Opinions
State of Tennessee v. Martin Aron Harasim
On or about July 31, 2025, the Defendant, Martin Aron Harasim, filed a pro se notice of appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). He simultaneously filed a pro se motion seeking review of the trial court’s ruling regarding the commencement of the sentence he received for his misdemeanor convictions in this case. Tenn. R. App. P. 8. As reflected in the judgment sheets, on July 25, 2025, the Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, first offense (Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401), attempted assault on a first responder (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-116), and resisting arrest (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16- 602), all of which are misdemeanors. The Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days of supervised probation after service of sixty days in jail. The Defendant is currently represented by appointed counsel and his case is still pending in the trial court, however. Accordingly, the pro se notice of appeal is premature. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c) and (d). Moreover, it has long been the rule that a defendant may not be represented by counsel and simultaneously proceed pro se on appeal. State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tenn. 1976); State v. Parsons, 437 S.W.3d 457, 478 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011). Accordingly, the pro se notice of appeal is hereby dismissed without prejudice. At the conclusion of the proceedings in the trial court, the Defendant, by and through counsel of record, may pursue an appeal to this Court, if appropriate. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). The pro se Rule 8 motion is denied for the same reason. Counsel may file the appropriate motion for review of the trial court’s ruling regarding the commencement of the Defendant’s sentence, if necessary. According to the statements by the Defendant in 08/04/2025 2 his motion, the trial court ordered him to begin serving his sixty-day sentence on August 1, 2025. If that is true, the Court makes the following observations for the benefit of counsel and the trial court. Subsection (b) of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-35-116 provides that the trial court may revoke bail immediately upon conviction, in applicable felony cases, “notwithstanding sentencing hearing[s], motion[s] for a new trial and related post-guilt determination hearings.” The Sentencing Commission Comments to that section advise that “[t]he standards for revocation of bail are set forth in Section 40-26-102.” Section 40- 26-102, entitled “Bail in felony cases,” governs admission to bail pending appeal. Subsection (e) of Section 40-26-102 provides that “[t]he setting of bail or release upon recognizance is a matter of right for one convicted of a felony and sentenced to confinement for less than one (1) year.” As discussed above, however, the Defendant in this case was convicted of misdemeanor offenses. The Sentencing Commission Comments to Section 40-35-116 further advise that bail in misdemeanor cases is addressed in Section 40-26-104. Both that statute and the Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a defendant has the right to bail pending appeal in misdemeanor cases. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-104; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(1). Section 40-26-104 provides: “In all misdemeanor cases, the judge or court shall direct the clerk of the circuit or criminal court to admit the defendant to bail in a sum prescribed by the judge or court, with sufficient sureties for defendant’s appearance at the circuit or criminal court in which judgment was rendered against the defendant, at the next term after the decision of the cause by the supreme court, to answer the judgment of the court.” Rule 32(d), which is titled “Release After Conviction, Pending Further Proceedings,” discusses release following conviction in both misdemeanor and felony cases. Subsection (d)(1) of Rule 37, which covers misdemeanor cases, provides simply: “A person convicted of a misdemeanor has a right to have bail set or to be released on recognizance pending the exhaustion of all direct appellate procedure in the case.” Accordingly, it is clear the legislature intended those defendants convicted of a misdemeanor to be entitled to bail pending the exhaustion of post-trial and appellate remedies. The Clerk shall forward a copy of this order to the Defendant, counsel of record, and the trial court clerk. Because the Defendant was declared indigent by the trial court, costs are taxed to the State. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elijah Shaw et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
This is an equal protection challenge to a city ordinance that restricts customer visits to some home-based businesses but not others, which the plaintiffs contend are similarly situated in all material respects in relation to the purpose of the restrictions. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that the restrictions were constitutional because they were rationally related to the city’s interest in preserving the residential nature of neighborhoods. Thus, the court granted Metro’s motion and denied the plaintiffs’ motion. The plaintiffs appeal, contending that the trial court reached the incorrect conclusion because the plaintiffs presented evidence that their home-based businesses have no greater impact on the residential nature of neighborhoods than the exempt home-based businesses. We agree with the plaintiffs. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Inc., et al. v. Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance
This appeal arises from a chancery court petition for interlocutory judicial review of an intermediate agency decision in a contested case proceeding before the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance. The petition sought judicial review of the administrative law judge’s denial of a motion to dismiss. The department moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The chancery court construed the challenge as a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction and determined that an adequate remedy would be available to the petitioners in the form of subsequent judicial review of a final administrative decision. Accordingly, the chancery court granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioners appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Wilson
Defendant, Joshua Wilson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s decision to deny judicial diversion in his guilty-pleaded conviction of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-503. Following our review, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric Orlando Carter v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Eric Orlando Carter, appeals from the Circuit Court of Davidson County’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following review, we dismiss the appeal as untimely. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Lee Ream
The defendant, Robert Lee Ream, pleaded guilty to two counts of arson, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of four years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay $75,000 in restitution. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in ordering restitution. Upon our review, we conclude that the defendant has failed to prepare a sufficient brief in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a), and therefore, his issue is waived. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Oscar Hernandez
A jury convicted the defendant, Oscar Hernandez, of three counts of rape of a child and five counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty-three years for each of the rape of a child convictions and to ten years for each of the aggravated sexual battery convictions. The trial court ordered the three thirty-three-year sentences to run consecutively and the remaining sentences to run concurrently, for an effective sentence of ninety-nine years’ incarceration. In his direct appeal, the defendant contends the effective sentence is excessive. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Tobias Ryan Byram
A Hardin County jury convicted the Defendant of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Shane McDonald
The Defendant, Kenneth Shane McDonald, appeals from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict, and the trial court improperly restricted cross-examination of one of his codefendants regarding sentencing exposure. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Susan Anderson, By Her Conservator Rebecca Woods Et Al. v. Alexian Village of Tennessee
In this health care liability action, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice upon finding that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
IN RE ESTATE OF BETTY RUTH SHAW MORGAN
This is an appeal from a trial court’s final order entered on February 7, 2025. The notice of appeal was not mailed to the Appellate Court Clerk via certified mail until May 9, 2025, more than thirty days from the final order’s entry date. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Byron Black v. Frank Strada, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.,
Byron Lewis Black, a death-row inmate scheduled for execution on August 5, 2025, |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
In Re Estate of Floyd Edward Faulkner
After the decedent’s most recent will was admitted to probate, the decedent’s grandson moved to certify standing for a will contest. The grandson claimed standing as a beneficiary of a prior will. After a couple of hearings, he came forward with signed copies of several prior wills that named him as a beneficiary. The trial court ruled the grandson lacked standing because he failed to produce an original instrument or establish a lost will. We conclude that the copies of the prior wills, standing alone, were insufficient to establish standing. So we affirm. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
JAMES E. BLOUNT, IV v. WEIGEL’S STORES, INC. ET AL.
The plaintiff sued a third party in North Carolina. During that litigation, the plaintiff learned that a Tennessee business might have information relevant to the lawsuit, so the plaintiff obtained a subpoena in North Carolina and, under the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, received a corresponding subpoena from the Circuit Court Clerk for Knox County, Tennessee. After serving the subpoena on an agent for the defendant, the plaintiff heard no response. He then brought a petition to enforce the subpoena against the company and its agent. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for Rule 11 sanctions, which the trial court granted. Because we find that the trial court did not adequately explain its decisions to dismiss the petition, grant attorney’s fees, and order Rule 11 sanctions so as to allow for meaningful appellate review, we vacate the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Darryl Whisnant v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
This appeal concerns a decision by the Tennessee Board of Parole (“the Board”). Following a hearing, the Board denied parole to inmate Darryl Whisnant (“Whisnant”). The Board said that, going forward, Whisnant should complete his programming as recommended by his Strong R Assessment, namely by continuing his positive behavior, remaining drug free, and taking a few minutes each day for positive reflection. Whisnant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court upheld the Board’s decision. Whisnant appeals. According to Whisnant, the Board violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(2)(B) by failing to state in writing how he could improve his chances of being released on parole. Whisnant argues that his recommended tasks were open-ended and impossible to complete. We find, as did the Trial Court, that the tasks given to Whisnant clearly were meant to be complied with up to his next parole hearing, at which time the Board can consider Whisnant’s compliance or non-compliance as part of its decision-making. The recommended tasks are neither open-ended nor impossible to complete. We hold that the Board complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(2)(B). We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Hayes
The petitioner, Paul Hayes, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Based on our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lakeesha Nicole Dixon-Starnes v. Ascension Saint Thomas Hospital Midtown
This matter is a petition for recusal of the trial judge pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. The inadequacies of the petition require this Court to affirm the trial court’s denial of the recusal motion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Alexis F. et al.
A mother and a father challenge the juvenile court’s finding of two grounds for the termination of their parental rights and its finding that termination was in the best interests of the two children. We find that the juvenile court failed to make sufficient findings regarding one ground and vacate that ground. We affirm in all other respects. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald C. Wade v. State of Tennessee
Ronald C. Wade brings this appeal challenging the Tennessee Claims Commission's denial of his motion to compel medical benefits. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because we conclude that the Claims Commission's two grounds for denying benefits are incorrect, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
IN RE VICTORIA H.
This action involves the dismissal of an appeal from the juvenile court regarding the custody of a minor child. We now affirm the dismissal of the appeal. |
Roane | Circuit Court | |
In Re Lola-Rayne D.
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision terminating her parental rights. She challenges the termination ground, which is severe child abuse, as well as the best interest determination. We have concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports both of these rulings by the trial court and, therefore, we affirm. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Livingston
A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Gregory Livingston, of first degree premeditated murder for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction; (2) the admission of the autopsy report prepared by a non-testifying forensic examiner and testimony from a medical examiner who did not conduct the autopsy; (3) the admission of a video recording from a police officer’s body camera showing the victim’s girlfriend crying following the shooting; and (4) the admission of Defendant’s statement that he previously killed others. Upon review, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Ometrick Stasher
Defendant, Carlos Ometrick Stasher, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and evading arrest.1 The trial court imposed an effective ten-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the firearm found in his vehicle; that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence of his prior possession of a firearm; and that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with prior convictions. Upon review of the record, the briefs of the parties, arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior possession of a firearm and by allowing the State to impeach Defendant with a prior conviction for possession of a firearm. However, we conclude that the error was harmless and affirm Defendant’s convictions. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Lucas S.
This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The father appeals the judgment of the trial court that terminated his parental rights to his minor child based on abandonment by willful failure to visit. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
STACIE SMITH v. GARY MEEK
This appeal arises out of a landlord-tenant dispute between Appellant Stacie Smith and Appellee Gary Meek. In response to a plumbing issue in her rented home, Ms. Smith sought injunctive relief from the Knox County General Sessions Court requiring Mr. Meek to make certain repairs to the home. The General Sessions Court granted the requested injunction, which Mr. Meek appealed to the Knox County Circuit Court. Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Meek and dismissed Ms. Smith’s complaint. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |