Opinions
State of Tennessee v. William Couch
The Defendant, William Couch, pled guilty to two counts of theft of property. The trial court imposed an effective ten-year sentence and placed the Defendant on supervised probation. While on probation, the Defendant absconded from supervision and committed new misdemeanor offenses. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked his suspended sentences and ordered him to serve the balance of those sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to impose a lesser sanction, such as reinstatement to probation or split confinement. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brandon Shane Wooley v. Dickson County et al.
This appeal concerns jail behavior credits. Dickson County Jail inmate Brandon Shane Wooley (“Plaintiff”) sued Dickson County and several officials (“Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Dickson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that he was wrongfully denied credits for good behavior. When Defendants failed to respond within 30 days, Plaintiff moved for default judgment. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. In addition, the Trial Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Trial Court stated, therefore, that it was unnecessary to address Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the Trial Court’s holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remand for the Trial Court to determine whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies and what those remedies were. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lorenza Zackery
The defendant, Lorenza Zackery, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the appeal as untimely. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rex A. Moore
The Defendant, Rex A. Moore, pleaded guilty to theft of property and two counts of violating the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004 (“Sexual Offender Registry”). The trial court imposed an effective four-year sentence and suspended the sentences, placing the Defendant on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant violated the terms of his probation by misrepresenting his residence in violation of the Sexual Offender Registry requirements and by assaulting a corrections officer while incarcerated. After a hearing, the trial court fully revoked the Defendant’s suspended sentences and ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his suspended sentences and by failing to consider lesser sanctions. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Taivaun Marquise Mallory
The Defendant, Taivaun Marquise Mallory, appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received a sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a firearm recovered after a traffic stop and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyler Christian
A Knox County Jury convicted Defendant, Tyler Christian, of two counts of carjacking and one count of driving on a revoked license. The trial court merged the carjacking convictions and imposed an effective sentence of sixteen years’ confinement as a Range II offender. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the trial court’s decision to supplement the pattern jury instructions with definitions of “force” and “violence,” and the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for new trial. After review, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rikiya Joy Parks
Defendant, Rikiya Joy Parks, appeals her Hawkins County Criminal Court jury convictions for aggravated child neglect, making a false report, and child abuse, challenging the admission of photographs of the minor victim, the admission of what she claims was improper character evidence, the exclusion of printed screenshots of Facebook messages, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and the imposition of consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stanley William Havens
A jury convicted Defendant, Stanley William Havens, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) and of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08% or higher (DUI per se), and it found that this was Defendant’s third DUI offense for enhanced sentencing. The offenses were merged, and Defendant was assessed a fine and sentenced to serve 11 months and 29 days in confinement, with a release eligibility of 75%. Defendant appeals, challenging: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the redacted video of the traffic stop; (3) the trial court’s failure to excuse a juror for cause; (4) a statement during voir dire that he asserts constitutes prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) his sentence. We affirm and remand for entry of a corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 3. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Keith R. Prather v. Yvonne R. Prather
The parties obtained a divorce in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). On appeal, the wife disputes the Trial Court’s calculation of her portion of the husband’s military retirement pay. Upon our review, we determine that the Trial Court miscalculated the wife’s portion given that it calculated her portion based on the parties’ date of informal separation, rather than the date of the husband’s retirement from the military. In doing so, the Trial Court misclassified marital property as separate property. We, accordingly, vacate the Trial Court’s classification of the husband’s military retirement pay as partially separate property acquired during the marriage and the Trial Court’s division of the entire marital estate, insofar as the Trial Court’s improper classification of this marital asset affects the equitable division of the marital estate as a whole. We remand this cause to the Trial Court for it to properly classify the husband’s military retirement pay as marital property acquired during the months of the marriage, recalculate its division of this marital asset, and re-access its division of the entire marital estate in light of its reclassification and recalculation of its division of this marital asset. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Coblentz et al. v. Tractor Supply Company
In this appeal, we consider whether a retail store purchaser of products can be a “statutory employer” of the product vendor’s injured employee under Tennessee’s workers’ compensation statutes, potentially secondarily liable for the employee’s workers’ compensation benefits, and also protected under the exclusive remedy provision. Resolving this issue requires us to answer a threshold question: whether the term “subcontractor” in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-113(a) includes a product vendor who engages in only the sale and ancillary delivery of merchandise. We hold that it does not. We hold that the term “subcontractor” in section 50-6-113(a) refers to a person or entity that performs labor or services for another; section 50-6-113(a) does not apply to a pure vendor-vendee relationship. To determine whether a vendor-vendee arrangement that includes services beyond the sale and ancillary delivery of merchandise is governed by section 50-6-113(a), we adopt a version of the “predominant purpose” test often utilized in connection with the Uniform Commercial Code to ascertain whether a contract is predominantly for the sale of goods or services. In this case, there was an arrangement between a product vendor and the defendant retail store that required the vendor’s sales employee to perform services other than ancillary delivery of purchased merchandise. Applying the predominant purpose test, we hold that the predominant purpose of the arrangement was for the product vendor to sell merchandise to the retail store. Any additional services rendered were incidental to the vendor’s sale of merchandise to the retail store. Accordingly, the relationship between the plaintiff’s employer and the defendant retail store was one of vendor-vendee, not principal-subcontractor, and is outside the ambit of section 50-6-113(a). For that reason, the defendant retail store is not the plaintiff’s statutory employer for purposes of section 50-6-113(a) and is not shielded from the plaintiff’s injury claims by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation statutes. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion. |
Lincoln | Supreme Court | |
Abdoulaye Mamadou v. Gatti, Keltner, Bienvenu & Montesi, PC
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant law firm in this legal malpractice action on the basis that the plaintiff failed to present expert proof in support of his claim that the defendant law firm breached the standard of care. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jo Carol Edwards v. Peoplease, LLC, et al.
In this appeal, we clarify the standard of review in workers’ compensation cases. We also explain when an aggravation injury is compensable under Tennessee workers’ compensation law. Plaintiff Jo Carol Edwards sought medical coverage and disability benefits after a work-related accident aggravated her pre-existing arthritis. Following a lengthy administrative process, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims awarded Ms. Edwards medical coverage and disability benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board reversed. Ms. Edwards appealed. We hold that the standard of review for factual findings in Workers’ Compensation cases is de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness unless the preponderance of the evidence shows otherwise. The standard of review for factual findings applies regardless of whether the finding is based on live testimony or deposition testimony. We also hold that an “aggravation” injury under workers’ compensation law does not require proof of a permanent change or a permanent worsening of conditions to be compensable. Instead, an aggravation injury is compensable when an employee shows, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the aggravation injury primarily arose out of and in the course and scope of employment. This means that an employee must show that the employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing the aggravation. Then, the employee must prove, by a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the aggravation contributed more than fifty percent in causing death, disablement or need for medical treatment. Applying these definitions to the record before us, we reverse the decision of the Appeals Board, and reinstate the award granted by the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims in its December 12, 2023 Order. |
Supreme Court | ||
Cynthia Allen West v. Roderick Jay West
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court found that the wife was economically disadvantaged, that it was not feasible for her to be rehabilitated, and that she had no meaningful earning capacity. Therefore, the court awarded the wife alimony in futuro. The court also conducted an equitable division of the couple’s marital property. The husband appealed. We have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the wife could not be rehabilitated. However, the court failed to consider all of the wife’s sources of income and to make sufficient findings. Therefore, we vacate the court’s alimony award and remand for further proceedings. We decline to award the wife her appellate attorney’s fees. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Andrew Levi Jefferson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Andrew Levi Jefferson, appeals the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions in Coffee County Circuit Court case numbers 40579, 42946, 43169, and 43688. Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance; possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver; possession of 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver; and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, for which he is serving an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to (1) investigate evidence tampering by a police officer; (2) file several motions to suppress; and (3) adequately explain the plea agreement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Lee Adams, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert Lee Adams, Jr., appeals the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his conviction of attempted second degree murder and resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, he claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal of his convictions. Based on our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antonio Kendrick v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the Weakley County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Weakley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Dewayne Wright, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Michael Dewayne Wright, Jr., was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, and first degree premeditated murder, for which he is serving two consecutive life sentences. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon (1) trial counsel’s conflict of interest stemming from representing two other suspects at the same time he represented Petitioner; (2) trial counsel’s failure to compel the same two suspects to testify at trial; (3) trial counsel’s failure to consult or call as a witness a firearms expert; (4) trial counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation and prepare for trial; and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors. Petitioner also asserts that the trial court failed in its duty to inquire about trial counsel’s conflict of interest. Finally, Petitioner asserts that the trial court failed to adjudicate Petitioner’s request for DNA testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act (“the DNA Act”). Following a thorough review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ashley Hester Ayers v. John Robert Ayers
This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. Husband asserts that the trial court erred in assigning the entire amount dissipated to Husband. Husband further assigns error to the trial court’s classification of an insurance settlement stemming from the theft of Husband’s pre-marital vehicle. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified by this Opinion. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
MARK KLEINMAN v. RHONDA LAWSON
This appeal concerns the trial court’s findings of six counts of criminal contempt against Mother following a contentious, years-long custody battle. Due to the lack of a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
CATHERINE AMANDA MULLIS v. SAI CHATTANOOGA N, LLC
After discovering that the roof of her new car leaked, the owner returned to the dealership several times for repairs, but the leaks persisted. Later, when she began feeling sick, the owner suspected that mold growing in the car was the cause. The ownersued the dealership claiming, among other things, that negligent repairs led to the mold growth and caused her health issues. The dealership moved for summary judgment, asserting that the owner could not prove causation. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Mar-Kee Mosley
Petitioner, Tony Mar-Kee Mosley, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude that Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal and the interest of justice does not warrant a waiver of the notice requirement. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal as untimely. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Felix Mandiel Leach
The Defendant, Felix Mandiel Leach, pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to sell or to deliver a Schedule II controlled substance as a Range II, multiple offender and received a twelve-year sentence to be served on probation. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony M. Patton
Defendant, Anthony M. Patton, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, to correct a clerical mistake in the judgments entered against him. He asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to apply pretrial jail credit to the second of two consecutively imposed sentences, arguing that he is entitled to receive such credit on both sentences. He also argues that his plea agreement is void as a result. The State responds that the trial court correctly applied jail credits to Defendant’s first sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Harold Clark
Defendant, Jimmy Harold Clark, was convicted by a Cumberland County jury of one count of rape of a child under the age of thirteen. The jury imposed the maximum fine of $50,000, and the trial court imposed a forty-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress his statement and that his sentence was excessive. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dewayne Harris v. Steve Upton, Warden
In 2018, a Williamson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dewayne Edward Harris, of joyriding, carjacking, and aggravated robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to serve an effective sentence of thirty years of incarceration. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and we affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment. Harris v. State, No. M2023-00681- CCA-R3-PC, 2024 WL 4164998, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2024), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application denied (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2025). The Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the trial court entered an order summarily dismissing the petition. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals |