SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Castlewood Inc., v. Anderson County, Tennessee; Patsy Stair, Trustee; Owen K. Richardson, Tax Assessor, City of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Tennessee State Board of Equalization
03S01-9705-CH-00053
Authoring Judge: Special Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William W. Lantrip

This case presents for review the Court of Appeals' decision that the classificatin as industrial and commercial of two or more condominiums units rented by the owners to others for their use as residences does not violate Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. Nor does the statute violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. That decision is affirmed.

 

Knox Supreme Court

Robert Harold Bomely, Jr. v. Mid-America Corporation, D/B/A Burger King
03S01-9605-CH-00059
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank W. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frederick D. McDonald

In this workers’ compensation action the Second Injury Fund, defendant-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Chancery Court of Knox County which found the employee, Robert Bomely, plaintiff-appellee, to be totally and permanently disabled. The award was apportioned 65 percent to the employer, Mid- America Corporation, d/b/a Burger King, defendant-appellee, and 35 percent to the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b). The trial court assessed
the employer’s liability based on 400 weeks of benefits and held the Second Injury Fund liable for the remaining 938 weeks of benefits (until the employee reached the age of 651). Thus, the employer’s liability was limited to 65 percent of 400 weeks rather than 65 percent of the total number of weeks to age 65. We transferred this case from the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel to decide whether it was proper to have limited the employer’s liability in this fashion. After carefully examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we conclude that the award should be apportioned between the employer and the Second Injury
Fund based on the total number of weeks to age 65 rather than limiting the employer’s liability to a percentage of 400 weeks. Accordingly, that portion of the trial court’s judgment is reversed. We shall also address (1) whether an award of permanent total disability is subject to the monetary cap imposed by the 400 week maximum total benefit provision of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a)(6) and (2) whether the apportionment of benefits between the employer and the Second Injury Fund in this case is controlled by subsection (a) or (b) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208.

Knox Supreme Court

Northwest Airlines, Inc., Federal Express Corp., American Airlines, Inc., Flagship Airlines, and Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization and CSX Transportation et al.
01S01-9702-FD-00030
Authoring Judge: Special Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr.

This Court has accepted from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, certified question of law regarding the effect of the 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. §
467 - 5 - 1512 ( b ) ( 2 ) on the calculation of interest on property tax paymens and refunds. 

Davidson Supreme Court

James J. Benson v. State of Tennessee
01S01-9704-CC-00089
Authoring Judge: Special Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald Harris

This case presents for review the appeal by the petitioner, James J. Benson, from the judgment of the Cour tof Criminal Appeals affirming the trila court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner asserts that he was denied the right to a fair trial before an impartial judge because the judge who presided over his criminal trial solicitated a bribe from him. The judment denying the petition is reversed, and the petioner is granted a new trial.

Supreme Court

Patricia Love v. American Olean Tile Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Sue Ann Head, Director of the Div of Worker's Comp, Division of Worker's Compensation - State of Tennessee
02S01-9508-CV-00077
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Whit A. Lafon

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Patricia Love, plaintiff-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Madison County awarding her permanent total disability benefits to age 65 or until the payment of such benefits reached the maximum total benefit. The trial court apportioned the award 67.5 percent to the Second Injury Fund and 32.5 percent to the employer, American Olean Tile Company, and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, defendants-appellees. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5), affirmed the trial court. Thereafter, the employee filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel’s decision. We granted the motion for review to determine (1) whether it was error not to have awarded benefits payable to age 65 notwithstanding the maximum total benefit, and (2) whether the apportionment between the employer and the Second Injury Fund was correct. After examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we reverse the decision of the lower courts to subject the employee’s award to the maximum total benefit. However, we affirm the apportionment of the award between the employer and the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a).

