SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

State of Tennessee v. David Keene
02S01-9112-CR-00064
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

On May 23, 1994, this Court affirmed petitioner's conviction for first-degree murder and remanded the cause for resentencing. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a timely petition pursuant to Rule 30, Tenn. R. App. P. for a rehearing.  We grant the petition to rehear and remand the cause to the trial court for the conduct of a sentencing hearing consonant with our holidng in State v. Richard Odom.

 


 

Shelby Supreme Court

State of Tennessee, ex rel., John Jay Hooker v. Brook Thompson, et al., State of Tennessee Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson, et al.
01A01-9606-CH-00259
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William D. Fones

These cases were heard before the Special Supreme Court on an expedited basis on
July 5, 1996. Due to the fact that our decision in these consolidated cases will affect the election which is set for August 1, 1996, the Court is issuing this Order today, with a more detailed Opinion to follow.

The Court finds as follows:
1. The statutory scheme for judicial selection and evaluation, popularly known as “The
Tennessee Plan”, T.C.A. Section 17-4-101 et seq. does not violate the Tennessee Constitution. State v. Dunn, 496 S.W. 2d 480 (Tenn. 1973).
2. Under the provisions of T.C.A. Section 17-4-114 (c), the Tennessee Plan is not applicable
unless the judicial evaluation commission recommends the retention of a judge. In the forthcoming judicial election, the judicial evaluation commission was not yet fully operational and, through no fault of Justice White, it did not act to recommend her retention as a Supreme Court Justice. Accordingly, the provisions of the Tennessee Plan are not applicable to the election to be held on August 1, 1996, and under T.C.A. Section 17-4-114(c), a political party may nominate a candidate, and independent candidates may qualify under the general election law for the general election which is the regular August election.
3. In accordance with the provisions of T.C.A. Section 2-5-101, independent and primary
candidates should have qualified for the upcoming August 1, 1996, election by filing all nominating petitions no later than twelve o’clock noon, May 16, 1996. Appellants Laska and Hooker attempted to obtain such petitions from Defendant Appellee Thompson, but were unsuccessful in their efforts because of an erroneous interpretation of the law to the effect that Justice Penny White was running unopposed in a “retention election” under the Tennessee Plan.
4. Appellants Hooker and Laska have made good faith efforts to qualify for the upcoming election. Similarly, Justice White has acted in good faith in declaring her candidacy for the Supreme Court.
5. At all times relevant to this Court’s decision, Appellant Hooker lacked the qualifications necessary under T.C.A. Section 2-5-106 to qualify for the office of Supreme Court Justice in the August 1, 1996, election, because Appellant Hooker’s law license was suspended as a result of his failure to meet continuing legal education requirements.
6. The Defendants have raised an issue as to the residency of Appellant Laska, who has
attempted to qualify as a candidate for the Western Grand Division of this State. Considerable proof regarding whether Mr. Laska is a bona fide resident of the Western Grand Division was offered at the Chancery Court hearing on this matter, but the Chancellor did not make a ruling as to Mr. Laska’s residency.

Supreme Court

01S01-9601-CC-00022
01S01-9601-CC-00022

Supreme Court

01S01-9601-CC-00022
01S01-9601-CC-00022

Supreme Court

Gene v. Aaby,
03S02-9507-CH-00073

Supreme Court

01S01-9412-FD-00155
01S01-9412-FD-00155

Supreme Court

01S01-9510-CC-00173
01S01-9510-CC-00173
Trial Court Judge: Donald P. Harris

Supreme Court

02S01-9410-CC-00069
02S01-9410-CC-00069

Supreme Court

02S01-9410-CC-00069
02S01-9410-CC-00069

Supreme Court

02S01-9501-CH-00005
02S01-9501-CH-00005

Supreme Court

01S01-9503-CC-00034
01S01-9503-CC-00034
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.

Supreme Court

01S01-9503-CC-00034
01S01-9503-CC-00034
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.

Supreme Court

02S01-9502-CC-00013
02S01-9502-CC-00013

Supreme Court

State of Tennesee v. Mario Lamont Wilson
02S01-9505-CC-00045
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Judge John Franklin Murchison

A jury convicted defendant, Mario Lamont Wilson, of three counts of aggravated assault and of felony reckless endangerment and possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to commit a felony. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Wilson’s felony reckless endangerment conviction and sentence, but reversed and dismissed the convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a deadly weapon. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it dismissed Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault.1 Although we conclude that Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault may not stand, we do not adopt entirely the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Rather, we affirm the dismissal of the aggravated assault charges because the evidence is insufficient to prove that Wilson intentionally and knowingly caused another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury.

Madison Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom - Concurring/Dissenting
02S01-9502-CR-00014
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson

I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case. I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989.

Jackson Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom AKA Otis Smith - Concurring/Dissenting
02-S-01-9502-CR-00014
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson

I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case.  I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989.

Shelby Supreme Court

Ira H. Murphy v. Board of Professional Responsibility
02S01-9503-CH-00031
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John Hill Chisholm

The issue raised by this appeal is whether the petitioner, a disbarred attorney, has satisfied the requirements for reinstatement of his license to practice law contained in Rule 9, § 19.3, Rules of the Supreme Court, by clear and convincing proof. A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that the petitioner had failed to carry the burden of proof for reinstatement. The Chancery Court, however, reviewed the Hearing Panel decision and held the petitioner was entitled to "conditional reinstatement" of his license to practice law.
 

Shelby Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Brian Keith Kimbro
02S01-9503-CR-00028
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

We review this cause in order to address an issue of first impression: whether attempt to commit felony-murder exists as an offense in Tennessee. We conclude that it does not and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing the appellee's conviction.

 

 

Shelby Supreme Court

Charles M. Cary, Jr. v. Cathy Ann Cary
02S01-9505-CV-00035
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

We granted this appeal to determine whether a provision in an antenuptial agreement by which a prospective spouse waives alimony is void because it violates public policy. The trial court held that such a provision in an antenuptial agreement, which waived alimony, was valid and enforceable and, therefore, denied the spouse’s application for alimony. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that the waiver of alimony provision was void as against public policy, and remanded to the trial court to consider whether to award alimony.

Hardeman Supreme Court

02S01-9505-CR-00037
02S01-9505-CR-00037

Supreme Court

02S01-9501-CR-00007
02S01-9501-CR-00007

Supreme Court

02S01-9502-CV-00020
02S01-9502-CV-00020

Supreme Court

Christopher v. Sockwell
01S01-9408-CV-00090

Supreme Court

02S01-9508-CV-00069
02S01-9508-CV-00069
Trial Court Judge: James M. Tharpe

Supreme Court

02S01-9601-CV-00134
02S01-9601-CV-00134
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown

Supreme Court