State of Tennessee v. Brandon D. Middlebrook
The defendant, Brandon Middlebrook, appeals his 2015 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary, attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and arguing that the trial court erred by permitting the State to use the non-testifying co-defendant’s statement to question the defendant at trial. We hold that the trial court erred by permitting the State to cross-examine the defendant using the statement of his co-defendant but that the error can be classified as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of attempted first degree murder. Because the defendant’s previous felony convictions do not qualify as prior convictions under the terms of Code section 39-17-1324, the defendant’s convictions of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after having been previously convicted of a dangerous felony in Counts 3, 7, 11, 15, 19, and 23 are vacated and those charges dismissed. The case is remanded to the trial court for the entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting the proper merger of the remaining convictions of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and the imposition of a six-year mandatory minimum period of incarceration for each of those convictions. See T.C.A. § 39-17- 1324(h)(1). The judgments of the trial court are otherwise affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Teresa Ann Norwood
The State appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order dismissing the 2019 presentment charging the defendant, Teresa Ann Norwood, with a single count of passing a worthless check, arguing that the trial court impermissibly ruled on the sufficiency of the evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
St. Paul Community Limited Partnership, Et Al. v. St. Paul Community Church
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees upon remand from this court. The defendant church requested attorney’s fees, to which the plaintiff lessee asserted that such fees were not warranted given the nature of the action. The trial court denied the request for fees, holding that an award of attorney’s fees was conditioned upon the need to hire counsel for the enforcement of the lease agreement and that the action at issue was one for declaratory judgment. We reverse and hold that attorney’s fees are warranted pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement. We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re John A.
Petitioner Angela Y. brought this action to terminate the parental rights of Melissa V. (“Mother”) to her child John A. (“Child”). Petitioner is the sister of Child’s father. Petitioner has had custody and taken care of the Child since April 25, 2017, when the Child was a little over one year old. The trial court terminated Mother’s rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support Child. We reverse the trial court’s finding that Mother abandoned Child by willfully failing to visit. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s parental rights. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Carolyn Coffman, Et Al. v. Armstrong International, Inc., Et Al.
This is a product liability action stemming from occupational exposure to asbestos. Pertinent to this appeal, Mr. and Mrs. Coffman (“Appellees”) asserted claims against the manufacturers of certain equipment (“Equipment Defendants”) under the Tennessee Products Liability Act for failing to warn of dangers for exposure to asbestos-containing products that the Equipment Defendants did not themselves manufacture or sell. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Equipment Defendants and the Court of Appeals reversed. This Court granted the Equipment Defendants’ application in part and directed the parties to address: “Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Equipment Defendants had a duty to warn of the dangers associated with the post-sale integration of asbestos-containing materials manufactured and sold by others.” We have concluded that the Equipment Defendants had no duty to warn on the facts and law applicable here. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Carolyn Coffman, Et Al. v. Armstrong International, Inc., Et Al. - Dissenting
In late 2014 Carolyn Coffman’s husband, Donald Coffman, was diagnosed with lethal malignant pleural mesothelioma, a virulent cancer of the thin membrane that lines the lungs and chest, caused by exposure to asbestos fibers. He died three months later. Mr. Coffman had been exposed to asbestos while working as a mechanic at the Tennessee Eastman Chemical plant in Kingsport. The Defendants, who manufactured the valves, gaskets, and other items that Mr. Coffman worked around, did not warn him that asbestos products had been added to the Defendants’ manufactured products after being sold. The Defendants also did not warn Mr. Coffman that exposure to these asbestos-containing products could cause him to develop mesothelioma. Based on the evidence Mrs. Coffman submitted on summary judgment, the Defendants knew or should have known that asbestos-containing products would have to be added to their equipment after the sale to make the equipment usable, yet the Defendants did not warn Mr. Coffman of the danger. Thus, the question before the Court is whether the Defendants had a duty to warn that the products they manufactured and sold were unreasonably dangerous when the Defendants knew or should have known that their products required post-sale integration of an asbestos-containing component to work properly. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Kirby Parkway Professional Condominium Association, Inc. v. Cindy-Jarvis Limited, L.P., et al.
