Shervin Shahriari et al. v. Ikon Electric Services, Inc. et al.
A defendant appeals a judgment arising out of a dispute over residential electrical work. Because the defendant did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel Forrester Hunter v. Winnie Sue Cooper
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, filed by Samuel Forrester Hunter (“Father”) seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Father, and finding no error, we affirm the denial of the recusal motion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert-Henry Butts IV v. Jacob Berti
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claim for false imprisonment based on the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Remmia Radhakrishnan Sukapurath v. Sajeesh Kumar Kamala Raghavan
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in Appellant’s petition, the appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Alan Gordon v. Heather Elizabeth Gordon
Husband and Wife both sought a divorce, with each attributing fault to the other. During the divorce process, Wife alleged to the police, the Department of Children’s Services, and Husband’s military employer that Husband had abused her and their child. Husband denied the allegations and responded with a petition to hold Wife in criminal contempt for making false allegations of abuse. The contempt petition and the military investigation into Wife’s claims remained open at the time of Wife’s deposition. Wife refused, allegedly based on these open matters, to answer questions at her deposition, pleading the Fifth Amendment. The deposition was relocated to the courthouse, where the trial court held an impromptu hearing on the matter. During the hearing, the judge informed Wife that her refusal to answer questions could result in her being held in civil contempt. However, instead of holding Wife in civil contempt, with no warning, the trial court struck Wife’s pleadings and entered a default judgment. Addressing Husband’s pleadings and testimony thereupon, the trial court thereafter entered a final order dividing the parties’ property and fashioning a parenting plan. Wife appealed, arguing, among other things, that the sanctions of striking her pleadings and issuing a default judgment were improper. Because we conclude that Wife had insufficient notice, we vacate the trial court’s sanctions order and remand the case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Darrin Numbers et al. v. Robert Snyder et al.
The plaintiffs in this case are two individuals who transferred a substantial amount of money to a business. After the business failed to repay the plaintiffs, they filed a lawsuit against the business and its owner, alleging various wrongdoings and seeking to pierce the corporate veil of the business. The trial court determined that the plaintiffs had proven all of their claims and awarded compensatory and punitive damages against both the business and its owner. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court failed to apply the proper test for piercing the corporate veil and failed to provide sufficient clarity in its damages award. We, therefore, remand the matter to the trial court for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Pirtle, in his capacity as the Executor of the Estate of Mark A. Pirtle, deceased v. John R. Howerton et al.
The plaintiff, in his capacity as the executor of the decedent’s estate, commenced this action for breach of a stock purchase agreement against the decedent’s former business partner and the business that they owned together. The agreement comprised two documents: one requiring an initial lump-sum payment of $1 million, and one requiring payment of “$8,000.00 per month for 96 months and two new automobiles with lease payments or purchase payments not to exceed $1,500.00 per month for 96 months.” The decedent also signed a handwritten note in which he agreed to forgive “all debts” if the former business partner honored “all agreements for 1 (one) year after [the decedent’s] death.” The plaintiff later moved for summary judgment based on evidence that the defendants made only 17 monthly cash payments and only 114 of the vehicle payments. In response, the defendants asserted that they made a lump sum payment of $40,000 “in full satisfaction of the debt” before the decedent’s death. The defendants also argued that the debt was forgiven pursuant to the handwritten note. Regardless, the defendants maintained that there was no evidence of missed payments. The trial court granted the motion in part, finding it undisputed that the defendants made only 17 payments. The court also found that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of his attorney’s fees and costs under a “Hold Harmless and Indemnity” clause in the purchase agreement. But the court found a dispute of material fact on whether the defendants breached their obligation to make all car payments. At trial, the defendants moved for a directed verdict due to the plaintiff’s alleged failure to prove damages. The trial court granted the motion because there was no evidence that the defendants missed any car payments. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment in all respects except for the award of attorney’s fees, which was based on an incorrect interpretation of the contract. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Acute Care Holdings, LLC v. Houston County, Tennessee
This appeal follows our remand in Acute Care Holdings, LLC v. Houston Cnty., No. M2018-01534-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2337434 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2019) (hereinafter “Acute Care I”). The dispute involves the alleged breach by Houston County of a Letter of Intent pertaining to the purchase of a hospital in Erin, Tennessee. On remand, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, Acute Care Holdings, LLC (“Acute Care”), by granting its motion for partial summary judgment on the basis that Houston County breached the Letter of Intent. Thereafter, the trial court entered an Agreed Final Judgment awarding Acute Care a judgment of $1,218,062.63 and prejudgment interest of $730,036.65. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Houston | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kansas B. et al.
