Raul Martinez v. Davids Group, LLC
The appellee sustained severe injuries after falling off of a ladder at his job. The appellee was performing work on a building owned by the appellant when the accident occurred, and he claims the ladder was owned by the appellant. The appellant’s workers’ compensation policy had lapsed and was not in effect at the time of the accident. The appellee filed a common law tort action against the appellant. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the appellee a judgment of $471,038.36. We conclude that the trial court erred in calculating the appellee’s damages for lost wages and future lost earning capacity and modify the trial court’s judgment to correct such error. We also remand this case to the trial court for consideration of whether the appellee is entitled to an award of noneconomic damages. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nick Charles Vergos
Because the Shelby County Probate Court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over this breach of contract case, we vacate the probate court’s order and remand with instruction to transfer the matter to the Shelby County Chancery Court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
TIMGMT Acquisitions, LLC v. 5D Development, Inc. et al.
This appeal concerns third-party claims for breach of contract filed by a real estate developer against several real estate investment companies. The trial court entered an agreed order extending the time for the third-party defendants to file a “responsive pleading.” Then, prior to the deadline for filing their responsive pleadings, the third-party defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. But the developer argued that the third-party defendants waived their right to file a Rule 12 motion because the agreed order only extended the deadline for “responsive pleadings.” During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the third-party defendants asked for an award of their attorney’s fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c)(1), which requires courts to “award the party or parties against whom the dismissed claims were pending at the time the successful motion to dismiss was granted the costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in the proceedings as a consequence of the dismissed claims by that party or parties.” The trial court granted the motion to dismiss but held that the third-party defendants could not recover their attorney’s fees and costs under § 20-12-119(c)(1) because “the written motion to dismiss did not include a request for an award of fees or cite to the statute.” This appeal followed. We conclude that the agreed order did not constitute a waiver of the third-party defendants’ right to file a motion to dismiss and affirm the dismissal of the claims at issue. However, we conclude that the third-party defendants are entitled to an award of their costs and attorney’s fees under § 20-12-119(c)(1). Thus, we reverse and remand with instructions to award the third-party defendants their reasonable and necessary attorney fees and costs. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re The Estate of Ethel M. Harris
Appellant, Shamika Sykes, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Probate Court that was entered on March 13, 2025. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
WENDIE DEANN DERRICK, ET AL. v. PEGGY LANE CASTLE, ET AL
The appellants filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the motion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Mario R. Perkins v. Frank Strada, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction
This is an appeal from an order dismissing an inmate’s Petition for Declaratory Judgment. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Yonas M. Teshale v. Fanchaisavanh Lanexang
This appeal concerns a father’s petition to modify the permanent parenting plan for his two children. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court magistrate entered a plan that modified the residential parenting schedule and gave the mother sole decision-making authority over all educational and non-emergency health care decisions. The father argues that the magistrate did not maximize his participation in the children’s lives as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a) and that there was no basis for modifying the allocation of decision-making authority. We affirm the judgment in all respects. We have also determined that the mother, as the prevailing party, is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Cedric Jones. Kroger Limited Partnership I et al.
After slipping and falling on accumulated snow and ice in the parking lot of a grocery store, a man filed a premises liability lawsuit against the store, the owner of the parking lot, and the company hired to perform snow and ice removal services for the parking lot. The trial court granted summary judgment to all of the defendants because the court found that the proof at the summary judgment stage showed conclusively that reasonable minds could not differ that the man was at least fifty percent at fault for the injuries he alleged to have suffered. Discerning that the evidence shows that a dispute of material fact exists, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Taylor G.
This appeal arises from the trial court’s modification of a permanent parenting plan in which the court designated the father as the primary residential parent and awarded the mother supervised visitation. We now affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James Simmons v. Rachel Montgomery Daniels
Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition for parental relocation and its entry of a modified permanent parenting plan naming Father/Appellee the child’s primary residential parent. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
AARON CREGATI v. BREANNA NICOLE PETET
This appeal concerns the trial court’s granting of a petition to extend an order of protection for ten years after finding that the respondent violated the original order of protection multiple times and failed to appear for hearings throughout the litigation. Because none of the issues the appellant raises were raised in the trial court, we dismiss the appeal. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-617(a)(1), we award the appellee’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the appeal and remand for calculation of the amount. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE ZAIMEON M.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish several statutory grounds of termination as applied to the mother. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Scott Materials, Inc. v. S.T.A. Financial, Inc., et al.
This is an action for breach of contract and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”). The defendants, who are Minnesota residents and who have no business activities in Tennessee except for this one transaction with the plaintiff, responded to the complaint by filing a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion on both grounds. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
TOWN OF GREENBACK, TENNESSEE, ET AL. v. M&M STONE FARMS, LLC, ET AL.
This action involves the proper use and zoning of a parcel of real property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner, determining that the owner’s use of the property as a quarry was not prohibited because the subject property was unzoned. The trial court based its ruling on the municipality’s inability to produce a validly enacted zoning ordinance that applied to the specific parcel. The municipality and its planning commission have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We also find that the property owner’s motions to consider post-judgment facts and to dismiss the appeal are not well taken, and we deny those motions. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Shelby County, Tennessee v. Stephanie Taylor ET AL.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her petition for writ of mandamus. Because Appellant improperly joined her original mandamus action with Appellee’s petition for judicial review, an appellate action, we affirm the dismissal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Juleah Marie Barrettsmith v. Christopher James Jeffers
Petitioner seeks to appeal a denial of her motion to recuse. Because she did not include her trial court motion and supporting documents, the record is insufficient to determine this appeal. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
MATTHEW L. ARMITAGE v. GINNY HALE
Finding good cause, a trial court issued an ex parte order of protection. Following the subsequent contested hearing, the trial court did not determine whether the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying offense predicate for issuance of an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b). Instead, the trial court determined that extension of the ex parte order of protection was unwarranted because the petitioner had failed to prove ongoing existing danger posed by the alleged perpetrator. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court, while noting a seeming tension between this approach and the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36- 3-605(b), concluded the result followed from this court’s decision in Dulaney v. Chico, No. E2022-00047-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2253373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023). Noting that this court’s prior decision is unpublished, the petitioner appeals, asserting that the trial court’s approach is inconsistent with the statute. We agree with the petitioner that the statute mandates extending an existing ex parte order of protection upon finding that a predicate act was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we vacate and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
MATTHEW L. ARMITAGE v. ANDREA L. KASULIS
A trial court declined to grant an ex parte order of protection. Following the subsequent contested hearing over whether to issue an order of protection, the trial court did not determine whether the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying offense predicate for issuance of an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b). Instead, the trial court determined that issuance of an order of protection was unwarranted because the petitioner had failed to prove ongoing existing danger posed by the alleged perpetrator. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court, while noting a seeming tension between this approach and the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b), concluded the result followed from this court’s decision in Dulaney v. Chico, No. E2022-00047-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2253373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023). Noting that this court’s prior decision is unpublished, the petitioner appeals, asserting that the trial court’s approach is inconsistent with the statute. While our understanding of the statutory scheme diverges from that set forth in Dulaney v. Chico, we affirm the trial court’s decision. We do so because we conclude that the absence of existing ongoing danger is a proper consideration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b) when no ex parte order has been issued and because the trial court properly understood its discretion in this case. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Fred M.
This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish statutory grounds of termination. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
MATTHEW L. ARMITAGE V. ANDREA L. KASULIS
JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., concurring. The majority provides a well-researched analysis of the interplay between the legislative purpose of a statute and its actual operation in the court system. However, I depart from the majority’s thoughtful conclusion as applied to the order of protection statutes, which I view as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
MATTHEW L. ARMITAGE v. GINNY HALE
JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., dissenting. The majority provides a well-researched analysis of the interplay between the legislative purpose of a statute and its actual operation in the court system. However, I depart from the majority's thoughtful conclusion as applied to the order of protection statutes, which I view as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Brandon Shane Wooley v. Dickson County et al.
This appeal concerns jail behavior credits. Dickson County Jail inmate Brandon Shane Wooley (“Plaintiff”) sued Dickson County and several officials (“Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Dickson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that he was wrongfully denied credits for good behavior. When Defendants failed to respond within 30 days, Plaintiff moved for default judgment. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. In addition, the Trial Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Trial Court stated, therefore, that it was unnecessary to address Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the Trial Court’s holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remand for the Trial Court to determine whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies and what those remedies were. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Keith R. Prather v. Yvonne R. Prather
The parties obtained a divorce in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). On appeal, the wife disputes the Trial Court’s calculation of her portion of the husband’s military retirement pay. Upon our review, we determine that the Trial Court miscalculated the wife’s portion given that it calculated her portion based on the parties’ date of informal separation, rather than the date of the husband’s retirement from the military. In doing so, the Trial Court misclassified marital property as separate property. We, accordingly, vacate the Trial Court’s classification of the husband’s military retirement pay as partially separate property acquired during the marriage and the Trial Court’s division of the entire marital estate, insofar as the Trial Court’s improper classification of this marital asset affects the equitable division of the marital estate as a whole. We remand this cause to the Trial Court for it to properly classify the husband’s military retirement pay as marital property acquired during the months of the marriage, recalculate its division of this marital asset, and re-access its division of the entire marital estate in light of its reclassification and recalculation of its division of this marital asset. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Abdoulaye Mamadou v. Gatti, Keltner, Bienvenu & Montesi, PC
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant law firm in this legal malpractice action on the basis that the plaintiff failed to present expert proof in support of his claim that the defendant law firm breached the standard of care. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia Allen West v. Roderick Jay West
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court found that the wife was economically disadvantaged, that it was not feasible for her to be rehabilitated, and that she had no meaningful earning capacity. Therefore, the court awarded the wife alimony in futuro. The court also conducted an equitable division of the couple’s marital property. The husband appealed. We have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the wife could not be rehabilitated. However, the court failed to consider all of the wife’s sources of income and to make sufficient findings. Therefore, we vacate the court’s alimony award and remand for further proceedings. We decline to award the wife her appellate attorney’s fees. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals |
