Susan Godfrey v. Jesus Ruiz
M2000-00101-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

This case arises out of an action by the plaintiffs to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The plaintiffs claim their injuries were caused by the negligent operation of a van owned by the defendants and driven by a cousin of one of the defendants. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants offered affidavits and deposition testimony stating that the driver was operating the van without their permission and that the driver was not their employee. Despite the prima facie evidence of an owner-driver agency relationship created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a) (1998), the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. We hold that an owner's offer of testimony negating the issue of agency, standing alone, cannot overcome the prima facie evidence created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a).

Daniel Paul Spatafore v. Catherine Juanelle Spatafore
E2001-02459-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge John B. Hagler, Jr.

In this action, the Trial Court awarded custody of the parties' minor child to the father, and the mother has appealed.

Randy Caldwell & Stevie W. Caldwell v. State of Tennessee
M2001-00334-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles D. Haston, Sr.

The petitioners, brothers, were tried and convicted, jointly, of first degree murder, aggravated arson, and conspiracy to commit arson against personal property. They filed petitions for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. After careful review, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

Jerry Wayne Matlock v. Ltv Steel, Inc. and Insurance
W2001-02512-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. C. Creed Mcginley, Judge
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Worker's Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer questions the trial court's finding of permanent partial disability for injury to the back, neck and hand. The employer also questions the award of benefits to claimant's right hand for carpel tunnel syndrome, due to the lack of notice of the injury to employer. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the evidence supports the findings of the trial court.

Anthony Hodges v. State of Tennessee
M2001-03068-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The Defendant, Anthony Hodges, was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life without parole and twenty-five years, respectively, to be served in the Department of Correction. The Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Hodges, 7 S.W.3d 609 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). The Defendant subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied. The Defendant now appeals, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that his due process rights were violated by the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on second degree murder; by the State's employment of inconsistent theories of guilt at his and his co-defendant's separate trials; and by the denial of his right to testify. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Barry C. Melton v. State of Tennessee
E2001-02689-CCA-MR3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rex Henry Ogle

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing: (1) his "best interest" plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in representing him at sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Ricky Lee Netherton v. State of Tennessee
E2001-02989-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lillie Ann Sells

The petitioner, Ricky Lee Netherton, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Cumberland County of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a violent offender to twenty-four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction to be served at one hundred percent (100%). Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court's denial of his petition. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Jerome F. Sawyers
M2001-02878-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

The defendant, Jerome F. Sawyers, pled guilty on July 16, 2001, to possession of cocaine less than .5 grams for resale and felony possession of a firearm and was sentenced, respectively, to six years and two years as a Range I, standard offender, with both sentences to be served concurrently. A violation of probation warrant was issued on August 8, 2001, alleging that he had violated probation by being in possession of a weapon and failing to report to his probation officer as ordered. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation; and he timely appealed, arguing that the proof was insufficient that he had violated the terms of his probation. We conclude that the evidence supports the revocation of probation.

State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Dana York
M2001-02956-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

The defendant was charged with twenty-four separate counts including one count of driving under the influence, nine counts of reckless endangerment involving a deadly weapon, one count of reckless driving, eight counts of aggravated assault, two counts of failure to give notice of an accident, two counts of evading arrest creating a risk of death, and one count of false imprisonment. Eight of the reckless endangerment and reckless driving counts merged with other charges. The defendant entered guilty pleas to the other sixteen counts. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years and six months. The defendant appealed the sentence as excessive, arguing that the trial court erred in calculating his total sentence. After review of the record, we affirm the judgments of conviction but remand for entry of corrected judgments.

State of Tennessee v. Andre D. Kimbrough
M2001-02149-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

Defendant, Andre Kimbrough, appeals his conviction in the Davidson County Criminal Court for second degree murder. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by: 1) failing to act as a thirteenth juror; 2) permitting the State to impeach the Defendant using prior bad acts without giving proper notice to the Defendant; and 3) not applying certain mitigating factors in sentencing Defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Rhandie Parker, et al., v. Wanda McDaniel, et al.
E2001-03110-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge O. Duane Slone

Shannon Dale Welch ("Welch") and Stacy Ann Brooks ("Brooks") were the only two occupants in an automobile traveling at a high rate of speed when it collided with a vehicle driven by Rhandie Parker ("Parker"). Parker's brother-in-law, Hershel D. Williams ("Williams"), was a passenger in his vehicle. As a result of the accident, Parker claimed $27,100 in property damage, medical expenses of $8,241.52, and personal injuries. Williams claimed medical expenses totaling $9,545.38 and personal injuries. Parker's wife, Janice Parker ("Ms. Parker"), asserted a claim for loss of consortium. A jury returned a verdict against Welch in favor of Parker for $35,000, and awarded Ms. Parker nothing. Williams was awarded $29,000. All three Plaintiffs appeal with the primary issue being the adequacy of the verdict. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Ruben Joseph Knight, Jr.
E2001-02874-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

The defendant, Ruben Joseph Knight, Jr., appeals the Blount County Circuit Court's revocation of his community corrections sentence. Following our review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm.

Dorothy Rault Heideman v. Richard Lawrence Heideman
W2001-01486-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Karen R. Williams

State of Tennessee v. Jody Lane Orr - Concurring
W2001-02075-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley
I concur with most of the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree with its conclusion that enhancement factor (5), regarding exceptional cruelty, does not apply. I believe that being duct taped, blindfolded, tied up, and made to wear a New Year’s party hat reflect mental abuse and degradation that goes above and beyond that inherently necessary for any aggravated rape. Although I do not believe that the weight of the two enhancement factors applied by the majority opinion should result in a maximum sentence of twenty-five years, I conclude that the sentence is appropriate because of the application of enhancement factor (5), as well.

State of Tennessee v. Jody Lane Orr
W2001-02075-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley
The Appellant, Jody Lane Orr, was convicted by a Carroll County jury of aggravated burglary, aggravated rape, and class E felony theft. He received an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, Orr raises the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress; (2) whether the State lost and/or mishandled a blood sample drawn by law enforcement after his arrest; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; and (4) whether his sentence was proper. After a review of the record, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Adrian Lumpkin
W2002-00648-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett

The Defendant, Adrian Lumpkin, was indicted for aggravated assault. He pled guilty and agreed to a sentence of three years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant judicial diversion subject to several conditions. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by placing unreasonable conditions on its grant of judicial diversion. We conclude that the trial court had no legal authority to impose a term of incarceration as a condition of judicial diversion. However, with respect to the remaining conditions, we dismiss the Defendant's appeal because a defendant to whom judicial diversion was granted has no appeal as of right.

William Davis vs. Reliance Electric Industrial
E2002-00973-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull
Arbitrator awarded compensatory and punitive damages to plaintiff for retaliatory discharge. On appeal, we affirm.

