In Re Krystopher C. et al.
In this case involving termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights to their two minor children, the trial court determined that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven as to each parent by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father and mother have each appealed and have proceeded pro se upon waiving their rights to appointed counsel. Having determined that clear and convincing evidence did not support the trial court’s finding of the statutory abandonment ground of failure to support as to the mother, we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to this ground as to the mother. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Celeste Lachapelle as the beneficiary of the will of James Russell Pace v. Blanchard E. Tual, et al.
Appellant sued the law firm that prepared a will on behalf of her fiancé for professional negligence after an out-of-state will contest resulted in the invalidation of the will. The trial court concluded that Appellant’s claim accrued when she was forced to respond to the will contest and not when the will was actually held to be invalid. Thus, Appellant’s action was filed after the one-year limitations period had expired, and the trial court granted summary judgment for the law firm. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
CHARLES J. BEARD ET AL. v. WILLIAM ODOM ET AL.
This appeal arises from the purchase of a residential home. The plaintiff homebuyers asserted claims against the defendant sellers for intentional or negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act (“TRPDA”). The plaintiffs’ claims were based solely on the defendants’ TRPDA disclosure statement, which said there were no known defects in the home’s floor structure. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims on the basis that the plaintiffs knew or should have known about the alleged defects because the plaintiffs had every opportunity to discover the defects and were made aware of the defects by their own observations and inspection reports. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they reasonably relied on the defendants’ misrepresentation. But the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof on summary judgment to establish that they actually or reasonably relied on the disclosure statement. For this reason, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Xingkui Guo v. State of Tennessee
Professor appeals from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s Rule 41.02(2) involuntary dismissal of his breach of contract action against Tennessee State University. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Kelly M. Et Al. v. Agness M.
Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Ridgeview Partners, LLC d/b/a Ravelle at Ridgeview v. Michelle Okoreeh-Baah Keister
In this unlawful detainer action, the landlord obtained judgment in the general sessions court against a tenant for failure to pay rent. The tenant, who remained in possession of the subject property, appealed the judgment to the circuit court without posting a bond for possession as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-18-130(b)(2)(A). In the absence of a bond, the landlord sought immediate possession of the property. The tenant moved to proceed on appeal without a bond, arguing that the affidavit of indigency she had filed with the general sessions court sufficed in lieu of a surety bond for her appeal. The circuit court ordered the tenant to either surrender possession of the property or post a possession bond. After the tenant failed to surrender possession or post a bond, the circuit court issued a writ of possession in favor of the landlord, which the landlord executed shortly thereafter. Having regained possession of the property, the landlord filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. The trial court accordingly entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice. The tenant has appealed the dismissal to this Court, arguing that because she had filed an affidavit of indigency in the general sessions court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-5-103, she should have been permitted to retain possession of the property pending resolution of her appeal to the circuit court without posting a bond. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marshall Turley v. John Mendez
The trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint with prejudice, and he appeals. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we do not reach the substantive issues. Appeal dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone
This emergency conservatorship action was litigated along with an action to establish a permanent conservatorship. The trial court’s judgments in both actions have been appealed. Because the appeal in the permanent conservatorship action has resolved the issues raised in this appeal, we dismiss the appeal as moot. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rosalynn (Victor) Addis v. Ryan Keith Addis
This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding in which the trial court adopted the wife’s marital property division and the wife’s proposed permanent parenting plan, found the husband willfully unemployed and imputed his income at $252,850.50 per year for child support purposes, and awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony, alimony in futuro, and a judgment in the amount of $43,407.50 for attorney’s fees. Husband appeals. We affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone
This is a conservatorship action. Appellants are attorneys who prepared estate planning documents for Susan Davis Malone in 2014 and 2018. Ms. Malone’s 2018 documents included a durable power of attorney and power of attorney for healthcare (“DPOAs”) in favor of Appellants. In that 2018 healthcare DPOA, Ms. Malone appointed Appellants to serve as her conservator should the need arise. In 2021, Ms. Malone suffered a disabling healthcare event, and Appellants provided for her care pursuant to the 2018 documents. In 2022, Ms. Malone purportedly revoked the 2018 DPOAs and executed DPOAs in favor of her daughter, Appellee Lisa Malone Jackson. Appellants filed a petition to be appointed conservator; Ms. Jackson filed a counter-petition. The proceedings in the trial court initially focused on whether Ms. Malone had the capacity to revoke the 2018 DPOAs and to execute the 2022 DPOAs. During the proceedings, Appellants filed two motions to recuse the trial judge. The trial court denied both motions. On appeal, this Court affirmed. While Appellants’ second motion to recuse was pending, the trial court found good cause to hold an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the competing conservatorship petitions. Attorneys did not participate in the hearing, and the trial court appointed a neutral interim conservator. Shortly after it denied Appellants’ second motion to recuse, the trial court determined that an additional hearing was not necessary. The trial court found that the 2022 documents were valid and concluded without an evidentiary hearing that it was in Ms. Malone’s best interest to appoint Appellees to serve as co-conservators. Upon review of the record, we determine that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Additionally, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the guardian ad litem. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Sue Speranza v. Scott Michael Speranza
In this divorce case, Appellant/Wife appeals the trial court’s denial of her Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion to alter or amend the final decree of divorce. Although Wife and Appellee/Husband tendered proposed final decrees and orally announced their consent to be divorced and to divide the marital estate, they did not file a written property-settlement agreement. In her Rule 59.04 motion, Wife asserts, inter alia, that the parties did not come to an agreement concerning the division of two marital assets, i.e. stock in Husband’s company, and funds held by the trial court Clerk. In the absence of such agreement, Wife contends that the trial court erred in entering its final decree and in the division of the disputed assets. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Korey DeJuan Dupree
This appeal arises from a probate matter in which the trial court, inter alia, granted by default a motion for substitution of the original personal representative. The original personal representative filed a motion to vacate the default order and later filed a “Verified Petition for Temporary Restraining Order without Notice” to prevent the disbursement of funds received from a related wrongful death suit. While the motion and petition were pending, the successor personal representative petitioned to close the estate and discharge personal representative, which the trial court granted. The original personal representative appeals, contending that it was error to grant the substitution of personal representative by default due to a lack of proper notice and hearing. After a review of the record, we find that there has been no adjudication of the motion to vacate the order removing the original personal representative or the petition for temporary restraining order. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is not final, and we must dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Genash, LLC v. Rose Legacy, LLC as successor in interest to Agnoletti Properties, LLC
In this commercial lease dispute, the tenant sued the landlord for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement, and the landlord counterclaimed for breach of contract. The trial court granted the tenant’s motion for partial summary judgment on its breach of contract claim, concluding that the landlord breached the lease. The matter then proceeded to trial, where the jury returned a verdict on a list of issues, including damages on the tenant’s breach of contract claim, the landlord’s defenses to the breach of contract claim, the tenant’s fraudulent inducement claim, and the landlord’s breach of contract claim against the tenant. The jury found in favor of the tenant on both of its claims against the landlord but only awarded damages on the breach of contract claim. The jury concluded that the landlord had not proven its breach of contract claim. We have determined that the trial court erred in granting the tenant’s motion for partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and, therefore, reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE AZALAYA J.
This action involves the termination of the parents’ parental rights to their minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish statutory grounds of termination as applied to each parent. The court found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the court’s termination decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE KANIEL Y.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish at least one statutory ground of termination. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s termination decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Helena Agri Enterprises, LLC v. Ted Rains d/b/a AG Services
Appellee filed a complaint against Appellant over a contract dispute, and Appellant failed to timely file a responsive pleading. The trial court granted a default judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellant filed a motion for the trial court to set aside the default judgment, and the trial court denied that motion. On appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the default judgment by failing to properly consider all relevant factors and by disregarding an issue related to venue. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
JESSICA GARVIN v. MARIAH SHELTON
On remand from this Court, Appellant filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs in the trial court. As the basis for her motion, Appellant relied on Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119 (contemplating an award of attorney’s fees to a party on grant of his or her Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss), and on this Court’s mandate from the first appeal, wherein we remanded the case to the trial court for, inter alia, “collection of costs.” The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Jones-Mbuyi et al. v. Jill Fitcheard et al.
In this declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, the trial court allowed the Tennessee Attorney General to intervene on behalf of the State of Tennessee (“the State”). However, instead of allowing intervention for the limited purpose of defending the statute’s constitutionality, the trial court ordered that the State be made a party defendant in the action, thereby invoking the requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-18-101(a) that a three-judge panel be appointed. The plaintiffs timely appealed. Determining that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24, we vacate the trial court’s order directing the State’s intervention as a party defendant. We remand this matter to the trial court to determine whether the State is a necessary party or whether the State should be allowed to intervene for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-312. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Jones-Mbuyi et al. v. Jill Fitcheard et al. (Dissenting)
Appellants Kimberly Jones-Mbuyi and Horwitz Law, PLLC challenge the constitutionality of a provision of Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-312 and a provision of the Code of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. The question presented by this appeal is whether the State of Tennessee must be a party to the Appellants’ declaratory judgment action. The majority concludes that the State may intervene for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of the statute consistent with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24; yet it remands for a determination of whether the State is a necessary party. Because the State is not a necessary party, I would reverse the trial court with instructions to permit the Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter to intervene on behalf of the State for the limited purpose of defending the statute’s constitutionality. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
JEFF HURST v. CITY OF MORRISTOWN
This is a Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) case, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-101, et seq., alleging negligent operation of a street sweeper by a city employee. The trial court denied the city’s claims of immunity and entered judgment after a nonjury trial, apportioning 51 percent fault to the city’s employee who was driving the street sweeper and 49 percent fault to the driver of the pickup truck that was involved in a collision with the sweeper. The city appealed. We affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE WALTER G. ET AL.
Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interests of their three younger children. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Mother and Father committed severe abuse against a child and that the children’s best interests are served by termination, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
RENEGADE MOUNTAIN COMMUNITY CLUB, INC. v. MOY TOY, LLC
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for recusal of the trial judge. After carefully reviewing the limited record provided by the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
SETH DOWNING v. KNOX COUNTY BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS ET AL.
This appeal arises out of a local planning commission’s approval of a development plan application. The Plaintiff sought to appeal the planning commission’s approval of the application to the local board of zoning appeals; however, a local zoning ordinance permitted the plan applicant to opt out of the appeal before the board of zoning appeals, which he did. The plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit court, challenging the planning commission’s approval of the application and the dismissal of his appeal by the board of zoning appeals. The plaintiff claimed that the opt-out provision violates his constitutional right; thus, by applying the opt-out provision, the board of zoning appeals acted illegally. The circuit court dismissed the petition, holding that the plaintiff impermissibly combined an original action with a petition for certiorari review. The circuit court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claim regarding the planning commission’s actions because the plaintiff did not sufficiently verify his petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Charlene Dreaden v. White & Rhodes, P.C.
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the petition, the appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Ferguson v. State of Tennessee
Following an automobile accident allegedly involving a State of Tennessee employee, claimant sought damages against the State based on alleged injuries arising from the accident. The Division of Claims and Risk Management denied the claim, and claimant appealed to the Claims Commission. Because claimant’s appeal was not filed within the ninety-day statutory time limit, the Claims Commission dismissed it. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals |
