Kenneth Hughes, et ux. v. Estate of Elizabeth Haynes
M2002-01896-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Don Davis
This appeal involves a claim filed against an estate for recovery for personal services rendered by claimants, husband and wife, to the decedent. The probate court granted the claim. Estate appeals. We reverse.

State of Tennessee v. Jody Sweat
E2000-02472-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rex Henry Ogle

The defendant, Jody Sweat, indicted for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault, was convicted of attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 11 and four years, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for attempted second degree murder; argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on attempted second degree murder as a lesser included offense; contends that the state was guilty of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; and submits that the jury was allowed to consider exhibits never offered into evidence. The judgments are affirmed.

Johnny Jenkins v. Kemper Insurance Co.
E2001-00154-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.

State of Tennessee v. Troy Wayne Davis
E2000-03050-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

The defendant, Troy Wayne Davis, was convicted of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years, to be served consecutively to a robbery sentence for which the defendant was on probation at the time of the aggravated assault. The single issue presented for review is whether the evidence is sufficient. The judgment is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Grady Paul Gatlin - Concurring and Dissenting
M2000-02356-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.

I must respectfully depart from the lead opinion in this case. I cannot conclude that the misdemeanor offense of casually exchanging a controlled substance is a lesser-included offense of felony possession with the intent to sell or deliver. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4) (1997) with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-418(a) (1997).

State of Tennessee v. Grady Paul Gatlin
M2000-02356-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

The Defendant, Grady Paul Gatlin, was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to sell a schedule IV controlled substance, possession with intent to sell a schedule II controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conspiracy to possess with intent to sell a schedule II
controlled substance. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to prove that the Defendant intended to sell controlled substances and (2) that it was plain error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of casual exchange. We reverse the Defendant’s convictions for possession with intent to sell a controlled substance and also his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to sell a controlled substance.  The Defendant’s conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia remains unaffected.

State of Tennessee v. Grady Paul Gatlin - Dissenting
M2000-02356-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

I, like Judge Witt, respectfully disagree with Judge Welles’ conclusion that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to charge “casual exchange” as a lesser-included offense of possession with intent to sell. However, I also respectfully disagree with Judge Witt’s conclusion that the failure to give the casual exchange inference instruction was plain error. I would affirm.

Dept.of Children's Svcs. vs. D.R., et al
E2000-01381-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: William Terry Denton
These parents of three minor children ("Children") were arrested in April 1998, while the Children were with them, for possession of a firearm, drug possession, and public intoxication. The State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services ("DCS"), filed a Petition for Temporary Custody of the Children which was granted. Thereafter, DCS entered Plans of Care with the Juvenile Court with which the parents, D.R. ("Mother") and L.M.R. ("Father"), had agreed. The Children remained in foster care for eighteen months during which time the parents were to work toward completing the goals set forth in the Plans of Care so they could be reunited with the Children. In August 1999, DCS filed a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. The Juvenile Court Referee heard this petition in October 1999, and granted it. The Juvenile Court Referee's Termination of Parental Rights and Final Decree of Guardianship was entered in April 2000 and confirmed by the Juvenile Court Judge in June 2001. Both Mother and Father appeal. We affirm.

Mary Ellen Barnes v. Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance
W2000-02559-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio, Judge
In this appeal, the employee insists the evidence preponderates against the denial of workers' compensation benefits and asks this tribunal to determine the extent of her vocational impairment. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment of dismissal should be reversed, the conditional award of permanent partial disability benefits based on 3 percent to the body as a whole affirmed, and the cause remanded with instructions.

State of Tennessee v. Thomas L. Jones
W2000-01028-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

The appellant was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder and was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-one years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant of second degree murder; and (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial because of improper jury instructions characterizing the appellant's statement as a confession. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

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Dawn A. Dugan v. Elliott R. Myers (Deceased),
E2001-00281-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: John L. Kiener

Dawn A. Dugan v. Elliott R. Myers (Deceased), Et Al.
E2001-00281-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: John L. Kiener

State of Tennessee v. Thomas E. Cowan, Jr.
E2000-02705-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

The defendant, Thomas E. Cowan, Jr., was found guilty of contempt. The trial court imposed a jail sentence of 10 days, six of which were suspended. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient; that the trial judge should not have acted as a witness; and that the sentence was excessive. Because the evidence was insufficient, the judgment is reversed and the cause dismissed.

State of Tennessee v. Neil Friedman
E2000-02877-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

The defendant, Neil Friedman, was convicted of driving under the influence, third offense, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, six months of which was to be served in the county jail, for driving under the influence. A consecutive sentence of six months, 30 days of which was to be served, was imposed for driving on a revoked license. This court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. State v. Neil M. Friedman, No. 03C01-9704-CR-00140 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 14, 1998). The application for permission to appeal to the supreme court was denied December 21, 1998. In a hearing conducted on the following day, the trial court reduced the DUI sentence to 120 days, which the defendant has since served, followed by seven months and 29 days of probation. Over one year later, the trial court revoked the probation and ordered service of the remainder of the sentence. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court no longer had authority to revoke the probation. Because the sentence had been fully served and the probationary term had ended when the probation revocation warrant was issued, the judgment must be reversed and the cause dismissed.

State of Tennessee v. Matthew Patrick Frontera, a/k/a Matthew Anthony Frontera, a/k/a Patrick Matthew Foster, a/k/a Derrick Joshua Foster
M2000-02747-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris

The Defendant, Matthew Patrick Frontera, pleaded guilty to criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. As part of his plea agreement, the Defendant attempted to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law relating to the legality of his stop, detention and questioning by police officers. In this appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained against him due to an unlawful stop and detention. He also argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him to serve six months in the county jail with release eligibility at seventy-five percent. Because the Defendant failed to properly reserve his issue concerning his stop and detention, we are unable to reach the merits of that issue. We affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Ben Doubleday vs. Larry Hargrove
M2000-02648-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Tamra L. Smith
This is an action to recover the balance due on a contract for the sale of timber. The purchaser's defense was impossibility of performance, because the seller had allegedly destroyed access. The seller testified that the purchaser cut and removed 95 percent of the timber, while the purchaser said he removed only about 40 percent owing to lack of access. The trial judge awarded the seller a judgment for the balance owing less some off-sets not relevant here. We affirm.

Lori Castle vs. Jeffrey Baker
E2000-02772-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: John S. Mclellan, III
These parties were divorced in May 1992. Custody of their daughter, Brittany, then 5 years old, was awarded to Mother pursuant to an Marital Dissolution Agreement [MDA] which obligated Father to pay $575.00 monthly support. About three months after the divorce was granted, the custodial care of Brittany was transferred to Father, by agreement of the parties and without recourse to the Court. In June 1998, Mother sought contempt liability against Father alleging that he was in arrears with his child support obligation in the amount of $40,800.00: at trial, the amount was stipulated to be $36,800.00. Father responded by filing a petition for change of custody, alleging that Brittany had resided with him for several years, a material change in circumstances. He also sought forgiveness of the arrearage. The Trial Court found a change in circumstances and awarded custody of Brittany to her father who was also credited with the monetary value of the necessities he furnished Brittany from August 1992 through February 1997. Mother appeals. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Marvin W. Hill, Jr.
E2000-02789-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

In July 1999, the Defendant pled guilty to evading arrest and possession of marijuana, both Class A misdemeanors, and received concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days supervised probation. In December 1999, the Defendant was indicted for assault and aggravated criminal trespass, both of which are also Class A misdemeanors. In January 2000, a violation of probation warrant was issued against the Defendant, alleging that he had violated his probation in the first two cases. In March 2000, the Defendant pled guilty to the assault and aggravated criminal trespass charges, and a combined sentencing hearing and probation violation hearing was held by the trial court. The trial court revoked the Defendant's probation in the first two cases and imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration. The court also imposed sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the second two cases, to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentences imposed in the first two cases. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing sentences of incarceration in each case. Because our review of the record reveals that the sentences were proper, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

King David Johnson v. State of Tennessee
M2000-02756-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

The petitioner, King David Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

Parks Properties, et al vs. Maury County, et al
M1997-00235-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William B. Cain
Parks Properties and Columbia Warehouses, Inc. have filed a petition pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 39 requesting a rehearing of this court's August, 17, 2001 opinion. We requested and have now received an answer to this petition on behalf of Maury County and Judy Langsdon. Parks Properties and Columbia Warehouses insist that our conclusion that they lacked a protectable property interest in constructing the two warehouses without installing the automatic required sprinkler systems is based on our "misunderstanding that the warehouses would have contained tobacco or other combustible products." They assert that "there was never any evidence before the trial court that the warehouses would be used to store tobacco or other combustible products." This argument misses the point. The lynchpin of our opinion is that the record contains no evidence (1) that the Parks family ever told any county official that tobacco and other combustible materials would not be stored in these warehouses and (2) that the Parks family never sought a waiver of the automatic sprinkler requirements under Section 402.4.1 exception

Dolores E. Rossello vs. Michael Magill, Commissioner
M2001-00113-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
The judgment of the Chancery Court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 10, Rules of the Court of Appeals.

Tomkats Catering, Inc. vs. Ruth E. Johnson, Commissioner of Revenue, State of TN
M2000-03107-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
This is a sales tax case. The tax period is from December 1, 1990 through January 31, 1994. During this period TomKats, a catering business, charged its customers a fixed, per unit price for food, but provided optional services for an additional charge, which was billed separately. The Commissioner ruled that such optional services were a "part of the sale," and assessed a tax deficiency which TomKats paid and filed this action for a refund which was unavailing. The judgment is reversed.

Marilyn Reddick v. Murray, Inc.
W2000-02178-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
In this appeal, the plaintiff insists the trial court erred in dismissing her claim at the close of her proof. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for full trial of all issues fairly raised by the pleadings.

Walter W. Carlen, Sr., et al vs. Ronald E. Jackson
M2000-02564-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull
The defendant asserted a comparative fault defense to a tort claim against him arising from his operation of a truck. He attributed fault to General Motors Corporation and Carlen Motors Inc. the manufacturer and prospective seller, respectively, of the truck. The defendant did not respond timely to a request for admission and summary judgment was entered that the defendant could not assert the affirmative defense attributing fault to General Motors and Carlen Motors Inc.