State of Tennessee v. Ronald L. Carroll and John Boyde Collett
Appellants Ronald L. Carroll and John Boyde Collett stand convicted of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Appellant Carroll to serve fifteen years as a violent offender and sentenced Appellant Collett to serve seventeen years as a violent offender. On appeal, the appellants argue that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for especially aggravated robbery; (2) the victim’s coaching of an essential witness should have resulted in a mistrial; and (3) the prosecutor violated the appellants’ right to remain silent during closing arguments. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Claiborne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Allen Brimmer v. David Sexton, Warden
The petitioner, David Allen Brimmer, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief challenging the validity of his 1999 aggravated kidnapping conviction and resulting sentence of 60 years as a violent offender. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tommy Joe Owens v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Tommy Joe Owens, appeals the Campbell County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child neglect and resulting effective twenty-five year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frederick Parks v. State of Tennessee
In 2000, the Petitioner, Frederick Parks, pled guilty to one count of escape. The trial court sentenced him to one year in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a prior six-year sentence as well as any other prior sentences. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. State v. Frederick Parks, No. W1999-01357-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1672341, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 27, 2000), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed. In 2012, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which was dismissed. This Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition on appeal. Frederick Parks v. Cherry Lindamood, No. W2013-00361-CCA-R3-HC, 2013 WL 6529307, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 10, 2013), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed. In 2013, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he presented multiple claims, including that his guilty plea to the escape charge had been illegally induced by the prosecutor. After a hearing, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the coram nobis court erred when it dismissed his petition, contending that the newly discovered evidence warrants a waiver of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Reuben Hickok Fairfield v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Reuben Hickok Fairfield, pled guilty to second degree murder and tampering with evidence, and he agreed to concurrent sentences of thirty-five years, at 100 percent, for the second degree murder conviction and to six years, at 30 percent, for the tampering with evidence conviction. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because his counsel was ineffective and his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err when it dismissed the petition. The post-conviction court’s judgment is, therefore, affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Allen v. State of Tennessee
Following a jury trial in 2008, Petitioner, Kenneth Allen, was ultimately convicted of two Class B felony cocaine offenses and two Class C felony cocaine offenses. He was sentenced to serve an effective sentence of thirty years as a career offender. The trial court ordered the effective thirty-year sentence to be served consecutively to an unrelated sentence of ten years for additional drug convictions for which his probation had been revoked. See State v. Kenneth Gregory Allen, No. M2009-00070-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2010). Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition attacking his 2008 convictions. After an evidentiary hearing the trial court denied relief. Petitioner has appealed arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Henry Wayne Russell
A Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Henry Wayne Russell, charging him in Counts One, Three, and Five with rape; and in Counts Two, Four, and Six with statutory rape by an authority figure. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty as charged in the indictment. The trial court merged the convictions in Count Two with Count One; Count Four with Count Three; and Count Six with Count Five. The trial court imposed a sentence of fifteen years for each count of rape as a Range II offender for a total effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for statutory rape by an authority figure; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion under Tenn. Rule Evid. 412 to allow evidence of C.L.’s sexual behavior; (3) the trial court erred by advising Defendant that the State would be permitted to cross-examine him concerning his prior felony drug convictions; (4) the trial court erred by allowing a forensic social worker to testify concerning the victim’s medical history; (5) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted rape; and (6) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Newton
The Defendant, Jeffery Newton, was convicted by a Marion County Circuit Court jury of attempt to commit aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years and nine months with thirty days to serve in confinement and the remainder to serve on probation. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the indictment, (3) the trial court erred during jury instructions, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lorenzo Spencer
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Lorenzo Spencer, was convicted of aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code. Ann. § 34-14-403. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to a ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cameron Winselle v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Cameron Winselle, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. However, this court is without jurisdiction in this case because the Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117(c). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Rodney Butler v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Christopher Rodney Butler, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. More specifically he contends that (1) trial counsel failed to “solicit” the testimony of Albert Sweat; (2) trial counsel failed to depose the State’s witnesses prior to trial; and (3) trial counsel failed to obtain video surveillance footage from the cameras at the “Mix Factory in Jackson, Tennessee showing that he had been approached by a young black man, who drove him to the purported crime scene.” After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Churchman
The defendant was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide, first degree (felony) murder and two counts of facilitation of attempted first degree murder. These convictions all sprang from an incident in which shots were fired at three men in a car during an attempted robbery. To establish the defendant’s identity as the murderer the State introduced evidence at trial of a separate carjacking and shooting committed by the defendant and an accomplice several hours prior to the homicide. The defendant, who had pled guilty to the attempted first degree murder of the carjacking victim prior to trial on the instant charges, asserts on appeal that the two incidents were subject to mandatory joinder and that he could not be tried for the charges in the present indictment after he had pled guilty to the attempted first degree murder. He also appeals the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence of the carjacking, the trial court’s limits on cross-examination of a witnesses, the trial court’s evidentiary decisions regarding hearsay, and the trial court’s denial of a mistrial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was no error and we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Walter Ware v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Walter Ware, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald W. Damon
The Defendant, Ronald W. Damon, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-402 (2010) (aggravated robbery), 39-14-403 (aggravated burglary), 39-12-103 (2010) (criminal conspiracy). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of twenty-three years as a violent offender for each of the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, eleven years as a Range I, standard offender for aggravated robbery, nine years as a Range II, multiple offender for aggravated burglary, and seven years as a Range II, multiple offender for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (3) the court erred in allowing an eight-day break in the trial between the proof and the closing arguments, (4) the court erred in excluding the testimony of a 9-1-1 operator regarding one of the victim’s statements, (5) the court erred in admitting testimony about a letter he wrote, (6) the court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts, (7) the court erred in allowing the State to play portions of a video recording of his pretrial statement, (8) the court erred in allowing a jail inmate to testify without being subject to cross-examination about the truthfulness or falsity of his prior testimony in another matter, (9) the court erred in admitting testimony about his financial problems despite the witness’s lack of personal knowledge, (10) the court erroneously admitted evidence in his first trial that resulted in a hung jury but would have resulted in an acquittal if the evidence had not been admitted, and (11) the court erred during sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Crystle D. Rutherford v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Crystle D. Rutherford, appeals the summary dismissal of her pro se petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. In June 2010, she pled guilty to two counts of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. She is currently serving a total effective sentence of fifty years in the Department of Correction. In March 2013, the petitioner filed a pro se petition alleging multiple grounds for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner addresses only her asserted grounds for relief, and she fails to address the finding of untimeliness. Following our review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Junior P. Samuel v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Junior P. Samuel, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for relief as time-barred. The petitioner is currently serving an effective thirty-two year sentence in the Department of Correction following his convictions for five counts of rape and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure in 2008. In April 2013, the petitioner filed the instant pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition after concluding that it was filed outside the statute of limitations. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the dismissal was improper because due process required tolling the statute of limitations. Specifically, he contends that he was mislead by appellate counsel into believing that appellate counsel was continuing the appellate process following the denial of the direct appeal. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mitchell Nathaniel Scott
The defendant, Mitchell Nathaniel Scott, entered a plea of guilty to one count of aggravated child abuse. Prior to a sentencing hearing, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion because he provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate a “fair and just reason” that would justify the withdrawal of his guilty plea. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Julie Fuller aka Julie Cole
The defendant, Julie Fuller a.k.a. Julie Cole, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for correction of an illegal sentence and/or reduction of sentence. On August 9, 2012, the defendant pleaded guilty to theft of property over $10,000, a Class C felony. The defendant was sentenced as a persistent offender to serve ten years at thirty percent. On appeal, the defendant argues that her sentence was illegal and that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to modify it. Following a review of the record, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion and remand to correct the judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Newt Carter v. State of Tennessee
A Madison County jury convicted Petitioner, Newt Carter, of aggravated rape and aggravated burglary. He received an effective sentence of twenty years to be served at 100 percent incarceration for the aggravated rape to be served consecutively to five years to be served at thirty percent incarceration for the aggravated burglary. State v. Newt Carter, No. W2009-00600-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2349207, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 11, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 12, 2010). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After holding evidentiary hearings on the petition, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appeals the denial of the petition and argues that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied the petition. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Matthew Black
The Defendant, William Matthew Black, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2010). The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of nineteen years’ confinement as a violent offender. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his police statement, (3) the trial court erred by permitting the State to strike potential jurors on the basis of race, and (4) the trial court erred by failing to include aggravated assault in the jury instructions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alvin Brewer and Patrick Boyland
In this consolidated appeal, the defendants, Alvin Brewer and Patrick Boyland, stand convicted of multiple crimes in two separate cases. In case number 11-02360, defendant Brewer was convicted by a jury of two counts of false imprisonment, two counts of robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of assault. Defendant Boyland was convicted of two counts of false imprisonment, one count of robbery, one count of facilitation of robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of assault. Each received effective twenty-eight year sentences as Range II multiple offenders. In this case, both have raised the following issues for review on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to charge criminal attempt to the jury when the proof of a completed robbery was controverted and not overwhelming; (2) whether the trial court erred by improperly commenting on the evidence by referring to the home residents as “victims” in the jury charge; (3) whether there is sufficient evidence to support the convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to force the State to make an election as to the aggravated assault charge when the proof presented showed two separate assaults. Following review, we have concluded that no reversible error has been established and affirm the judgments and resulting sentences. However, the judgment for facilitation of robbery in Count 4 for defendant Boyland incorrectly indicates that he was convicted of a Class C felony. In actuality, it should reflect conviction of a D felony, and we remand for entry of a corrected judgment form. In case number 11-02361, the defendants incurred multiple convictions. Defendant Boyland was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and three counts of facilitation of aggravated assault. During the motion for new trial hearing, the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, defendant Boyland was sentenced to an effective forty-eight year sentence. Defendant Brewer was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and three counts of aggravated assault. As with defendant Boyland, the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and defendant Brewer was sentenced to an effective forty-eight year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendants argue: (1) that the employing a firearm offense is void for failure to allege a predicate felony; (2) alternatively, that the firearm conviction should be reversed because the trial court improperly instructed the jury and provided improper verdict forms; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify in violation of rule 404(b); (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (5) that the trial court erred in refusing to merge the conviction for aggravated robbery with the convictions for aggravated assault and facilitation of aggravated assault, respective to each defendant, in violation of double jeopardy protections; (6) alternatively, that if merger is not applicable, then the trial court erred in failing to compel an election for the aggravated assault and facilitation of aggravated assault; and (7) that the trial court erred in allowing Mr. Clarence Mann to testify when his name was not endorsed on the indictment. Additionally, the State raises an issue for appeal, that being that the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions of both defendants. Following review, the convictions for each defendant for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony are reversed. Moreover, we have determined that the court did erroneously refuse to merge defendant Boyland’s conviction for facilitation of aggravated assault and defendant Brewer’s conviction for aggravated assault into their respective aggravated robbery convictions. Moreover, the judgment of conviction form for defendant Brewer’s aggravated assault conviction in Count 8 fails to specify a release eligibility. Additionally, the trial court’s granting of motions for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of especially aggravated kidnapping for both defendants is reversed, and the judgments should be re-instated. As such, the case is remanded for sentencing on the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and for further proceedings and actions necessary in accordance with this opinion. The convictions and sentences are affirmed in all other respects. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Presson
A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Presson, of ten counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and eleven counts of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-five years of confinement. On direct appeal from his convictions, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it refused to admit into evidence the medical record for one of the victims; (3) the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 615 by allowing the State’s designated witness to be present during the victims’ testimony, without requiring the designated witness to testify first; (4) the State improperly used an exhibit and commented on a jury questionnaire during closing arguments, violating the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial; (5) the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the mens rea elements of the crimes; (6) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences; and (7) the trial court erred when it placed the victim’s medical records under seal and denied the Defendant the opportunity to review the records. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James H. Saint, Jr.
The petitioner, James H. Saint, Jr., was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery and was ordered to serve a sixty-six-year sentence. The petitioner brings this post-conviction action where he alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in that: (1) trial counsel failed to sufficiently inform the petitioner regarding the details of his settlement offer; (2) trial counsel failed to adequately prepare both himself and the petitioner for trial; and (3) trial counsel failed to adequately cross-examine the petitioner’s wife at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner has not established that counsel performed deficiently or that any deficiency prejudiced the petitioner. We accordingly affirm the denial of his petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alvin Brewer and Patrick Boyland
In this consolidated appeal, the defendants, Alvin Brewer and Patrick Boyland, stand convicted of multiple crimes in two separate cases. In case number 11-02360, defendant Brewer was convicted by a jury of two counts of false imprisonment, two counts of robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of assault. Defendant Boyland was convicted of two counts of false imprisonment, one count of robbery, one count of facilitation of robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of assault. Each received effective twenty-eight year sentences as Range II multiple offenders. In this case, both have raised the following issues for review on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to charge criminal attempt to the jury when the proof of a completed robbery was controverted and not overwhelming; (2) whether the trial court erred by improperly commenting on the evidence by referring to the home residents as “victims” in the jury charge; (3) whether there is sufficient evidence to support the convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to force the State to make an election as to the aggravated assault charge when the proof presented showed two separate assaults. Following review, we have concluded that no reversible error has been established and affirm the judgments and resulting sentences. However, the judgment for facilitation of robbery in Count 4 for defendant Boyland incorrectly indicates that he was convicted of a Class C felony. In actuality, it should reflect conviction of a D felony, and we remand for entry of a corrected judgment form. In case number 11-02361, the defendants incurred multiple convictions. Defendant Boyland was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and three counts of facilitation of aggravated assault. During the motion for new trial hearing, the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, defendant Boyland was sentenced to an effective forty-eight year sentence. Defendant Brewer was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and three counts of aggravated assault. As with defendant Boyland, the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and defendant Brewer was sentenced to an effective forty-eight year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendants argue: (1) that the employing a firearm offense is void for failure to allege a predicate felony; (2) alternatively, that the firearm conviction should be reversed because the trial court improperly instructed the jury and provided improper verdict forms; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify in violation of rule 404(b); (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (5) that the trial court erred in refusing to merge the conviction for aggravated robbery with the convictions for aggravated assault and facilitation of aggravated assault, respective to each defendant, in violation of double jeopardy protections; (6) alternatively, that if merger is not applicable, then the trial court erred in failing to compel an election for the aggravated assault and facilitation of aggravated assault; and (7) that the trial court erred in allowing Mr. Clarence Mann to testify when his name was not endorsed on the indictment. Additionally, the State raises an issue for appeal, that being that the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions of both defendants. Following review, the convictions for each defendant for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony are reversed. Moreover, we have determined that the court did erroneously refuse to merge defendant Boyland’s conviction for facilitation of aggravated assault and defendant Brewer’s conviction for aggravated assault into their respective aggravated robbery convictions. Moreover, the judgment of conviction form for defendant Brewer’s aggravated assault conviction in Count 8 fails to specify a release eligibility. Additionally, the trial court’s granting of motions for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of especially aggravated kidnapping for both defendants is reversed, and the judgments should be re-instated. As such, the case is remanded for sentencing on the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and for further proceedings and actions necessary in accordance with this opinion. The convictions and sentences are affirmed in all other respects. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Darnell Kendrick
The defendant, Travis Darnell Kendrick, was found to be in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation agreement and was sentenced to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the remainder of his sentence to be served in incarceration. After review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals |
