Tony Mar-Kee Mosley
Petitioner, Tony Mar-Kee Mosley, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude that Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal and the interest of justice does not warrant a waiver of the notice requirement. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal as untimely. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Felix Mandiel Leach
The Defendant, Felix Mandiel Leach, pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to sell or to deliver a Schedule II controlled substance as a Range II, multiple offender and received a twelve-year sentence to be served on probation. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony M. Patton
Defendant, Anthony M. Patton, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, to correct a clerical mistake in the judgments entered against him. He asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to apply pretrial jail credit to the second of two consecutively imposed sentences, arguing that he is entitled to receive such credit on both sentences. He also argues that his plea agreement is void as a result. The State responds that the trial court correctly applied jail credits to Defendant’s first sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Harold Clark
Defendant, Jimmy Harold Clark, was convicted by a Cumberland County jury of one count of rape of a child under the age of thirteen. The jury imposed the maximum fine of $50,000, and the trial court imposed a forty-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress his statement and that his sentence was excessive. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dewayne Harris v. Steve Upton, Warden
In 2018, a Williamson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dewayne Edward Harris, of joyriding, carjacking, and aggravated robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to serve an effective sentence of thirty years of incarceration. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and we affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment. Harris v. State, No. M2023-00681- CCA-R3-PC, 2024 WL 4164998, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2024), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application denied (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2025). The Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the trial court entered an order summarily dismissing the petition. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robin Lee Teague
The Defendant, Robin Lee Teague, pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor for possessing material that depicted a minor engaged in sexual activity, a B felony based on his possession of more than 100 images, and two counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor for exchanging material that included a minor engaged in sexual activity, a Class C felony. The plea agreement contemplated the trial court determining the sentence, and it sentenced him to twelve years for the B felony and six years for each of the C felonies. The trial court then ordered that all the sentences run consecutively to each other for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing, in part because it used Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(10) to enhance his sentence, which he asserts is forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. After review, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly applied 40-35-115(b)(10) to order consecutive sentences. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgments of conviction but remand the case for a new sentencing hearing during which the trial court will reconsider whether consecutive sentencing is appropriate. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Goldsberry, Jr.
The Defendant, William Goldsberry, Jr., appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the violation of probation warrant due to a violation of his speedy trial rights and by revoking his probation in full, contending that the evidence was insufficient to establish he committed a non-technical violation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Goldsberry, Jr. - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion on two grounds. First, although not addressed by the majority, I find the exceedingly late issuance of the November 19, 2024 violation of probation warrant to be problematic. A strong argument can be made that the November 19, 2024 warrant, which was issued more than twenty-two years after the Defendant’s sentence expired on June 23, 2002, and decades after the new criminal offenses in Oklahoma and California were allegedly committed, would violate the Defendant’s due process rights under the test for pre-accusatorial delay. Though perhaps not as strong, an argument can also be made that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the November 19, 2024 violation of probation warrant, which alleged the Oklahoma and California offenses, because this second warrant was issued more than twenty-two years after the Defendant’s probationary sentence expired on June 23, 2002. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(a)(1) (stating that “[w]henever it comes to the attention of the trial judge that a defendant who has been released upon suspension of sentence has been guilty of a breach of the laws of this state or has violated the conditions of probation, the trial judge shall have the power to cause to be issued under the trial judge’s hand: . . . (A) A warrant for the arrest of the defendant as in any other criminal case; or (B) For a technical violation brought by a probation officer, and subject to the discretion of the judge, a criminal summons.”); see also State v. Moon, No. M2023-01192-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 1672885, at *12 n.7 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 13, 2025) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 311(a) (reiterating that probation revocation proceedings “may only be commenced within the applicable probationary period”). Because the November 19, 2024 warrant was issued decades after the criminal offenses in Oklahoma and California and more than twenty-two years after the Defendant’s sentence expired, this court could have concluded either that this warrant violated the Defendant’s due process rights or that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over this matter. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kristopher Pappas
The Defendant, Kristopher Pappas, was convicted after trial by jury of aggravated assault by causing serious bodily injury, as a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court denied his request for judicial diversion and entered judgments for a total effective sentence of five years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because he acted in self-defense and that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. We ordered supplemental briefing to address whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that aggravated assault is a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder. Following our review, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault and remand for a new trial on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter for that count. We affirm the judgment of conviction for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and the denial of judicial diversion as to the remaining count. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy J. Hancock
Billy J. Hancock, Defendant, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and abuse of a corpse. State v. Hancock, No. M0212-02307-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7006969, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2015). His convictions were affirmed on appeal. Defendant filed a pro se motion to correct a clerical error pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 on January 30, 2025, in which he argued that the trial court committed a clerical error by checking the “T.D.O.C.” box on the judgment form and by ordering his sentence to be served as a “100 percent violent offender.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that Defendant failed to state a colorable claim. Defendant appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jermaine R. Carpenter
Before the court is the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 20. The State argues that the trial court properly denied the Appellant’s motion for plain error review of his sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36, because no such pleading is contemplated by the rules of criminal procedure. The pro se Appellant has filed a response in opposition to the State’s motion. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Hall