Donna Harlow v. Reliance National,
M2001-02336-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: James L. Weatherford, Sr.J.
Trial Court Judge: Russ Heldman, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Almost three years prior to his death from injuries sustained in a work accident, the employee and his ex-wife (the plaintiff), had taken part in a "remarriage" ceremony at a church but failed to obtain a marriage license. The trial court found that the plaintiff, was the "lawful wife" of the deceased worker and awarded death benefits. Additionally, upon motion by the plaintiff, the trial court commuted the award to lump sum. We reverse the trial court and remand for dismissal because we find that the plaintiff was not the surviving spouse of the deceased. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed. JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR.J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J. and JOE C. LOSER, SP.J., joined. Jill A. Hanson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Reliance National and All Pro Painting. Joseph D. Baugh, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellee, Donna Harlow. MEMORANDUM OPINION Gary Harlow and Donna Barber were married in 1973 and divorced in 1994. In 1995, the Harlows reinitiated their relationship, and Mr. Harlow moved into Ms. Harlow's home. In April 1997, the Harlows participated in a "remarriage" ceremony at a church in which marriage vows were exchanged under the direction of a minister. However, no marriage license was obtained at that time nor thereafter. The Harlows lived together until Mr. Harlow's death. In 1998, the Harlows met with a tax preparer who advised them that they could not file a joint tax return without a marriage license. Until the notification by the tax preparer, Ms. Harlow was unaware that no marriage license existed. After meeting with the tax preparer, Ms. Harlow asked Mr. Harlow several times about obtaining a marriage license, and Mr. Harlow responded that "it was not important" or "you worry about silly things." Ms. Harlow took no affirmative action to obtain the license beyond her questioning of Mr. Harlow. The Harlows filed separate tax returns as "single" or "head of household" for the tax years of 1997, 1998 and 1999. Despite filing separate tax returns, the Harlows filed other documents, including a loan application, indicating their status as husband and wife. Mr. Harlow was sporadically employed during the "remarriage" period, and Ms. Harlow served as the primary breadwinner. On January 11, 2, Gary Harlow, an employee of All Pro Painting, sustained severe head injuries after falling from a work platform, and five days later Mr. Harlow died from those injuries. After Reliance National, the workers' compensation insurer for All Pro Painting, denied death benefits to Ms. Harlow as a surviving spouse, Ms. Harlow filed this action against All Pro Painting and Reliance National ("defendants") seeking payment of statutory death benefits under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law. The trial court granted Ms. Harlow's motion for summary judgment and awarded death benefits, finding that she was the "lawful wife" of Mr. Harlow because a "solemnized" relationship existed between the Harlows. The trial court also found that Ms. Harlow was an actual dependent of the deceased and that it would violate Tennessee public policy as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 36-3-113 to declare that the Harlows' "solemnized" relationship was not a marriage. Upon a motion by Ms. Harlow, the trial judge commuted the award to a lump sum. ANALYSIS Review of findings of fact by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo without any presumption of correctness. Ivey v. Trans Global Gas & Oil, 3 S.W.3d 441, 446 (Tenn. 1999). The workers' compensation statutes are to be given an equitable and liberal construction in favor of workers and their dependents. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-116; Sullivan Electric Co. v. McDonald, 541 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tenn. 1976). I. Whether Ms. Harlow is the surviving spouse of Mr. Harlow. Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-21(a) provides: For the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law, the following described persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent: -2-

Stan Ley M Oo Re v. Pay Less Ca Shway S, In C., E
W2002-00705-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe H. Walker III , Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Rita L. Stotts, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee appeals the trial court dismissal of his claims by granting summary judgment in favor of employer, holding the action was barred by the statute of limitations. We reverse and remand. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court Reversed and Remanded. JOE H. WALKER III , SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J, and JOE C. LOSER, SP. J. joined. Steve Taylor, Memphis, TN, for the Appellant, Stanley Moore. Lori D. Parrish, Memphis, TN, for the Appellees, Payless Cashways, Inc., et al. MEMORANDUM OPINION Stanley Moore worked for Payless Cashways. During the course of his employment, on June 23, 1999, lumber accidentally fell on Mr. Moore. He was transported to the emergency room and treated by Dr. Bobo. He was paid temporary total benefits until released to return to work in September, 1999. He was followed by Dr. Bobo and Dr. Chen for reflex sympathetic dystrophy until released February 1, 2. The last payment for medical treatment was made March 29, 2, for treatment received February 1, 2. Dr. Bobo was of the opinion that he had no permanent partial impairment. Mr. Moore had obtained counsel at some point, who notified Mr. Moore in April 2, that medical records indicated Mr. Moore had no permanent partial impairment, and the attorney was closing his file, that Mr. Moore could consult with another attorney. Mr. Moore continued to have problems with his left upper and lower extremities. He obtained new counsel and a complaint was filed April 3, 21. Dr. Rizk evaluated the claimant and opined by letter dated June 11, 21, that Mr. Moore has reflex sympathetic dystrophy which Dr. Rizk considers to be a permanent condition, and caused by his work-related accident. Summary judgment was granted for the employer on the ground that the suit is barred by the statute of limitations found at T.C.A. _ 5-6-23, and 224. I. Rule 56.4 provides that summary judgment is appropriate where: (1) there is no genuine issue with regard to the material facts relevant to the claim or defense contained in the motion, and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts. See Staples v. CBL & Associates, Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). "Courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must also draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor." Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 89. "Courts should grant a summary judgment only when both the facts and the inferences to be drawn from the facts permit a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion." Id. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment by order entered July 3, 21, stating: "It is the opinion of this Court that Defendants' Motion is not well- founded and should be and is hereby denied." Defendants filed for permission to appeal or for reconsideration. On March 5, 22, the trial court entered an order granting relief from the prior order, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissing the complaint. The trial court made no findings of fact, thus the appeal comes with no presumption of correctness. The panel finds that summary judgment was not appropriate in this case. II. A complaint for workers' compensation benefits must be filed within one year after the accident resulting in injury, T.C.A. _ 5-6-23; or within one year after the occurrence of injury, T.C.A. _ 5-6-224. It is well-settled that "the running of the statute of limitations is suspended until by reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and apparent that an injury compensable under the workmen's compensation laws has been sustained." Livingston v. Shelby Williams Indus., Inc., 811 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1991). It is the date on which the disability manifests itself to a person of reasonable diligence, not the date of the accident which triggers the running of the statute of limitations. Jones v. Home Indem. Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tenn. 1984). Ordinarily, the limitation period should not begin to run until a physician presents claimant with a diagnosis of his condition. Poore v. Magnavox Co., 666 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1984).

State of Tennessee v. David L. Baker
M2001-02025-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge John J. Maddux

The defendant, David L. Baker, was convicted of driving under the influence, fourth offense, and sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with 210 days to be served in the county jail and the balance on supervised probation. He was ordered to pay a fine of $1100 and to complete an alcohol education safety program, and his driver's license was suspended for four years. He timely appealed, presenting as the single issue his claim that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the verdict. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

In Re: The Estate of Martha G. Spencer
M2001-02187-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: J. B. Cox
The origin of this appeal was a claim made against the Estate of Martha G. Spencer, by NHC Health Care of Lewisburg, a skilled nursing home, for services rendered her in the amount of $25,934.54. After a plenary trial the Chancellor dismissed the claim upon finding that NHC was estopped from pursuing its claim because of representations made that Ms. Spencer's expenses were covered by Medicare. NHC appeals. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis Reid
M1999-00803-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

In this capital case, the defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery for killing two Captain D’s employees and robbing one of the employees. As to each conviction of first degree murder, the jury found in the sentencing hearing that the State had proven three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt – (1) that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; (2) that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; and (3) that the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (6), and (7) (1997). Finding that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death on each murder conviction. The trial court subsequently imposed a twenty-five-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to the two death sentences. On direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the defendant mounted numerous challenges to both his convictions and sentences. After fully considering the defendant’s claims, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Thereafter, the case was docketed in this Court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (1997). After carefully and fully reviewing the record and the relevant authority, the defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis Reid - Concurring and Dissenting
M1999-00803-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

I concur with the majority’s opinion affirming the conviction of the defendant. With regard to the imposition of the death sentences in this case, however, I cannot agree. My concerns, as expressed below, pertain to my continued dismay with the comparative proportionality review protocol imposed by the majority.

Mary F. Hall. v. Mary Rose Pippin.
M2000-01151-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Vernon Neal
The Defendants, Mary Rose Pippin and Dale Delaney appeal the Trial Court's dismissal of a Rule 60 motion, which attacked a previous determination by the Trial Court relative to their right to maintain a fence across a roadway over which the Plaintiffs, Mary F. Hall and Don K. Hall claim a private right-of-way. We affirm.

W2001-03088-COA-R3-CV
W2001-03088-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: James F. Russell