State of Tennessee v. Gerald Robert Stevens, Laurie Ann Williams, and James Darren Brothers Stevens, et al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether a conclusory allegation in an affidavit that information was provided by a “concerned citizen source” is sufficient to establish the presumptive reliability of the information for the issuance of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.1 There is a distinction in Tennessee law between “citizen informants” and “criminal informants” or those from the criminal milieu. Information provided by an unnamed ordinary citizen is presumed to be reliable, and the affidavit need not establish that the source is credible or that the information is reliable. State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 354 (Tenn. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137, 103 S. Ct. 770, 74 L. Ed. 2d 983 (1983). On the other hand, where information is provided by an anonymous criminal informant, the affidavit must establish (1) the basis of the informant’s knowledge, and (2) the reliability of the informant or the information. State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989). |
Henry | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kristina Schindler
We granted this appeal to address whether a trial court can consider prior grants of diversion or previously expunged offenses in determining a defendant's suitability for diversion. In the case now before us, the trial court denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion because the defendant had previously been placed on diversion on two different occasions. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's application for judicial diversion. Upon review, we hold that evidence of prior diversions may be considered in determining whether a defendant is a suitable candidate for diversion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Robby McCurry v. Container Corp. of America, a Division of Jefferson Smurfit Corporation
The appellee, Robby McCurry, filed a second motion to rehear on December 28, 1998, petitioning this Court to reconsider our decision in the above styled case. The appellee filed this petition without first seeking permission from this Court as prescribed in Rule 39(f) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the motion is not well taken. |
Campbell | Supreme Court | |
Charles Walton Wright v. State of Tennessee
We granted this appeal to determine whether the appellant’s due process rights were violated when the lower courts dismissed his post conviction petition as timebarred by the three-year statute of limitations since the asserted violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), did not arise until after expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Estate of Foster Hume, III, Deceased, The University of the South v. Meredith Klank
We granted this appeal to determine whether the probate rule of ademption by extinction applies to the specific bequest of a house, where the house is sold at foreclosure before the testator’s death and sales proceeds representing the testator’s interest are identifiable after his death. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. William Henry Barney
The defendant, William Henry Barney, was convicted of eleven counts of rape of a child and seven counts of aggravated sexual battery. He is currently serving a total effective sentence of eighty years. Upon the Court of Criminal Appeals’s affirmance of these judgments, the defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to this Court. We granted the application in order to determine whether the language of the indictment was sufficient under State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997), and to determine whether the multiple convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery violate the constitutional principles of due process or double jeopardy. We conclude that the indictment is sufficient under Hill. In addition, we conclude that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, multiple convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery are justified and do not violate the constitutional principles of due process or double jeopardy. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Preston Carter - Concurring
In this capital case, the defendant, Preston Carter, pled guilty and was convicted on two counts of felony murder. A jury sentenced him to death on both counts, finding that the murders of Thomas and Tensia Jackson were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(5). The jury imposed sentences of death based upon the presence of this sole aggravating circumstance. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Jordan vs. Baptist Three Rivers Hospital
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State vs. Pettus
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Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Helms vs. Dept. of Safety
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Supreme Court | ||
Anderson vs. Moran Foods
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Wilson vs. Wilson
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Vaughn Mixon
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Supreme Court | ||
Seals vs. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg Co., Inc. and 2nd Injury Fund
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Supreme Court | ||
Seals vs. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg Co., Inc. and 2nd Injury Fund
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Claiborne | Supreme Court | |
Wayne Eldred Hill v. CNA Insurance and Larry Brinton, Jr., Director of the Division of Workers Compensation, Tennessee Dept of Labor - Concurring
I concur in the majority's holding that this case falls within the purview of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a). I, however, continue to adhere to my dissent in Bomely v. Mid-America Corp., 970 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. 1998), in which I concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a) is applicable when there is a subsequent injury and the employee is rendered permanently and totally disabled. Subsection (b), however, should apply only when the employee is still able to earn a wage or be gainfully employed but has received compensable vocational disabilities that exceed 100 percent or 400 weeks of compensation |
Supreme Court | ||
Wayne Eldred Hill v. CNA Insurance and Larry Brinton, Jr. Director Chancellor of the Division of Worker's Compensation Fund, Tennessee Department of Labor
In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court determined that Wayne Eldred Hill, the employee, was permanently and totally disabled. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a), the court apportioned 10 percent of the award to the employer and 90 percent of the award to the Second Injury Fund. The case was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e). The Appeals Panel modified the award by apportioning 65 percent to the employer and 35 percent to the Second Injury Fund pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b). |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Walker vs. Saturn Corp.
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Walker vs. Saturn Corp.
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Wilson vs. Wilson
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Bobby Blackmon
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Sumner | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Bobby Blackmon
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Sumner | Supreme Court | |
Est. of Ruth Garrett vs. St. Thomas Hospital
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Est. of Ruth Garrett vs. St. Thomas Hospital
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Supreme Court | ||
Wilson vs. Wilson
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Supreme Court |