Defendant, Jonathan Hall, pled guilty in two separate cases to one count of aggravated assault and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in exchange for dismissal of a related domestic violence charge and an effective eight-year sentence with the trial court to determine the manner of service. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of confinement, four years for the aggravated assault charge to be served at 100% and eight years for the possession of a firearm charge to be served at 85%. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request for a suspended sentence. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. PEJHMAN EHSANI
This matter is before the Court upon application of the Defendant, Pejhman Ehsani, |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Justin David Whaley
A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury convicted Defendant, Justin David Whaley, of |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kentavis Antwon Jones v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kentavis Antwon Jones, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erroneously dismissed the petition for not being in the proper form without giving him reasonable opportunity to correct the petition with the assistance of counsel. He also argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling due to the negligence of his trial counsel. The State responds that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition as untimely and that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darrell Peterson
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Darrell Peterson, of one count of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a life sentence plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Keshon Ford v. Brandon Watwood, Warden
In 2022, the Petitioner, Keshon Ford, pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder in exchange for a sentence of ten years of incarceration. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his plea was not entered voluntarily. The habeas court entered an order dismissing the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the habeas corpus court erred when it denied his request for appointment of counsel and when it summarily dismissed his petition. We affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Damone Pewitte
A Gibson County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua Damone Pewitte, of three counts of rape of a child. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant broadly challenges whether the election process was sufficient to protect against the risk of a non-unanimous verdict. Specifically, the Defendant raises three inter-related issues regarding the election process on plain error review: (1) the State made its initial election outside the presence of the jury and did not mention its election to the jury until its rebuttal closing argument; (2) the State referenced examples of uncharged conduct during its closing argument; and (3) the language from the trial court’s unanimity instruction was different from the State’s election and closing argument. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Thomas Hunter, Jr.
The Defendant, Michael Thomas Hunter, Jr., was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony, at a bench trial in the Montgomery County Circuit Court. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2018) (subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve ten years at 100% for each offense, with five of the six sentences to be served consecutively. The court also ordered community supervision for life and placement on the sexual offender registry. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial, (2) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress his post-polygraph statements, (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and (4) the court erred in sentencing him. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for the correction of a clerical error in the offense date on the judgment for Count 6. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lucian A. Clemmons
The Defendant, Lucian A. Clemmons, appeals from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. On appeal, he asserts constitutional and evidentiary claims related to the trial court’s exclusion of prior statements he made to the lead detective following his arrest. Additionally, as to the murder conviction, the Defendant contends that it was error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on self-defense and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict because the State failed to establish premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Esther Lynn Bowman v. Paul Chapman Smith, Jr.
This appeal concerns a father’s petition to modify a permanent parenting plan to name him as the primary residential parent for his two daughters. The trial court found a material change in circumstance based on, inter alia, the mother’s remarriage and frequent out-of-state travel, and it concluded that modification was in the children’s best interests. This appeal followed. The mother contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of a material change in circumstances. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cody R. Mashburn
The Defendant, Cody R. Mashburn, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and criminal simulation. As part of the plea, the parties agreed that the Defendant would be sentenced to an effective term of ten years, but the trial court would determine the manner of service. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence and imposed a sentence of full confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence because, among other things, it improperly sentenced the Defendant without considering the results of a validated risk and needs assessment. Upon our review, we agree with the Defendant. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse and vacate the judgments and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cristobal J. Quintana II
The Defendant, Cristobal J. Quintana II, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor; possessing an open container of alcohol while operating a motor vehicle, a Class C misdemeanor; and violation of the financial responsibility law, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401(1) (2020) (DUI), 55-10-402(a)(2) (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (sentencing for second-offense DUI), 55-10-416 (open container law), 55-12-139 (2020) (financial responsibility). He was also found civilly liable by the trial court for violation of the implied consent law. See id. § 55-10-406 (2020) (subsequently amended) (implied consent). The trial court imposed an effective eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence, forty-five days of which was to be served in jail, and the balance on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment for second offense DUI and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and the finding on the implied consent violation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of clerical errors on the judgment forms for Counts 1, 2, and 3. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chaisty Dawn Jones
In June 2021, the Maury County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Chaisty Dawn Jones, for first degree premeditated murder in Count 1, first degree felony murder perpetration of aggravated burglary in Count 2, aggravated burglary in Count 3, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in Count 4, and simple possession of marijuana in Count 5. At trial, the jury convicted the Defendant of the lesser included offense of second degree murder in Count 1 and convicted her as charged in Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5. The trial court merged the conviction in Count 1 with the conviction in Count 2 and imposed an effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the Defendant had a “duty to retreat” prior to acting in self-defense. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Count 1 and Count 2. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Allen Fitzgerald Ailey
Defendant, Allen Fitzgerald Ailey, pleaded guilty in two cases to felon in possession of a weapon, possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine, and possession with intent to sell or deliver oxycodone. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant received concurrent four-year sentences for the drug offenses to be served consecutively to a sentence of six years for the weapon offense, with the manner of service of Defendant’s sentences to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered Defendant to serve his entire ten-year sentence in confinement. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by denying probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of judgments on the counts that were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |
