Workers' Compensation Opinions

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sustained an injury to her shoulder in April 2005 while working for Employer. When she returned to the office, she made a statement in the presence of her supervisor and others that she had injured her shoulder. The supervisor testified that she did not hear the statement. In the following months, Employee received occasional medical treatment for the injury. In March 2006, her doctor recommended surgery. Employee gave written notice of the injury to her supervisor on the next day.  Employer denied the claim based upon Employee’s failure to give notice of her injury within thirty days. The trial court found that Employee had given sufficient notice and awarded 7.5% permanent partial disability. Employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in finding that the claim was not barred by failure to give timely notice. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. While at work for the Employer, the Employee’s hair was caught in machinery, which violently pulled her head into the machine. Her scalp was pulled away from her skull. She received treatment at an emergency room.  In the months that followed, she had three surgical procedures to repair the wound and her scalp.  She was diagnosed with post traumatic stress syndrome, developed sleep problems, anxiety and headaches. She became fearful and anxious around machinery and was ultimately discharged by her Employer. Her physicians and vocational experts and the Employer’s vocational expert agreed that when a Social Security questionnaire was considered, she was 100% disabled. Nevertheless, the Employer contends that she is not 100% disabled. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by basing the employee’s impairment rating on the testimony of the independent medical examiner instead of on the employee’s treating physician. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee and Employer entered into a court-approved settlement agreement in 1988. The agreement required Employer to continue to provide medical treatment for the injury in accordance with the workers' compensation law. Employee received treatment from time to time. Employer paid for the treatment. In June 2006, Employer requested an independent medical examination of Employee. The evaluating physician concluded that current medical treatment was not related to the original work injury.  Employer thereafter declined to provide further treatment. Employee filed this action. The trial court ordered Employer to continue to provide medical treatment. Employer has appealed. We affirm the judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Jim Sanders, retired from his employment with the United Parcel Service in September 2003. In February 2004, he gave notice to his employer of a workers’ compensation claim. He alleged that he had sustained gradual injuries or aggravation of his pre-existing conditions as a result of his work activities. The claim was denied, and the Mr. Sanders filed suit. At trial, the court sustained objections by both parties to medical records attached to medical depositions. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that the employee had failed to carry his burden of proof and also that the claim was barred by failure to give timely notice of the alleged injury. The employee has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in sustaining the employer’s objection to medical records, in finding that he had not carried his burden of proof, and in finding that he had not complied with the notice requirement of the workers’ compensation law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

This workers’ compensation appeal involves an employer’s liability for medical benefits stemming from injuries that occurred subsequent to an original compensable injury. Following a 2001 work-related injury to his elbow, the employee and his employer settled the employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The settlement obligated the employer to pay future medical bills resulting from the elbow injury. Shortly after undergoing corrective surgery on the injured elbow in 2004, the employee burned his hand while cooking at home. While recuperating from the burn to his hand, he suffered additional injuries to his hand in a fall near his sister’s home. The employee filed a petition seeking to recover medical expenses for these two injuries to his hand on the basis that the medical expenses associated with these injuries were the direct and natural consequence of the original work-related injury to his elbow. The trial court found that the medical expenses sought by the employee were the result of intervening causes, namely the employee’s own negligence, and denied the petition. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel reversed, finding that the subsequent injuries were the direct and natural consequence of the original compensable injury and that there were no intervening causes. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the injuries to the employee’s hand were due to his own negligence, and therefore, the employer is not required to pay the medical bills associated with those injuries. Accordingly, we reverse the Panel’s decision and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. It involves an employee with a pre-existing medical condition who sustained a work-related injury. The employer terminated the employee after he failed to report for work or call in after he had been released to return to work without conditions.  Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court for Davidson County found that the employee had sustained a work-related injury that had aggravated a pre-existing condition. The trial court also determined that the employee had not made a meaningful return to work and, therefore, that the cap on benefits in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(1) (2005) did not apply. The trial court also determined that the employee was one hundred percent permanently partially disabled. The employer has appealed. While we affirm the trial court’s finding that the employee sustained a compensable injury, we vacate the finding that the employee had not had a meaningful return to work and that the employee was one hundred percent permanently partially disabled. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. It involves a delivery driver who asserts that he sustained two work-related back injuries in 1999. Following surgery in 2002, the delivery driver’s surgeon assigned him a twenty-eight percent impairment and opined that the 1999 injuries had exacerbated a pre-existing back condition. The delivery driver later filed a complaint seeking benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Law in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the delivery driver sixty percent permanent partial disability and temporary total disability from March 2000 to September 2004. The trial court also directed the delivery driver’s employer to pay some of his medical expenses. On this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred (1) by admitting the second deposition of the delivery driver’s surgeon, (2) by finding that the delivery driver had sustained a permanent impairment as a result of his work-related injuries, (3) by awarding the delivery driver temporary total disability benefits, and (4) by requiring it to pay a part of the delivery driver’s medical expenses. For his part, the delivery driver asserts that the trial court erred by failing to award him some of his claimed medical expenses and for declining to impose a bad faith penalty against the employer. We have determined that the award of temporary total disability benefits should be reduced and that the medical expenses awarded by the trial court should be paid directly to the providers rather than in a lump sum to the delivery driver. Therefore, we affirm the judgment as modified by this opinion.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. It involves the attempt of a long-term employee of an air conditioner manufacturer to obtain benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act for an injury to her foot. She filed a claim seeking workers’ compensation benefits in the Chancery Court for White County. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and that she was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits resulting from a fifty-five percent permanent partial disability to her foot. On this appeal, the employer asserts that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the injury arose out of the course of the employment and that the disability award was excessive. We have determined that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s award.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. It involves an employee who returned to work after sustaining a compensable injury but who was unable to continue working after his injury worsened.  He filed a petition in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2) (2005) in the Chancery Court for Putnam County seeking reconsideration of his permanent disability. Following a bench trial, the trial court made an award based on a seventy-five percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, subject to a credit for the amount of the earlier settlement. The employer asserts on this appeal that the trial court erred by exceeding the cap of six times the impairment in the absence of expert proof regarding whether the employee has reasonably transferable job skills.  Because we have determined that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242 (2005) requires expert proof on this issue, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  After working an evening shift at his job, the employee awoke the next morning with severe back pain. He sought medical treatment through his family physician who referred him to a neurosurgeon.  Within a few days, he had surgery to repair bone spurring and degenerative changes in his cervical spine. After the surgery, he informed his supervisor that he believed his job caused his condition.  He made a workers’ compensation claim, which his employer denied. The trial court found that his injury was work-related and awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, contending that the claim is barred by failure to comply with the notice requirement of the workers’ compensation law, and that the employee did not sustain his burden of proof concerning causation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Gregory Yeary, suffered a compensable low back injury in October 2003. He received medical treatment and returned to work. In August 2004, he experienced back pain while lifting his two year old son. Mr. Yeary advised his employer that he had never recovered from the original injury and made a workers’ compensation claim. The claim was denied. Two evaluating physicians testified that Mr. Yeary had sustained a permanent impairment as a result of the October 2003 injury. Neither doctor could state with certainty the effects of the August 2004 child lifting episode. The trial court awarded 42% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer, CMH Manufacturing, Inc., has appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in failing to find that the August 2004 event was the intervening cause of the employee’s disability, that the amount of the award was excessive, that the trial court erred in requiring payment of unauthorized medical expenses, and that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The employer also contends that the trial court placed improper conditions upon granting a stay. We affirm the judgment.

This action for workers’ compensation benefits has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The claimant seeks workers’ compensation benefits for the death of his wife, a long distance truck driver, who died after leaping from the cabin of her tractor trailer on a mountainous stretch of highway. Her employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier is in liquidation. As part of the liquidation process, the chancery court assigned the claim to a referee for a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The referee concluded that the wife’s death did not arise out of her employment. The chancery court affirmed the denial of benefits, but on the grounds that the Liquidator had established that the wife’s death was due to willful misconduct. The claimant appeals. This appeal presents two issues: 1) whether the claimant’s tardiness in filing objections to the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law was due to excusable neglect, and 2) whether the chancery court erred in holding that the Liquidator met its burden of proof for establishing the willful misconduct defense. Upon review, we hold that the claimant’s late filing was due to excusable neglect. In addition, we hold that the Liquidator failed to establish that the wife’s death was due to willful misconduct. Accordingly, we reverse the chancery court’s holding on both issues and remand for a new hearing.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee received medical treatment for low back pain in March 2004. She was pushed to the floor by a patient in April 2004. She had back surgery in July 2004 and returned to work in September 2004.  She continued to have symptoms. In February 2005, she was involved in a serious automobile accident, unrelated to her employment. She had a another surgery in July 2005 and did not return to work thereafter. She filed suit, contending that both surgeries were caused by the April 2004 incident. The Employer denied liability, contending that the first surgery was the result of her preexisting condition and the second surgery was the result of the motor vehicle accident. The trial court found both surgeries to be compensable and awarded 45% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The Employer has appealed. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding concerning the first surgery but does preponderate against its finding concerning the second surgery. We also find that Employee had a meaningful return to work after the first surgery, and we therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part and remand to the trial court for recalculation of the Employee’s permanent partial disability.

I concur with the majority opinion that the evidence presented in this case does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Mr. Cotton was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury he sustained while working at Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company. In order to find that this injury rendered Mr. Cotton permanently and totally disabled, however, it is necessary to find that he sustained the shoulder injury and that the injury and subsequent treatment aggravated his pre-existing diabetes.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee was a diabetic. He suffered a compensable shoulder injury, which required two surgeries and another procedure to correct. He returned to work on light duty status. Some time later, he fell into a diabetic coma. He subsequently developed renal failure and required dialysis thereafter. The trial court found Employee to be permanently and totally disabled, found that the shoulder injury alone had caused a 30% permanent partial disability, and apportioned the award between Employer and the Second Injury Fund. The Fund has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in awarding benefits for permanent total disability. Employee contends that the trial court erred in attributing only 30% disability to the shoulder injury, and in apportioning the award under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-208(a). We affirm the judgment and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion and the Suggestion of Death upon the Record filed in this matter.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2005) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of facts and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had suffered a 65 percent vocational impairment to the body as a whole resulting from gradual hearing loss and tinnitus and also found that the employee’s last day worked was his date of injury. The trial court awarded 260 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the employee failed to prove causation of his tinnitus and that he is therefore entitled to recover only for his hearing loss, an injury to a scheduled member. The employer also asserts that the date of injury should be an earlier date, the last date on which the employee was exposed to high levels of noise injurious to his hearing. We hold that the trial court was correct in setting the employee’s date of injury as the last day on which the employee worked for the employer. Based on the proof in the record, we hold that the trial court did not err in ruling that the employee suffered a “whole body” impairment. The judgment below is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded lump sum benefits. On appeal, a previous workers’ compensation appeals panel reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Employee died for reasons unrelated to the injury, while the appeal was pending. The trial court modified its previous award and again commuted the amount to a lump sum. The Second Injury Fund has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by awarding benefits in excess of those which had accrued prior to the Employee’s death. We agree, modify the judgment accordingly, and remand to the trial court for the calculation of the benefits payable to the Estate.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee has been treated for a shoulder injury and a back injury. The shoulder injury occurred on July 1, 2000. The back injury occurred on January 28, 2002. After the shoulder injury, the employee sought treatment from numerous doctors for pain in her shoulder. The doctors were unable to determine the cause of her pain until a SLAP lesion was diagnosed on October 29, 2003. On December 13, 2002, the employee filed a complaint seeking compensation for both injuries. The trial court determined that both injuries were compensable and awarded the employee eighty percent (80%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that the shoulder injury was not barred by the statue of limitations and as a result erred in determining the employee’s vocational disability by including the shoulder injury.  The judgment is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case was remanded by a prior workers’ compensation appeals panel for recalculation of the award of permanent partial disability benefits. On remand, the award was modified. The employer, Bridgestone Firestone, Inc., paid the judgment, but declined to pay post-judgment interest. The trial court denied a motion to require payment of interest that was filed by the the employee, Steven Q. Manchester, and he has appealed. We reverse the trial court and hold that Mr. Manchester is entitled to post-judgment interest on the modified amount of the award from the date of the original judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Her job as a school psychologist required her to travel between schools and other sites in the City of Kingsport. She had gone to a restaurant for lunch after completing an assignment at an elementary school. She was injured in an automobile accident which occurred as she was leaving the parking lot of the restaurant. At the time, she was returning to her office to pick up materials for an assignment at a second school. The trial court granted Employer’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Employee’s injury did not arise from or occur in the course of her employment. Employee has appealed. We hold that Employer was not entitled to summary judgment, vacate the judgment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee developed lateral epicondylitis as a result of his work activities, and the Employer provided medical treatment for the injury. The Employee’s symptoms were not relieved, and he sought and received a second opinion through his Employer. Both authorized physicians concluded that the Employee had no permanent impairment. The Employee sought an evaluation from an unauthorized physician, who diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome in addition to lateral epicondylitis. That physician performed surgery and assigned permanent impairment. The Employee sought permanent disability benefits, and the Employer denied liability. The trial court awarded 30% permanent partial disability to the right arm. The Employer has appealed arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. We affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Homer Hooper, Jr., filed a motion to set aside a court-approved settlement of his workers’ compensation claim. The trial court granted the motion, but ordered that Mr. Hooper repay the original settlement amount to his employer, Kathy Freeman Trucking, Inc., within thirty days. Mr. Hooper failed to do so and the trial court reinstated its previous order approving the settlement. On appeal, Mr. Hooper contends that the trial court erred in requiring repayment as a condition of setting the settlement aside. We reverse the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee sustained a compensable injury to his lower back in February 2000. He had surgery to repair the injury in July 2000 and returned to work in September of that year. In April 2001, he completed a temporary day shift assignment. Shortly thereafter, he moved to Florida. The timing and cause of the move are disputed. In July 2002, he consulted a doctor in Florida for low back pain.  He had a second surgery in May 2003. The Employer admitted liability for the February 2000 injury and surgery, but denied that the second surgery was compensable. The trial court found that the Employee had a meaningful return to work after the initial injury, that the second surgery was not compensable and awarded 25% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The Employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in finding that the second surgery was not related to the initial injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This action, seeking permanent partial disability benefits attributable to a disputed diagnosis of a permanent lung injury, was dismissed by the trial court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.