant, Kerry Granderson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting a witness’s prior statement to police as substantive evidence; (2) the trial court erred in admitting jailhouse phone calls made by him; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry D. Carney v. State of Tennessee
In 1998, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jerry D. Carney, of first degree premeditated murder. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions. See State v. Jerry D. Carney, No. M1999-01139-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1335770, at *1(Tenn. Crim. Appl, at Nashville, Sept. 15, 2000), perm app. denied (Tenn. April 24, 2001). On December 19, 2014, the Petitioner filed his fourth petition for a writ of error coram nobis and in it alleged newly discovered evidence. The trial court issued an order on April 22, 2014, dismissing the petition as time-barred and meritless. We affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Yvonne R.
A circuit court adjudicated a child dependent and neglected because her mother’s mental incapacity rendered the Mother unfit to properly care for the child. Upon review, we conclude that the circuit court’s decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and thus, we affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy Newell v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Jimmy Newell, appeals as of right from the Bradley County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that the State violated the terms of his plea agreement by filing a letter of opposition to parole with the Board of Parole. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is welltaken and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arzell A. Harmon
Arzell A. Harmon (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder and was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement to ten years at thirty percent release eligibility with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant then filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the trial court summarily denied. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion. Alternatively, the Defendant contends that the trial court should have converted his Rule 35 motion into a petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the Knox County Criminal Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Jerome Miller
Anthony Jerome Miller, the Defendant, pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor and reserved a certified question for appeal regarding the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. He asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the State during a search of his residence because the District Attorney General’s Office did not apply for the search warrant, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1007. The State responds that: (1) a search warrant is not “process” as intended by the meaning of section 39-17-1007; (2) the search warrant is valid under section 39-17-1007 because Investigator O’Keefe’s application falls under the “except as otherwise provided” clause because law enforcement are authorized to apply for search warrants under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(a); and (3) if a search warrant is considered process under section 39-17-1007, then Investigator O’Keefe fulfilled the requirements of the statute by seeking verbal consent from an Assistant District Attorney. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Fisher v. State of Tennessee
An individual previously convicted of a felony drug offense petitioned for restoration of his citizenship rights. The trial court restored all his citizenship rights except the right to bear arms. In doing so, the court concluded that Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17- 1307(b), which makes it an offense for certain persons to possess a firearm, prohibited the court from restoring the right to bear arms. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Global Mall Partnership v. Shelmar Retail Partners, LLC, et al
The landlord of a shopping mall commenced this action against a commercial tenant for breach of a lease. The tenant claimed it had an enforceable oral agreement to terminate the lease with the former landlord. The landlord contended that the original lease contained a “no oral modification” clause; thus, the oral agreement to terminate the lease was unenforceable. After the landlord presented its proof at trial, the court dismissed the case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2), ruling that the oral termination agreement between the tenant and the former landlord was enforceable despite the “no oral modification” clause in the lease. This appeal followed. When a defendant files a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2) motion for involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s proof at trial, the only evidence the trial court may consider in determining whether the proof was sufficient to demonstrate a right to the relief is “the plaintiff’s proof” at trial. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2). We have determined that the trial court erroneously considered facts and documents not found in the plaintiff’s proof. Excluding the extraneous facts and documents, the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court’s factual findings and its conclusion that the landlord’s predecessor in interest and the tenant entered into a binding lease termination agreement. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mariah H.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving the child, Mariah H. (“the Child”), who was one year of age at the time of trial. On June 26, 2015, the Johnson City Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where she has remained since that date. Following separate hearings, the trial court entered two orders adjudicating the Child dependent and neglected in the care of the parents: one on November 25, 2015, as to the mother, Teresa H. (“Mother”), and the second on January 13, 2016, as to the father, Stafford B. (“Father”). On February 2, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child after determining by clear and convincing evidence that Father willfully failed to visit the Child during the four months prior to the filing of the termination petition. Furthermore, the trial court dismissed the grounds alleged against Father of failure to establish paternity and persistence of the conditions leading to removal. Also finding clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child. Father has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Yates v. Randy Lee, Warden
The pro se Petitioner, Jeffrey Yates, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the Johnson County Criminal Court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Garwood
The Appellant, Brian Garwood, pled guilty in the Grundy County Circuit Court to three counts of forgery and received a total effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing, specifically drug court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demarco Cortez Taylor
Defendant, Demarco Cortez Taylor, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He received an effective sentence of ten years for the convictions. On appeal, Defendant challenges: (1) the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress; (2) the State’s use of improper leading questions; (3) the exclusion of the victim’s recorded interview; (4) the omission of a jury instruction on intoxication; (5) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions for aggravated robbery and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (6) the denial of a new trial on the basis of jury bias; (7) an excessive sentence; and (8) cumulative error. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Hearing v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, David Hearing, appeals as of right from the Greene County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis challenging his guilty-pleaded convictions for first degree murder. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Pacer International, Inc.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jamie B., et al
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two of her children. Shortly after the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, the juvenile court appointed counsel for the mother, who lacked the funds to afford one. However, on the day of trial, appointed counsel orally moved for leave to withdraw. The court granted the motion, and the trial proceeded with the mother representing herself. Ultimately, the court found clear and convincing evidence of five grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The mother argues on appeal, among other things, that the trial court erred in permitting her appointed counsel to withdraw. Because we agree, we vacate the judgment to the extent it terminated the mother’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Hawkins v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gary Hawkins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. On appeal, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to object to testimony regarding an alleged prior bad act by the Petitioner and (2) failing to object to improper statements made during the State’s closing argument. Additionally, he asserts that the cumulative errors made by trial counsel entitle him to relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Joseph Kratochvil v. Randy Lee, Warden
The pro se petitioner, John Joseph Kratochvil, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion to affirm the habeas corpus court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roy D. Moore
The Defendant, Roy D. Moore, through counsel, appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of James E. Miller
This is a probate case. Vickie Miller (Widow), personal representative of the estate of her late husband, James E. Miller (Decedent), petitioned the trial court for letters of administration. Decedent died intestate on July 17, 2010. At issue is the ownership of Jim Miller Excavating Company, Inc. (the corporation), the company operated by the Decedent. Widow argues that she is the owner of all of the 1,000 shares of stock that the corporation issued to “Jim Miller and Vicky [sic] Miller JTROS” shortly after the company’s incorporation on April 3, 1990. She filed a copy of the stock certificate, dated April 30, 1990. Mechelle Miller and Jamie L. Shannon, Decedent’s daughters and heirs of the estate, argue that the stock certificate was invalid and that the corporation’s assets should be part of Decedent’s estate. The daughters filed a copy of the corporation’s bylaws, in which the following language is found: “the Board of Directors shall consist of one individual, to-wit, its sole shareholder, James E. Miller.” The trial court granted Widow’s motion for summary judgment. Only Mechelle Miller appealed. We hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the corporation’s directors and incorporators intended that the company would be owned by Decedent and Widow as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. We vacate the trial court’s summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Nelson E. Bowers, II v. Estate of Katherine N. Mounger
The plaintiff initiated this action, claiming, inter alia, a breach of contract. The plaintiff alleged that he was bringing the action as the assignee of a limited liability company, which was an original party to the contract at issue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant estate, also an original party to the contract at issue, determining that the plaintiff lacked standing to file the action. The plaintiff timely appealed. Determining that the plaintiff possessed standing, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s decision to allow the estate to amend its responses to the requests for admission propounded by the plaintiff. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
City of Gatlinburg v. Maury R. Greenstein, Et Al.
This appeal involves post-judgment proceedings following a final judgment in favor of the city that the appellants pay $45,175 for unpaid maintenance fees on their commercial real property. The appellants appeal the trial court’s action overruling a motion to pay the judgment by installments under the so-called “slow-pay” statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 26-2-216. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Stoney's Bail Bonding, Inc.
This is an appeal by Stoney’s Bail Bonding, Inc., (“Stoney’s”) of an order of the Maury County Circuit Court, sitting en banc, which denied Stoney’s Renewed Motion for Relief from Bond. Stoney’s argues the single issue that the trial court erred in its application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-201(c) because the State failed to commence extradition proceedings, as previously ordered by the en banc panel. Following our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals |