State of Tennessee v. Christopher M. Flake
W2000-01131-CCA-MR3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernie Weinman

The defendant was indicted for attempted first degree murder. A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of the lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and the trial court sentenced him to four years imprisonment. In this appeal, the defendant alleges: (1) his insanity defense was established by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted statements made by the defendant and a weapon seized from his vehicle; (3) the trial court erroneously restricted the testimony of a psychiatrist by disallowing his statement that the defendant was committable if found not guilty by reason of insanity, while allowing him to testify that the defendant stated he believed he would be free to go home within 60 to 90 days if adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity; (4) the trial court erroneously allowed the state to call a psychiatrist because the defense was not notified pre-trial that he would be an expert witness; (5) the trial court improperly found that a psychiatrist was qualified to testify as an expert; and (6) the trial court erroneously refused the defendant's request to have the opening and rebuttal closing arguments.  After a through review of the record, we reverse the judgment of conviction, modify the judgment to “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity,” and remand for further proceedings pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-7-303.

State of Tennessee v. Laverne Long
W2000-02773-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

The Defendant, Laverne Long, entered a guilty plea to reckless homicide, a Class D felony, in exchange for a two year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. Following an evidentiary hearing on the Defendant's motion to suspend her sentence, the trial court denied alternative sentencing. The Defendant now appeals as of right from the denial of alternative sentencing. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shirley Shelburne vs. Frontier Health, et al
E2000-02551-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.
This is a negligence action that finds its genesis in the suicide of a county jail inmate. Prior to his death, the decedent had been evaluated by Richard Kirk, a member of a crisis response team operated by the defendant Woodridge Hospital, a facility owned and operated by the defendant Frontier Health. Kirk concluded the decedent did not suffer from any psychiatric illness and did not require further care or treatment. The widow of the decedent, Shirley A. Shelburne, individually and as the next friend of her son, Travis Lee Shelburne, sued Frontier Health on the basis of vicarious liability. In response to the defendant's third motion for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the grant of summary judgment, which was denied. The plaintiff appeals, arguing (1) that this case should be remanded for the trial court to reconsider the evidence submitted in support of the plaintiff's motion to alter or amend in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2000); (2) that Frontier Health is not entitled to summary judgment, which was granted on the basis of Kirk's alleged statutory immunity; and (3) that Frontier Health's third motion for summary judgment constitutes an improper "appeal" of the denial of its second summary judgment motion by a different trial judge. We affirm.

Peggy Lane, et al vs. Luella Spriggs, et al
E2001-00163-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Telford E. Forgerty, Jr.
This case involves the validity of an unsigned warranty deed in the plaintiffs' chain of title. Following a bench trial, the court below reformed the deed to add the missing signature. The defendants appeal, arguing, among other things, that the unsigned deed is inoperative and cannot be reformed. We affirm.

Dennis Mauk vs. Debra Perry, et al
E2001-00485-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Thomas R. Frierson, II
The plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration regarding the proper interpretation of a will. The trial court found a will provision leaving "real property and contents" to the decedent's son, the plaintiff Dennis Mauk, is not ambiguous and that the word "contents" includes a 27-year old mobile home on the decedent's property. The decedent's other four children appeal, contending the will is ambiguous. They argue the trial court erred in failing to consider parol evidence as to the meaning of the subject language. They further contend the trial court erred in ordering a $6,000 bequest to the appellants to be paid into court, thus making it subject to the debts of the estate. We modify the trial court's judgment to provide that the share of personal property bequeathed to each of the decedent's children should be burdened with one-fifth of the decedent's debts. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Investors Group I, LTD. vs. Knoxville's Community Dev. Corp.
E1999-00395-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
The complaint seeking damages for breach of contract was signed and filed by a general partner of Investors Group I, Ltd., a limited partnership. The Chancellor dismissed the case, holding the complaint was void because a limited partnership is a legal entity, and can neither appear pro se nor by a general partner who is not a licensed attorney. We affirm.

Arvil Holt, et a; vs. Zula Parton
E2000-02695-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II
Arvil A. Holt and Beulah Holt Jones ("Plaintiffs") filed this will contest against one of their sisters, Zula Holt Parton ("Defendant"), regarding their Mother's will ("Will"). The case was tried by a jury. During the second day of the jury's deliberations, the Trial Court engaged in ex parte communications with the jury regarding their answers to special interrogatories in a "Special Verdict Form" and their apparent deadlock on the general verdict. The jury foreperson indicated on two occasions that the jury would like to deliberate further. Over objection of Defendant's counsel, however, the Trial Court did not allow for further jury deliberations and entered its judgment. Defendant appeals. We vacate and remand.

Kimberly J. Svacha, et al vs. Waldens Creek Saddley Club, et al
E2000-03121-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Rex Henry Ogle
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment relying, at least in part, on oral testimony from one of the plaintiffs. This testimony was not transcribed, filed with the trial court, and provided to this court as part of the record on appeal. Due to the somewhat peculiar procedural aspects of this case, we conclude that defendants had the responsibility to file a transcript of this testimony. Because we cannot evaluate the propriety of the grant of summary judgment without having before us this evidence relied on by the trial court, we vacate the grant of summary judgment.

Tex Helton, et al vs. Colonial Loan Assoc., Inc. et al
E2001-00060-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: John K. Wilson
Tex Helton and his wife sue Colonial Loan Association, Inc., and Lakeview Motors, Inc., seeking damages in connection with Colonial Loan's repossession of an automobile sold to them by Lakeview Motors. The Trial Court granted a summary judgment as to Colonial Loan. The claim as to Lakeview Motors has been concluded and this appeal only concerns the granting of a summary judgment in favor of Colonial Loan. We vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand.

James Richard Bishop v. State of Tennessee
E2000-01725-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

Petitioner, James Richard Bishop, was convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary. Following a sentencing hearing, Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony murder and concurrent sentences of twenty years and five years respectively for the especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary. On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. James Richard Bishop, No. 03C01-9308-CR-00268, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 536, at *1, Knox County (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, August 18, 1994), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1994). Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the Knox County Criminal Court, which the post-conviction court subsequently denied. He challenges the denial of his petition, raising the following issue: whether the trial court erred in dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, based upon a ruling that Petitioner's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit. Based upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jerry Grace, et al vs. Mountain States Health Alliance
E2000-03031-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.
In this medical malpractice suit the Trial Court granted a summary judgment in favor of Mountain States Health Alliance, d/b/a/ Johnson City Medical Center Hospital and five Doctors. The Trial Court overruled the Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend his determination that all Defendants were entitled to summary judgment. As to the Doctors, the determination was predicated upon the motion to alter or amend not being timely filed, and as to the Medical Center on the grounds that the delay in submitting materials accompanying the motion to alter or amend was not justified. We affirm.

Donald Miller, et al vs. Choo Choo Partners
E2001-00007-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne

Donald Miller, et al vs. Choo Choo Partners
E2001-00007-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne

Tex Helton, et al vs. Colonial Loan Assoc., Inc. et al
E2001-00060-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: John K. Wilson
Tex Helton and his wife sue Colonial Loan Association, Inc., and Lakeview Motors, Inc., seeking damages in connection with Colonial Loan's repossession of an automobile sold to them by Lakeview Motors. The Trial Court granted a summary judgment as to Colonial Loan. The claim as to Lakeview Motors has been concluded and this appeal only concerns the granting of a summary judgment in favor of Colonial Loan. We vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand.

Susan Green v. Leon Moore, et al.
M2000-03035-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Lee Davies
This appeal arises from the breach of a settlement agreement entered into by the Appellants and the Appellee. The Appellee filed a complaint against the Appellants in the Circuit Court for Williamson County, seeking damages for loss of reputation, embarrassment, humiliation, lost wages, loss of earning capacity, and loss of the ability to advance. The Appellants filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss.

Humphreys County Utility Dist. vs. Schatz Underground Cable, Inc.
M2000-02650-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace
In this negligence action, Plaintiff sued Defendant for damages in connection with the rupture of a gas line. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for Plaintiff. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

Darra Mcmillin v. Mckenzie Special School District,
W2000-02165-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Julian Guinn, Judge
In this appeal, the Second Injury Fund (the Fund) insists the trial court erred in (1) awarding permanent total disability benefits and (2) apportioning the award between the Fund and the employer. The employer insists (1) the employee's injury is not compensable, (2) the trial court erred in commuting one-half of the award to a lump sum, and (3) the trial court erred in awarding the employee a scooter and special bed. As discussed below, the panel has concluded judgment should be modified by reducing the lump sum, because it exceeds the statutorily allowed maximum, but otherwise affirmed.

Dorothy Pirtle v. Royal Insurance Company
W2000-00867-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J
Trial Court Judge: W. Michael Maloan, Chancellor
In this appeal, the employer's insurer insists (1) the award of benefits based on 75 percent permanent partial disability to both arms is excessive and (2) the trial court erred in awarding as discretionary costs an independent medical examiner's fee for examining and evaluating the injured employee. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of disability benefits should be affirmed and the award of discretionary costs modified.

Kenneth Warren v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare, Nashville Memorial Hospital
M2000-02579-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes
This is a malicious prosecution case. The defendants obtained a warrant against the plaintiff after observing a man matching the plaintiff's description attempting to break into a car on the defendants' property. After a jury trial, the plaintiff was found not guilty. Subsequently, the plaintiff instituted a lawsuit against the defendants for malicious prosecution. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the defendants acted with probable cause and without malice in obtaining the warrant.

Mary Regina Blalock v. Travelers Insurance Company,
W2000-01616-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J
Trial Court Judge: Karen R. Williams, Judge
The appellant, Travelers, insists (1) the trial court improperly applied the last injurious injury rule, (2) the trial court erred by assuming certain facts and taking judicial notice of matters not in evidence, (3) the trial court erred by giving deference to the opinion of an evaluating physician instead of a treating physician and (4) the award of benefits based on 25 percent to both arms is excessive. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed.

Thomas White v. Kathy White
M2000-02674-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Arthur E. Mcclellan
This appeal arises from the Appellant's filing of a Petition to Modify the Final Decree of Divorce in the Circuit Court of Sumner County. The Appellant requested a downward deviation in child support and a reduction in alimony. The Appellant also requested that he no longer be required to reimburse the Appellee for health insurance coverage. The Appellee filed a Counter-Petition requesting an upward deviation in child support. Following a trial on the Petition and Counter-Petition, the trial court entered an order reducing the Appellant's child support obligation to $1,000.00 per month. The trial court declined to modify the award of rehabilitative alimony and health insurance coverage. The Appellant appeals the decision of the Circuit Court of Sumner County setting child support at $1,000.00 per month and refusing to modify the award of rehabilitative alimony and health insurance coverage. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's decision.

Doris Jean Bryant v. Tennessee Conference of The United
M2000-01797-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy

Provident Life & Accident Ins. vs.Tina Shankles, et al
E2000-02073-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
This is an interpleader bill filed by Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company against four named Beneficiaries in a policy of insurance issued to their father, Arnold Joe Johnson. Two of the Beneficiaries were children by a former marriage of Mr. Johnson, who were added as such shortly before his death. The two Beneficiaries by a subsequent marriage insisted that the provisions of a divorce decree precluded Mr. Johnson from adding his other two children as Beneficiaries. The Trial Court found that all four should share in the proceeds of the policy equally and entered a summary judgment to that effect. We vacate and remand.

E2000-02221-COA-R9-CV
E2000-02221-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III

Jerome Felix Havely vs. Almeda Matthews Havely
E2000-02275-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Joyce M. Ward
In 1983, Jerome Felix Havely and Almeda Matthews Havely were divorced. They had entered into a Property Settlement Agreement which was incorporated into the Judgment of Divorce ("Divorce Judgment"). Neither the Divorce Judgment nor the Property Settlement Agreement mentioned the military pension of Jerome Felix Havely ("Plaintiff"). Approximately one month after the entry of the Divorce Judgment, Almeda Matthews Havely ("Defendant") filed a motion essentially seeking relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 in which she alleged that the Divorce Judgment should be set aside because she had not been aware of her entitlement to Plaintiff's military pension. This motion was dismissed in 1984 by the trial court for failure to prosecute. This matter lay dormant for fourteen plus years until Defendant filed two more Rule 60.02 motions. Defendant's third and final Rule 60.02 motion, filed in 1999, is the subject of this appeal. After three notices of hearing were filed, the trial court dismissed Defendant's motion without providing its reasons for the dismissal. Defendant appeals. We affirm.