Castlewood Inc., v. Anderson County, Tennessee; Patsy Stair, Trustee; Owen K. Richardson, Tax Assessor, City of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Tennessee State Board of Equalization
This case presents for review the Court of Appeals' decision that the classificatin as industrial and commercial of two or more condominiums units rented by the owners to others for their use as residences does not violate Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. Nor does the statute violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. That decision is affirmed.
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
Robert Harold Bomely, Jr. v. Mid-America Corporation, D/B/A Burger King
In this workers’ compensation action the Second Injury Fund, defendant-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Chancery Court of Knox County which found the employee, Robert Bomely, plaintiff-appellee, to be totally and permanently disabled. The award was apportioned 65 percent to the employer, Mid- America Corporation, d/b/a Burger King, defendant-appellee, and 35 percent to the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b). The trial court assessed |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Northwest Airlines, Inc., Federal Express Corp., American Airlines, Inc., Flagship Airlines, and Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization and CSX Transportation et al.
This Court has accepted from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, certified question of law regarding the effect of the 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
James J. Benson v. State of Tennessee
This case presents for review the appeal by the petitioner, James J. Benson, from the judgment of the Cour tof Criminal Appeals affirming the trila court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner asserts that he was denied the right to a fair trial before an impartial judge because the judge who presided over his criminal trial solicitated a bribe from him. The judment denying the petition is reversed, and the petioner is granted a new trial. |
Supreme Court | ||
Patricia Love v. American Olean Tile Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Sue Ann Head, Director of the Div of Worker's Comp, Division of Worker's Compensation - State of Tennessee
In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Patricia Love, plaintiff-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Madison County awarding her permanent total disability benefits to age 65 or until the payment of such benefits reached the maximum total benefit. The trial court apportioned the award 67.5 percent to the Second Injury Fund and 32.5 percent to the employer, American Olean Tile Company, and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, defendants-appellees. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5), affirmed the trial court. Thereafter, the employee filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel’s decision. We granted the motion for review to determine (1) whether it was error not to have awarded benefits payable to age 65 notwithstanding the maximum total benefit, and (2) whether the apportionment between the employer and the Second Injury Fund was correct. After examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we reverse the decision of the lower courts to subject the employee’s award to the maximum total benefit. However, we affirm the apportionment of the award between the employer and the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a). |
Supreme Court | ||
Patricia Love vs. American Olean Tile Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Sue Ann Head, Director of the Divison of Workers' Compensation, State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
I rely on my concurring and dissenting opinion in Bomely v. Mid-American Corp., ___ S.W.2d ___ (Tenn. 1998). While I agree with the majority's conclusion that awards of permanent and total disability are payable to age sixtyfive, I continue to disagree, as voiced in my Bomely dissent, with the majority's analysis of apportionment which discourages employers from hiring the handicapped and is contrary to the stated legislative purpose behind the Second Injury Fund legislation. An employer's liability should be limited to the first 400 weeks of benefits unless the subsequent injury would have in and of itself caused permanent and total disability in the absence of any prior injuries or disabilities. In such cases, the employer should bear responsibility for the entire award to age sixty-five. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Thomas Dee Huskey
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Supreme Court | ||
Seffernick vs. St. Thomas Hospital, et. al.
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Lavender & Hobbs
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Byrd
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Byrd
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Cattone
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Supreme Court | ||
Earhart vs. City of Bristol
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Supreme Court | ||
Earhart vs. City of Bristol
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Supreme Court | ||
Howard Woods vs. MTC Mgt. & Solomon Mgt.
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Supreme Court | ||
Cole vs. Campbell, Comm., et. al.
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Perry A. Cribbs
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Perry A. Cribbs
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
01S01-9702-CH-00026
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Wilson | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Perry A. Cribbs
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Perry A. Cribbs
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Juanita Mitchell, Personal Representative of the Estate of Billy Mitchell v. Sam Cole, Jr., Substitute Trustee, Estate of Prudence Reynolds and Gerald W. Pickens, Administrator
This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals that a debtor cannot collateraliy attack in state court an adjudication made in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding regarding the balance due on a deb owed by the debtor-bankrupt. The judgment of the Court of appeals is affirmed as modified.
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Supreme Court | ||
Rebecca Fay Woods, Harry B. Woods, Jr. and Shirley Ann Woods, et. al. v. Harry B. Woods Plumbing Co., Inc., Harpeth Construction Co. and Travelers Insurance Co.
We granted this workers' compensation appeal to address two issues: (1) whether the decedent's death arose out of and in the course of employment; and (2) whether the decedent was the initial aggressor; and if so, whether the aggressor doctrine precluded recovery. We find that the decedent's death arose out of and in the course of employment. As to the second issue, we hold the common law aggressor defense as it relates to workers' compensation claims under the Act is abolished in Tennessee and does not bar the decedent's recovery |
Supreme Court | ||
Robert Jones v. Vick Idles
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Anderson | Supreme Court | |
03S01-9704-PB-00042
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Supreme Court |