Mark D. Talley v. Board of Professional Responsibility
This appeal involves a disciplinaryproceeding against a Memphis lawyer who pleaded guilty in the Criminal Court for Shelby County to facilitating the felonious violation of the Tennessee Securities Act. After a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel recommended that he be disbarred, the lawyer filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Shelby County seeking judicial review of the hearing panel’s decision. The trial court affirmed the recommendation of the hearing panel, and the lawyer appealed to this Court. On appeal, the Board of Professional Responsibility asserts that the lawyer’s petition should be dismissed because his petition for writ of certiorari did not contain the recitation required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-106 (2000). For his part, the lawyer asserts that the punishment of disbarment is excessive. We have determined that the lawyer’s deficient petition for writ of certiorari does not prevent the courts from reviewing the hearing panel’s decision. We have also determined that the record fully supports the hearing panel’s findings and that disbarring the lawyer is not an excessive punishment in light of the facts and circumstances of this case. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Mark D. Talley v. Board of Professional Responsibility - Concurring
I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I do not concur in the reasoning of the majority opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Federal Insurance Company a/s/o Robert and Joanie Emerson v. Martin Edward Winters, d/b/a Winters Roofing Company
The defendant contractor entered into a contract to replace a roof. When the newly installed roof developed leaks, the defendant hired an independent contractor to make the necessary repairs. While performing the work, the independent contractor caused a fire, resulting in an $871,069.73 insurance claim by the homeowners. As subrogor to the homeowners’ rights and claims arising out of the fire, the plaintiff insurance company sued the defendant in both tort and in contract. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that because he had subcontracted the work, he could not be liable. The trial court granted the motion on both the negligence and breach of contract claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant had a non-delegable contractual duty to perform the roofing services in a careful, skillful, and workmanlike manner. This Court granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal in order to determine the propriety of the claim under the theory of contract. Because the defendant had an implied non-delegable duty to install the roof in a careful, skillful, diligent, and workmanlike manner, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Davis
The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, carjacking, attempt to commit especially aggravated kidnapping, and attempt to commit first degree murder. At issue is the legality of the stop of a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, and whether the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for attempt to commit first degree murder. We conclude that reasonable suspicion existed to permit the officers to conduct a brief investigatory stop of the car in which the defendant was a passenger. Further, we find there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant and his fellow perpetrator planned and intended to kill the victim, and that the defendant’s conduct, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, constituted a substantial step sufficient to support a conviction for attempted murder. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Trousdale | Supreme Court | |
Scott M. Craig v. David Mills, Warden - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In July 1998, a Bradley County jury convicted Scott M. Craig (“petitioner”) of two counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated kidnapping and assessed a twentyfive thousand dollar ($25,000) fine on one of the aggravated rape convictions and twenty thousand dollar ($20,000) fines on each of the other convictions, for aggregate fines of sixtyfive thousand dollars ($65,000). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years for the aggravated rape convictions and a consecutive eight-year sentence for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, for an aggregate sentence of twenty-three years. On July 27, 1998, judgments were entered reflecting each conviction and sentence; however, these judgments did not reflect the fines imposed by the jury, nor did these judgments reflect imposition of any sexual offense surcharge. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-709 (2010). |
Morgan | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Alfred Turner
The defendant was indicted for a murder that occurred nearly ten years prior to his arrest. The defendant’s theory of the case implicated two other men as the individuals responsible for the murder. These men previously had been tried and acquitted of the murder. Over the objection of the defendant, the State introduced evidence of the prior acquittals of the other men. A jury convicted the defendant of facilitation of first degree murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the evidence of the acquittals of the other parties was irrelevant and that the erroneous admission of the evidence was not harmless. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Joseph Edward Rich, M.D. v. Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners
This is an appeal from an administrative hearing wherein the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners suspended a physician’s medical license for one year and imposed other conditions after finding that, among other things, the physician had violated Tennessee Code Annotated sections 63-6-214(b)(1),(4), and (12) (2010). Upon review, the trial court affirmed the Board’s ruling; however, because the Board failed to articulate the applicable standard of care in its deliberations, the Court of Appeals reversed the Board’s ruling. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Board was required to articulate the standard of care in its deliberations. Therefore, we vacate the ruling of the trial court to the extent that it affirms the Board’s decision that the physician violated Tennessee Code Annotated sections 63-6-214(b)(1),(4), and (12). However, rather than reversing the Board’s decisions, we are remanding the matter to the Board and instructing it to conduct deliberations based on the existing record and articulate the applicable standard of care as required by the statute. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Joseph Edward Rich, M.D. v. Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners - Dissenting
The majority asserts that the Board must “articulate what the standard of care is in its deliberations.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-214(g)(2010). To this end, the majority today has found “the standard of care” to be unambiguous. I also find this language to be unambiguous. My reading of Tennessee Code Annotated section 63-6-214(g), however, compels a different conclusion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Lynn Parker
We granted this appeal by the State to determine if the defendant’s conviction of second degree murder should be affirmed pursuant to State v. Mellons, 557 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. 1977), despite insufficient evidence to support it. We hold that Mellons does not control the outcome of this case. We also hold that sufficient proof must support every element of the offense of which a defendant is convicted, even where the conviction offense is charged as a lesser-included offense and sufficient proof supports the greater offense. In this case, the trial court erred in charging the jury with second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of first degree felony murder. Because the proof is not sufficient to support it, we must reverse and vacate the conviction of second degree murder. However, because the proof is sufficient to support the offense of reckless homicide, we remand this matter to the trial court for (1) entry of an amended judgment reflecting a conviction of reckless homicide, and (2) sentencing on reckless homicide. The defendant is entitled to no relief on his remaining issues. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. |
Cocke | Supreme Court | |
Johanna L. Gonsewski v. Craig W. Gonsewski
We granted review in this divorce case to determine whether alimony in futuro should be awarded to a spouse who has a college degree, good health, a stable work history in a relatively high paying job, and a lack of demonstrated need for such long-term alimony. The trial court divided the parties’ real and personal property, declined to award spousal support of any type to either party, and denied a request made by both parties that they be awarded their attorney’s fees and expenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s division of the marital estate, but reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding spousal support and ordered the husband to pay the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,250 per month until her death or remarriage. The Court of Appeals also awarded the wife, in the form of alimony in solido, her attorney’s fees and expenses, both at trial and on appeal. We conclude that the award of alimony in futuro and the award of attorney’s fees and expenses is inappropriate in this case. Additionally, the wife has failed to demonstrate that transitional alimony is appropriate. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
Dr. William P. Harman v. University of Tennessee
The issue presented in this case is whether the employee’s complaint states a cause of action for relief under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The employee, hired as a university professor and department head, filed suit against the university after he was removed as department head. On motion of the university, the trial court concluded that the complaint failed to allege that the employee was discharged or terminated or that he was discharged or terminated for refusing to participate in or for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities and dismissed the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.03. A cause of action arises under the Act when an employer discharges or terminates the employee for refusing to participate in or for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities. We determine that because the employee was neither terminated nor discharged from his employment, only removed as department head, the complaint does not allege facts from which we can reasonably infer a claim under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.03 dismissal of the employee’s complaint. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Dr. William P. Harman v. University of Tennessee - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of a majorityof this Court that the plaintiff’s pleadings are insufficient to withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the element of termination. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Arlene R. Starr v. Paul B. Hill, Sr., et al.
A father and his sixteen-year-old son were sued after the son was involved in an accident while driving a vehicle owned, insured, and provided to him by his father. The basis for the suit against the father was the family purpose doctrine, which imposes vicarious liability on the owner of a vehicle for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a family member. Whether the family purpose doctrine applies to the father requires us to address these issues: (1) whether the father, who does not reside in the same household as the son, was a head of the household under the family purpose doctrine; (2) whether the vehicle was maintained for the comfort or pleasure of the family or solely for use by the son; and (3) whether the vehicle was being driven with the father’s permission such that he had control over its use. The essential elements of the family purpose doctrine are that the owner must be a head of the household who furnishes and maintains the vehicle for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort for the family, and at the time of the injury, the vehicle must have been driven in furtherance of that purpose with the head of the household’s express or implied permission. The trial court granted summary judgment to the father, finding that the family purpose doctrine did not apply. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the family purpose doctrine applied to the father as a matter of law. We hold that the father was a head of the household because he had a family relationship with his son and a duty to support his son and the father furnished and maintained the vehicle for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort to the family. However, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the father had sufficient control over the vehicle. We vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for trial. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Nagele
The defendant pled guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to six years of enhanced probation. At the time, the trial court did not warn the defendant that, upon the expiration of his sentence, he would be subjected to lifetime community supervision,which is mandated by statute upon a conviction for attempted aggravated sexual battery and other sex offenses. Just before the sentence expired, the State filed a petition to amend the judgment to include lifetime community supervision. On the same day that the trial court corrected the judgment, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant had been adequately informed of the lifetime community supervision requirement by his trial counsel. We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal to determine the effect of our decision in Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010), which was filed after the release of the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the trial court failed to warn the defendant of the mandatory nature of lifetime community supervision, as is required by our ruling in Ward, and the State was unable to establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilt. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
William H. Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone North American Tire, LLC
In June of 2008, William Mansell (the “Employee”) suffered a compensable injury to his right shoulder while working for Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC (the “Employer”). Dr. Sean Kaminsky, an orthopaedic surgeon, served as the authorized treating physician and assigned an impairment rating of 3% to the body as a whole. The Employee obtained an Independent Medical Evaluation from another orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. Robert Landsberg, who assigned a 10% impairment rating. When the Benefit Review Conference at the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“DOL”) ended in an impasse, the Employee filed suit. |
Smith | Supreme Court | |
Randall D. Kiser v. Ian J. Wolfe, et al.
The plaintiff, an employee of the insured, was injured while driving the insured’s tow truck. He filed suit against the defendant and later sought to invoke the insured’s uninsured motorist policy in an amount equal to the liability coverage for bodily injury. The insurer filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to limit uninsured motorist coverage to the amount listed on the first page of the policy rather than the amount otherwise fixed by statute. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the insured was entitled to a partial summary judgment. When the insured signs an application indicating the selection of uninsured motorist coverage lower than the liability limits, but neglects to initial a provision designed to confirm the selection of coverage less than the standard provided by statute, the “in writing” requirement under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1201(a)(2) (2008) has been satisfied. The cause is remanded to the trial court for the entry of partial summary judgment and such other proceedings, as may be necessary. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Randall D. Kiser v. Ian J. Wolfe, et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that our review should include all three pages of the insurance application appended to the summary judgment motion. I, however, would construe Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1201 (2008) to require more than merely the insured’s signature at the end of an application for insurance in order for the insured to effectively reject “in writing” the amount of uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage otherwise mandated by the statute. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. L.W.
In these two cases, consolidated for oral argument, defendants entered guilty pleas to one count in their respective indictments in exchange for dismissal of other counts. In both cases, the trial court denied their subsequent requests for expungement of the dismissed charges. Both defendants filed petitions for writ of certiorari. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed both cases and remanded for entry of orders requiring the requested partial expungement. We granted the State’s applications for permission to appeal and ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that the procedural requirements for petitions for writ of certiorari set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-106 (2000) do not apply in criminal cases. We further hold that a conviction for one count in an indictment does not preclude expungement of the records relating to a dismissed charge in a separate count. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in both cases. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
K.F. v. State of Tennessee
In these two cases, consolidated for oral argument, defendants entered guilty pleas to one count in their respective indictments in exchange for dismissal of other counts. In both cases, the trial court denied their subsequent requests for expungement of the dismissed charges. Both defendants filed petitions for writ of certiorari. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed both cases and remanded for entry of orders requiring the requested partial expungement. We granted the State’s applications for permission to appeal and ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that the procedural requirements for petitions for writ of certiorari set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-106 (2000) do not apply in criminal cases. We further hold that a conviction for one count in an indictment does not preclude expungement of the records relating to a dismissed charge in a separate count. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in both cases. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Donna Faye Shipley, et al. v. Robin Williams
In medical malpractice actions, Tennessee adheres to a locality rule for expert medical witnesses. Claimants are required by statute to prove by expert testimony the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the community where the defendant medical provider practices or a similar community. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 (2000 & Supp. 2010). Since the locality rule was enacted in 1975, Tennessee courts have reached different conclusions in interpreting it. The rule does not define "similar community," nor does it provide guidance as to how a community is determined to be "similar" to the defendant’s community. In this case, we address and clarify the applicable standards that courts should use in determining whether a medical expert is qualified to testify as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case. Applying these standards, we hold that the trial court’s exclusion of the claimant’s two proffered medical experts under the locality rule was error. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Donna Faye Shipley, et al. v. Robin Williams - Concurring/Dissenting
We originally granted the application for permission to appeal in this case to address a question regarding summary judgments in medical malpractice cases that was left unanswered in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008). That question is whether a defendant in a medical malpractice case who does not present evidence that his or her conduct complied with the applicable standard of care is entitled to a summary judgment when he or she demonstrates that the expert witness or witnesses the plaintiff plans to present at trial do not satisfy the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 (Supp. 2010). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Donna Faye Shipley, et al. v. Robin Williams - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to address the dissenting opinion’s assertion that the “sky is falling.” The majority opinion has not substantially altered “the standard of review of summary judgments based on the inadmissibility of evidence relating to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case.” Despite Justice Koch’s statements to the contrary, after the release of this opinion, appellate courts will continue to review evidentiary determinations using an abuse of discretion standard. Stating otherwise does not advance this discussion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Alicia D. Howell v. Nissan North America, Inc., et al.
The issue presented in this workers’ compensation case is whether the employee made a meaningful return to work. Upon being released by her physician to return to work, she resigned her employment after her employer told her that she would have to return to a production line job that, based on her work experience and personal knowledge of the work conditions and her physical abilities and limitations, she did not believe she could perform. The trial court awarded her additional benefits, ruling that she did not have a meaningful return to work and was eligible for reconsideration of her earlier settlement for workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241 (Supp. 2010). The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel reversed. We hold that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work following her injuries and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trialcourt’s award of increased permanent partial disability benefits. The judgment of the Appeals Panel is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated. |
Moore | Supreme Court | |
David Cantrell v. Joe Easterling, Warden
We granted this appeal to determine if the defendant’s four sentences for aggravated rape are illegal because each of the four uniform judgment documents designates the defendant as a “Multiple 35% Range 2” offender and does not designate the defendant as a “Multiple Rapist.” Because the four uniform judgment documents indicate that the defendant is eligible for early release on parole, which is in direct contravention of a statutory provision, we hold that the four sentences are illegal and void. The defendant’s underlying convictions of aggravated rape, which arose from a jury verdict before a court of competent jurisdiction, remain intact. We remand this matter to the sentencing court for the entry of four amended judgment orders, each to set forth the legal sentence on each of the defendant’s four convictions of aggravated rape, including the designation that the defendant is a “Multiple Rapist.” |
Hardeman | Supreme Court | |
David Cantrell v. Joe Easterling, Warden - Concurring
I can concur that the petitioner’s sentence is illegal and void because it directly contravenes the multiple rapist sentencing statute. By granting limited habeas corpus relief and remanding to the trial court for entry of a corrected sentence, the majority has essentially adopted the position of the State. While this result is proper under these specific circumstances, I would submit that the ruling today is inconsistent with the opinion in Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn. 2008), a case I continue to believe was wrongly decided. Moreover, in an apparent effort to conform its decision today with rulings in our previous habeas corpus cases, the majority has created new and heightened standards for relief which, in my assessment, will serve to further confuse this area of the law. Finally, I believe that this case offered an opportunity to overrule altogether our decision in Edwards and, by doing so, reconcile a series of our prior opinions on the subject of habeas corpus. |
Hardeman | Supreme Court |
