SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

01S01-9507-CC-00104
01S01-9507-CC-00104
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton

01S01-9503-CC-00035
01S01-9503-CC-00035

03S01-9410-CR-00106
03S01-9410-CR-00106
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

03S01-9508-CC-00096
03S01-9508-CC-00096
Trial Court Judge: Leon C. Burns, Jr.

03S01-9508-CC-00096
03S01-9508-CC-00096
Trial Court Judge: Leon C. Burns, Jr.

03S01-9410-CR-00106
03S01-9410-CR-00106

03S01-9501-CH-00008
03S01-9501-CH-00008

03S01-9502-CH-00018
03S01-9502-CH-00018

03S01-9502-CV-00015
03S01-9502-CV-00015

Terry E. Wood v. State of Tennessee
01S01-9501-CC-00015
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris

We granted the application of Terry E. Wood, the defendant, for permission to appeal in order to resolve an issue of first impression in Tennessee: whether the return of a sealed presentment 1 engages an accursed person's speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 9 , of the Tennessee Constitution. After a thorough examination of the reocrd and careful consideration of the issue, we conclude, for reasons appearing below, that the reutnr of a presentment, whether sealed or unsealed, whether the accompanying capias is executed or unexecuted, is a formal accusation that engages constitutional speedy trial provisions. Thus, we must apply the criteria of Barkery.Wingo 2 and state b. Bishop 3 to determine whether the thirteen-year delay in this case deprived the appellant of this constitutional speedy trial rights. We find that there was no such deprivation and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Can Do, Inc. Pension and Profit Sharing Plan and Successor Plans, Indiv. and as a Trustee for Georgoe W. Holder, Jr., v, Manier, Herod, Hollabaugh& Smith, C. Kinian Cosner, Jr. and H. Rowan Leathers, III
01S01-9501-CH-00013
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin Gilcrease

This case presents a question of first impression in Tennessee: whether or not a legal malpractice claim is assignable. We have determined that soundpublic policy reasons militate against allowing assignment of legal malpractice actions. We, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals and dismiss the complaint.

State of Tennesse v. Terry Wood -Dissenting
01S01-9501-CC-00015
Authoring Judge: Justice Reid
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris

I concur in the dissent of Justice White.

Wanda Cruise v. City of Columbia - Concurring
01S01-9508-CV-00132
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe C. Loser

In this property confiscation case, the Court must decide whether a direct  appeal was timely and whether the Governmental Tort Liability Act's1 twelve-month statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-20-305(b) applies to bar plaintiff's claim for damage to and loss of personal property seized by police officers employed by defendant, the City of Columbia. For the reasons explained below, we hold that the appeal was timely and that plaintiff's claim is controlled by the three-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-105 and is, therefore, not barred.

Fannie Tuggle and Hoyt Tuggle v. Allright Parking Systems, Inc.
02-S-01-9501-CV-00009
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kay S. Robilio

We granted this appeal to determine whether a party with a derivative claim - loss of consortium - is entitled to challenges under the peremptory jury challenge statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-3-105.

We conclude that the clear and unambiguous language of the jury challenge statute provides additional peremptory challenges to a party with a derivative claim,1 and that a new trial is required because the denial of that statutory right constitutes prejudice to the judicial process. In the interest of judicial economy, since a new trial is required, we have also decided that under comparative fault principles, the recovery of a spouse claiming loss of consortium will be reduced in proportion to or barred by the fault of the physically injured spouse. We, therefore, affirm the Court of  Appeals’ decision reversing and remanding for a new trial.

03S01-9502-CV-00014
03S01-9502-CV-00014
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman

03S01-9503-CH-00027
03S01-9503-CH-00027

02S01-9504-CR-00029
02S01-9504-CR-00029
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Mccartie

01S01-9503-CH-00045
01S01-9503-CH-00045
Trial Court Judge: Robert S. Brandt

Gene v. Aaby,
03S01-9507-CH-00073

Gene v. Aaby,
03S01-9507-CH-00073

01S01-9505-CH-00083
01S01-9505-CH-00083

01S01-9504-CV-00047
01S01-9504-CV-00047

01S01-9508-CH-00138
01S01-9508-CH-00138
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

02S01-9410-CR-00071
02S01-9410-CR-00071

In Re: Estate of Mary T. Austin, Deceased, Elizabeth T. Austin, v .Christy N. Austin and Robert C. Austin C., Jr.
03S01-9410-PB-00092
Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Dennis H. Inman

This case presents for review the decision of the probate court, affimred by the Court of Appeals, that the personal representative in this case may, in his discretion, distribute certain corporate stock in kind rather than sell the stock and distribute the proceeds. The decision miscontrues applicable law and is reversed.