Underground II, Inc., D/B/A The Boiler Room, v. The City of Knoxville, et al.
03A01-9709-CH-00425
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Sharon Bell

In this action the plaintiff-appellant (plaintiff) challenges the validity of an ordinance of the City of Knoxville which prohibits the practice of "brown bagging" (bringing your own alcoholic beverage) into restaurants, clubs, and businesses between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., Monday through Saturday and 1:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on Sundays. It further makes it unlawful for businesses of any kind to permit or allow any customer to "bring in, carry, or possess, or consume beer or alcoholic beverages" during specified times as set out above. The proprietors of the designated places are also prohibited from selling any non-intoxicating beverabe to be mixed with and/or consumed with alcoholic beverages between the designated times. The trial court upheld the validity of the ordinance. We reverse the trial court.

State of Tennessee vs. Michael G. Rose
01C01-9611-CC-00478
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe B. Jones
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark

The appellant, Michael G. Rose (defendant), was convicted of driving while under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor, by a jury of his peers. The trial court sentenced the defendant to pay a $1,500 fine and serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Williamson County Jail. The trial court suspended all but 180 days of the sentence, and required the defendant to serve the balance of his sentence on probation. The court also revoked the defendant’s license for two years. In this court, two issues are presented for review. The defendant contends (a) the evidence contained in the record will not support a finding by a rational trier of fact that he is guilty of driving while under the influence, and (b) the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by denying his motion to suppress certain statements he made to a law enforcement officer. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law governing the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this court that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

State of Tennessee vs. Joseph Pendergrass
03C01-9706-CC-00210
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

This appeal attempts to present certified questions of law pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The certified questions primarily involve the legality of a stop of a motor vehicle and a subsequent search and seizure resulting therefrom. Because we conclude that this matter is not properly before us, we dismiss this appeal.

Tommy Freeman v. Madison County Sheriff's Department
02S01-9704-CH-00034
Authoring Judge: Hewitt P. Tomlin, Jr., Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issues presented by this appeal are whether the trial court erred in finding that the statutory presumption created by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 7-51-21 applied to plaintiff and whether or not the defendant's medical proof overcame the presumption. The panel concludes that the judgment of the trial court awarding benefits should be reversed and the case dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Thomas Freeman ("plaintiff") was employed by the Madison County Sheriff's Department in 1971. He served as a deputy for a year and then was promoted to the rank of Captain. He stayed in the rank of Captain until 1991, when he was appointed Assistant Chief Deputy. He had been appointed to the position of Chief Deputy at the time of trial. In the early days following his promotion to Captain, plaintiff assumed supervisory duties along with his regular duties. However, as the department grew he began to delegate more of the regular duties and moved into a more supervisory role. With the promotion to Assistant Chief Deputy, he assumed even more of a supervisory and administrative position. Since 1991, his job duties have been primarily that of supervisor and he was not required to go out on patrol or do things such as working on accidents as part of his regular job duties. In November, 1994 plaintiff begin to experience symptoms of a heart attack while sitting at his desk at work. Nothing out of the ordinary occurred on the job either on that day or in the time period before that. He was subsequently treated for a heart attack at a local hospital and was diagnosed with coronary artery disease. He underwent quintuple bypass surgery thereafter. He returned to work on a gradual basis and is now working full time in his former position as Chief Deputy. Plaintiff was fifty-one years old at the time of his heart attack. The medical proof consisted of the testimony of several physicians by deposition, which testimony is summarized as follows: Dr. James Crenshaw, a cardiologist, testified that he was called to the emergency room to examine plaintiff, after plaintiff was admitted complaining of chest pains and suffering from an acute myocardial infarction. Following Dr. Crenshaw's examination, 2

Nathan Wayne Smith v. Maremont Corporation
01S01-9703-CV-00077
Authoring Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim Hamilton
This Workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e) (3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that he has suffered permanent partial disability as a result of an accident in the course and scope of his employment with the Defendant. The matter was heard by the trial court on May 1, 1993. The court awarded plaintiff 25% permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole. The trial court also awarded benefits paid in a lump sum. Within 3 days from the judgment of the trial court the plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment; the substance of plaintiff's motion to alter and amend was that the court should have awarded a greater percentage of permanent partial impairment based on the proof. Later, in l995 the motion to amend and alter the judgment was amended to contain allegations of newly discovered evidence; this new allegation was based on alleged new discovery of a cervical problem, a slipped disc; plaintiff alleged that this new injury related back to the original lumbar back injury. The trial Judge heard the motion to amend and the later filed amended motion alleging newly discovered evidence. The motion was denied in October, 1996. The court ruled that T.C.A._ 5-6-231 provides that lump sum payments are final and dismissed plaintiff's motion. This appeal presents two issues: (1) Whether the court erred in awarding 25% permanent partial disability, and (2) Whether the court erred in not granting plaintiff's motion for a hearing based upon newly discovered evidence. The panel affirms the trial court on both issues. However, the Panel remands the question of whether the newly discovered cervical disc problem, that led to a subsequent cervical surgery which is the focal point of the motion to alter and to amend, relates back to the original lumbar back injury which, in turn, would render the defendant liable for medical expenses. The proof discloses that Mr. Smith, the plaintiff, at the time of the trial was 51 years old, and possessed a high school education. He has a variety of job skills including previous employment as a carpenter, employment with a termite company, electrical and other diverse jobs. At the 2 time of the injury involved in this lawsuit he was employed with Maremont having worked there from June, 1967 to October, 1988. The plaintiff has been unemployed since 1988.

State vs. Clarence Washington
02C01-9703-CC-00097

State vs. Clarence Washington
02C01-9703-CC-00097

State vs. Torrance Johnson
02C01-9610-CR-00350

State vs. Noah Noble
02C01-9701-CC-00060

State vs. Melvin Currie
02C01-9701-CC-00047

State vs. Richard Young
02C01-9703-CR-00130
Trial Court Judge: Carolyn Wade Blackett

State vs. Estes Anderson
02C01-9704-CC-00141

02C01-9611-CR-00384Cecil
02C01-9611-CR-00384Cecil
Trial Court Judge: Bernie Weinman

01C01-9607-CC-00308
01C01-9607-CC-00308

State vs. Marcus Velez
01C01-9611-CC-00488
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III

Dillard vs. The Vanderbilt University
01A01-9706-CV-00265
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers

Oolie vs. Qureshi
01A01-9706-CV-00240
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

Gordon McGee v. Carl Pippin, Helen Pippin, et al. - Concurring
01-A-01-9706-CH-00289
Authoring Judge: Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert E. Corlew, III

This is a suit by a stockholder of an insolvent corporation, against another stockholder, his wife and an employee, seeking judgment against them for  dissipation of assets of the corporation, recovery of money due from  debtors of the corporation and liquidation of the corporation for the benefit  of creditors. Although not designated such in the complaint, the suit appears to be a suit for a receivership. Matter of Liquidation of United American Bank in Knoxville. Tenn. 1987, 743 S.W.2d 911.

Horton vs. Hughes
01A01-9601-CV-00045
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.

Tuttle vs. Tuttle
01A01-9512-CV-00546

01A01-9605-CH-00229
01A01-9605-CH-00229
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton

State vs. Samuel Perry
02C01-9611-CR-00435
Trial Court Judge: Arthur T. Bennett

| State vs. Ricky Jackson
02C01-9702-CR-00081
Trial Court Judge: James C. Beasley, Jr.

State vs. Michael Holmes
02C01-9703-CR-00106
Trial Court Judge: Chris B. Craft

State vs. Demarco Bowdery, et al
02C01-9705-CR-00173
Trial Court Judge: Carolyn Wade Blackett