This is an appeal from a case between a nonprofit development management association and a condominium unit owner regarding the unit owner’s failure to pay monthly fees as well as a special assessment approved by the Board of the association. The trial court held in favor of the association, finding that it was well within its authority to assess both the monthly fees as well as the special assessment against the unit owner. The unit owner now appeals. For the reasons contained herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Treymarion S., et al.
In this matter involving the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her two minor children, who were eight and seven years of age, respectively, at the time of trial, the trial court determined that there were three statutory grounds supporting termination: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and (3) persistence of the conditions leading to the Children’s removal. The trial court further found clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Camille Black v. Maryam H. Mula Khel
This appeal involves a personal injury action stemming from an automobile accident. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff’s filing fell outside of the applicable statute of limitations. In granting dismissal, the trial court found that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03. For the same reasons, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decisions and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Justice Ball v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Justice Ball, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, carjacking, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and evading arrest and his effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kendrick Watson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kendrick Watson, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to conspiracy to introduce marijuana into a penal facility, money laundering, aggravated assault, being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and conspiracy to possess more than three hundred pounds of marijuana in exchange for a total effective sentence of seventeen years as a Range I, standard offender. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that he had been denied due process prior to and during the plea process. The Petitioner also contended that the post-conviction court should recuse itself. The post-conviction court denied the recusal motion and denied post-conviction relief, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Amber R., et al.
In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); (2) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); (3) persistence of conditions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3); and (4) mental incompetence, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Gwendolyn H. King v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.
Following two unsuccessful lawsuits filed by the instant plaintiff in federal district court, a foreclosure on the plaintiff’s home, and a successful unlawful detainer action filed in general sessions court by the purchaser of the home at foreclosure, the plaintiff filed this action against multiple defendants in the chancery court, seeking an order setting aside the foreclosure and a temporary injunction prohibiting her eviction. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the instant action on the basis of res judicata. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Garrett Ramos v. The Electric Employees' Civil Service And Pension Board Of The Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County
Appellant, a Lineman with the Nashville Electric Service (“NES”), filed a grievance with Appellee Electric Employees’ Civil Service and Pension Board (the “Board”) after the NES revoked Appellant’s unauthorized raise. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held that the facts supported the NES’ decision to withdraw the raise, and the Board adopted that finding. Appellant appealed to the Chancery Court of Davidson County (“trial court”). The trial court held that there was substantial and material evidence to support the Board’s decision and that the decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank Edward Sharp, Jr.
The Appellant, Frank Edward Sharp Jr., contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his original sentence in confinement. The Appellant acknowledges that he violated the terms of his probation and argues that the trial court should have given him a sentence of split confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, but we remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment of conviction in case number 17-CR-125 to reflect that the Appellant pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Laron Rashawn Lumpkin
Indicted for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, Defendant, Laron Rashawn Lumpkin, was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of five years for voluntary manslaughter and twenty years for especially aggravated robbery to be served concurrently for an effective twenty-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated robbery but reverse and vacate his conviction for voluntary manslaughter. In doing so, we impose a conviction for the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide and remand the case to the trial court for a sentencing hearing on the newly imposed conviction. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Laron Rashawn Lumpkin - Concurring in Part, Dissenting In Part
I join the majority in affirming Defendant’s conviction of especially aggravatedrobbery. However, I write separately to dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of voluntary manslaughter. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Maddox F.
This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Trial Court conducted a trial and entered an order finding that the statutory ground of abandonment existed for termination of the father’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest. Because a court reporter was not present, the Trial Court approved a statement of the evidence for purposes of appeal. We determine that the Trial Court failed to make sufficient findings of fact relevant to the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to visit the child and failure to provide financial support for the child that were in effect at the time of the 2017 termination petition, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k), and that the statement of the evidence approved by the Trial Court is insufficient for us to review the termination on appeal. Therefore, we vacate the Trial Court’s judgment terminating the father’s parental rights. We remand for the Trial Court to enter an order with sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law on each of the statutory grounds for the termination of the father’s parental rights and the best interest analysis. If there is a subsequent appeal of that order, the Trial Court shall develop a more detailed statement of the evidence reflecting a complete account of the testimony and evidence presented during trial. If a detailed statement of the evidence is not possible, the Trial Court shall conduct additional proceedings as necessary to prepare a sufficient record for appeal, including a new trial if necessary. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jim Hudgins v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jim Hudgins, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his conviction of first degree premediated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to present evidence that he was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent for premeditation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Jaylan J., et al.
This appeal involves the termination of parental rights of a mother and a father. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination had been proven and that termination was in the best interest of the two children. The mother and the father separately appealed. On appeal, the Department of Children’s Services “does not defend” some of the grounds that the trial court concluded were established. However, DCS maintains that three grounds for termination were sufficiently proven against the mother and that one ground was sufficiently proven against the father. We conclude that two of the remaining grounds for termination alleged against the mother were sufficiently proven, but we do not find clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the children. We conclude that the sole remaining ground alleged against the father was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. As such, we reverse the termination of parental rights and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jon Vazeen v. US Med
Pro se appellant appeals the trial court’s involuntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2). Due to the deficiencies in the appellant’s brief, we dismiss the appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re March 9, 2012 Order
In a prior appeal, this Court affirmed dismissal of this case and remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees owed to the appellee due to the appellant’s frivolous appeal. On remand, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay the sum of $11,901.35. The appellant then filed a motion to alter or amend, arguing, for the first time, that the trial court’s order was “void ab initio” because it was “adjudicated by an adjudicator with compromised neutrality in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment[.]” As support for this claim, the appellant pointed to comments made by the trial judge during hearings in a separate but related case in 2010 and 2012. The appellant argued that the Fourteenth Amendment required the trial judge to disqualify herself sua sponte and that her failure to do so rendered all subsequent orders entered by the trial judge void. The trial court treated this as a request for recusal “embedded” in the motion to alter or amend and denied the motion in all respects. The appellant has appealed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
St. George Holdings LLC v. James D. Hutcherson
This appeal concerns an option agreement. St. George Holdings, LLC (“SGH”), an entity formed to purchase the old St. George Hotel (“the Hotel”) in Chattanooga, entered into an agreement with James D. Hutcherson (“Hutcherson”) under which SGH would borrow $700,000 from Hutcherson to develop the Hotel. An option agreement, one of four documents executed in the transaction, provided that if SGH was unable to obtain a full development loan in 18 months, Hutcherson could purchase the Hotel for the amount of his loan. SGH never obtained a development loan. When Hutcherson attempted to exercise his right to purchase, SGH refused to comply. Instead, SGH sued Hutcherson in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Hutcherson filed a counterclaim. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to Hutcherson on SGH’s claims. After trial on Hutcherson’s counterclaim, the Trial Court granted him specific performance. SGH appeals, arguing among other things, that a jury waiver provision in the deed of trust did not serve to waive its right to jury under the option agreement. We hold, inter alia, that the deed of trust’s separately-initialed jury waiver, broad in its language as to its scope across the transaction, was sufficient to waive the right to jury for actions arising out of the option agreement. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in all respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Weakley v. Franklin Woods Community Hospital Et Al.
This is an appeal from a trial court’s order dismissing a claim of false imprisonment against a hospital and two of its employees, wherein the trial court found that the acts alleged all constituted “health care services” as defined by the Tennessee Healthcare Liability Act. Specifically, the trial court found that the Appellant failed to provide pre-suit notice and failed to file a certificate of good faith as required by statute. As a result, the trial court dismissed the Appellant’s claims with prejudice. The Appellant now appeals the trial court’s decision. For the reasons contained herein, we affirm the decision of the trial court |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Willie Gordon v. William Louis Chapman
Two men were driving along I-40 in Memphis when their cars collided. One driver sued the other driver for damages, alleging negligence, and the other driver counter-sued, also alleging negligence. The defendant filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to supplement his discovery responses. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to serve his supplemental discovery on the defendant’s attorney by August 2, 2019, and stated that the case would be dismissed if he failed to comply. The plaintiff failed to meet the deadline or ask for an extension, and the court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |