State of Tennessee v. Arturo Jaimes-Garcia
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Arturo Jaimes-Garcia, of multiple drug offenses relating to three different drug sales, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the Drug-Free School Zone statute is unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case; (3) the trial court improperly enhanced his punishment because the State did not give him adequate notice of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence; (4) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument; and (5) three of the Judgment of Conviction forms contain errors. The State contends that this appeal should be dismissed because the Defendant’s amended motion for new trial was not timely filed, and he failed to file a timely notice of appeal. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court improperly permitted the Defendant to file an amended motion for new trial. Therefore, we review the issue properly preserved by his original motion for new trial, the sufficiency of the evidence, and conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain all of his convictions. We conclude, however, that two of those convictions violate his double jeopardy protections. Those convictions are, therefore, merged or dismissed in accordance with the reasoning below. Further, we have reviewed forplain error the issues the Defendant failed to properly preserve but hold that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on any of those issues. This case is remanded for the entry of corrected judgments in accordance with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lance Sandifer, Stephon Dante Cunningham, Tornita Crenshaw, & Glenard Thorne
Based upon events on November 7, 2006, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Appellants, Tornita Crenshaw, Stephon Dante Cunningham, Lance Sandifer, and Cortez Thorne for two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. In addition, Appellants Crenshaw, Cunningham, and Thorne were indicted for two counts of facilitation to commit aggravated rape; Appellants Crenshaw and Cunningham were indicted for two counts of coercion of a witness; and Appellant Sandifer was indicted for four counts of aggravated rape. Appellants were tried jointly in August 2008. Appellants were convicted of the following crimes: Appellant Crenshaw – one count of robbery, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of coercion of a witness; Appellant Cunningham – two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of facilitation of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and one count of coercion of a witness; Appellant Thorne – two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of facilitation of aggravated rape, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping; Appellant Sandifer – two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, four counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Appellants to the following effective sentences: Appellant Crenshaw – twenty-three years; Appellant Cunningham – fifty-two years; Appellant Thorne – fifty-two years; Appellant Sandifer – onehundred and eight years. Appellants now argue several issues on appeal. These issues include: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions (all Appellants); (2) that the trial court erred in not apply mitigating factors, applying enhancement factors, the weight given to the factors and imposing consecutive sentences (all Appellants); (3) that the trial court failed to merge the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions into either aggravated robbery or aggravated rape convictions (Appellants Sandifer, Thorne, and Cunningham); (4) that the trial court failed to grant Appellants’ motions for severance (Appellants Thorne and Cunningham); (5) that the trial court failed to merge Appellant Sandifer’s four convictions for aggravated rape and attempted aggravated rape as one single act of rape; (6) that the trial court erred in denying Appellant Thorne’s motion in limine to exclude the victims from the courtroom; and (7) that the trial court erred in denying Appellant Thorne’s motion to require the State to elect the facts upon which it was relying for the two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that Appellants’ issues do not require either the reversal of any of their convictions or an adjustment to their sentences. For this reason, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Anthony McNack
The Defendant, Mark Anthony McNack, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s revocation of his community correction sentence and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in calculating his credit for time served. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s community corrections sentence but conclude that the Defendant is entitled to credit for time served until the violation warrant was issued. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded for the correction of the judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel Lee Draper v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur with the results reached in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree with the majority view of the timeliness of the petition for a writ of error coram nobis. I do not believe the Petitioner’s mistaken filing of a second post-conviction petition, not provided by law, tolled the time within which a coram nobis petition was to be filed. The Petitioner’s ignorance of the proper action to take does not warrant a due process tolling of the statute of limitations in this case. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel Lee Draper v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Daniel Lee Draper, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the court should have appointed counsel and afforded him an evidentiary hearing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James William Taylor, A/K/A Lutfi Shafq Talal v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, James William Taylor, also known as Lutfi Shafq Talal, was convicted in the Williamson County Circuit Court of felony murder, robbery, and second degree burglary. He was subsequently sentenced to consecutive sentences of life, fifteen years, and fifteen years for the respective convictions. In this appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for nunc pro tunc to consolidate prior offenses. Because such an order is not subject to an appeal as of right under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the petitioner’s appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Melvin Shorty
The Defendant-Appellee, Melvin Shorty was convicted by a Shelby County jury of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. Several months prior to trial the State filed a notice to seek enhanced punishment listing two of Shorty’s prior Tennessee felony convictions. The day before sentencing, the State amended their notice to seek enhanced punishment by adding two prior Wisconsin felony convictions. The trial court determined that the amended notice failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202, and sentenced Shorty as a Range I, standard offender to four years in a workhouse. In this appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in sentencing Shorty as a Range I, standard offender, rather than a Range II, multiple offender because the original notice was sufficient to alert Shorty that they intended to seek enhanced punishment, and that Shorty has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the amended notice. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Shermaine Lillard
Defendant, Phillip Shermaine Lillard, was convicted of first degree felony murder and received a life sentence. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in not charging the jury concerning his prior criminal convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Waylon Hanson
Defendant, William Waylon Hanson, was indicted for one count of violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, Tenn. Code Ann. section 55-10-616. Defendant entered a no contest plea to the charge and was sentenced by agreement to serve two years to be suspended on probation after 90 days. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether Defendant could have been convicted of driving in violation of the Act more than three years after the order was entered declaring him to be an habitual offender. After reviewing the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Clilon Bates
A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, David Clilon Bates, of aggravated rape and assault, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred when it set the length of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary Wayne Bell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gary Wayne Bell, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his “motion” for post-conviction relief. The State has moved to have this court summarily affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the record demonstrates that the “motion” was filed outside the statute of limitations applicable to petitions for post-conviction relief, we grant the motion and affirm the order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 20. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel Livingston v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Daniel Livingston, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. The petitioner entered a guilty plea to one count of facilitation of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class D felony, in exchange for a six-year sentence, to be served as a Range I, standard offender at thirty percent. The court ordered the sentence to be served consecutive to a sentence imposed following a parole violation. On appeal, he argues that his sentence is illegal. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Latisha Jones v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Latisha Jones, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. She was convicted of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, both Class A felonies. She was sentenced to life for the murder conviction and to twenty-three years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, with the sentences set to run consecutively. On appeal, she argues that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. After careful review, we affirm the denial of relief by the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mike Settle v. David Mills, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his sentences were imposed in violation of the Interstate Compact on Detainers. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lisa Renea Smith
Appellant, Lisa Renea Smith, was engaged in a custody dispute over her daughter but allowed to visit her pursuant to a Knox County Juvenile Court order. After one such visit, she refused to return her child and instead took her to Atlanta. The juvenile court held a hearing and found Appellant in contempt for violating the visitation order. Appellant was later indicted in the instant case for violating the custodial interference statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-306. After an unsuccessful motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy protections, she pled guilty to a Class A misdemeanor but preserved the double jeopardy issue for appeal. Upon review, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Curtis Adkins
The Defendant, Jimmy Curtis Adkins, was found guilty by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a class D felony, and initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-433, -435 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to six years’ and fourteen years’ confinement, respectively, to be served concurrently but consecutively to the Defendant’s convictions in Georgia. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, and (3) the trial court erred during sentencing by considering prior convictions that were not proven by certified copies of the convictions and by considering enhancement factors that were not submitted to the jury. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Scott Reynolds
A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Larry Scott Reynolds, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court improperly excluded evidence from Karla Teutsch, whom he alleges was a legitimate suspect in this murder investigation; (3) the trial court improperly admitted a statement by the victim as an excited utterance; (4) a question by a juror pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.1 violated his right to an impartial jury and that such questioning is unconstitutional; (5) the trial court erred when it failed to provide the jury with a curative instruction about people crying in the courtroom during the trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeff Carter
The Defendant, Jeff Carter, was charged with one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522(b). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than thirteen years old, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504(b). In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to use the doctrine of election to offer proof of prior bad acts, after the State had provided a bill of particulars describing one particular incident and repeatedly said that it intended on electing that incident; (2) the trial court did not follow the procedures mandated in Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear about prior bad acts that occurred outside the time frame of the indictment; (4) the evidence at trial was insufficient because there was no evidence offered to support the time frame stated in the indictment; (5) the trial court erroneously allowed three witnesses to testify that the Defendant had confessed to them, without finding whether the alleged confessions pertained to the charged crime or prior bad acts; and (6) the trial court’s failure to give a specific unanimity instruction was reversible error. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did commit reversible error when it allowed testimony of other bad acts and three irrelevant admissions of guilt that the Defendant allegedly made. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aaron Williams v. State of Tennessee
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Aaron Williams, pled guilty to four counts of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of forty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends: (1) his conviction was based on a coerced confession; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steve Wallace v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Steve Wallace, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief attacking his 1986 convictions for second degree burglary and aggravated assault. The Petitioner alleged, among other things, that his judgments of conviction were void because ineffective assistance of trial counsel led him to enter a guilty plea which was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for seeking habeas corpus relief and, furthermore, that he did not state a cognizable claim for relief. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the order summarily dismissing the petition. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Perdido Cook v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Perdido Cook, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After being convicted of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery, he was sentenced to an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate and prepare for his case. After careful review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John N. Moffitt
The pro se defendant, John N. Moffitt, was convicted of one count of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation after seven days of incarceration. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred when it allowed an officer to commit perjury and in refusing the defendant’s request to play the surveillance disc from the hospital. He also argues that it was error for the State laboratory to destroy his blood sample before he filed a motion for independent testing. After review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Montgomery Koons
The Defendant, Montgomery Koons, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-506(c) (2010). He was sentenced to four years each for the first count and second count as a Range I standard offender and six years for the third count as a Range II standard offender, with all sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered the defendant to serve one year of incarceration and five years of probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court denied his due process right of compulsory process when it quashed his subpoena for the minor victim to testify at the sentencing hearing, (2) the trial judge abused his discretion by declining to recuse himself from the sentencing hearing, (3) the trial court erred by denying his application for diversion based on an erroneous application for certification of eligibility, (4) the trial court erred by denying him full probation, and (5) the trial court erred by entering a Probation Order for six years of probation after one year of incarceration. Because the defendant was denied his due process right to compulsory process at the sentencing hearing and because the denial of judicial diversion was based on an inadvertently submitted preliminary draft of the application, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new hearing, at which the trial court shall consider judicial diversion and if diversion is denied, the manner of service of the defendant’s sentences. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Samuel Jacob Webb
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Samuel Jacob Webb, pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that he understood that he would be placed on parole for his eight-year sentence and returned to federal custody to serve his federal sentence for another charge. The trial court denied relief after a hearing, and the Defendant now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin M. Frierson
A Davidson County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Kevin M. Frierson, for possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him, which was discovered on the Defendant’s person and seized by a police officer who had stopped a vehicle in which the Defendant was a passenger. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Defendant pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of a schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver, but reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the search of the Defendant was constitutional. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |
