In Re Estate of Shawn Edward Sheeks
Shawn Sheeks (“Decedent”) and Paul Slate (“Mr. Slate”) co-owned and managed several business entities. Following Decedent’s untimely death, Mr. Slate, acting on behalf of the businesses they co-owned, filed a Verified Claim against Decedent’s estate in the Chancery Court (Probate Division) for Montgomery County seeking an accounting and damages of $382,207.48. Shortly thereafter, Janet Sheeks (“Ms. Sheeks”), Decedent’s widow and the Administratrix of the Decedent’s estate, filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (hereinafter “the Business Court”) on behalf of herself and Decedent’s estate against Mr. Slate seeking an accounting and to windup and dissolve the business entities. Mr. Slate filed a counterclaim against the estate and Ms. Slate, as well as cross-claims against the business entities, seeking an accounting and payment for debts allegedly owed to him. While the Claim in the Probate Court was held in abeyance, all claims by and among the parties in the Business Court were tried. In a detailed and thorough final order, the Business Court ordered dissolution of the business entities and allocated the distribution of the assets among the parties after applying offsets and credits. No one appealed the judgment from the Business Court. Thereafter, the Administratrix of the Estate filed a motion for summary judgment in this Probate Court proceeding contending the Claim should be dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The Probate Court granted the motion and summarily dismissed the Claim on the ground of res judicata finding that the Claim was not a separate and distinct cause of action from the Business Court action, that the underlying facts at issue were the same in both lawsuits, and that the Claim could have, and should have, been litigated in the Business Court action. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Beverly Louise Ingram
In this appeal, the appellants challenge administrative and legal fees the trial court awarded the administrators of the estate and the parties’ respective legal counsel. We have determined that these issues have been waived for a variety of reasons including the appellants’ failure to comply with Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6 and Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We find that the administrator of the estate is entitled to reasonable compensation for services rendered and expenses incurred in defending this appeal. We also find this appeal to be frivolous. We remand for the trial court to award the administrator an appropriate fee and to award damages in favor of the estate against the appellants, Robert Davidson, Sr. and Shuntae Davidson, for fees and expenses the estate incurred in defending this appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Nicole Marie Beach v. Mark Phillip Beach
Appellant filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal seeking to recuse the trial judge. Because Appellant did not file a written motion to recuse and because the trial court never entered an order on same, we dismiss the appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Taylor Thornton, III, et al. v. T.M.D. Farms, Incorporated
This appeal involves a complaint to quiet title and for injunctive relief and damages |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Violet L.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found multiple |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kristyn Elise Turner, deceased, by and through her Natural Parents, Anna Marie Turner et al. v. Charles Brent Boles, M.D.
Parents, on behalf of their deceased child, filed a health care liability action against an obstetrician, alleging that the infant’s death was the result of negligent medical treatment during delivery. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the parents argue that the trial court erred in: (1) limiting the testimony of their causation expert and excluding his exhibits and demonstrative aids; (2) denying a motion in limine to prohibit a line of questioning and argument by the defense; (3) excluding evidence of the suspension of the defendant’s medical license; (4) refusing a request for a special jury instruction on informed consent; and (5) declining to grant a new trial based on misconduct of defense counsel during closing argument. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Andrea Jaye Mosby v. Eric Lee Meachem
Appellant and Appellee agreed ona permanent parenting planthat provided for equal parenting timeof their minorchildafter their divorce.Appellee later sought to relocate with the childto pursue an employment opportunityin Georgia.One hundred four days after Appellee filed a relocation petition, Appellant filedan answer opposing the relocation. Thetrialcourt permitted the relocationand struck Appellant’s opposition because it was filedafter the expiration of the thirty-day period set forth inTennesseeCode Annotated section 36-6-108.The courtamended the parties’ parenting accordingly.Onappeal, Appellantargues the trial court erred in striking his response as untimely.We affirm thejudgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Travis Lynn Rasmussen v. Sasha Nicole Rasmussen
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court found that the husband is |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Southern Auto Source Finance, LLC v. Airways Towing & Recovery, LLC
This extraordinary appeal involves whether a non-attorney individual may file a notice of |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joan Young v. Cottage Grove Condominium Association, Inc.
The appellant filed the instant action seeking a copy of the property management contract between her condominium association and its property management company. The trial court determined that “a contract between a condominium association and its management company would not be included in those records that a condominium association would be required to provide to a unit owner.” The court dismissed the matter with prejudice. The appellant appeals. We affirm the ruling of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
ZACHARY C. CROUCH v. UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE
This matter concerns a plaintiff’s effort to revive a discrimination lawsuit. Having determined that the plaintiff’s principal appellate brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of briefing in this Court, we conclude that his issues purportedly raised on appeal are waived. The appeal is dismissed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
CALEB TAYLOR SPEARS v. RUSSELL LEE SCRUGGS ET AL.
This accelerated interlocutory appeal requires us to determine whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for recusal, which was brought pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2. Because Appellant’s petition fails to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.03, the appeal is dismissed. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Marla Ann Richardson v. Dianne M. Moore
A property owner brought suit against the owner of a neighboring property, seeking either an order awarding her land encompassing a driveway or an easement to use the driveway. The trial court referred the issues to a special master, who made detailed findings regarding the boundary between the properties and as to the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement and an easement by necessity. Following a hearing on objections to the special master’s report, the trial court accepted the special master’s findings and recommendations. The neighbor appealed, raising issues regarding the court’s weighing of the evidence in finding the boundary line and granting of a prescriptive easement and an easement by necessity. We affirm. |
Houston | Court of Appeals | |
Chicago Title Insurance Company v. Closed Nashville, LLC et al.
Mortgage companies maintain that the Tennessee Housing Development Agency(“THDA”), which services mortgages through the trade name of Volunteer Mortgage Loan Servicing(“VMLS”), is liable for monetary losses following the use of an improper bank account number. THDA and VMLS contend that they are protected by sovereign immunity and filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion because it found THDA was engaged in commercial activities. THDA and VMLS appealed. We reverse. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Andrew J. Withers v. Withers Collection, Inc., et al.
This appeal arises from a complaint originally filed in the Shelby County chancery court |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charlotte R. Sappo v. 4404 Holdings, LLC
A homeowner brought suit against the owner of the house next door, asserting a claim for breach of a joint driveway agreement and an alternative action for a declaratory judgment that the neighbor had abandoned the easement created by the driveway agreement. The neighbor filed counterclaims for a declaratory judgment, trespass, and an alternative claim for rescission for failure of consideration. After a trial, the trial court entered a final order determining the boundaries of the easement established by the driveway agreement; the court rejected the plaintiff’s claims for breach of the easement and abandonment as well as the defendant’s claim for trespass. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in its rulings regarding the boundaries of the easement, its denial of her claims for breach of the easement and abandonment, and in its award of discretionary costs to the defendant. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE JADEN H.
In this termination action, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights to his |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Project Reflect v. Joan Anderson et al.
Thisis an appeal from the dismissal ofa nonprofitcorporation’s complaint pursuant to the doctrine of prior suit pendingbecausethe nonprofit had previously filed a lawsuit in another courtagainst the same defendantbased onsimilar claims. The nonprofit appealed. After review, we have determined that the circuit court correctly dismissed the complaint. We also use our discretion to deny the appellee’s request for fees under the frivolous appeal statute. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Burstiner v. Brian Boyd et al.
After the trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss, Appellant sought relief from the order pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion. The trial court then denied Appellant’s request pursuant to Rule 59.04 for relief from the denial of his Rule 60.02 motion. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Tomlin v. Nephrology Associates, P.C. et al.
This is the third appeal arising from more than a decade of litigation between Plaintiff/Appellant and Defendant/Appellee regarding claims of unpaid leasing commissions and breach of contract. The sole issue on appeal is from what date should mandatory post-judgment interest begin to accrue after a remand by this court. Discerning no error in the determination of the trial court, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Matthew Woodruff v. Jessica Ann Woodruff
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Because Appellant failed to provide this Court with a copy of the motion to recuse filed in the trial court,the appeal is dismissed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
SHERRY KELTCH EX REL.CHARLES KELTCH v. CANDICE MARIE WILLIAMS ET AL.
This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 23, 2026. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until April 23, 2026, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Kaileigh Marie Dunn v. Russell Allen Dunn, III
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
CLAUDE R. ELLIS v. MELISA JANE GODFREY ELLIS
This is a long-running divorce case on appeal to this Court for the third time. The husband |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Isaiah M.
Petitioner/Mother seeks accelerated review of the trial court’s denial of her 12th motion to recuse. A final judgment has been entered in the underlying termination of parental rights case, and Mother has appealed that judgment. Issues related to the trial court’s denial of Mother’s motion to recuse may be raised in Mother’s appeal of the trial court’s final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. |
Court of Appeals |