Supreme Court

Patricia Love vs. American Olean Tile Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Sue Ann Head, Director of the Divison of Workers' Compensation, State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
02-S-01-9508-CV-00077
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Whit A. Lafon

I rely on my concurring and dissenting opinion in Bomely v. Mid-American Corp., ___ S.W.2d ___ (Tenn. 1998). While I agree with the majority's conclusion that awards of permanent and total disability are payable to age sixtyfive, I continue to disagree, as voiced in my Bomely dissent, with the majority's analysis of apportionment which discourages employers from hiring the handicapped and is contrary to the stated legislative purpose behind the Second Injury Fund legislation. An employer's liability should be limited to the first 400 weeks of benefits unless the subsequent injury would have in and of itself caused permanent and total disability in the absence of any prior injuries or disabilities. In such cases, the employer should bear responsibility for the entire award to age sixty-five.

Madison Supreme Court

State vs. Thomas Dee Huskey
03S01-9610-CR-00096

Supreme Court

Seffernick vs. St. Thomas Hospital, et. al.
01S01-9706-CV-00122
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers

Supreme Court

State vs. Lavender & Hobbs
01S01-9704-CR-00088

Davidson Supreme Court

State vs. Byrd
03S01-9705-CR-00057
Trial Court Judge: Rex Henry Ogle

Supreme Court

State vs. Byrd
03S01-9705-CR-00057
Trial Court Judge: Rex Henry Ogle

Supreme Court

State vs. Cattone
03S01-9706-CR-00075
Trial Court Judge: Mayo L. Mashburn

Supreme Court

Earhart vs. City of Bristol
03S01-9709-CH-00116

Supreme Court

Earhart vs. City of Bristol
03S01-9709-CH-00116

Supreme Court

Howard Woods vs. MTC Mgt. & Solomon Mgt.
02S01-9706-CH-00061

Supreme Court

Cole vs. Campbell, Comm., et. al.
01S01-9705-CH-00104

Supreme Court

State vs. Perry A. Cribbs
02S01-9703-CR-00014

Supreme Court

State vs. Perry A. Cribbs
02S01-9703-CR-00014

Shelby Supreme Court

01S01-9702-CH-00026
01S01-9702-CH-00026
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith

Wilson Supreme Court

State vs. Perry A. Cribbs
02S01-9703-CR-00014
Trial Court Judge: W. Fred Axley

Shelby Supreme Court

State vs. Perry A. Cribbs
02S01-9703-CR-00014
Trial Court Judge: W. Fred Axley

Shelby Supreme Court

Juanita Mitchell, Personal Representative of the Estate of Billy Mitchell v. Sam Cole, Jr., Substitute Trustee, Estate of Prudence Reynolds and Gerald W. Pickens, Administrator
02S01-9703-CH-00020
Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Special Chancellor Russell Fowler

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals that a debtor cannot collateraliy attack in state court an adjudication made in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding regarding the balance due on a deb owed by the debtor-bankrupt. The judgment of the Court of appeals is affirmed as modified.

 

Supreme Court

Rebecca Fay Woods, Harry B. Woods, Jr. and Shirley Ann Woods, et. al. v. Harry B. Woods Plumbing Co., Inc., Harpeth Construction Co. and Travelers Insurance Co.
01S01-9606-CH-00124
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Gilcrease

We granted this workers' compensation appeal to address two issues: (1) whether the decedent's death arose out of and in the course of employment; and (2) whether the decedent was the initial aggressor; and if so, whether the aggressor doctrine precluded recovery. We find that the decedent's death arose out of and in the course of employment. As to the second issue, we hold the common law aggressor defense as it relates to workers' compensation claims under the Act is abolished in Tennessee and does not bar the decedent's recovery

Supreme Court

Robert Jones v. Vick Idles
E2001-02833-SC-S09-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: William E. Lantrip
We granted this appeal to determine whether the chancellor correctly granted a new trial after finding that the jury's allocation of ninety percent of the fault to the plaintiffs and ten percent of the fault to the defendant was against the weight of the evidence and that the evidence supported "a defense verdict for both sides." A majority of the Court of Appeals concluded that the chancellor correctly granted a new trial on both the plaintiffs' claim and the defendant's counterclaim and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we agree with the Court of Appeals and hold that the chancellor properly granted a new trial after finding that the jury's allocation of fault was against the weight of the evidence in his role as the thirteenth juror. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Anderson Supreme Court

03S01-9704-PB-00042
03S01-9704-PB-00042

Supreme Court