The appellant is a physician assistant accused by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) of sexually abusing a stepchild. After one appeal of the dependency and neglect case, the appellant and DCS entered into an agreed order to resolve the matter. According to the appellant, he did not stipulate in the agreed order that he engaged in the alleged misconduct. In a related criminal case, the appellant was indicted by a grand jury and ultimately entered a no contest plea. He did not admit guilt, no conviction was entered, and all charges will be dismissed and expunged if he completes his probation. The Tennessee Department of Health (“DOH” or “the Department”) informed the appellant that it had opened a case against him before the Board of Physician Assistants regarding his fitness to practice “due to the allegations in the [dependency and neglect] matter.” The Department sought certain records from the juvenile court case, and the appellant opposed it. The trial court granted the Department’s motion, and the appellant appealed. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Batiste, et al. v. The Memphis and Shelby County Board of Adjustment, et al.
The president of a homeowner’s association filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a decision by a local zoning board. The chancery court dismissed the petition, finding that the petition was insufficiently verified. After review, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Laura Kisana v. Isaac Caldiero
The appellant, Isaac Caldiero (“Appellant”), filed a notice of appeal with this Court in September 2025, which states that Appellant is appealing the August 8, 2025 order of the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“the Trial Court”). Upon receiving the appellate record in this appeal, this Court reviewed the record on appeal to determine if the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(b). |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
SIGNAL PUMP, LLC D/B/A SIGNAL POWER v. ARROW ELECTRONICS, INC.
This appeal concerns an unsuccessful business relationship between two companies. Signal Pump, LLC (“Signal”), a company that builds LED light towers, contracted with Arrow Electronics, Inc. (“Arrow”), a major supplier of electronics components, for Arrow to become Signal’s exclusive supplier. The relationship broke down as Arrow failed to timely supply Signal with parts and Signal failed to pay Arrow. Signal sued Arrow in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) alleging, among other things, breach of contract and fraud. New York substantive law governed this lawsuit as provided for by the parties’ agreement. Arrow filed a counterclaim against Signal for breach of contract based on Signal’s alleged failure to fully compensate Arrow for its products and services. According to Signal, Arrow’s failure to timely supply parts per the agreement cost Signal massive losses in profits it otherwise would have earned. Arrow, in turn, has asserted throughout that Signal continually changed its requests for parts. After a bench trial, the Trial Court found that both parties breached the agreement. The Trial Court awarded Arrow damages for Signal’s failure to pay. However, the Trial Court declined to award Signal any damages for lost profits, citing a liability limitation clause in the parties’ agreement. Signal appeals. We hold that the liability limitation clause is an exculpatory clause. We modify the Trial Court’s judgment in that respect. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Stanley H. Trezevant, et al. v. Collierville Auto Center, Inc.
At the conclusion of proof in a bench trial in a breach of lease action, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that both plaintiffs lacked standing. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that the individual plaintiff’s lack of standing rendered his claim moot but vacate the trial court’s decision regarding the plaintiff company. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Monica D. Sorensen v. Jayson R. Sorensen
The trial court denied Husband’s timely motion to alter or amend a divorce decree involving child custody, child support, and the distribution of military retirement benefits. Several days later, the trial court entered a Military Retired Pay Division Order. Husband’s notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the former order, but within thirty days of the latter order. Because we determine that the time for filing an appeal from the order denying Husband’s motion was not affected by the entry of the Military Retired Pay Division Order, we conclude that Husband’s appeal was untimely. Without a timely filed notice of appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
James William Rose et al. v. Patrick M. Malone
In this grandparent visitation action, the grandparents filed a contempt petition, alleging that the child’s father had violated provisions of a previously entered visitation order. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court rendered an oral ruling and found the father in contempt. Before the trial court’s entry of a written order regarding contempt, however, the father filed a motion seeking the trial court judge’s recusal. The trial court entered orders adjudicating the contempt charges and the father’s bond before entering a written order adjudicating the recusal issue. The trial court then entered orders awarding attorney’s fees to the grandparents. The father has appealed. Upon review, we determine that the trial court erred by entering further orders before entering an order adjudicating the recusal motion. We therefore vacate the trial court’s August 2023 bond orders and the August 2023 order regarding the second contempt petition, which were entered while the motion to recuse was pending. We reverse the trial court’s orders awarding attorney’s fees to the grandparents. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
CHARLES EDWARD COPELAND ET AL. v. SCG IV-KARCH’S CROSSING, LLC
This is an appeal from a premises liability, slip-and-fall claim against the owner of a shopping center. The husband slipped and fell while trying to get into his vehicle at a shopping center owned by the defendant company. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend, which the trial court denied. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick Michael Wallen v. LC Germantown Owner, LLC
Because Appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal, and it is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Heintz v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization
Appellant filed a complaint for judicial review of the Tennessee State Board of Equalization’s decision to deny his request for property tax relief. Because Appellant sought review of an administrative order that had not become final under the applicable version of tax relief statutes, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(a)(1) (“A person who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review”) (emphasis added). Affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gholam Reza Safaeih v. Reza Alizadegan
The parties entered into an agreement in which the defendant provided funds and the |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Crain Law Group, LLC v. Jenna Renee Amacher
This appeal arises from a breach of contract claim. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment after Appellant’s counsel failed to respond or otherwise appear to oppose the motion. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Scott Keith Lannom v. Renee Alyce Lannom
In this post-divorce action, the trial court conducted a two-day hearing regarding the mother’s petition to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan. At the conclusion of the hearing, the father moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41. The trial court granted the motion, determining that modification of the parenting plan was not warranted because the mother had not met her burden to prove that there had been a material change of circumstance affecting the minor child’s well-being. The trial court accordingly dismissed the mother’s petition with prejudice and awarded the father his reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We further determine that Father is entitled to his reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Braxton M.
This appeal involves a mother and stepfather’s petition to terminate the parental rights of a father to his surviving child after the death of the parties’ other child. The petition alleged two grounds for termination of parental rights – abandonment by failure to support and severe child abuse. The chancery court found that neither ground had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court also reviewed the statutory best interest factors and concluded that it was not in the best interest of the child for the father’s parental rights to be terminated. The mother and stepfather appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Braxton M. - Concur in Part/Dissent in Part
It is often said that “hard cases make bad law.” This case is more than hard — it is tragic. In circumstances such as these, which evoke strong emotions, this Court must resist the temptation to bypass the limits of our appellate review and re-try cases and re-evaluate facts to achieve what some deem to be a more just result. Unfortunately, in my view, the majority’s opinion does exactly this – essentially abrogating the role of the trial judge as a factfinder. Specifically, the majority opinion reverses the trial court’s determination that no grounds existed for termination, reverses the trial court’s conclusion that termination of parental rights is not in Braxton’s (“the Child’s”) best interest, reverses factual findings made by the trial court, and even disregards credibility findings made by the trial court. I agree that clear and convincing evidence exists to establish abandonment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). The majority and I then choose different paths. Although I would reverse the trial court’s ruling as to abandonment, I would affirm in all other respects. In my view the majority ignores the presumption of correctness in the standard of review and does not give sufficient weight to the trial court’s credibility findings to travel the path they deem just. I do not agree that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings of fact, nor that the aggregation of the individual facts amounts to clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Hill Boren Properties, et al. v. Ricky Lee Boren, et al.
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Madison | Court of Appeals | |
KATHY DIANE BARKER COMPTON v. MICHAEL COMPTON
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The wife primarily challenges the trial court’s decision to deny her alimony. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals |
